free will-how can it exist?

[Notvacka]

Our very use of language here makes it obvious that something must be wrong with the concept itself.

Look at this:

The common expression is "I have a free will" rather than "I am a free will".

But how can my will be free if it's in my possession? The phrase suggests that my will is not free from "me".

On the other hand, can I be free from my will? Does my will not rule my actions?

In which case the expression should be "free will has me". Which seems like so much nonsense, because it is.

What, then, is the will supposed to be free from? External influences? Internal influences? Can anybody come up with anyghing that makes even the slightest bit of sense as to what the supposedly "free" will could be "free" from?

Free will is the experience of having alternatives to choose from. Beyond the experience itself, there is nothing tangible to be found.

[chaz wyman]

Our very use of language here makes it obvious that something must be wrong with the concept itself.

Look at this:

The common expression is "I have a free will" rather than "I am a free will".

But how can my will be free if it's in my possession? The phrase suggests that my will is not free from "me".

On the other hand, can I be free from my will? Does my will not rule my actions?

In which case the expression should be "free will has me". Which seems like so much nonsense, because it is.

What, then, is the will supposed to be free from? External influences? Internal influences? Can anybody come up with anyghing that makes even the slightest bit of sense as to what the supposedly "free" will could be "free" from?

Free will is the experience of having alternatives to choose from. Beyond the experience itself, there is nothing tangible to be found.

Schopenhauer said something like; "We are free to do as we will but not free to will as we will." With this he intended to show that we act from our will to do so, but ultimately we were not free to command the deepest part of ourselves, as that was caused by the unavoidable truth of necessity.

Free-will is a necessary (excuse the pun) fiction, that has been promoted by Xianity as it is required for a just judgement. It preys on the fallacy that despite all of the causes that shape us we have a free choice to choose to act piously and follow the church's teaching - even (presumably) if we have never heard of Jesus.
Descartes conception of the mind and body is philosophy's greatest collaboration with this fallacy. We might be inclined to forgive him as he needed to appease the church so he could get on with his maths and science.

[Dimebag]

Our very use of language here makes it obvious that something must be wrong with the concept itself.

Look at this:

The common expression is "I have a free will" rather than "I am a free will".

But how can my will be free if it's in my possession? The phrase suggests that my will is not free from "me".

On the other hand, can I be free from my will? Does my will not rule my actions?

In which case the expression should be "free will has me". Which seems like so much nonsense, because it is.

What, then, is the will supposed to be free from? External influences? Internal influences? Can anybody come up with anyghing that makes even the slightest bit of sense as to what the supposedly "free" will could be "free" from?

Free will is the experience of having alternatives to choose from. Beyond the experience itself, there is nothing tangible to be found.

Schopenhauer said something like; "We are free to do as we will but not free to will as we will." With this he intended to show that we act from our will to do so, but ultimately we were not free to command the deepest part of ourselves, as that was caused by the unavoidable truth of necessity.

Free-will is a necessary (excuse the pun) fiction, that has been promoted by Xianity as it is required for a just judgement. It preys on the fallacy that despite all of the causes that shape us we have a free choice to choose to act piously and follow the church's teaching - even (presumably) if we have never heard of Jesus.
Descartes conception of the mind and body is philosophy's greatest collaboration with this fallacy. We might be inclined to forgive him as he needed to appease the church so he could get on with his maths and science.

Chaz, i think we don't really need the concept of free will at all and can still have choice in a deterministic universe. In this thread here I argue as much: http://www.skepticforum.com/viewtopic.p ... 30#p267249

If we can't make choices, just react, then noone can, not our parents, our teachers, our senators, our presidents. Noone can choose. But wait, lets just slow down and take a closer look at what we mean by choice? One definition of choice is "to select from a number of possibilities". Now it is clear that our minds do infact weight up different possibilities, otherwise deliberation just wouldn't happen. So its clear there are possbilities. What do we mean by possibilities? I mean, hypothetical options which our minds imagine ahead of time. These possibilities can be deliberated over, and have a final option emerge either through conscious logical analysis, unconscious gut instinct of weighing options, or just a mental coin flip. At any rate, our mind takes possibilities, and selects from these possibilities in order to bring one of those possibilities into action. That sounds alot like the definition of choice. So it can be argued that choice does exist.

