Philosophically, this...THIS IS AMAZING!

[blackbox]

Ok, I think I missed the point being made. It's not so much about language. I didn't give enough attention to the explanation.

Having done so, I find I disagree with it. But my understanding of what constitutes an adaptive trait may be faulty... I thought an adaptive trait was positive - ie a trait that gives advantage under that organism's context. I didn't think neutral or negative traits would be called "adaptive". I'll go and investigate...

[blackbox]

Chaz, I recently read Jeremy Coyne's book Why Evolution is True. I noticed multiple occasions where he also used language that could be read as assuming intentionality. The English language seems to veer towards agency/intentionality.

I agree - but I don't think it takes to much imagination to be able to re-phrase statements to avoid it.
Darwin is also full of it, but then he also believed in Lamarckian evolution by acquired characteristics too.

I recently read "What Darwin Got Wrong.", which sums up the problem very succinctly - don't worry it is pro-evolution, and starts with a title disclaimer.

http://www.amazon.co.uk/What-Darwin-Wro ... 1846682193

Here's what they say.


There has been a long-standing, subtle confusion, elegantly expressed by Fodor & Piattelli-Palmarini between
“(1) The claim that evolution is a process in which creatures with adaptive traits are selected and
(2) the claim that evolution is a process in which creatures are selected for their adaptive traits.”
This subtle difference is at the heart of the diverse uses and abuses of Darwinism. The connection between Darwin’s and Fodor’s statements here is that the overemphasis on the study of positive traits has led to that assumption and the working assumption that claim (2) is more likely to be applied than statement (1), where more interest on neutral and negative traits would suit an approach with greater fidelity to the simplicity of Darwin’s original argument and more clearly demonstrate a natural world of infinite variety. But with the will of humans to uncover explanatory stories, rather than simple observations, the issue of positive stories of evolutionary change have a greater head-lining quality; additionally to political and social pressure to offer an alternative to the explanatory power of theology may be responsible for the overstatement of natural selection here.

According to wiki, an adaptive trait is one that gives advantage. If so, I cannot see much difference between 1) and 2).

[Arising_uk]

According to wiki, an adaptive trait is one that gives advantage. If so, I cannot see much difference between 1) and 2).

I may be jumping in here but I think its the idea that there is some way that something 'knows' there is an advantage, i.e. some kind of teleology being involved, whereas what happens is a trait appears by some mechanism(mutation being the preferred one at present) and its only after the event that it turns out to be advantageous, could just as easily kill one off. Sorry if I'm missing the points.

[chaz wyman]

Chaz, I recently read Jeremy Coyne's book Why Evolution is True. I noticed multiple occasions where he also used language that could be read as assuming intentionality. The English language seems to veer towards agency/intentionality.

I agree - but I don't think it takes to much imagination to be able to re-phrase statements to avoid it.
Darwin is also full of it, but then he also believed in Lamarckian evolution by acquired characteristics too.

I recently read "What Darwin Got Wrong.", which sums up the problem very succinctly - don't worry it is pro-evolution, and starts with a title disclaimer.

http://www.amazon.co.uk/What-Darwin-Wro ... 1846682193

Here's what they say.


There has been a long-standing, subtle confusion, elegantly expressed by Fodor & Piattelli-Palmarini between
“(1) The claim that evolution is a process in which creatures with adaptive traits are selected and
(2) the claim that evolution is a process in which creatures are selected for their adaptive traits.”
This subtle difference is at the heart of the diverse uses and abuses of Darwinism. The connection between Darwin’s and Fodor’s statements here is that the overemphasis on the study of positive traits has led to that assumption and the working assumption that claim (2) is more likely to be applied than statement (1), where more interest on neutral and negative traits would suit an approach with greater fidelity to the simplicity of Darwin’s original argument and more clearly demonstrate a natural world of infinite variety. But with the will of humans to uncover explanatory stories, rather than simple observations, the issue of positive stories of evolutionary change have a greater head-lining quality; additionally to political and social pressure to offer an alternative to the explanatory power of theology may be responsible for the overstatement of natural selection here.

According to wiki, an adaptive trait is one that gives advantage. If so, I cannot see much difference between 1) and 2).

Then read it again!
NO creature can be selected FOR a trait.
Creatures survive because they do not die, no trait is SELECTED.

Creature are selected, not traits.

[chaz wyman]

According to wiki, an adaptive trait is one that gives advantage. If so, I cannot see much difference between 1) and 2).

I may be jumping in here but I think its the idea that there is some way that something 'knows' there is an advantage, i.e. some kind of teleology being involved, whereas what happens is a trait appears by some mechanism(mutation being the preferred one at present) and its only after the event that it turns out to be advantageous, could just as easily kill one off. Sorry if I missing the points.

It is as straightforward as that, yes.

There is no actual 'selection'. Creatures either produce viable offspring or they do not.
It is only the co-incidence of more useful traits appearing in those survivors that allows evolution to happen.
The point that Palmentiari and Fodor are pointing to is the fact that most do not draw this important but subtle distinction.
And it is interesting that Blackbox has missed the difference!!

