Your close, but you've let your extreme view turn to solipsism. It's like saying I eat, but there is only eating, there is nothing I eat. I love, but there is only the love, I don't love anything. I experience, but there is only experiene, I don't experience anything.RCSaunders wrote: ↑Tue Apr 12, 2022 12:45 pm I agree. Further, not only is there no "stuff" that we call mind, there is no physical stuff either; no brain, no anythings, only experience .
A contentless experience, an experience of, "nothing," is, "no experience." If you have an experience, that is just what everyone else means by stuff. It's only the name of actual experiences.
Do you have experiences? Are they all identical? Can you describe them? Whatever you describe as your experience, that is what everyone else means by stuff.
Of course there is only experience, but experience of nothing is no experience, and whatever the something one's experience is, that is physical existence. You don't have to call it that, just so long as you understand that's what other's mean by physical existence. When they have those experiences just like those you have called seeing, hearing, feeling, smelling, and tasting, they call the details that are seen, heard, felt etc. the actual experience, the, "stuff," they experience.
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I'm not this kind of radical phenomenalist but one could argue that what we call experience, is hallucinated into subject perception object. But really there is just this flow of experiencing. It's not that there are no objects, since the concept itself, in this belief system, is a hallucinated concretization using what are in fact not facets of experiencing, since there is no such thing. Likewise the self as experiencer. There is just this flow of experiencing. This is NOT saying that there is only mind. Since that is part of the hallucinated, or cultural, model of subject perception object. All that is actually found is this experiencing. Of course, since language is based on this assumption that reality has these parts (S;P;O) it will seem an analytic truth that when 'we' experience we experience something. It's built into the cultural assumptions or ontological assumptions in language.
I don't think we can just say 'that's wrong and we can prove it.' It's not what I believe, but I think it's 'safe' from disproof, in part because it is parsimonious. Which of course does not mean it is right. And I don't. But there are some other good working hypotheses out there, and I tend towards them.