Metaphysics cannot but contradict itself

[Angelo Cannata]

Metaphysics can be considered as a method of thinking that believes it can identify universal truths that are independent from us. For example, if I say that the moon exists, from a metaphysical point of view I can think of having identified a truth (the moon really exists) that is universal (that the moon exists is a universally valid fact) independent from us (the moon exists even when I do not think about it, so much so that others tell me that they saw it even when I did not think about it, so the moon is not a product of my thought, it's not a dream of mine).

Let us now examine better what this universality consists of. Universality can be considered almost synonymous with totality. I can think of having described a universal knowledge if I have taken into account all the essential components involved in that process of knowledge. In the case of the moon, for example, I have taken into account it, me (its existence is independent from me), others (they told me that they saw it even when I did not think about it).

Crucial question: but are we sure that we really took into account all the components, at least the most important ones, involved in knowledge?

The answer is no, because, if we think well about it, we have omitted the subject, that is ourselves, those who think, I have omitted myself.

It seems that the subject was taken into consideration, when I spoke of existence independent from myself, an independence confirmed by what others told me, but there is a gap, an overlooked point. This overlooked point consists in the involvement of the subject in all the moments of verifying the truth, especially in the last one, that is when I ask others and they tell me that they saw the moon even when I did not think about it. In this last phase we forgot to take into account the fact that the opinion of others is still subject to interpretation, both by me and by others who expressed it. There is therefore a plural involvement of subjects: myself and others. These are components that, for a knowledge that wants to be universal, we cannot afford to ignore.

In short: any thought that wants to be called universal, in order to be called as such, must take into account the involvement of the subject, otherwise it will only be a partial, incomplete thought, missing the consideration of the subject.

The problem is that, when I, in order to make my thought truly universal, all-encompassing, decide to take into account the involvement of the subject, it is as if I were hosting a viper, it is like letting a virus enter, which ultimately denies the universality of such thought, because it forces us to take note that it is polluted by the interpretation given by me, the subject.

In short, it turns out that a thought that wants to be truly universal cannot but conclude that it is not universal.

Said in even more lapidary forms:

if a thought is universal, then it is not universal.

If something is true, it follows that it is not true.

If being is, it is not.

[Impenitent]

momentarily

-Imp

[Atla]

Metaphysics can be considered as a method of thinking that believes it can identify universal truths that are independent from us.

Are you sure? Isn't it basic metaphysics that we can't identify universal truths, we can only try to come up with the best guess?

[Angelo Cannata]

Metaphysics can have a lot of meanings, even contradictory or opposite meanings, so that it could be even impossible to talk about it, due to this abundance of meanings.
Among all those meanings, I assume the one that I described in my post.

[Eodnhoj7]

Metaphysics can be considered as a method of thinking that believes it can identify universal truths that are independent from us. For example, if I say that the moon exists, from a metaphysical point of view I can think of having identified a truth (the moon really exists) that is universal (that the moon exists is a universally valid fact) independent from us (the moon exists even when I do not think about it, so much so that others tell me that they saw it even when I did not think about it, so the moon is not a product of my thought, it's not a dream of mine).

Let us now examine better what this universality consists of. Universality can be considered almost synonymous with totality. I can think of having described a universal knowledge if I have taken into account all the essential components involved in that process of knowledge. In the case of the moon, for example, I have taken into account it, me (its existence is independent from me), others (they told me that they saw it even when I did not think about it).

Crucial question: but are we sure that we really took into account all the components, at least the most important ones, involved in knowledge?

The answer is no, because, if we think well about it, we have omitted the subject, that is ourselves, those who think, I have omitted myself.

It seems that the subject was taken into consideration, when I spoke of existence independent from myself, an independence confirmed by what others told me, but there is a gap, an overlooked point. This overlooked point consists in the involvement of the subject in all the moments of verifying the truth, especially in the last one, that is when I ask others and they tell me that they saw the moon even when I did not think about it. In this last phase we forgot to take into account the fact that the opinion of others is still subject to interpretation, both by me and by others who expressed it. There is therefore a plural involvement of subjects: myself and others. These are components that, for a knowledge that wants to be universal, we cannot afford to ignore.

In short: any thought that wants to be called universal, in order to be called as such, must take into account the involvement of the subject, otherwise it will only be a partial, incomplete thought, missing the consideration of the subject.

