Wyman wrote:Sounds like a trinity, not monism.
I don't see this as a trinity. I am claiming that there is only one substance but that this substance can express itself in a physical and non-physical way. The best I can do, as of now, to describe this would be to talk about another kind of monism. Say, for instance, a physicalist. They believe that there is only one kind of substance--physical substance--and that this substance has a plethora of physical properties. And just because this substance is expressed through many different properties doesn't mean it is no longer monism...If that makes sense.
Wyman wrote: What's the justification - being appealing to you is not enough. Flaw - what does it explain, predict, simplify, etc.?
This theory, I believe, has the ability to solve the mind-body problem and the problem of qualia.
It solves the mind-body problem insofar as there is no longer a need to explain how something physical (the brain, the body) and non-physical (the mind) interact with one another. This is because they are one and the same substance. They are merely being expressed in two different ways.
It solves the problem of qualia because we can understand why a scientific explanation is explanatorily impotent with respect to our qualitative experiences [Now this is something I am still trying to develop, so bear with me]. Since our language has developed to discuss the extrinsic properties of the "Substance", it cannot express to you what it feels like for someone like me to see the color red.