compatibilism

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Flannel Jesus
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Re: compatibilism

Post by Flannel Jesus »

Flannel Jesus wrote: Wed Feb 01, 2023 8:05 am
iambiguous wrote: Wed Feb 01, 2023 4:19 am The point some hard determinists argue is there is nothing at all that we think, feel, say or do, that we were ever able to freely opt not to.
There's a recursive nature to the proposition that you can "freely opt" to think or feel everything you think or feel, which makes the proposition itself dead in the water. Do you see the recursiveness, the infinite regress, yourself? I can explain it if you don't.
I'm gonna lay out an example, because this is important.

So, I don't necessarily disagree that you can choose how you feel or choose what you think, to some degree, but that choice is... fundamentally limited. Let me demonstrate.

So here's an internally narrated example of me making a choice to change how I feel - every choice is indicated by --:
I wake up
I feel groggy
I don't like feeling groggy
I want to change that
I know what will make me feel less groggy, a shower
-- So I choose to
-- go take a shower
<And after the shower I don't feel groggy anymore, so I chose to change how I feel>
So, here, I made a choice to go take a shower, so I changed my own feelings, right?

BUT, my choice was the direct consequences of thoughts I didn't choose. I didn't choose to think "I want to change that". I didn't choose to think "a shower will make me feel less groggy". These thoughts just happened to me. I thought them, I didn't choose to think them, the thoughts occurred to me, happened to me.

But you object, perhaps. Perhaps you say, no no, for me it was a choice to think I want to change that!

So I respond, you wanted to want to change that? Okay, so that just adds another thought to the chain of thoughts
I wake up
I feel groggy
I don't like feeling groggy
I want to want to change that
-- so I choose to think
I want to change that
I know what will make me feel less groggy, a shower
-- So I choose to
-- go take a shower
<And after the shower I don't feel groggy anymore, so I chose to change how I feel>
It's still based on a thought that you didn't choose to have, you've just moved that thought one thought further back in time. Before, you didn't choose to have the thought of "I want to change that", now the case is barely different. You chose that thought, but it's the direct consequence of a thought you didn't choose.

Let's say you object again. No, I chose that one too! You say.

So you wanted to want to want to change how you feel?

Okay, here we go again
I wake up
I feel groggy
I don't like feeling groggy
I want to want to want to change that
-- so I choose to think
I want to want to change that
-- so I choose to think
I want to change that
I know what will make me feel less groggy, a shower
-- So I choose to
-- go take a shower
<And after the shower I don't feel groggy anymore, so I chose to change how I feel>
Once again, it's just the direct consequence of thoughts that happen to you.

You can keep going, you can insist you're making an infinite sequence of choices to want to want to want to... times infinity.

But we've just woken up, we've been awake a finite amount of time. We don't have enough time to have had an infinite sequence of thoughts and choices. So eventually, it has to stop, there has to be a thought that kicked this all off that you didn't choose.

Philosophers approaching the free will problem have, for a very long time, had a problem with the infinite regress inherent in some people's view of free will.
Arthur Schopenhauer wrote:Man can do what he wills but he cannot will what he wills.
This is a problem whether determinism is true or not. Determinism neither harms nor helps this problem. Indeterminism neither harms nor helps this problem. Even dualism neither harms nor helps this problem. Whatever choice you make, eventually you can trace it to a thought that you didn't choose to have.

I'm not denying we can make choices, and I'm not denying we can choose to some extent what to feel or think, but if we do choose that, that chain of choices can't be infinite. We can't choose every thought and every feeling back for eternity, the choices started somewhere, and that means they had to start with thoughts we didn't choose.
Last edited by Flannel Jesus on Wed Feb 01, 2023 10:52 am, edited 2 times in total.
Flannel Jesus
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Re: compatibilism

Post by Flannel Jesus »

And that's where the compatibilist steps in and says, we don't need an infinite series of choices to be free. I don't have to choose to choose to choose to take a shower, it's enough for me to just choose to take a shower. The state of my being is such that I want to take a shower, I have the capacity to do that, so I choose to do it - that's all the freedom my will needs.

I don't need to will what I will, I just need to be able to do what I will.

That's sufficient.

And that's not incompatible with determinism. "The state of my being is such that I want to take a shower, I have the capacity to do that, so I choose to do it" - that's fine. Determinism doesn't say human beings don't have preferences. Determinism doesn't say human beings can't act based on their preferences.
BigMike
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Re: compatibilism

Post by BigMike »

phyllo wrote: Wed Feb 01, 2023 2:11 am
BigMike wrote: Tue Jan 31, 2023 9:38 pm
phyllo wrote: Tue Jan 31, 2023 7:16 pm
Somebody burns down your house and nothing is going to happen to them? :shock:
Moral responsibility refers to the idea that individuals are accountable for their actions and decisions, based on ethical and moral principles. This means that they have a duty to make choices that align with their moral values and that they are answerable for the consequences of their actions.