The problem is that, when I, in order to make my thought truly universal, all-encompassing, decide to take into account the involvement of the subject, it is as if I were hosting a viper, it is like letting a virus enter, which ultimately denies the universality of such thought, because it forces us to take note that it is polluted by the interpretation given by me, the subject.

In short, it turns out that a thought that wants to be truly universal cannot but conclude that it is not universal.

Said in even more lapidary forms:

if a thought is universal, then it is not universal.

If something is true, it follows that it is not true.

If being is, it is not.

So metaphysics contradicts itself, but metaphysics is required to observe this contradiction of metaphysics? If this is the case, a contradiction is merely an observation of deficiency, with this deficiency necessitating a "being" by default...in this case metaphysics. In these respects metaphysics is not only necessary but unavoidable.

[Angelo Cannata]

I agree: metaphysics appears to be a not only necessary but unavoidable contradiction.

[Eodnhoj7]

I agree: metaphysics appears to be a not only necessary but unavoidable contradiction.

Metaphysics however is not a contradiction if contradiction necessitates a metaphysics. Metaphysics can only be deemed as "incomplete", but this incompletion implies a necessity in being considering metaphysics is requires to observe metaphysics.

In simple terms, Metaphysics is necessary as it is evident for what it is through itself and the nature of contradiction is only justified and formed because of metaphysics.

Metaphysics in these respects, maintains itself and in a separate respect is not-contradictory as the maintenance of its own structure necessitates a rationality in its self.

Therefore:

1) Metaphysics is not-contradictory
2) Metaphysics is contradictory
3) Hence "Metaphysics" exists as its own dimension of measurement and is both the foundation and end of contradiction/non-contradiction. It maintains a third part of "neutrality" in the respect is exists for what it is as an axiom.

[Angelo Cannata]

Metaphysics however is not a contradiction if contradiction necessitates a metaphysics.

This is not true. After our discovering that metaphysics is contradictory, any conclusion based on metaphysics cannot be considered reliable. So, after reflecting on metaphysics, we encounter contradiction, but at that point we cannot be metaphysically certain about that contradiction. It is only a human experience. When I wrote that “metaphysics appears to be a not only necessary but unavoidable contradiction”, I wrote “appears to be”: it is not a metaphysical certainty, it is only an appearance, a human experience.
Discovering that metaphysics is contradictory means that we have no way to obtain absolute certainty. Even this phrase cannot be considered a certain phrase, but this does not imply that it is false: it just implies that is in doubt. Being in doubt about doubt does not grant us about any certainty: it only confirms that we are in doubt. This confirmation is an experience, a human experience, not a certainty.

[Eodnhoj7]

Metaphysics however is not a contradiction if contradiction necessitates a metaphysics.

This is not true. After our discovering that metaphysics is contradictory, any conclusion based on metaphysics cannot be considered reliable.
The problem occurs in the respect that "reliability", and its inherent nature, is dependent on a form of definition that is prerequisited in a system of metaphysics considering "reliability", as a facet or element of "being", extends through being qua being.

So, after reflecting on metaphysics, we encounter contradiction, but at that point we cannot be metaphysically certain about that contradiction.
So if metaphysics, appears to be contradictory yet in itself is uncertain of this contradiction then metaphysics does not end in contradiction as for it to appear contradictory it must be certain of this contradiction. The reason for this premise is in "being through being" fundamentally observing an inherent reflective element within metaphysics, hence metaphysics has a dual subjective and objective nature of a mirroring process which gives definition to reality through a mirroring process where symmetry, through concepts both real and abstracts, repeats itself to give structure.

Contradiction may be a limit of metaphysics, in the respect it is a deficient in structure due to an inherent element of approximation resulting in apparent randomness, but this contradiction as a "limit" does not necessitate that metaphysics is contradictory (nor appears as such) in its own right. Rather this contradiction is merely a "limit" as a deficiency.

The nature of contradiction must further be defined and observed if metaphysics is to appear contradictory, but this in itself would require metaphysics to argued against itself in one respect. This argument of "negation" would require a positive to continually negate, that being metaphysics itself, which in turn necessitates positive qualities of this very same metaphysics. In these respects we can observe Metaphysics as ordered and lacking in order at the same time in different respects, with this dualism of order and non-order providing a neutral boundary as to what metaphysics "is" and "is not"...this in itself is metaphysics. From this we may derive certain constants in metaphysics as having a trinitarian nature of:

1) Being through structure as order through the repetition of Symmetry as reflection or a mirror effect.
2) Being through negation of unified order through the relation of parts which must continually relate in order to approximate any general unified knowledge.
3) Being through unity and multiplicity where a neutral element of boundaries occurs that simultaneously unify and divide being.
a) All unity is an observation of structural extensions of one unified existence with this multiplicity being an approximation of this very same unity akin to "randomness" as a limit.
b) All multiplicity is an observation of relations conducive to change through finite parts which must continual individuation into further parts which must relate.

