That's unintelligible until I know what you mean by "choice". But since causal indeterminism makes the outcome unchosen, the only possible conclusion is that "choice" as you use the term is an empty category.Terrapin Station wrote: ↑Tue Jun 08, 2021 8:29 pm"Freedom of state" doesn't make much sense. Freedom has to involve some degree of causal indeterminism. Adding choice to the scenario just makes it more complicated than it needs to be to address freedom. You can't make a choice is there's no causal indeterminism to exploit.RogerSH wrote: ↑Tue Jun 08, 2021 8:16 pmI don't see how that is a response to my point that ontological freedom of a system is freedom of its state, hence freedom to be chosen, whereas what free will requires is freedom to choose. Just because a concept has been labelled "freedom" doesn't, as far as I can see, guarantee its applicability to any other concept with the same name in the title.Terrapin Station wrote: ↑Tue Jun 08, 2021 1:49 pm This is because "free will" still hinges on "freedom" in that general/simple sense. You can't have free will if there is no freedom in that ontological sense...
A Meccano model of two Incompatibilist Fallacies
Re: A Meccano model of two Incompatibilist Fallacies
Re: A Meccano model of two Incompatibilist Fallacies
You are squirming a thousand worms in a bucket of lemon juice.Terrapin Station wrote: ↑Tue Jun 08, 2021 8:26 pmAh--of course it wouldn't make much sense to credit Beethoven with a particular recorded performance of his music. You credit him with composing it.Sculptor wrote: ↑Tue Jun 08, 2021 6:56 pmFFS.Terrapin Station wrote: ↑Tue Jun 08, 2021 1:36 pm
It would make it incorrect per what?
"People shouldn't hold ethical stances that are inconsistent with other stances they hold because . . ."? Well, because what?
(If you're rather saying that they can't actually hold inconsistent stances, that's another matter, but then no one actually has inconsistent stances, of course.)
"What I have a problem with are certain non-speech actions."
I don't have a problem with speech actions, in other words.
I have a problem with certain non-speech actions. Hence why I specified that.
You're doing that thing where one can't even preemptively nip a misconception in the bud, because the other person will just ignore it anyway and proceed with the misconception.
??
People who think that Beethoven was a genius certainly can and do do this. I don't understand why you're asking this, really (because it seems so obvious that people report what they think/how they feel about such things).
Stop dancing.
You have said that Hitler bears no responsibility for the holocaust because he killed no jews, only told others to do it?
If this what you said or not?
It would follow then that since Beethoven did not perform the music he wrote he gets no credit for the Ninth Symphony/
If the first is a true statement of your position then the second has to be also.
If you accept one, but no the other then you have a contradiction in your thinking and therefore hold a WRONG ethical stance.
And yeah, insofar as Hitler killed no one, I wouldn't say he's responsible for any deaths.
That would be ANY perfromance of ANY music he had written, if you are going to let Hitler off the hook.
What would you give hitler and beethoven credit for?
Last edited by Sculptor on Tue Jun 08, 2021 9:33 pm, edited 1 time in total.
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Re: A Meccano model of two Incompatibilist Fallacies
??? I'm responding to you using the word "chosen/choose." Don't you know how you were using that term?RogerSH wrote: ↑Tue Jun 08, 2021 8:48 pmThat's unintelligible until I know what you mean by "choice". But since causal indeterminism makes the outcome unchosen, the only possible conclusion is that "choice" as you use the term is an empty category.Terrapin Station wrote: ↑Tue Jun 08, 2021 8:29 pm"Freedom of state" doesn't make much sense. Freedom has to involve some degree of causal indeterminism. Adding choice to the scenario just makes it more complicated than it needs to be to address freedom. You can't make a choice is there's no causal indeterminism to exploit.RogerSH wrote: ↑Tue Jun 08, 2021 8:16 pm
I don't see how that is a response to my point that ontological freedom of a system is freedom of its state, hence freedom to be chosen, whereas what free will requires is freedom to choose. Just because a concept has been labelled "freedom" doesn't, as far as I can see, guarantee its applicability to any other concept with the same name in the title.
"Since causal indeterminism makes the outcome unchosen"--you'd have to explain yourself there.
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Re: A Meccano model of two Incompatibilist Fallacies
The post your quoting said, "You credit him with composing it."Sculptor wrote: ↑Tue Jun 08, 2021 9:08 pmYou are squirming a thousand worms in a bucket of lemon juice.Terrapin Station wrote: ↑Tue Jun 08, 2021 8:26 pmAh--of course it wouldn't make much sense to credit Beethoven with a particular recorded performance of his music. You credit him with composing it.Sculptor wrote: ↑Tue Jun 08, 2021 6:56 pm
FFS.
Stop dancing.
You have said that Hitler bears no responsibility for the holocaust because he killed no jews, only told others to do it?
If this what you said or not?
It would follow then that since Beethoven did not perform the music he wrote he gets no credit for the Ninth Symphony/
If the first is a true statement of your position then the second has to be also.