The other problem that comes up is conscious choice. Well given what we know about consciousness and studies of free will, choices are not made consciously, and its unclear as to how consciousness could aid in choice. Consciousness is present when we think, that is clear, however we can't say that consciousness is the cause of thought. So the reason we think consciousness is important with choice is not necessarily because it is responsible for choice, but it is however an indicator that a person is reasonably well informed to make a choice.

The other problem with regards to choice is ownership. Now we tend to think of ourself as owners, the inner I or the self. But from what we have learned about the self, it is a construction, and not an ineffable unit or entity which remains constant. So how can we really say that this collection or things which make up the self, which can change with time, is more us than say, the unconscious determinants which comprise the self? That is the true source of the self. So if our self, that which we attribute ownership to, actually arises from completely unconscious processes, the SAME unconscious processes which also take part in building the possibilities which are also selected by those unconscious processes, why can't we then say that what we call the self, is actually that which makes choices? I think that is indeed the case, and if this is the case, then that would seem to reinstate some sense of responsibility for actions.

So even if you deny that the typical idea of free will is indeed not possible or even wanted, that doesn't mean you also throw away personal responsibility.

[chaz wyman]

Our very use of language here makes it obvious that something must be wrong with the concept itself.

Look at this:

The common expression is "I have a free will" rather than "I am a free will".

But how can my will be free if it's in my possession? The phrase suggests that my will is not free from "me".

On the other hand, can I be free from my will? Does my will not rule my actions?

In which case the expression should be "free will has me". Which seems like so much nonsense, because it is.

What, then, is the will supposed to be free from? External influences? Internal influences? Can anybody come up with anyghing that makes even the slightest bit of sense as to what the supposedly "free" will could be "free" from?

Free will is the experience of having alternatives to choose from. Beyond the experience itself, there is nothing tangible to be found.

Schopenhauer said something like; "We are free to do as we will but not free to will as we will." With this he intended to show that we act from our will to do so, but ultimately we were not free to command the deepest part of ourselves, as that was caused by the unavoidable truth of necessity.

Free-will is a necessary (excuse the pun) fiction, that has been promoted by Xianity as it is required for a just judgement. It preys on the fallacy that despite all of the causes that shape us we have a free choice to choose to act piously and follow the church's teaching - even (presumably) if we have never heard of Jesus.
Descartes conception of the mind and body is philosophy's greatest collaboration with this fallacy. We might be inclined to forgive him as he needed to appease the church so he could get on with his maths and science.

Chaz, i think we don't really need the concept of free will at all and can still have choice in a deterministic universe. In this thread here I argue as much: http://www.skepticforum.com/viewtopic.p ... 30#p267249

If we can't make choices, just react, then noone can, not our parents, our teachers, our senators, our presidents. Noone can choose. But wait, lets just slow down and take a closer look at what we mean by choice? One definition of choice is "to select from a number of possibilities". Now it is clear that our minds do infact weight up different possibilities, otherwise deliberation just wouldn't happen. So its clear there are possbilities. What do we mean by possibilities? I mean, hypothetical options which our minds imagine ahead of time. These possibilities can be deliberated over, and have a final option emerge either through conscious logical analysis, unconscious gut instinct of weighing options, or just a mental coin flip. At any rate, our mind takes possibilities, and selects from these possibilities in order to bring one of those possibilities into action. That sounds alot like the definition of choice. So it can be argued that choice does exist.

The other problem that comes up is conscious choice. Well given what we know about consciousness and studies of free will, choices are not made consciously, and its unclear as to how consciousness could aid in choice. Consciousness is present when we think, that is clear, however we can't say that consciousness is the cause of thought. So the reason we think consciousness is important with choice is not necessarily because it is responsible for choice, but it is however an indicator that a person is reasonably well informed to make a choice.

The other problem with regards to choice is ownership. Now we tend to think of ourself as owners, the inner I or the self. But from what we have learned about the self, it is a construction, and not an ineffable unit or entity which remains constant. So how can we really say that this collection or things which make up the self, which can change with time, is more us than say, the unconscious determinants which comprise the self? That is the true source of the self. So if our self, that which we attribute ownership to, actually arises from completely unconscious processes, the SAME unconscious processes which also take part in building the possibilities which are also selected by those unconscious processes, why can't we then say that what we call the self, is actually that which makes choices? I think that is indeed the case, and if this is the case, then that would seem to reinstate some sense of responsibility for actions.