It is only a human experience.
Considering this "human experience" is determined by "boundaries" which give form to both subjective and objective axioms, not only is the nature of "humanity" and it's relation to reason put to question but whether metaphysics is strictly a human only condition. The reason for this, using an example on other threads, stems from the concept of a line being a universal boundary that we apply subjective and objectively at the abstract and physical level through both intuition and reason. Considering this premise boundary maintains a dual subjective and objective role when observed (as the application of line requires the line to exist as an objective entity, but that would implying this objective element to be rooted in a subjective nature and vice versa), metaphysics as "being que being" through an above argued act of reflection, has a nature which while rooted in the human condition may not be entirely limited to it except if viewed as strictly a category of study. Even as a category of study, mediated through human reason, this reason extends from universal boundaries (ie the example of the line) that in themselves are neutral elements that both compose the human condition and are neither the human condition in separate respects.

When I wrote that “metaphysics appears to be a not only necessary but unavoidable contradiction”, I wrote “appears to be”: it is not a metaphysical certainty, it is only an appearance, a human experience.

True, but looking at the nature of appearance we can derive an inherent form of symbolism that may be limited to human reason in one respect, but simultaneously acts as a connective median in another. For example a tree may be viewed as symbolic from the human perspective, but that tree as an objective reality still mediates into further phenomena (coming from and going back to dirt, air, water, etc.) much in the same manner a symbol mediates to further symbols. In these respects the symbol, as an appearance which is structure through image, acts as a subjective and objective medial point in itself and an inherent boundary of "the point" comes into question considering:

1) All microscopic views of a phenomena (it expanding) lead into a point in space.
2) All macroscopic views of a phenomena (it shrinking) lead into a point in space.
3) All medial views of a phenomena lead into a form as approximate points.

In these respects the nature of observation is prerequisite in a neutral boundary of the point whose relations, approximated by lines, form the angles that not just compose the forms but perspective itself.


Discovering that metaphysics is contradictory means that we have no way to obtain absolute certainty.
No, because we would have to be certain that metaphysics in itself is contradictory, hence a dualism of Absolute and Relative occurs with the third medial perspective being that metaphysics is the study of being que being as a neutral axiom. In these respects metaphysics expands its definition through a simultaneous linear progression and circular rational which maintains itself.

Even this phrase cannot be considered a certain phrase, but this does not imply that it is false: it just implies that is in doubt.
Yes this is true, but metaphysics as an objective science (considering all sciences are founded upon axioms which maintain a dual subjective and objective nature) does not necessitate a subjective doubt only approach unless one is to objectify doubt by doubting it. This "doubting" of "doubt" as a subjective experience mirroring a subjective experience gives an objective quality of "boundary" through which the subjective experience is mediated. This is the only approach considering what is subjectively experienced is dependent upon objective reality and vice versa. Metaphysics, in these regards, observes a universal form of reflection (maintenance of constants through infinite replication of boundaries) and relation (individuation of parts which relate through change as an approximation of this unity) which gives metaphysics its definitive axiomatic nature of "being que being" through an approximation of universal circularity expressed under the approximation of this unity by alternating linear reasoning as a synthesis of axioms.


Being in doubt about doubt does not grant us about any certainty: it only confirms that we are in doubt. This confirmation is an experience, a human experience, not a certainty.

[Eodnhoj7]

Metaphysics can have a lot of meanings, even contradictory or opposite meanings, so that it could be even impossible to talk about it, due to this abundance of meanings.
Among all those meanings, I assume the one that I described in my post.

This problem of "opposites" or "duals" observed within metaphysics can be viewed as a form of contradiction if viewed from a perspective of division where opposing polarities cause a degree of seperation. This division, as a form of possibilitic form in which "what is not" provides the "negative dimensions" through which "positive dimensions" move through and exist, simultaneously argue for the paradox as a dualism resulting in synthesis. This synthetic nature, as a joining conducive to observing definitions as unified extensions of "one" truth and approximate relative units, implies that a "contradictory" approach is in itself is irrational as it is dependent upon a synthetic unity and units of phenomena as "axioms".