He is not the only one failing to draw that distinction = you can find it in evolutionary psychology and even in the best evolutionary thinkers like Dawkins and Dennett.
It's my view that they tend to get lazy with the extra grammar that is necessary, but this leads them to unsubstiatable conclusions that lack rigour and present a teleology.

[chaz wyman]

Ok, I think I missed the point being made. It's not so much about language. I didn't give enough attention to the explanation.

Having done so, I find I disagree with it. But my understanding of what constitutes an adaptive trait may be faulty... I thought an adaptive trait was positive - ie a trait that gives advantage under that organism's context. I didn't think neutral or negative traits would be called "adaptive". I'll go and investigate...

THe point is that traits and genes are not selected- whole organisms are selected, and they contain a huge range of traits and behaviours.

[blackbox]

According to wiki, an adaptive trait is one that gives advantage. If so, I cannot see much difference between 1) and 2).

I may be jumping in here but I think its the idea that there is some way that something 'knows' there is an advantage, i.e. some kind of teleology being involved, whereas what happens is a trait appears by some mechanism(mutation being the preferred one at present) and its only after the event that it turns out to be advantageous, could just as easily kill one off. Sorry if I'm missing the points.

The primary meaning of "for" does entail intention (which in turn entails agency), and it's that meaning that I think you and Chaz are objecting to. And I agree with both of you that there is no agent at work, no intention, no telos.

However, that's not the only meaning "for" can carry. It can also carry the meaning "because of", as in "to shout for joy". Here, "for" entails no agency or intention or end, it's purely explanatory, as in "because of the joy... shouting!"

Now, when I read "creatures are selected for their adaptive traits" the more common meaning of "for" makes no sense, so I don't interpret it in that way. And the second meaning I mentioned makes complete sense - because those creatures have adaptive traits, they (the creatures carrying those traits) are selected.

=========
Since we're talking about adaptive traits, which by definition give advantage, they could not just as easily kill one off. You could say that about mutations, which can be suited to the environment, unsuited, or neither, but you can't say it of adaptive traits.

[chaz wyman]

According to wiki, an adaptive trait is one that gives advantage. If so, I cannot see much difference between 1) and 2).

I may be jumping in here but I think its the idea that there is some way that something 'knows' there is an advantage, i.e. some kind of teleology being involved, whereas what happens is a trait appears by some mechanism(mutation being the preferred one at present) and its only after the event that it turns out to be advantageous, could just as easily kill one off. Sorry if I'm missing the points.

The primary meaning of "for" does entail intention (which in turn entails agency), and it's that meaning that I think you and Chaz are objecting to. And I agree with both of you that there is no agent at work, no intention, no telos.

However, that's not the only meaning "for" can carry. It can also carry the meaning "because of", as in "to shout for joy". Here, "for" entails no agency or intention or end, it's purely explanatory, as in "because of the joy... shouting!"

Now, when I read "creatures are selected for their adaptive traits" the more common meaning of "for" makes no sense, so I don't interpret it in that way. And the second meaning I mentioned makes complete sense - because those creatures have adaptive traits, they (the creatures carrying those traits) are selected.

=========
Since we're talking about adaptive traits, which by definition give advantage, they could not just as easily kill one off. You could say that about mutations, which can be suited to the environment, unsuited, or neither, but you can't say it of adaptive traits.

Nice try! And of indeed 'for' can have that meaning. However, in the text quoted that is NOT how it was meant.
And the claims of the authors in this case were not intended to have that ambiguity. Their intention is, after long careers in related disciplines to point to errors in evolutionary interpretations, not to give air to the ambiguity inherent in English. And the two statements quoted were intended to provide a contrast between a misinterpretation and a more reasonable one. If you look back you can see what they mean.
If you take their statement the way you want it, that would render their entire book little more than a joke about 2 statements saying the same thing.

And on your last point. Traits of any kind are not 'killed off' - that is the whole point. The unit of selection by evolution is NOT a trait, nor is it a gene, a behaviour, nor a meme. The unit of selection is the individual reproductive unit. As long as that animal or plant produces viable offspring, nature does not give a fuck about traits. Traits are not a natural category, but a human one. Individuals can have a host of traits good, bad and indifferent, they may or may not survive, it is the offspring that matter, not the human categories upon which they are divided.

[blackbox]

Nice try! And of indeed 'for' can have that meaning. However, in the text quoted that is NOT how it was meant.
And the claims of the authors in this case were not intended to have that ambiguity. Their intention is, after long careers in related disciplines to point to errors in evolutionary interpretations, not to give air to the ambiguity inherent in English. And the two statements quoted were intended to provide a contrast between a misinterpretation and a more reasonable one. If you look back you can see what they mean.
If you take their statement the way you want it, that would render their entire book little more than a joke about 2 statements saying the same thing.

And on your last point. Traits of any kind are not 'killed off' - that is the whole point. The unit of selection by evolution is NOT a trait, nor is it a gene, a behaviour, nor a meme. The unit of selection is the individual reproductive unit. As long as that animal or plant produces viable offspring, nature does not give a fuck about traits. Traits are not a natural category, but a human one. Individuals can have a host of traits good, bad and indifferent, they may or may not survive, it is the offspring that matter, not the human categories upon which they are divided.