So even if you deny that the typical idea of free will is indeed not possible or even wanted, that doesn't mean you also throw away personal responsibility.

I think the best we can retrieve from this concept is to approve that choices are made by the person, but that these are determinable by a range of factors so complex that they resist predictability. And that this can be seen as the will in action.

But we must jettison the term "free" as being completely meaningless.

[JasonPalmer]

Read

Blackmore, S.J. (2007) In The Myth of Free Will, Ed. Cris Evatt, Cafe Essays, Princeville, HI, Foreword (ix-xiv) and Living Happily and Morally (49-51)

Blackmore, S.J. (2005) It is possible to live happily and morally without believing in free will. In What We Believe But Cannot Prove: Today's Leading Thinkers on Science in the Age of Certainty. Ed. John Brockman, Free Press, 41-2
Reprinted in The Best American Nonrequired Reading, Ed. D. Eggers Houghton Mifflin 2006 p 14-15.

There is also a large section in my textbook Consciousness: An Introduction devoted to questions of free will and agency. Indeed I discuss free to some extent in most of my books. There is a chapter in Zen and the Art of Consciousness, and I ask all the conversationalists in my book Conversations on Consciousness the question "Do you have free will?". Their responses are very telling.

Listen

BBC Radio 3 Free Thinking Festival, in Liverpool. Listen to "The Myth of Free Will", broadcast on Radio 3, on 2.11.08

Free will and why I don't believe in it. Podcast for G'Day World 22 May 2008


http://www.susanblackmore.co.uk/Researc ... 20will.htm

[JasonPalmer]

chaz wyman

writer of no books on free will

who i shall now place in my foes list, so i can not see his posts

[JasonPalmer]

I can no longer see posts by chaz wyman

I have the illusion of free will, and using it, I have removed him from my reality.

However, without my brain, working out, without telling me, that it was a good idea to block him, I would not have done it.

Remember, philosophy is about selling books.

write em
sell em
hope people buy em

more on this in the latest version of 'the black swan'

[chaz wyman]

I can no longer see posts by chaz wyman

I have the illusion of free will, and using it, I have removed him from my reality.

However, without my brain, working out, without telling me, that it was a good idea to block him, I would not have done it.

Remember, philosophy is about selling books.

write em
sell em
hope people buy em

more on this in the latest version of 'the black swan'

The closing of a dead mind is no loss.
Stick your fingers in your ears and scweem!

[JasonPalmer]

straw dogs by john gray backs up the work of susan blackmore

books

read em

[MGL]

A few thoughts:

1) Real free will must involves the real possibility of an agent doing something other than he did, given exactly the same circumstances.
2) You can't get real free-will in a deterministic universe. All compatibilism can do is attempt to justify our use of the concept, which I suspect it can't.
3) Free-will is only possible if the universe allows random non-deterministic events. These can be physical events, so there is no need to invoke spirits or ghosts in the machine.
4) If there are events that form part of the internal deliberating process of a human agent that determines how it spends its energy ( ie what actions it takes ) , then I would suggest that that agent has a free will.
5) Note that this is not to say an agent acts pureley arbitrarily, becasue it will still be constrained by the usual forces that motivate it ( thirst, hunger, reputation, etc) which are deterministic. Free will is only significant in circumstances of uncertainty where the facts or relative importance of competing desires are not clear. The more you question your beliefs and desires, the more free will you will have.
6) Of course if you want to see such random events as not being part of the entity that is the agent, you will consider that agent as not having a free will. However, to do so, it must be possible to distinguish between the random events and the agent itself. If we presume an equivalence between agency and consciousness, then if the physical processes that equate to our consciousness are non-deterministic, then we have free will.