If you accept one, but no the other then you have a contradiction in your thinking and therefore hold a WRONG ethical stance.
And yeah, insofar as Hitler killed no one, I wouldn't say he's responsible for any deaths.
What would you give hitler and beethoven credit for?
You actually read that and then asked what I'd credit Beethoven for.
Re: A Meccano model of two Incompatibilist Fallacies
Yes, but you seem to be using it in a different way which I can't get you to define.Terrapin Station wrote: ↑Tue Jun 08, 2021 9:29 pm??? I'm responding to you using the word "chosen/choose." Don't you know how you were using that term?RogerSH wrote:[/list]206 time=1623181690 user_id=21734]That's unintelligible until I know what you mean by "choice". But since causal indeterminism makes the outcome unchosen, the only possible conclusion is that "choice" as you use the term is an empty category.Terrapin Station wrote: ↑Tue Jun 08, 2021 8:29 pm
"Freedom of state" doesn't make much sense. Freedom has to involve some degree of causal indeterminism. Adding choice to the scenario just makes it more complicated than it needs to be to address freedom. You can't make a choice is there's no causal indeterminism to exploit.
I have done before, but to recap:"Since causal indeterminism makes the outcome unchosen"--you'd have to explain yourself there.
- Causal indeterminism entails that the consequent state of the world is not determined by the antecedent state of the world
- The antecedent state of the chooser is part of the antecedent state of the world
- Therefore the consequent state of the world is not determined by the antecedent state of the chooser
- Therefore the outcome is not chosen by the chooser
There is a close analogy, I am beginning to think, between the metaphysics of choice and the metaphysics of observation – the metaphysics underlying Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle. Do you accept Heisenberg’s analysis? Has this analogy been explored to your knowledge?
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Re: A Meccano model of two Incompatibilist Fallacies
The problem is that "choice" has a connotation of "an act of selecting or making a decision when faced with two or more possibilities," and when we're not talking about agents, yet we want to focus on ontological freedom, the notion of things like single particles making "choices" is misleading.RogerSH wrote: ↑Wed Jun 09, 2021 10:59 am I have done before, but to recap:
- Causal indeterminism entails that the consequent state of the world is not determined by the antecedent state of the world
- The antecedent state of the chooser is part of the antecedent state of the world
- Therefore the consequent state of the world is not determined by the antecedent state of the chooser
I said "the only possible conclusion is that "choice" as you use the term is an empty category." Maybe that is what you are really saying?
- Therefore the outcome is not chosen by the chooser
Re: A Meccano model of two Incompatibilist Fallacies
And what would you give Hitler credit for?Terrapin Station wrote: ↑Tue Jun 08, 2021 9:32 pmThe post your quoting said, "You credit him with composing it."Sculptor wrote: ↑Tue Jun 08, 2021 9:08 pmYou are squirming a thousand worms in a bucket of lemon juice.Terrapin Station wrote: ↑Tue Jun 08, 2021 8:26 pm
Ah--of course it wouldn't make much sense to credit Beethoven with a particular recorded performance of his music. You credit him with composing it.
And yeah, insofar as Hitler killed no one, I wouldn't say he's responsible for any deaths.
What would you give hitler and beethoven credit for?
You actually read that and then asked what I'd credit Beethoven for.
Re: A Meccano model of two Incompatibilist Fallacies
That doesn't seem an adequate definition of choosing. When I throw a dice, I am faced with six possibilities, but the outcome is not chosen by me. The possibilities must be reduced to one according to my eventual state of mind: that is, the consequent state must be determined by the antecedent state of my mind.Terrapin Station wrote: ↑Wed Jun 09, 2021 1:30 pmThe problem is that "choice" has a connotation of "an act of selecting or making a decision when faced with two or more possibilities," and when we're not talking about agents, yet we want to focus on ontological freedom, the notion of things like single particles making "choices" is misleading.RogerSH wrote: ↑Wed Jun 09, 2021 10:59 am I have done before, but to recap:
- Causal indeterminism entails that the consequent state of the world is not determined by the antecedent state of the world
- The antecedent state of the chooser is part of the antecedent state of the world
- Therefore the consequent state of the world is not determined by the antecedent state of the chooser
I said "the only possible conclusion is that "choice" as you use the term is an empty category." Maybe that is what you are really saying?
- Therefore the outcome is not chosen by the chooser
As a physicalist, I see a physical system as a physical system, whether it is also a conscious agent, a digital simulation of a conscious agent, or a particle.
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Re: A Meccano model of two Incompatibilist Fallacies
His paintings, for one.Sculptor wrote: ↑Wed Jun 09, 2021 3:27 pmAnd what would you give Hitler credit for?Terrapin Station wrote: ↑Tue Jun 08, 2021 9:32 pmThe post your quoting said, "You credit him with composing it."
You actually read that and then asked what I'd credit Beethoven for.
