Scott Mayers wrote:
It bothers me if I hear a credible scientist declare dismissal of philosophy but then feign credibility in it to argue why their suggested theories do
using the expertise of philosophy. So my point is that if we accept a clear distinction then philosophy takes the reigns OR include philosophy with
in the realm of science as two parts of it. If it is included within the topic then the scientific empirical method belongs only to the practical part while the theoretical parts require an expanded function that includes a different but inclusive method to proceed
The theoretical parts are merely provisional until a potentially falsifiable theory can be discovered. Even if a hypothesis is true or sound
it is non scientific by definition less it can actually be tested. And applying philosophical principles such as logic or reason while entirely
valid would not be scientific. And therefore for reasons of clarity and practicality it is far better if the two disciplines are kept separate
The problem I am seeing though is about where such a theory IS effective but the explanation can be variable. As such, for instance, if one agrees to the general conclusion but believe a different explanation is required that both fits and is improved, it gets dismissed offhand based on this pre-requisite that a theory MUST state something NEW to which also requires a NEW prediction. For much of my own ideas, they are about interpretation but not against the present observations nor the math being used. But it will get ignored as because only the initial author of the theory that 'works' is granted acceptance of their own interpretations and explanations even where better ones may fit.
For instance, I interpret Einstein's relativity as valid but have a contention with the assumption that time itself is what is altered rather than the matter in some accelerated or inertial frame. This seemingly trivial alteration may not alter his theory's end result particularly but for what it is borrowing from some other area or gets applied to other theories, the interpretations or explanations alter how other theories elsewhere are interpreted in error.
Let me think of a simplified example.
Imagine that in some court case we determine legally that some person is guilty of some crime. But the explanation, for instance may be that some male had hated some woman to which motivated his action. But even though this person may be guilty regardless, perhaps a different possible motive may fit that while making him guilty still alters what others may use to generate some other theory.
So, to expand, imagine that many such 'confirmations' of this behavior has granted a similar conclusion upon many cases where men have also been charged under the same explanation but also have another other common justification.
Then, a decision to create a law is based on the interpretation of these confirmed cases that base their argument on the induced conclusion that men cause violence against women because they hate them.
Even while these cases can act independent as 'true' based on their input and output conclusions, the validity of the latest conclusion may be faulty merely on a misinterpretation of the explanation of motive for those other original cases. But the way it operates in the institution is to preserve the original interpretations of the authorities who proposed the motives that work. We are not allowed to redress the old cases by altering the interpretation but are forced to find some novel cases in the future to redress this instead, even if unnecessary. In fact, with regards to things like physics, much of our past observations are not even able to find novelty. For instance, the distant quasars are interpreted as unusually powerful and large galaxies that do not exist up close. Yet I have an alternate explanation that also preserves their distance but the way light travels at such distances alter the way we perceive them. So I would be dismissed offhand since I cannot re-present the phenomena in any different way than it is already perceived. I'd be forced to try to find some other new phenomena and appeal to the present explanation by default unless I can disprove the practical means which the original authors present is false.