What is time?

[jayjacobus]

This is true but relativity can be simplified from physicists' explanation and relativity requires that the characteristics of space are consistent across the whole universe. Space is a whole lot simpler than relativity and broaching relativity is a tangent that does not reveal what space is.

[Belinda]

Relativity is a new paradigm it's no tangent.

[jayjacobus]

Relativity is a new paradigm it's no tangent.

Relativity was a theory and it has been proven by empirical evidence.

A person cannot ignore relativity when theorizing about time but a person can ignore relativity when theorizing about space. You might say that space-time requires relativity but space-time is a theory that has no empirical evidence. Space-time is not a scientific theory but a philosophical premise that has yet to be proven. I still think of time and space as two independent phenomenon because the logic that supports the space-time theory is weak to say the least.

[Speakpigeon]

Still, assuming as you do that time doesn't exist, what then makes two clocks stay (broadly) synchronised? I could ask a similar question about space, of course, but maybe answering the one about time will provide an answer to the one about space. So, do you know?

Nothing makes them stay synchronized. The rate at which things move and accelerate relative to each other is determined by the physics of their nature, their mass in particular. A pendulum is the perfect example. Two pendulums of the same mass and length in the same environment (say earth) will have the same period of swing. Nothing, "makes them have the same period except their own nature. If the pendulums are part of two clocks, the clocks will be synchronized by the nature of the pendulums. There is nothing else necessary to make them stay synchronized. Does that seem reasonable to you?

Sure, and I have some sympathy for this way of looking at the problem. But "nature" seems as much metaphysical a construct as you dismiss time as being. Everything that happens can certainly be attributed to "nature", somewhat like attributing our existence to God. But you might just as well say the clocks stay synchronised because reality is what it is. True, but... Further, insisting that things accelerate and move seems to require a dimension into which to move and accelerate, a dimension we would have to call space and time. Further, if time doesn't exist, how come we have this impression of being at a particular point in time. If time doesn't exist, why is it I am conscious of only one moment at a time?
EB

[RCSaunders]

Still, assuming as you do that time doesn't exist, what then makes two clocks stay (broadly) synchronised? I could ask a similar question about space, of course, but maybe answering the one about time will provide an answer to the one about space. So, do you know?

Nothing makes them stay synchronized. The rate at which things move and accelerate relative to each other is determined by the physics of their nature, their mass in particular. A pendulum is the perfect example. Two pendulums of the same mass and length in the same environment (say earth) will have the same period of swing. Nothing, "makes them have the same period except their own nature. If the pendulums are part of two clocks, the clocks will be synchronized by the nature of the pendulums. There is nothing else necessary to make them stay synchronized. Does that seem reasonable to you?

Sure, and I have some sympathy for this way of looking at the problem. But "nature" seems as much metaphysical a construct as you dismiss time as being. Everything that happens can certainly be attributed to "nature", somewhat like attributing our existence to God. But you might just as well say the clocks stay synchronised because reality is what it is. True, but... Further, insisting that things accelerate and move seems to require a dimension into which to move and accelerate, a dimension we would have to call space and time. Further, if time doesn't exist, how come we have this impression of being at a particular point in time. If time doesn't exist, why is it I am conscious of only one moment at a time?
EB

By, "nature," I do not mean nature as a synonym for reality or metaphysics, I mean the attributes and characteristics of an existent that identify what it is. It is the mass of a pendulum, and the physical principle of acceleration, and mechanics of a lever that determine a pendulum's period. It is not saying reality is what it is (which is true), it is describing a particular aspect of that reality, the nature (attributes and characteristics) of a pendulum in the context of a constant mass, e.g. earth.

There is one other thing I better explain. Time does not exist as a thing, an entity, or a substance. Time does exist as one of the relationships between motions, the other being speed. (There is no velocity unless there is acceleration) But time does not exist independently of the motion it is a metric of. Time only exists as an attribute, a relative attribute. Just as size or color or temperature do not exist independently of those things that have size or color or temperature as attributes (there are no wild sizes or colors running around) there is no time without motion.