On the other hand, moral accountability is a similar concept but may place more emphasis on the accountability aspect, rather than the responsibility aspect. It suggests that individuals are held accountable for their actions regardless of whether they had control over them or not, and that they may face consequences for those actions.

So, in summary, moral responsibility emphasizes the idea of duty and obligation to act in accordance with moral principles, while moral accountability emphasizes the idea of being held accountable for one's actions, regardless of their control over them.

I think that if people had a chance to debate it and come to reasonable definitions of the terms, they might agree to use the term "moral accountability" instead of "moral responsibility", even if they don't have free will. In any case, burning down my home is a legal matter, not a moral one.
I'm not sure what was achieved by changing "moral responsibility" to "moral accountability" and "moral" to "legal".

The end result seems to be that same ... someone does something considered bad and is punished for it.

Surely that is accountability and/or responsibility.

Why can't it be considered to be "responsibility" or "accountability"?
When the Berlin Wall fell in 1989 and Eastern Europeans flooded across the borders, a local children's handball team from Romania (if I recall correctly) was invited to play a friendly match against a local handball team in Norway. When the Romanian team arrived in Norway, they had to pass through some Duty Free shops at the airport before reaching passport control.
The kids had no idea what "Duty Free" meant, but one of them knew what "Free" meant, and he spread the word. They quickly swarmed the duty-free shops, stocking up on everything from perfume to cigarettes.
This somewhat amusing incident was later covered in every local newspaper, but everyone agreed that the kids couldn't be charged with stealing because they didn't know any better.
And here is my point. Our ability to remember and learn, despite being the result of deterministic processes, is unique to animals that possess brains, as opposed to, say, billiard balls on a table. When parents and society as a whole teaches a child right from wrong, and the child demonstrates that they know right from wrong by passing tests and various examinations, and also knows that society expects them not to do wrong, they can no longer justify their future wrongdoings by claiming that they did not know or had no “choice” in the matter.
Although the child is not morally responsible, because it is still led by deterministic processes, the aim of their upbringing (that is to induce learned behavior by strengthening or growing new neuronal connections in their deterministic brains) is to make them morally accountable. The concept of "moral responsibility" thus places blame solely on the "moral character" of the child independent of external factors, whereas the concept of "moral accountability" places blame on society's ability or inability to teach children right from wrong and to instill it in them. Therefore, moral accountability is compatible with determinism while moral responsibility is not.
Flannel Jesus
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Re: compatibilism

Post by Flannel Jesus »

This idea of free will as this recursive control, this idea that you can choose what to think - but it is your thoughts that you're using to choose what to think, so did you choose those thoughts too? - creates a paradox of control.

If I can use my will to change my will, surely that's just... another part of my will making that choice. One part of my will is controlling another part of my will. But did the part that's controlling also get chosen, or am I just stuck with that?

It starts looking a lot like this fella, from one of my favourite artists:
download.jpeg
download.jpeg (13.79 KiB) Viewed 277 times
Do you really need your will to be recursive and self-referential? Or is just having one hand drawing what it wants enough?
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phyllo
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Re: compatibilism

Post by phyllo »

"freely opt" to think or feel everything you think or feel
I don't think this makes any sense even with free-will.

A person with free-will has a personality, a history of experience, specific abilities and a current environment.

He is not a blank slate. He is responding to the environment with his particular 'bias'. As soon as he does that, then he is not "freely opting". Is he?
Flannel Jesus
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Re: compatibilism

Post by Flannel Jesus »

phyllo wrote: Wed Feb 01, 2023 3:20 pm
"freely opt" to think or feel everything you think or feel
I don't think this makes any sense even with free-will.

A person with free-will has a personality, a history of experience, specific abilities and a current environment.

He is not a blank slate. He is responding to the environment with his particular 'bias'. As soon as he does that, then he is not "freely opting". Is he?
That's what I'm getting at really. You can't have an infinite regress of choice, if you follow your train of thought you have to follow it back to some things you didn't choose.
BigMike
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Re: compatibilism

Post by BigMike »

Flannel Jesus wrote: Wed Feb 01, 2023 9:21 am
Arthur Schopenhauer wrote:Man can do what he wills but he cannot will what he wills.
Maybe I should just shut up and let that error just pass in silence, just let it slip unnoticed under the carpet. After all, I agree wholeheartedly with Schopenhauer's (and millions of other people's) conclusion that free will is an illusion. But I can't.

I have a problem with Schopenhauer's claim that an action is driven by a desire to perform it. This idea is not accurate. He argues that people can do what they want, "man can do what he wills...", suggesting a model we now call "interactionist dualism"; that a mental state (M1) - that is not physical - causes an action (P1) that is physical. See illustration below.

Image

However, according to determinism, non-physical mental states cannot cause or even influence physical states. This means that your will cannot control the nerve impulses that make your muscles move to perform an action.

Returning to Schopenhauer, it would be more accurate to say that "man can will what he does...", as opposed to "man can do what he wills...". His will cannot cause physical effects. The "interactionist dualism" model describes a form of psychokinetics, which is a debunked myth.