[lancek4]

You first need to understand that the traditional view of free will, being an agent or being within us which is the beginning of the causal chain which produces action from nowhere is a troublesome and useless concept, and one which is nonsensical. The idea that somehow the mind can produce something called free will, which supposedly creates ideas out of pure nothingness, without any help from our senses, our memories, our neural pathways, is utter fantasy and in no way grounded in reality. Think for a second what use a form of free will would be if ithad no help in making decisions from our senses, past experience, and reflex actions. Basically, without these things we are blind to our options, and no amount of planning can aid this. We need content to base our actions on, and we get this from our the aformentioned sources, which are causally connected to the external world. What we do have, which is not some abstract white hole of action, is a SENSE of will. We FEEL like we are the author of our own actions, and that sense that we are producing our own actions is important for our sense of potency and sense of control. If we didn't have this sense of ownership of our actions, we would basically feel like we were watching events unfold, as we sometimes feel when we react to things in the moment and let our unconscious automatic processes take control (for which they do extremely well when they now what to predict). But when we come up against more unexpected circumstances we require the help of all the resources at our disposal, and something needs to be directing the shots, otherwise it might all fall apart (like an orchestra without a conductor). Fortunately the brain is more than capable of achieving everything it needs to do, however it lacks a central author being a grup of many expert cells, with no captain. This is where our sense of conscious will comes into play. Instead of there actually being a controller, the brain and its stockpile of resources are given full reign, however, they are also led to believe there is a controller at work, and the supposed controller (our conscious perception of will) also believes it is in control, however it only thinks it has this potency, and thus acts as a sort of echo chamber to the willings of the brain, and allows the system to be aware of whether it is causing its own actions, or the world is causing them. Basically our sense of will is a sense, similar to our others in the sense (pardon the pun) that is allows us to perceive something which exists in the external world - our brains coordinated actions which affect the world around it. It might be seen as a sort of feedback mechanism which boosts confidnece or shows areas of concern when it comes to actions.

Im not sure if this explanation is entirely satisfactory, but it is basically Wegner's conception of conscious will, which i rather like, as it seeks to explain what is is and why we feel the way we do, rather than outright denying free will and not replacing it with anything (which is why denying free will is such a hard pill to swallow, leaving nothing in its place).

I like thsi very incorporative explanation, but doesn't it explain free will through determinism? Has anyone expalined determinism through free wil ? Perhaps the former reduction is based in a particular orientation of control. One PN author suggested that it is because (historically Western) of our insistancy upon a dualistic 'real' universe.

[Dimebag]

You first need to understand that the traditional view of free will, being an agent or being within us which is the beginning of the causal chain which produces action from nowhere is a troublesome and useless concept, and one which is nonsensical. The idea that somehow the mind can produce something called free will, which supposedly creates ideas out of pure nothingness, without any help from our senses, our memories, our neural pathways, is utter fantasy and in no way grounded in reality. Think for a second what use a form of free will would be if ithad no help in making decisions from our senses, past experience, and reflex actions. Basically, without these things we are blind to our options, and no amount of planning can aid this. We need content to base our actions on, and we get this from our the aformentioned sources, which are causally connected to the external world. What we do have, which is not some abstract white hole of action, is a SENSE of will. We FEEL like we are the author of our own actions, and that sense that we are producing our own actions is important for our sense of potency and sense of control. If we didn't have this sense of ownership of our actions, we would basically feel like we were watching events unfold, as we sometimes feel when we react to things in the moment and let our unconscious automatic processes take control (for which they do extremely well when they now what to predict). But when we come up against more unexpected circumstances we require the help of all the resources at our disposal, and something needs to be directing the shots, otherwise it might all fall apart (like an orchestra without a conductor). Fortunately the brain is more than capable of achieving everything it needs to do, however it lacks a central author being a grup of many expert cells, with no captain. This is where our sense of conscious will comes into play. Instead of there actually being a controller, the brain and its stockpile of resources are given full reign, however, they are also led to believe there is a controller at work, and the supposed controller (our conscious perception of will) also believes it is in control, however it only thinks it has this potency, and thus acts as a sort of echo chamber to the willings of the brain, and allows the system to be aware of whether it is causing its own actions, or the world is causing them. Basically our sense of will is a sense, similar to our others in the sense (pardon the pun) that is allows us to perceive something which exists in the external world - our brains coordinated actions which affect the world around it. It might be seen as a sort of feedback mechanism which boosts confidnece or shows areas of concern when it comes to actions.

Im not sure if this explanation is entirely satisfactory, but it is basically Wegner's conception of conscious will, which i rather like, as it seeks to explain what is is and why we feel the way we do, rather than outright denying free will and not replacing it with anything (which is why denying free will is such a hard pill to swallow, leaving nothing in its place).