Your consciousness is the continuous perception of all the is made available to be perceived by the neurological system. Your immediate consciousness is of whatever is currently being perceived. For most animals that is all that they can be conscious of and the question of "why is it I am conscious of only one moment at a time?" never comes up. But you have a memory which you can volitional call on to know there is a past and a future. Your consciousness is not one moment at time, you are conscious of whatever presently exists that can be perceived. It does not change, moment to moment, like the frames of a cinema, it is continuous.

[Skepdick]

By, "nature," I do not mean nature as a synonym for reality or metaphysics, I mean the attributes and characteristics of an existent that identify what it is.

How do you deal with the inherent uncertainty in complementarity then?

The attributes/characteristics which define an existent cannot all be measured/known at the same time.

[RCSaunders]

The attributes/characteristics which define an existent cannot all be measured/known at the same time.

First, a thing's attributes and characteristics do not, "define," an existent (which is an epistemological function), a thing's attributes and characteristics are what it is, and in order to identify anything it is that thing's attributes and characteristics that must be discovered and identified.

I think you are confusing what a thing is, metaphysically, (which it is whether anyone knows it is exists or has the nature it has or not), with how we know that it exists and what its nature is. There is no reason that a thing's attributes and characteristics must be discovered simultaneously to know what they are?

Finally, I suppose I must say something about complementarity. Some examples are: position and momentum, energy and duration, spin on different axes (which is actually not a good example), etc. None of these are inherent attributes, they are all relationships, descriptions of behavior or a things relationships. It is true that a thing's behavior and what relationships are possible to it are determined by it's own nature (attributes and characteristics) in a given context, but they are all dependent on a thing's actual nature. Once I have identified what an apple is, it does not matter if it is still hanging on a tree, is half-eaten, is fresh, or rotting, it is still an apple.

[Skepdick]

First, a thing's attributes and characteristics do not, "define," an existent (which is an epistemological function), a thing's attributes and characteristics are what it is, and in order to identify anything it is that thing's attributes and characteristics that must be discovered and identified.

I think you are confusing what a thing is, metaphysically, (which it is whether anyone knows it is exists or has the nature it has or not), with how we know that it exists and what its nature is. There is no reason that a thing's attributes and characteristics must be discovered simultaneously to know what they are?

Finally, I suppose I must say something about complementarity. Some examples are: position and momentum, energy and duration, spin on different axes (which is actually not a good example), etc. None of these are inherent attributes, they are all relationships, descriptions of behavior or a things relationships. It is true that a thing's behavior and what relationships are possible to it are determined by it's own nature (attributes and characteristics) in a given context, but they are all dependent on a thing's actual nature.

This entire post is one massive error. It's beyond rescue.

On the one hand you speak about attributes being the identity of a thing (implying a Kantian thing-in-itself), and in the very next paragraph you reject momentum, spin, mass, charge, coherence etc as being 'inherent' to things.

According to you a thing's mass depends on its nature. You reject physics and speak about noumena and knowing the nature of things, while you accusing me of metaphysical errors.

Once I have identified what an apple is, it does not matter if it is still hanging on a tree, is half-eaten, is fresh, or rotting, it is still an apple.

You are confusing nature with essence.

[RCSaunders]

On the one hand you speak about attributes being the identity of a thing (implying a Kantian thing-in-itself), ... and in the very next paragraph you reject momentum, spin, mass, charge, coherence etc as being 'inherent' to things.

A thing is whatever it's attributes are. Do you think a thing's attributes are one thing and the thing, itself, something else?

I do not care if you want to attribute things to me that are not true but just to clarify what I mean, I have no use for Kant whose ideas I regard as the worst in philosophy after Hume. To say a thing is whatever its attributes are only means that any existent, to be an existent, must have some nature and whatever that nature is, that is what the thing is. The attributes only describe that nature.

...and in the very next paragraph you reject momentum, spin, mass, charge, coherence etc as being 'inherent' to things.