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Re: A Meccano model of two Incompatibilist Fallacies
Oy vey.RogerSH wrote: ↑Wed Jun 09, 2021 6:51 pmThat doesn't seem an adequate definition of choosing. When I throw a dice, I am faced with six possibilities, but the outcome is not chosen by me. The possibilities must be reduced to one according to my eventual state of mind: that is, the consequent state must be determined by the antecedent state of my mind.Terrapin Station wrote: ↑Wed Jun 09, 2021 1:30 pmThe problem is that "choice" has a connotation of "an act of selecting or making a decision when faced with two or more possibilities," and when we're not talking about agents, yet we want to focus on ontological freedom, the notion of things like single particles making "choices" is misleading.RogerSH wrote: ↑Wed Jun 09, 2021 10:59 am I have done before, but to recap:
- Causal indeterminism entails that the consequent state of the world is not determined by the antecedent state of the world
- The antecedent state of the chooser is part of the antecedent state of the world
- Therefore the consequent state of the world is not determined by the antecedent state of the chooser
I said "the only possible conclusion is that "choice" as you use the term is an empty category." Maybe that is what you are really saying?
- Therefore the outcome is not chosen by the chooser
As a physicalist, I see a physical system as a physical system, whether it is also a conscious agent, a digital simulation of a conscious agent, or a particle.
Do you understand what it means to say that a term has some connotation or other?
Re: A Meccano model of two Incompatibilist Fallacies
But not the holocaust oddlyTerrapin Station wrote: ↑Wed Jun 09, 2021 8:02 pmHis paintings, for one.Sculptor wrote: ↑Wed Jun 09, 2021 3:27 pmAnd what would you give Hitler credit for?Terrapin Station wrote: ↑Tue Jun 08, 2021 9:32 pm
The post your quoting said, "You credit him with composing it."
You actually read that and then asked what I'd credit Beethoven for.
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Re: A Meccano model of two Incompatibilist Fallacies
Rhetorical question ignored.Terrapin Station wrote: ↑Wed Jun 09, 2021 9:01 pmOy vey.RogerSH wrote: ↑Wed Jun 09, 2021 6:51 pmThat doesn't seem an adequate definition of choosing. When I throw a dice, I am faced with six possibilities, but the outcome is not chosen by me. The possibilities must be reduced to one according to my eventual state of mind: that is, the consequent state must be determined by the antecedent state of my mind.Terrapin Station wrote: ↑Wed Jun 09, 2021 1:30 pm
The problem is that "choice" has a connotation of "an act of selecting or making a decision when faced with two or more possibilities," and when we're not talking about agents, yet we want to focus on ontological freedom, the notion of things like single particles making "choices" is misleading.
As a physicalist, I see a physical system as a physical system, whether it is also a conscious agent, a digital simulation of a conscious agent, or a particle.
Do you understand what it means to say that a term has some connotation or other?
I was trying to identify the sense of “possible” that is necessary when speaking of a choice that is not something done to the world but something done to part of the world by another part of the world – the crucial distinction that your formulation appears to me to gloss over.
I can’t help noticing that none of the objections to my thesis have actually addressed the specific arguments, but are more along the lines of “you can’t argue like that” [at least if the argument doesn’t lead to the conclusion first thought of]. The trouble with this kind of objection is that you can use it to defend any position – like a Flat Earth:-
“The surface of the earth is horizontal, and the concept of spherical horizontality is incoherent. If you claim the earth is spherical, you clearly don’t understand what horizontality is.”
Or less politely: “The earth is not remotely like a child’s marble, LOL!”
So I’ll leave it there & focus on a different part of the subject area (when I return from a week in Scotland).
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Re: A Meccano model of two Incompatibilist Fallacies
There is the mind which is free. There is the body that behaves according to the laws of nature. The body however can be in an undecided state. It is during this time that the mind can intervene and affect reality.RogerSH wrote: ↑Thu May 13, 2021 1:30 pm “Incompatibilism” is the claim that free will is incompatible with a deterministic world.
Take four similar Meccano strips (or equivalent) and bolt them loosely together at their ends to form a rhombus. Bolt a fifth strip between two of the opposite corners. The resulting assembly has no degrees of freedom: it is determinate. Note, however, that different lengths of the diagonal strip result in different shapes of the assembly.
Consider this as a model for a world containing at least one mind. The mind is modelled by the diagonal strip, and the length of the diagonal represents its will.
Then we conclude that this world is determinate, but ALSO that the will of the included mind is able to determine the state of the world. This apparent contradiction arises because the determinism of the world equates to an absence of externally accessible freedom, whereas the freedom needed for a will to determine what happens is internally accessible freedom – accessible to a will whose state is itself a variable of the world state. The model illustrates that it is a fallacy that a lack of externally accessible freedom necessitates a lack of internally accessible freedom. This is the first Incompatibilist fallacy.
The standard reply to this kind of argument is that in addition to the ordinary kind of freedom – the freedom of a free-range chicken, for example – “freedom of will” requires the ability of the mind to choose its own state at the time of choice. This is impossible, it is claimed, because prior causes in the world provide necessary and sufficient conditions to determine that state. Can anyone guess why I claim that this too is a fallacy?