What is this thing called science?
Posted: Tue Oct 23, 2007 6:50 pm
Is anyone up for discussing the problems with existing philosophies of science? I have recently read Alan Chalmers book 'What is this thing called science?' which gives an overview of the different attempts at a philosophy of science along with their strengths and weaknesses. The first half of the book is quiet good, covering inductive accounts of science, Popper's falsificationism and Kuhn. The latter half of the book which covers Lakatos, Feyerabend, subjective Bayesianism and other theories seems quite superficial.
The arguments always seem to come to an impasse when they get to the question of whether science makes progress and in what sense. None of the theories seem to be able to deal with this point convincingly and in the end none of them really seem to work as a realistic philosophy of science. They all seem to fall down because they are looking for objective criteria to measure science against and this doesn't seem to work. The only approach I've seen that I think works is Michael Polanyi's idea of personal knowledge which claims to be neither subjective nor objective but stresses the personal participation of the knower in an 'art of knowing'.
I have a number of questions arising from what I've read and a few proto-answers that I would like to subject to scrutiny.
1) What characterises science as science?
Chalmers concluded that there was no general account of science and scientific method but if this is true then on what grounds can we say that something is science and something else isn't. I feel comfortable claiming that astrology isn't a science so I must be making a judgement. I feel qualified to make this judgement but I don't think I could reduce it to stated criteria.
2) Is science based on anything?
My thinking behind this question is that science is an articulate system of knowledge which originates and is tested in our experience of the world. I feel more comfortable with this description of science than I do with an idea that science is based on facts or even that science is based on accumulating observations. The reasons being that I see the idea of a 'fact' as being a human assertion of the belief that 'something represents reality'. I also take observation as being guided by theory - there are so many observations that can be made that for us not to be over-whelmed we need to be guided by an idea (or theory) of what is significant.
3) Does Science Make Progress?
I think it does but I don't think it can be shown objectively. I think Polanyi would claim that science was a tool which we develop through a heuristic process in order to gain control of our environment. The tool is improved and refined as it is used in wider contexts. I take the Copernican revolution as an example of scientific progress but what are the appropriate criteria of judgement?
4) Are scientific theories true?
I don't think we can know. I take 'true' to mean a description of the reality that I assume we interact with when we experience things. As our senses are embodied I don't feel that we can assume that our experience equates to reality. In which case how can we know if our theories correspond to reality? Are there different ways to approach this question? Is the question sensible?
5) What is or should be the relationship between scientific and other explanations?
This is a topical question given debates on creationism and evolution. Examples such as the difference between a thought I may have and the recording of electrical activity in my brain are interesting. The electrical activity doesn't contain my thought in a sense in which I would recognise it as such. The two explanations seem to have their place and legitimate use for different things and both would be valid in certain contexts. Does this also go for the creation myths of the established religions?
Does anybody have any thoughts, or perhaps a bus to drive through the holes I've overlooked in my answers?
Bullwinkle
The arguments always seem to come to an impasse when they get to the question of whether science makes progress and in what sense. None of the theories seem to be able to deal with this point convincingly and in the end none of them really seem to work as a realistic philosophy of science. They all seem to fall down because they are looking for objective criteria to measure science against and this doesn't seem to work. The only approach I've seen that I think works is Michael Polanyi's idea of personal knowledge which claims to be neither subjective nor objective but stresses the personal participation of the knower in an 'art of knowing'.
I have a number of questions arising from what I've read and a few proto-answers that I would like to subject to scrutiny.
1) What characterises science as science?
Chalmers concluded that there was no general account of science and scientific method but if this is true then on what grounds can we say that something is science and something else isn't. I feel comfortable claiming that astrology isn't a science so I must be making a judgement. I feel qualified to make this judgement but I don't think I could reduce it to stated criteria.
2) Is science based on anything?
My thinking behind this question is that science is an articulate system of knowledge which originates and is tested in our experience of the world. I feel more comfortable with this description of science than I do with an idea that science is based on facts or even that science is based on accumulating observations. The reasons being that I see the idea of a 'fact' as being a human assertion of the belief that 'something represents reality'. I also take observation as being guided by theory - there are so many observations that can be made that for us not to be over-whelmed we need to be guided by an idea (or theory) of what is significant.
3) Does Science Make Progress?
I think it does but I don't think it can be shown objectively. I think Polanyi would claim that science was a tool which we develop through a heuristic process in order to gain control of our environment. The tool is improved and refined as it is used in wider contexts. I take the Copernican revolution as an example of scientific progress but what are the appropriate criteria of judgement?
4) Are scientific theories true?
I don't think we can know. I take 'true' to mean a description of the reality that I assume we interact with when we experience things. As our senses are embodied I don't feel that we can assume that our experience equates to reality. In which case how can we know if our theories correspond to reality? Are there different ways to approach this question? Is the question sensible?
5) What is or should be the relationship between scientific and other explanations?
This is a topical question given debates on creationism and evolution. Examples such as the difference between a thought I may have and the recording of electrical activity in my brain are interesting. The electrical activity doesn't contain my thought in a sense in which I would recognise it as such. The two explanations seem to have their place and legitimate use for different things and both would be valid in certain contexts. Does this also go for the creation myths of the established religions?
Does anybody have any thoughts, or perhaps a bus to drive through the holes I've overlooked in my answers?
Bullwinkle