A philosophy of science

How does science work? And what's all this about quantum mechanics?

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JohniJones
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A philosophy of science

Post by JohniJones »

Science describes three types of object. The first two are those that can be hidden - material objects, and those that are necessarily hidden - quantum objects. Thus, we have an independent source supporting Popper's* view that science is the domain of the empirically falsifiable, as hidden objects are a source of falsification and are the objects of science. Empirical is, in effect, the domain of the hideable.

There are other types of objects that are not hideable, hence not empirical or subject to falsification or Popperian doubt. Such objects are numerous, they include colours, sounds, and smells.

The third class of object of science is the supernatural object. This is a non-Popperian postulate of science that has been designed. There are two reasons for this design.
1) to discredit mystical practices and ideas,
2) to establish causal relationships on the basis of non-empirical associations :

1) The supernatural object is not a mystical object. The mystical object belongs to the class of objects that vanish and appear without empirical redress. On the other hand, the derogatory supernatural object of science changes its form between the mystical object, and the empirical or hideable object, and vice versa; for example, the idea that gods physically cause thunder.

2) The other, causal/associative, supernatural object of science also changes form supernaturally but finds a role in justifying certain studies of science, such as psychiatry where brain is said to cause mind in what is at root a supernatural causation.

Science, then, supports three types of object. Two of these are the hideables, the third is the supernatural object of which science describes two types.

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(* Popper:
But I shall certainly admit a system as empirical or scientific only if it is capable of being tested by experience. These considerations suggest that not the verifiability but the falsifiability of a system is to be taken as a criterion of demarcation. In other words: I shall not require of a scientific system that it shall be capable of being singled out, once and for all, in a positive sense; but I shall require that its logical form shall be such that it can be singled out, by means of empirical tests, in a negative sense: it must be possible for an empirical scientific system to be refuted by experience. (1959)
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mickthinks
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Re: A philosophy of science

Post by mickthinks »

Science describes three types of object.

You've begun with a personification of an abstract entity. A person describing things is a familiar notion to us and isn't easily misunderstood. A field of enquiry is not a person, and the parallel your personification implies between the two is not at all clear.

One problem I foresee is that there may be scientists who imagine you are talking about them and what they describe, and they may, rightly I think, baulk at the idea that they are authors of the third class of object in your schema.
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JohniJones
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Re: A philosophy of science

Post by JohniJones »

mickthinks wrote:Science describes three types of object.

You've begun with a personification of an abstract entity. A person describing things is a familiar notion to us and isn't easily misunderstood. A field of enquiry is not a person, and the parallel your personification implies between the two is not at all clear.

One problem I foresee is that there may be scientists who imagine you are talking about them and what they describe, and they may, rightly I think, baulk at the idea that they are authors of the third class of object in your schema.
How does a source of information convey? It cannot. But it does. So we use a metaphor.

The supernatural object of science is well-known. It is used to discredit mystical practice and to support the social injunctive that brain affects mind.
mickthinks
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Re: A philosophy of science

Post by mickthinks »

That's okay, John. There should be no problem with the use of metaphor provided it doesn't lead to mistakes and misunderstandings.

[Science] is used to discredit mystical practice and to support the social injunctive that brain affects mind.

Two problems:

1. I don't know of any scientists who would agree with that as it is stated. Can you cite any scientific authority for this?

2. It isn't saying quite the same thing as "Science describes three types of object".
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Re: A philosophy of science

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mickthinks wrote:That's okay, John. There should be no problem with the use of metaphor provided it doesn't lead to mistakes and misunderstandings.

[Science] is used to discredit mystical practice and to support the social injunctive that brain affects mind.

Two problems:

1. I don't know of any scientists who would agree with that as it is stated. Can you cite any scientific authority for this?

2. It isn't saying quite the same thing as "Science describes three types of object".
Dawkinian literature promotes the idea of the supernatural object in its condemnation of religion. The effort backfires.
Brain sciences blithly talk about the the brain's processes affecting the mind.
mickthinks
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Re: A philosophy of science

Post by mickthinks »

I don't think Richard Dawkins is promoting the supernatural so much as denouncing the idea of it, and I'm not sure that any scientists studying the brain are committed to any theories which postulate minds.

It really would help if you could cite the science behind your ideas, because right now they look like nothing more than lay opinions.
chaz wyman
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Re: A philosophy of science

Post by chaz wyman »

JohniJones wrote:
mickthinks wrote:That's okay, John. There should be no problem with the use of metaphor provided it doesn't lead to mistakes and misunderstandings.

[Science] is used to discredit mystical practice and to support the social injunctive that brain affects mind.

Two problems:

1. I don't know of any scientists who would agree with that as it is stated. Can you cite any scientific authority for this?

2. It isn't saying quite the same thing as "Science describes three types of object".
Dawkinian literature promotes the idea of the supernatural object in its condemnation of religion.