If this is more than just loose/ambiguous use of language, there must be a heap of evolutionary authors that envisage agency and purpose within natural selection. What agency are they positing? Or do they think that the process itself actually purposes things? That it has a defined telos towards which it is purposely moving. Who are these authors? Has anyone challenged them and tried to clarify whether they do actually believe in purpose here, or whether they're using language ambiguously. These challenges and response, if they have occurred, would clear this question up. Do you know of any?

[chaz wyman]

Nice try! And of indeed 'for' can have that meaning. However, in the text quoted that is NOT how it was meant.
And the claims of the authors in this case were not intended to have that ambiguity. Their intention is, after long careers in related disciplines to point to errors in evolutionary interpretations, not to give air to the ambiguity inherent in English. And the two statements quoted were intended to provide a contrast between a misinterpretation and a more reasonable one. If you look back you can see what they mean.
If you take their statement the way you want it, that would render their entire book little more than a joke about 2 statements saying the same thing.

And on your last point. Traits of any kind are not 'killed off' - that is the whole point. The unit of selection by evolution is NOT a trait, nor is it a gene, a behaviour, nor a meme. The unit of selection is the individual reproductive unit. As long as that animal or plant produces viable offspring, nature does not give a fuck about traits. Traits are not a natural category, but a human one. Individuals can have a host of traits good, bad and indifferent, they may or may not survive, it is the offspring that matter, not the human categories upon which they are divided.

If this is more than just loose/ambiguous use of language, there must be a heap of evolutionary authors that envisage agency and purpose within natural selection. What agency are they positing? Or do they think that the process itself actually purposes things? That it has a defined telos towards which it is purposely moving. Who are these authors? Has anyone challenged them and tried to clarify whether they do actually believe in purpose here, or whether they're using language ambiguously. These challenges and response, if they have occurred, would clear this question up. Do you know of any?

Dawkins and Dennett are both guilty of slack use of language. Why they do not think this is important has always amazed me. By abusing language in this way they elevate evolutionary 'explanations' to a religion.
For Steve Pinker and Susan Blackmore, this sort of abuse is bread and butter, they are unapologetic and, I think, philosophically naive.

[blackbox]

Dawkins and Dennett are both guilty of slack use of language. Why they do not think this is important has always amazed me. By abusing language in this way they elevate evolutionary 'explanations' to a religion.
For Steve Pinker and Susan Blackmore, this sort of abuse is bread and butter, they are unapologetic and, I think, philosophically naive.

I am unconvinced that this is anything other than a slack use of language. Does Pinker, or Blackmore, explicitly advance the idea that there is agency or purpose, or do they just speak in a manner that can be interpreted in that way?

Or to put it another way, if these were asked "are you saying that evolution is the outworking of some purpose?" or "do you think there is an (intelligent) agent behind the process of evolution?" Would they answer in the affirmative? I would be surprised if they would, but then, I've been surprised many times in my life.

[chaz wyman]

Dawkins and Dennett are both guilty of slack use of language. Why they do not think this is important has always amazed me. By abusing language in this way they elevate evolutionary 'explanations' to a religion.
For Steve Pinker and Susan Blackmore, this sort of abuse is bread and butter, they are unapologetic and, I think, philosophically naive.

I am unconvinced that this is anything other than a slack use of language. Does Pinker, or Blackmore, explicitly advance the idea that there is agency or purpose, or do they just speak in a manner that can be interpreted in that way?


Make up your own mind.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fQ_9-Qx5Hz4

Where the human agent is completely ignored as a dupe with no volition.
Whereas a meme is described as having a volition.
If she were talking about god, or fairies, or spirits she would be in the luney bin, but she is talking about a thing for which there is no material corollary. So what is the difference?



Or to put it another way, if these were asked "are you saying that evolution is the outworking of some purpose?" or "do you think there is an (intelligent) agent behind the process of evolution?" Would they answer in the affirmative? I would be surprised if they would, but then, I've been surprised many times in my life.

[blackbox]

Make up your own mind.

Yes, I see what you mean. She explicitly rejects agency and purpose early on, but once she gets onto those "temes" she starts getting incredibly loose.

[chaz wyman]

Make up your own mind.

Yes, I see what you mean. She explicitly rejects agency and purpose early on, but once she gets onto those "temes" she starts getting incredibly loose.

Yeah, I think the game she is playing is sort of self justifying. Temes and Memes are what we normally call ideas. All she is talking about is that ideas live or die-out according a mechanism whose results are Darwinian. I say - so what! All she is saying is nothing. Social science, history, anthropology and human experience is a discourse about the reasons human choose to reproduce and repeat those ideas, and why they survive. They do not survive because they want to, but because of the fact that we choose them.
What she does is negate the human by characterising us a dupes to the volition and 'need to survive' of the meme or teme.
I just seems to me that she adds zero to human understanding, and the discourses I mention do a far better job telling us the meaning of the cultural ideas, ideologies and practices that characterise humans behaviour.