So yes, I agree with what you say, but a contradictory approach is evidently contradictory.

[Angelo Cannata]

What I described in the first post of this discussion is not a system of ideas, but a process, that has different steps. Now I will describe more in detail the sequence of steps.

1. Metaphysics conceives of itself as capable of universality.

2. Being universal implies to consider everything.

3. To consider everything implies considering the relation to the subject that is thinking it.

4. Considering the relation to the thinking subject implies to take note that the entire thinking is conditioned by the subject.

5. This means that the subject thinking about universal metaphysics must take note that this thought is always and anyway conditioned by himself, that is, the subject.

6. The subject in forced to admit that a thought, that is inevitably conditioned by himself, cannot be stated as a universal thought.

Up to point 6 every statement is assumed as universal, because all points are based on point 1, that states that metaphysics is capable of universality.

Point 6 represents passing to a different way of thinking, that is the way of uncertainty. Points from 1 to 6 are certain; after point 6, any statement must be considered uncertain.

Now we must consider more in detail point 6, because it appears to demolish itself, being the passage from certainty to uncertainty.

If you reason in a synthetic, static way, obviously you will always find ways to defend the certainty of metaphysics, because, by reasoning this way, you maintain yourself inside the system of metaphysics, that is equivalent to not considering point 6, not entering in the mentality of doubting and of going by steps, rather than by a static system.

This is the reason of your statement:

“So if metaphysics, appears to be contradictory yet in itself is uncertain of this contradiction then metaphysics does not end in contradiction as for it to appear contradictory it must be certain of this contradiction”.

Being uncertain that metaphysics is contradictory does not mean that we are certain that metaphysics is not contradictory. We must not confuse uncertainty with certainty of negation. If I say that I am uncertain about “no”, that does not mean that I am certain about “yes”.

When I say that metaphysics cannot be certain, I am not pronouncing a statement that claims to be certain; rather, I am pronouncing a suspect that cannot be removed. It’s a worm of doubt, that has no certainty, but cannot be eliminated.

All the steps that I listed above could have missed something, could be demolished in the future, they do not guarantee any certainty. But thay cannot be eliminated. They introduce a doubt that prevents metaphysics from being considered certain. Doubt is not a certainty that militates against another certainty; it is only a demolition, not a construction of something positive in opposition to something else positive. Doubting does not mean saying “not”; saying “not” is a certainty. Doubting is saying “perhaps”. Saying “perhaps” is much more demolishing than saying “not”, because “not” can be demolished, but “perhaps” cannot be demolished. You cannot demolish a flowing of rubble.

[Eodnhoj7]

For the record I appreciate having a dialogue/debate with someone who is educated, or at least things through considering the rarity of it these days...with that being said:

What I described in the first post of this discussion is not a system of ideas, but a process, that has different steps. Now I will describe more in detail the sequence of steps.

a) All processes inevitably result in systems as systems themselves are "means" of movement. So while system offers a percievably static, or absolute, form this form in itself is compose of and composed further movements. While this agrees with your relativistic standpoint, it contradicts it as the form as form maintains a constant of "means". This "means" observe not just a point of origin, relative to movement, but fundamentally a origin of movement in the respect that all further means, which extends from the universal of "means", are strictly extensions of it. In this manner a constant framwork of "means through means" observes a constant nature of movement under a mirroring process where form and function are unified.

1. Metaphysics conceives of itself as capable of universality.
This "universality" in itself is "universal" in the respect that while different interpretation of "universality" may extend from it, as evidenced from this conversation, they are approximates (hence "extensions") non the less. In this manner the argument of "universality" observes "universality" as having a inherent nature of "origin as means of movement" which mirrors back to itself as "universal". In these respects universality not just implies but necessitates in various degrees degree of definition which "do not" change the point of origin...in this case "universal". An expanding circulation of definition resulting in definition occurs in which universality maintains itself.

2. Being universal implies to consider everything.
Universality that is dependent upon implication only is not universal.

3. To consider everything implies considering the relation to the subject that is thinking it.
Yes, but also that which the subject is not thinking about considering these "non-thoughts" act simultaneously as:
A) Limits through randomness in which the thought is defined by what it is not.
B) Limits through Potentiality in which the thought is defined by the course of movement, with this course being potential in its own nature.
C) Limits through Possibility in which what is possible observes an absence of limit in which the limit maintains its own definition and synthesisze further definition. This is expressed in points A and B.