You would be more clear if you would define this object. I am assuming you mean "religion" itself?
Dawkins is not using science per se to define this object?
What method are you suing to define the supernatural object "Dawkinian"?


The effort backfires.

Since the effort is not what you say it it, there is no backfire. What do you think the nature of this backfire it?


Brain sciences blithly talk about the the brain's processes affecting the mind.

Please cite!
chaz wyman
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Re: A philosophy of science

Post by chaz wyman »

JohniJones wrote:
mickthinks wrote:Science describes three types of object.

You've begun with a personification of an abstract entity. A person describing things is a familiar notion to us and isn't easily misunderstood. A field of enquiry is not a person, and the parallel your personification implies between the two is not at all clear.

One problem I foresee is that there may be scientists who imagine you are talking about them and what they describe, and they may, rightly I think, baulk at the idea that they are authors of the third class of object in your schema.
How does a source of information convey? It cannot. But it does. So we use a metaphor.

The supernatural object of science is well-known. It is used to discredit mystical practice and to support the social injunctive that brain affects mind.

I think the scientist would say brain effects minds, where the mind is a metaphor for the phenomenal activity of the brain.
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Re: A philosophy of science

Post by converge »

I agree with chaz and mic; niether science nor Dawkins really says any of those things. It sounds like you are setting up a strawman to discredit science.
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Re: A philosophy of science

Post by JohniJones »

chaz wyman wrote:
JohniJones wrote:
mickthinks wrote:That's okay, John. There should be no problem with the use of metaphor provided it doesn't lead to mistakes and misunderstandings.

[Science] is used to discredit mystical practice and to support the social injunctive that brain affects mind.

Two problems:

1. I don't know of any scientists who would agree with that as it is stated. Can you cite any scientific authority for this?

2. It isn't saying quite the same thing as "Science describes three types of object".
Dawkinian literature promotes the idea of the supernatural object in its condemnation of religion.

You would be more clear if you would define this object. I am assuming you mean "religion" itself?
Dawkins is not using science per se to define this object?
What method are you suing to define the supernatural object "Dawkinian"?


The effort backfires.

Since the effort is not what you say it it, there is no backfire. What do you think the nature of this backfire it?


Brain sciences blithly talk about the the brain's processes affecting the mind.

Please cite!
Sorry about the late reply. I can answer that.

I've already defined the supernatural objects. And I did it by using my premises. I will repeat here:

The supernatural object of science has two types. One is identified by the causal relationship mooted between mind and brain, the other is the derogatory supernatural object, the object that switches its behaviours between objects that cannot be hidden (like colours) and objects that can be hidden (like material objects).
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JohniJones
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Re: A philosophy of science

Post by JohniJones »

chaz wyman wrote:
JohniJones wrote:
mickthinks wrote:Science describes three types of object.

You've begun with a personification of an abstract entity. A person describing things is a familiar notion to us and isn't easily misunderstood. A field of enquiry is not a person, and the parallel your personification implies between the two is not at all clear.

One problem I foresee is that there may be scientists who imagine you are talking about them and what they describe, and they may, rightly I think, baulk at the idea that they are authors of the third class of object in your schema.
How does a source of information convey? It cannot. But it does. So we use a metaphor.

The supernatural object of science is well-known. It is used to discredit mystical practice and to support the social injunctive that brain affects mind.

I think the scientist would say brain effects minds, where the mind is a metaphor for the phenomenal activity of the brain.
Well now you are saying that brain affects brain. What does that tell us?
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JohniJones
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Re: A philosophy of science

Post by JohniJones »

mickthinks wrote:I don't think Richard Dawkins is promoting the supernatural so much as denouncing the idea of it, and I'm not sure that any scientists studying the brain are committed to any theories which postulate minds.

It really would help if you could cite the science behind your ideas, because right now they look like nothing more than lay opinions.
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mickthinks
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Re: A philosophy of science

Post by mickthinks »

JohniJones wrote:
mickthinks wrote:I don't think Richard Dawkins is promoting the supernatural so much as denouncing the idea of it, and I'm not sure that any scientists studying the brain are committed to any theories which postulate minds.

It really would help if you could cite the science behind your ideas, because right now they look like nothing more than lay opinions.
see new post
You've not cited any science, Johni, so I'm puzzled. In what other way did you think your new post might qualify as a response to my post there.
chaz wyman
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Re: A philosophy of science

Post by chaz wyman »

JohniJones wrote:
chaz wyman wrote:
JohniJones wrote:
I think the scientist would say brain effects minds, where the mind is a metaphor for the phenomenal activity of the brain.
Well now you are saying that brain affects brain. What does that tell us?

Nope, that is what YOU are saying.
I am saying that what we think of as 'mind' is an abstraction of the activity of the brain.
Please note I said brain effects mind. NOT brain affects mind.
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