I subscribe to the epiphenomenalist model.
Flannel Jesus
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Re: compatibilism

Post by Flannel Jesus »

BigMike wrote: Thu Feb 02, 2023 9:33 am
I have a problem with Schopenhauer's claim that an action is driven by a desire to perform it. This idea is not accurate. He argues that people can do what they want, "man can do what he wills...", suggesting a model we now call "interactionist dualism"; that a mental state (M1) - that is not physical - causes an action (P1) that is physical. See illustration below.

Image

However, according to determinism, non-physical mental states cannot cause or even influence physical states. This means that your will cannot control the nerve impulses that make your muscles move to perform an action.
Nothing in that quote by Schopenhauer necessarily implies mental states are non physical - I certainly don't believe that (even if Schopenhauer himself does). But even if they were, I don't see that any of what you said necessarily follows.
BigMike wrote: Thu Feb 02, 2023 9:33 am I subscribe to the epiphenomenalist model.
Does this mean you think consciousness has no effect whatsoever, or something else?
BigMike
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Re: compatibilism

Post by BigMike »

Flannel Jesus wrote: Thu Feb 02, 2023 9:39 am
BigMike wrote: Thu Feb 02, 2023 9:33 am I subscribe to the epiphenomenalist model.
Does this mean you think consciousness has no effect whatsoever, or something else?
That is right. Since consciousness is not a physical thing, it has no effect on physical things like the flow of nerve signals or any other physical process.
BigMike
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Re: compatibilism

Post by BigMike »

Flannel Jesus wrote: Thu Feb 02, 2023 9:39 am Nothing in that quote by Schopenhauer necessarily implies mental states are non physical - I certainly don't believe that (even if Schopenhauer himself does). But even if they were, I don't see that any of what you said necessarily follows.
Just wondering, are you saying that mental states are physical?
Flannel Jesus
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Re: compatibilism

Post by Flannel Jesus »

BigMike wrote: Thu Feb 02, 2023 10:01 am
Flannel Jesus wrote: Thu Feb 02, 2023 9:39 am Nothing in that quote by Schopenhauer necessarily implies mental states are non physical - I certainly don't believe that (even if Schopenhauer himself does). But even if they were, I don't see that any of what you said necessarily follows.
Just wondering, are you saying that mental states are physical?
I'm saying that I don't have a reason to suppose that the mind is not a direct consequence of the physical world.
Flannel Jesus
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Re: compatibilism

Post by Flannel Jesus »

BigMike wrote: Thu Feb 02, 2023 9:50 am
Flannel Jesus wrote: Thu Feb 02, 2023 9:39 am
BigMike wrote: Thu Feb 02, 2023 9:33 am I subscribe to the epiphenomenalist model.
Does this mean you think consciousness has no effect whatsoever, or something else?
That is right. Since consciousness is not a physical thing, it has no effect on physical things like the flow of nerve signals or any other physical process.
To me, this seems inherently extremely problematic. Human beings talk about and write about their conscious experiences all the time. Talking about it, writing about it, having a word for it at all - those would all be extremely coincidental if they weren't an effect of conscious experience itself.
BigMike
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Re: compatibilism

Post by BigMike »

Flannel Jesus wrote: Thu Feb 02, 2023 10:16 am
BigMike wrote: Thu Feb 02, 2023 9:50 am
Flannel Jesus wrote: Thu Feb 02, 2023 9:39 am
Does this mean you think consciousness has no effect whatsoever, or something else?
That is right. Since consciousness is not a physical thing, it has no effect on physical things like the flow of nerve signals or any other physical process.
To me, this seems inherently extremely problematic. Human beings talk about and write about their conscious experiences all the time. Talking about it, writing about it, having a word for it at all - those would all be extremely coincidental if they weren't an effect of conscious experience itself.
Well, since you think that consciousness is physical, then what I said above doesn't apply.
Flannel Jesus
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Re: compatibilism

Post by Flannel Jesus »

Ah I see.

I still don't see it as fundamentally implausible that two modes of existence could have a small surface area of bi-directional casualty with each other, which is what I suppose dualists think, right? There's a mind-realm and our physical realm, synced time-wise and having a small casual relationship with each other, apparently exclusively in the brain.

I don't think it's correct, and I don't think it actually solves any philosophical problems, but the idea of it seems on the surface at least not internally contradictory or inherently not possible.
BigMike
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Re: compatibilism

Post by BigMike »

Flannel Jesus wrote: Thu Feb 02, 2023 10:14 am
BigMike wrote: Thu Feb 02, 2023 10:01 am
Flannel Jesus wrote: Thu Feb 02, 2023 9:39 am Nothing in that quote by Schopenhauer necessarily implies mental states are non physical - I certainly don't believe that (even if Schopenhauer himself does). But even if they were, I don't see that any of what you said necessarily follows.
Just wondering, are you saying that mental states are physical?
I'm saying that I don't have a reason to suppose that the mind is not a direct consequence of the physical world.
As far as I can tell, we are in complete agreement here.
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