4. Considering the relation to the thinking subject implies to take note that the entire thinking is conditioned by the subject.
If the relations of A to the thinking subject is determined by the thinking subject than "A" is an inherent element within the thinking subject. The problem occurs in the respect that this premises an inherent "intradimensional" nature to relation, which in itself is not universal considering "what is directed inwards" exists relative to "what is directed outwards". In simpler terms, in and out may both be one direction but they exist through a relation premised in inversion.

In these respects relativity is dependent upon an inherent nature of inversion necessary for relation to occur. This leads to the problem of not just the objective being conditioned "only" into a strictly subjective interpretation but simultaneously (at the larger and more abstract level) points to relativity by necessity of its own framework inverting into a universality. In this manner universality and relative exist dually in different respects at the same time.

5. This means that the subject thinking about universal metaphysics must take note that this thought is always and anyway conditioned by himself, that is, the subject.
A line may be fold subjectively to form various other forms or even lines, but this not not take away the objective universal nature of the line away from the line itself. The line exists as the line, however its movement through the application of various measurements as a folding of reality still maintains the line as the line objectively folding through itself.

6. The subject in forced to admit that a thought, that is inevitably conditioned by himself, cannot be stated as a universal thought.
The logic of this fails as:
A) You are expressing a subjective thought which in itself only applies to you, hence is inevitable wrong relative to other subjective thoughts.
B) You are expressing an objective thought which in itself observes boundaries of definition that form both "subjectivity" and "objectivity".
C) Subjective and Objectivity are mediated under a neutral "being qua being" as a universal form of subjective and objective mirroring resulting in symmetry.

Up to point 6 every statement is assumed as universal, because all points are based on point 1, that states that metaphysics is capable of universality.

Point 6 represents passing to a different way of thinking, that is the way of uncertainty. Points from 1 to 6 are certain; after point 6, any statement must be considered uncertain.
Sorry for the joke...but are you certain of this?

Now we must consider more in detail point 6, because it appears to demolish itself, being the passage from certainty to uncertainty.
Points 6, does not necessitate points 1-5 being wrong but rather observes the limit of the argument. Reason leading to contradiction observes the contradiction as the limits of reasoning, not that reasoning does not exist.

If you reason in a synthetic, static way, obviously you will always find ways to defend the certainty of metaphysics, because, by reasoning this way, you maintain yourself inside the system of metaphysics, that is equivalent to not considering point 6, not entering in the mentality of doubting and of going by steps, rather than by a static system.

Synthesis is fundamentally neutral in the respect it provide boundaries of definition as mediated between "universality" and "multiplicity", "being" and "non-being", and a variety of other duals. Synthesis, while containing an element of what is "static", in itself is not strictly static considering it is dependent upon a relativistic change as a polar dual to the static. Synthesis can be observed as a line between to polar opposite points, with the line being the boundary that observes the points as both relative to and approximate to eachother.

If synthesis is an inherent part of metaphysics, because metaphysics deals with universals and hence must contain synthesis, then metaphysics holds a degree of certainty because of the nature of synthesis resulting in a degree of certainty.

If I maintain myself in the system of metaphysics in this manner, as all subjective interpretations claim, and you claim metaphysics is a contradiction because everything is subjective...are you contradictory because you are subjective considering the subject cannot seperate themselve from the interpretation, in this case contradiction?

To claim contradiction, from a subjective standpoint, is to become contradictory by the very same argument you applied.

However metaphysics cannot be strictly subjective interpretation considering their are certain subjective interpretations I have not subjectively interpretted. In simpler terms their are subjective arguments which exists, which I have not observed fully, and hence their are objective interpretations of metaphysics in the respect that I have not subjectified them.

Now these interpretations may be subjective in respect to the individuals that observe them, but because I have not subjected them to my own interpretation they inherently are "objective" to me in the respect that they exist for what they are: "interpretations". In this manner subjectivity, as an observation of relation, inevitably results in an objective means where an axioms exists for what it is and nothing more.

This is the reason of your statement:

“So if metaphysics, appears to be contradictory yet in itself is uncertain of this contradiction then metaphysics does not end in contradiction as for it to appear contradictory it must be certain of this contradiction”.

Being uncertain that metaphysics is contradictory does not mean that we are certain that metaphysics is not contradictory. We must not confuse uncertainty with certainty of negation. If I say that I am uncertain about “no”, that does not mean that I am certain about “yes”.