I only mentioned position, momentum, energy, duration, and spin, but that's right, momentum, spin, and none of the others I mentioned are inherent in a thing. A thing's mass is inherent because it is one of a things attributes, but its momentum is a function of motion, normally written, p = mv, momentum equals the mass times velocity. A thing would be the same thing if it were not moving at all. Of course energy is also a function of motion, E = 1/2 m X V^2, kenetic energy equals one half he mass times the velocity squared. Again a thing would be the same thing no matter how little or much energy it had. It is also true of spin; whether spinning or not a thing is the same thing. An entity's mass, size, density, physical structure, state at a specific temperature and pressure (gas, liquid, solid), are inherent attributes.

According to you a thing's mass depends on its nature.

No. According to me a thing's mass is one of a thing's attributes.

You reject physics and speak about
noumena and knowing the nature of things, while you accusing me of metaphysical errors.

I have certainly never said anything that is a rejection of physics, or any science including chemistry and biology. I do reject a great deal of nonsense those claiming to be scientists say, but I do not reject science at all. Within the realm of the physical it is the only means to knowledge about existence.

I still think you confused the ontological nature of existents with epistemological knowledge of that nature. It's not an accusation, it's just an observation. I'm not judging you. If possible I would like you to understand why I hold the views I do. You don't have to agree, and where you don't, if you could provide specific criticisms of my reasoning, it could be helpful, but not generalities that label my views as derived from some crackpot philosopher.

Once I have identified what an apple is, it does not matter if it is still hanging on a tree, is half-eaten, is fresh, or rotting, it is still an apple.

You are confusing nature with essence.

I do not use the word essence only because it is philosophically loaded and smacks of Platonic realism. Nevertheless universal concepts do identify classes and categories of existents that have the same necessary attributes that make them the kind of things they are. In that sense, an apple is an apple, epistemologically, because it has the same necessary attributes as all apples identified by the universal concept, "apple;" but that is only true because apples, ontologically, have those attributes.
[/quote]

[jayjacobus]

I'm not judging you. If possible I would like you to understand why I hold the views I do. You don't have to agree, and where you don't, if you could provide specific criticisms of my reasoning, it could be helpful, but not generalities that label my views as derived from some crackpot philosopher.

Okay. Your reasoning is not relevant to time. That may not be the only critism but it is the most relevant criticism.

[Skepdick]

A thing is whatever it's attributes are. Do you think a thing's attributes are one thing and the thing, itself, something else?

I have no idea. I know nothing about "things in themselves". All I know about the phenomena I experience stops with the fallibility of my knowledge which is always susceptible to Type I and Type II errors.

I do not care if you want to attribute things to me that are not true but just to clarify what I mean, I have no use for Kant whose ideas I regard as the worst in philosophy after Hume. To say a thing is whatever its attributes are only means that any existent, to be an existent, must have some nature and whatever that nature is, that is what the thing is. The attributes only describe that nature.

But you also said that a different set of attributes a different thing makes, so if say that one apple is green, and another apple is red but they are both apples then you are quite literally doing the exact opposite of what you are saying.

You are ignoring the differences in color, taste, shape and whatever else for the sake of the similarities. You are talking about essence.
It begs a question: Do things have essence, or do concepts have essence?

How much of an apple (be it the concept or an actual thing) would you have to take away before it stops being an apple?

An entity's mass, size, density, physical structure, state at a specific temperature and pressure (gas, liquid, solid), are inherent attributes.

No. According to me a thing's mass is one of a thing's attributes.

But you said "a thing is whatever its attributes are" right at the beginning of this post! You also said "The attributes only describe that nature.".

So do you or do you not know what the nature of a particular thing is? I would assume you do, else how would you describe it?

I have certainly never said anything that is a rejection of physics, or any science including chemistry and biology. I do reject a great deal of nonsense those claiming to be scientists say, but I do not reject science at all. Within the realm of the physical it is the only means to knowledge about existence.

Ok, then you have to make up your mind here. Science does not and will not tell us what a thing's nature is. Science can only tell us what a thing does.

I do not use the word essence only because it is philosophically loaded and smacks of Platonic realism.

The concept you are describing is essence (as a phenomenologist or a Platonist might call it), or a noumenon (as a Kantian would call it), or "nature" as - you would call it.