I like thsi very incorporative explanation, but doesn't it explain free will through determinism? Has anyone expalined determinism through free wil ? Perhaps the former reduction is based in a particular orientation of control. One PN author suggested that it is because (historically Western) of our insistancy upon a dualistic 'real' universe.

It would depend on what kind of free will you are trying to explain deterministically. This version does away with the traditional view of free will, tosses it out the door, and suggests what we think of as free will is actually an illusion, but it then explains the illusion rather than just leaving us as unfeeling automatons. If you wish to explain the version of free will which considers us as the true authors of our actions, with nothing else to intervene and guide those actions, then it will be extremely difficult to explain that deterministically. The problem is, determinism is very simple, its cause and effect, and it is difficult to introduce any change in this idea to allow THAT version of free will in. So you need to start with a more friendly version of free will.

[chaz wyman]

straw dogs by john gray backs up the work of susan blackmore

books

read em

Reductionist bullshit. I am just so far ahead of this stuff.

I can ignore you and her you and she are nothing but memes.

[chaz wyman]

A few thoughts:

1) Real free will must involves the real possibility of an agent doing something other than he did, given exactly the same circumstances.
Given a set of circumstances it is necessary that I would act the same if I were to fully consider my options. I would be basing my act on my experience. Any 'reality' in which I might choose otherwise would not only be undesirable - as I would not be fully considering my options based on my experience, AND of course impossible, as if this were the case we could never predict any event and the laws of physics would have to be null and void.
Thus 'free wil' is not only undesirable but also impossible.

2) You can't get real free-will in a deterministic universe. All compatibilism can do is attempt to justify our use of the concept, which I suspect it can't.

Compatibilism simply re-works the concept to accommodate determinism. Free will in these terms take the individual as a determining agent; free will is what determining agents do from a subjective perspective. This simply recasts act of will as 'free'; with the 'free' aspect being wholly determined by the individual's motivation and desire.

3) Free-will is only possible if the universe allows random non-deterministic events. These can be physical events, so there is no need to invoke spirits or ghosts in the machine.

Not even that helps the free-will case. In what way is it free if it is "determined" by a chaotic and random act. Thus free will is impossible even in a universe with true randomness


4) If there are events that form part of the internal deliberating process of a human agent that determines how it spends its energy ( ie what actions it takes ) , then I would suggest that that agent has a free will.

It is not free in any sense as you are at the end of a long chain of determined events the first of which (your birth) you had no control over whatever. Your personality is the result of determined events and environmental influences, none of which you may control outside the system of cause and effect.

5) Note that this is not to say an agent acts pureley arbitrarily, becasue it will still be constrained by the usual forces that motivate it ( thirst, hunger, reputation, etc) which are deterministic. Free will is only significant in circumstances of uncertainty where the facts or relative importance of competing desires are not clear. The more you question your beliefs and desires, the more free will you will have.

This makes you a compatibilist.

6) Of course if you want to see such random events as not being part of the entity that is the agent, you will consider that agent as not having a free will. However, to do so, it must be possible to distinguish between the random events and the agent itself. If we presume an equivalence between agency and consciousness, then if the physical processes that equate to our consciousness are non-deterministic, then we have free will.

If there are random events that have no cause then you simply cannot make the distinction, and the laws of physics would have to be jettisoned.
PS Quantum events are - causes unknown - this does not invalidate determinism.

[zimmer80203`]

Free-will implies choice. Freewill does not imply or mean using the same "thing" or "source" to choose. Thought choosing red rather than blue or right rather than left is not free-will. It is merely thought making a choice or decision. In order for free-will to exsist there has to be two completely different and unrelated sources to make a decision.

Fortunately, man has two sources to choose from: thought and consciousness. Man has the freedoom to choose whether he wants to rely upon thought or consciousness. The absence of thought allows man to experience consciousness and understand how thought and consciousness are different.

Thought is binary, fragmented, limited, and incomplete. On the other hand, consciousness is multidimensional, whole, complete, and unlimited. Thought and consciousness are two completely different fields of existence. Thought is unaware or oblivious of consciousness; consciousness is aware and understands thought.