Then if you are uncertain that metaphysics is contradictory you defeat your own premise of certainty in the title "Metaphysics cannot but contradict itself".

Uncertainty, by its very nature, gives certain of negation as "uncertainty" is dependent upon "un" defining "certainty" with degree of axiomatic evidence (subjective and objective) as to the nature of certainty. Being "uncertain" in these terms necessitates a universal definition of "negation" which approximates "no" in various grades.

So Yes while that "Being uncertain that metaphysics is contradictory does not mean that we are certain that metaphysics is not contradictory" metaphysics in a seperate respect must give structure as to the axioms of non-contradiction and contradiction in order for it to take place. In these respects it maintains a certainty of both, with this certain providing the very same boundaries the the metaphysics which determines them.

When I say that metaphysics cannot be certain, I am not pronouncing a statement that claims to be certain; rather, I am pronouncing a suspect that cannot be removed. It’s a worm of doubt, that has no certainty, but cannot be eliminated.

But that is a subjective argument and if it is not then it is an objective argument. Either way saying "doubt" cannot be removed within metaphysics, and metaphysics is universal, would require that "belief" cannot be removed either. Doubt cannot exist on its own terms without belief, but doubt is the limit of belief in which belief still occurs.

All the steps that I listed above could have missed something, could be demolished in the future, they do not guarantee any certainty.
So here you are uncertain.

But thay cannot be eliminated.
But here you are certain. This only leads to the axioms I have previously presented.

They introduce a doubt that prevents metaphysics from being considered certain. Doubt is not a certainty that militates against another certainty; it is only a demolition, not a construction of something positive in opposition to something else positive. Doubting does not mean saying “not”; saying “not” is a certainty. Doubting is saying “perhaps”. Saying “perhaps” is much more demolishing than saying “not”, because “not” can be demolished, but “perhaps” cannot be demolished. You cannot demolish a flowing of rubble.

Any metaphysical system which ceases mirroring the subjective and objective, the abstract or physical, inherently limits its nature of relfection of "being through being" in the respect it is neither following its form or function. We see this in the stagnation of the metaphysics of the past...we see this also in the stagnation of modern empiricism in its inability to provide an clear answers.

Stagnation does not cause a thing to "cease" though, however it may give the respect of dying relative to the measurement of time.

Uncertainty is the limit of certainty and vice versa. What we observe, neutrally, is an inherent form of alteration necessary for definition.

[Angelo Cannata]

I think I need to better define what I said about point 6, that is, the moment when I see that metaphysics appears to be contradictory, since it ignores being conditioned by the subject, so that this omission contradicts its claim to be universal.

When, along the process, I arrive to point 6, not only point 6 reveals to be demolished, but all other points as well. This demolishion does not mean an irrelevance of the entire reasoning, because the starting point was the assumption that such a reasoning would be coherent.

The conclusion I obtained can be expressed in these terms: any reasoning started by assuming its objective coherence appears to end in some incoherence.

On the contrary, it seems to me that all your answers do not assume this ending in incoherence, they assume that some coherence, objective coherence, is still possibile after point 6.

Now you could object that I also could not write my reflections if I would not assume the possibility of some remaining coherence. This would be true if I would consider my reasoning finally objective. But I don’t consider my conclusions as something certain and objective. In this sense, I admit that the title I put to this discussion could be misleading. When I conclude that “Metaphysics cannot but contradict itself” I do not consider this conclusion a certain conclusion. I consider it a suspect that until now nobody has been able to delete.

This means that any reasoning you would write as an answer would necessarily appear as already demolished just because it is a reasoning.

This is the problem: suspect appears impossible to destroy. If, instead of suspect, it would be a reasoning, it could be easily destroyed by another reasoning. But how can we destroy a suspect? Are there reasonings that can be guaranteed as free from any possibility of any suspect?

[Eodnhoj7]

I think I need to better define what I said about point 6, that is, the moment when I see that metaphysics appears to be contradictory, since it ignores being conditioned by the subject, so that this omission contradicts its claim to be universal.

When, along the process, I arrive to point 6, not only point 6 reveals to be demolished, but all other points as well. This demolishion does not mean an irrelevance of the entire reasoning, because the starting point was the assumption that such a reasoning would be coherent.

The conclusion I obtained can be expressed in these terms: any reasoning started by assuming its objective coherence appears to end in some incoherence.