It's a distinction born out of dualism. The "map vs territory" metaphor is the modern version of the same conclusion.
There are facts that are known (explained phenomena) and there are facts to be known (unexplained noumena).

But even that distinction begs a question: what is an explanation?

Nevertheless universal concepts do identify classes and categories of existents that have the same necessary attributes that make them the kind of things they are. In that sense, an apple is an apple, epistemologically, because it has the same necessary attributes as all apples identified by the universal concept, "apple;" but that is only true because apples, ontologically, have those attributes.

Hence the problem I point out. In order to create the category "apple" you have necessarily had to ignore differences between apples and only focus on their similarities. This is the process of abstraction at play. It is also the root-cause of logical incompleteness. Omission of detail.

Abstraction is the elimination of the irrelevant and the amplification of the essential so when one is busy abstracting, one might as well be saying "the differences are inconsequential".

[RCSaunders]

I know nothing about "things in themselves". All I know about the phenomena I experience ...

What phenomena you experience? How can you know anything about it if is not a thing (if it is nothing). (I have no idea what, "thing in itself," is supposed to mean. Is there such a thing as a, "thing outside itself."

But you also said that a different set of attributes a different thing makes, so if say that one apple is green, and another apple is red but they are both apples then you are quite literally doing the exact opposite of what you are saying.

You are ignoring the differences in color, taste, shape and whatever else for the sake of the similarities.

You are talking about essence.

There is no God of epistemology that says you must use a certain word for a concept. If you want to use the word essence, that's fine, so long as you do not raise that concept to the level of some mystic substance that inheres in things.

Do things have essence, or do concepts have essence?

You tell me. I do not use that word just because it smacks of mysticism, suggesting there is some mysterious property called essence that makes things what they are.

How much of an apple (be it the concept or an actual thing) would you have to take away before it stops being an apple?

A thing's attributes are not something added to or taken away from it. Whatever a thing is its attributes are what it is. Metaphysically a thing is all its attributes. Epistemologically, a thing is all of its attributes that are necessary to identify it, i.e., to define it if it is a particular concept, or all the attributes that a thing has in common with all other of the same kind of thing, if it is a universal concept.

An entity's mass, size, density, physical structure, state at a specific temperature and pressure (gas, liquid, solid), are inherent attributes.

No. According to me a thing's mass is one of a thing's attributes.

But you said "a thing is whatever its attributes are" right at the beginning of this post! You also said "The attributes only describe that nature.".

So do you or do you not know what the nature of a particular thing is? I would assume you do, else how would you describe it?

I'm not sure I understand the question. A thing's nature is determined by its attributes. If I know what those attributes are, of course I know what its nature is. I don't see the problem here.

I have certainly never said anything that is a rejection of physics, or any science including chemistry and biology. I do reject a great deal of nonsense those claiming to be scientists say, but I do not reject science at all. Within the realm of the physical it is the only means to knowledge about existence.

Ok, then you have to make up your mind here. Science does not and will not tell us what a thing's nature is. Science can only tell us what a thing does.

That is not true, but even if it were, then it would have to be that a thing is whatever does such'n'such. If a thing's only attributes were it's behavior that would be what it is. But of course things have many other attributes other than their behavior. They have size, shape, and if things that can be perceived, all the perceptual qualities. I know that things like temperature, energy, etc. can be reduced to action, but all action can be described as motion. Before a thing can have motion as an attribute, it must have position as an attribute, because motion is change of position.

I'll make one other statement without argument which I'm sure you will not agree with. What anything does is determined entirely by its own nature in any particular context. It is what a thing is that determines what it does. Place a pool ball on a pool table and strike it with the another pool ball. The behavior of the struck ball is determined by the fact it is a pool ball. Replace the pool ball with an egg and strike it with a pool ball. The behavior will be entirely different because the egg has a different nature than a pool ball.

I've already addressed your other comments.

Randy

[Belinda]

RCSaunders wrote:

A thing's attributes are not something added to or taken away from it. Whatever a thing is its attributes are what it is. Metaphysically a thing is all its attributes. Epistemologically, a thing is all of its attributes that are necessary to identify it, i.e., to define it if it is a particular concept, or all the attributes that a thing has in common with all other of the same kind of thing, if it is a universal concept.