I understand that point entirely. Where I disagree, and the above posts should (at least I hope) elaborate is that this stance is contradictory if left "only" to its own terms.

On the contrary, it seems to me that all your answers do not assume this ending in incoherence, they assume that some coherence, objective coherence, is still possibile after point 6.

Yes, inevitablely. What is incoherent is strictly a limit of the coherent that does not negate the coherent but places boundaries to it. What we understand of as "objective", while dependent on the subjective, maintains itself as objective regardless of the subjective interpretation. The line example above address this point while simultaneously observing that there are inherent "boundaries" from which the objective and subjective stem from. In this manner "objectivity" and "subjectivity", reverting to the line example again, exist through a process of synthesis where:

1) The line is an objective phenomenon in the respect is it universally a line.
2) The line is a subjective phenomenon in the respect how it manifests mirrors a form of randomness that is not universal.
3) The universal and random nature of the line, observes the line as synthesis of what is constant and not-constant
4) Metaphysics, as the study of being through being, has a trifold nature of Absolute, Relativistic and Synthetic Neutrality which exist through eachother as eachother as 3 in 1 and 1 in 3.

Now you could object that I also could not write my reflections if I would not assume the possibility of some remaining coherence. This would be true if I would consider my reasoning finally objective. But I don’t consider my conclusions as something certain and objective. In this sense, I admit that the title I put to this discussion could be misleading. When I conclude that “Metaphysics cannot but contradict itself” I do not consider this conclusion a certain conclusion. I consider it a suspect that until now nobody has been able to delete.

It is objective in the respect it is a perspective. Understanding "x" perspective may require a degree of subjectivity, but the fact that "x" perspective exists in itself is objective.

This means that any reasoning you would write as an answer would necessarily appear as already demolished just because it is a reasoning.

Any necessity in appearance observed an objective universality, considering the nature of "necessity" predispose a requirement of some universal nature within a being. For example if it is "necessary" for "y" to form "x", "x" has a universal objective nature where "y" is required for "x" to exist. A universality in function, conducive to further form, exists as a constant.

Even if "y" is a finite reality which may change with time, "y" is still absolute in the respect that "x"'s existence is inherently interwoven in it. In simpler terms the nature of relation is dependent upon the angle of observation. If I view "x" from angle "a" I may see "x1" and "x2" as elements of it. But if I observe it from angle "b", I may see "x3" and "x4" as inherent elements of it.

Now angle A and B relate to specific relations inherent within X, and in doing so exist in relation to each other through x. A multiplicity of angles causes an inherent seperation of x into various parts.

Reverse this and we can see that "x" results in the inherent angle of perspective which compose it, hence what is subjective (the perspective) becomes objectified in the respect it is an "angle"...hence a quality of universality become not just inevitable but is necessitated as a structure.

The question of universality occurs in respect to observing an inherent unity, with this "unity" existing through the objective structure as a thing in itself along with an inherent unifying of the subjective perspective. So while "x" may contain as elements "x1,x2,x3,x4...", "x" is mirrors itself through "x1,x2,x3,x4..." with "x1,x2,x3,x4" being extensions of "x". "x" in turn is an extension of further medians etc unto 1.

A simple observation of all number as extensions of "1" can quantitatively argue this point.

Universality, in these respects, is an observation from a perspective of 1 dimension where the phenomena is directed as itself through itself as itself.

This is the problem: suspect appears impossible to destroy. If, instead of suspect, it would be a reasoning, it could be easily destroyed by another reasoning. But how can we destroy a suspect?
Suspect as a deficiency, with Reason as structure, can be synthesized to observe the boundaries, or axioms, for what they are as neutral entities. The question is less of get rid of doubt/suspicion, or in more objective terms "deficiency", and rather observing the boundaries which give premise to the doubt/reason.

Doubt, or deficiency, cannot be destroy except through the observation of order, considering these negations are not things in themselves.

Are there reasonings that can be guaranteed as free from any possibility of any suspect?

Yes the boundaries or limits, as inherent neutral axioms, which give premise to reasoning. While a concept may differ in interpretation, the concept as an abstract boundary can be viewed for what it is as a concept.

So for example while "x" may be doubted, or not fully understooding, what is observed is "x" regardless of its degree of truth. "x" may be true, or false, but "x" is axiomatic as "x". Even the process of questioning or doubting "x" still gives boundaries to "x" where "x" is observed as a boundary in itself.