Your culture of belief attributes phenomena so that any given set of phenomena seem to clump together to form an entity. It's impossible for you or anybody to conceptualise beyond your culture of belief. But what you can do is know that you are encultured and embodied. It's one thing to be powerless and another to be powerless and not know it.

[Skepdick]

What phenomena you experience?

All of them.

How can you know anything about it if is not a thing (if it is nothing). (I have no idea what, "thing in itself," is supposed to mean. Is there such a thing as a, "thing outside itself."

Observe that all you have done is you have re-labelled "phenomenon" into "thing". You've assigned a new label to the concept, but you've told me nothing about the concept itself.

There is no God of epistemology that says you must use a certain word for a concept. If you want to use the word essence, that's fine, so long as you do not raise that concept to the level of some mystic substance that inheres in things.

I would've thought epistemology requires no words at all? I don't need to know the name of something in order to be able to reason about it, know things about it. Predict its behaviour.

As I demonstrated above - you can associate multiple words to the same concept. Labels are not knowledge.

A thing's attributes are not something added to or taken away from it. Whatever a thing is its attributes are what it is. Metaphysically a thing is all its attributes. Epistemologically, a thing is all of its attributes that are necessary to identify it, i.e., to define it if it is a particular concept, or all the attributes that a thing has in common with all other of the same kind of thing, if it is a universal concept.

You are beating around the bush here. You say nothing about classification/identification errors. e.g mistaking one thing for another.

I'm not sure I understand the question. A thing's nature is determined by its attributes. If I know what those attributes are, of course I know what its nature is. I don't see the problem here.

How would you ever know if your knowledge of those attributes is complete?
And if you can never know that - how would you ever be certain that you aren't making an identification/classification error?

I'll make one other statement without argument which I'm sure you will not agree with. What anything does is determined entirely by its own nature in any particular context. It is what a thing is that determines what it does. Place a pool ball on a pool table and strike it with the another pool ball. The behavior of the struck ball is determined by the fact it is a pool ball. Replace the pool ball with an egg and strike it with a pool ball. The behavior will be entirely different because the egg has a different nature than a pool ball.

Indeed. A reductionist tautology. Ignores all systemic interactions between the various components of the system.

But this catches my curiosity: It is what a thing is that determines what it does.
I would've said the exact opposite: It's what a thing does that determines what it is.

If a thing didn't DO anything it cannot be the cause of any observed phenomena. There would be no effect to be measured - no way for me to know that the thing even exists.

And I'll close off with this simple claim. All that you say about anything pertaining to knowledge, ontology or metaphysics is worthless, if you cannot put it to practice. So lets see if you can practice what you preach.

I give you two phenomena: A and А.
Can it be said that A is the same phenomenon as А?

A simple yes/no answer would suffice.

[RCSaunders]

RCSaunders wrote:

A thing's attributes are not something added to or taken away from it. Whatever a thing is its attributes are what it is. Metaphysically a thing is all its attributes. Epistemologically, a thing is all of its attributes that are necessary to identify it, i.e., to define it if it is a particular concept, or all the attributes that a thing has in common with all other of the same kind of thing, if it is a universal concept.

Your culture of belief attributes phenomena so that any given set of phenomena seem to clump together to form an entity. It's impossible for you or anybody to conceptualise beyond your culture of belief. But what you can do is know that you are encultured and embodied. It's one thing to be powerless and another to be powerless and not know it.

If you can find in the teaching of any culture or ideology or religion or society what I wrote above I'd greatly appreciate it. I have searched all my life for even one individual expresses the precise view I described. The closest I have ever found is in the writing of Peter Abelard. I didn't learn it from anyone else, much less some, "culture," or some mystic religion or some inane philosophy.

I think that is actually what you dislike about my views. You know they require someone to think for themselves to understand them, that there is no authority or guru or expert one can depend on instead of using their own mind.

When one comes to the end of their ability to reason they begin to accuse others of having wrong beliefs without addressing the contents of those beliefs.

If you think what I wrote is wrong, tell me what's wrong with it, not that I hold it because it comes from the wrong source.