Dimebag wrote: ↑Sun May 23, 2021 9:19 pm
Of course, you mention epistemology, with no further explanation of what about the situation requires elucidation. I explain to you, in quite a lot of detail, just WHY our developing minds don’t question that mental content, and why it continues to not be questioned. But that’s not good enough for you.
Because that has absolutely nothing to do with the epistemological dilemma I'm talking about.
What I'm talking about is a situation that can be formalized this way:
(1) F only involves x
(2) Y (re F) is not possible given G
(3) We know (2) via F
(4) To know (2) requires y as opposed to x
The above is obviously a problem, because (1) through (4) can't be conjointly the case. It's an epistemological dilemma, a set of premises/conditions that are contradictory when taken together. A proper response needs to show how to solve the contradiction from an epistemological perspective. It either needs to modify one or more premises, or it needs to show why the premises aren't conjointly contradictory despite the appearance that they are.
Explaining why developing minds don't question something yada yada yada obviously has nothing to do with the formalization above. But the formalization above is what I've been talking about (just not as a formalization, but with particular variables plugged in).
I will admit, these formalisations are my LEAST favourite part of philosophy, so I tend to avoid them.
It is difficult for me to understand how this applies to the problem at hand, especially since you haven’t defined the variables for me, again, making me have to guess.
I am assuming, F is perception and X is mental representation. I am taking Y to be justified knowledge of the world, G I am not so sure of, but it seems that F seems to exclude it based on 3. 4 seems to again state that we cannot know Y, which I have guessed as justified knowledge of the world.
I feel like I missed the mark there, though with so many different undefined terms it’s not hard to wonder why.
It would be far simpler if you would either fill in those terms, or even better, express the same logic in some sentences.
Right, so at first, I didn't want to fill in the variables, because I want you to first realize that I'm talking about a very specific logical issue. Focusing on what we're plugging into the variables is bringing in a whole host of baggage that is throwing things off from focusing on the logical issue I'm talking about, and we're going on and on about the baggage where there's no focus at all on the logical issue at hand. We could plug any number of things into the variables and the problem would be the same--that conjointly, those four claims are contradictory. And what I'm looking for is either a modification of one or more premises or a defense of why they're not actually contradictory (or perhaps why the contradiction doesn't matter in this case, if one would argue for some paraconsistent solution).
So, with some hesitation, because it will probably just head back to tangents involving the baggage, what we'd plug into the variables in this case (most of which you got right) are that:
F is perception
x is mental phenomena qua mental phenomena, or we could say awareness of mental phenomena as such
y is the observation of externals as such (or awareness of externals) as opposed to mental phenomena qua mental phenomena, and
G is scientific claims about how perception works a la the organs (or just body parts in general) involved, what the organs do with respect to the nervous system, and so on
My bad. You see in my research of direct realism I think I stumbled across the usage of naïve realism in social psychology
I don't know nuthin' about that. Reid's Common Sense Realism is all I'm talkin' about here.
Would you care to elaborate on why you don’t like the usage of the word perception in the context of direct realism?
Aesthetics, for one. Perception is hackneyed, the eyes flashes over it without seein' it. Apprehension, apprehending, apprehendings, these catch the eye, force the reader to consider what is bein' said. Appropriateness, for another. Perception implies a certain passivity while apprehension, apprehending, apprehendings implies activity or action (I see, I listen, I taste, I touch, I sniff).
So it seems you very much identify with your entire body?
*Yes. I think we all do. It's natural and normal to do so becuz we are our bodies.
When you say I see, I hear, etc, these are all dependent on the sensory organs doing their jobs, detecting the light, detecting the sound, etc. Or would you object even that the sensory organs detect signals? See, this is why details are important, when we get into the details, we uncover just where you stand on these important metaphysical details. Keeping it too simple glosses over that rich and important detail.
I'm leery of gettin' bogged down in examinin' the tree for fear of ignorin' the forest. And, in context of the conversation, it seems unnecessary to dwell on the details. Direct Realism requires no adherence to a particular biological model. And, really, do you wanna go down that road? I could well ask you to describe the organic mechanisms by which I represent or model the world in my gray matter (where precisely does this modeling occur?). We both know there's no definitive answer in the same way there's no definitive answer to 'how does the brain generate mind?'
Simply: I don't wanna go down that particular rabbit hole. It's not, to me, a productive passin' of time.
But, as I say, the direct realist does not say light, or molecules, or sound waves have no role in seein', smellin', tastin', hearin' the world; nor does he say organs are merely ornamental. What the direct realist sez is, the organs alone account for nuthin'. The optical system, for example, does not see or watch. Alone, isolated, it literally is dog food.
No that’s right
No, that's right on the money. A computer is not conscious, not self-conscious, not self-aware. It apprehends nuthin'. There's no one there inside the casing. It's a calculator.
Therefore it's not surprising at all that they are finding that they have to literally build the world from the inside, identifying every aspect of the world within a scene. Man, however, is not a computer, he is a person, and he apprehends directly.
Our minds are perfectly built for a world of objects, because we need to interact to survive. The objects we perceive in the world, simultaneously contain within them, the manipulability which we require. For instance, when we see a cup, we actually see a handle to grip with our hand to hold liquids in for drinking. The shape and form of the object also contains encoded within our perception it’s functionality.
No, this is not accurate. The world is not a natural supplier of cups. Man has to shape some part of the world, make it suitable. We create the handle, make sumthin' that suits us. We impose that manipulability.
There is an appeal to consciousness. Consciousness necessarily entails at minimum, the sense of a bound unity, though some argue it might be illusory. So, there doesn’t necessarily HAVE to be a Cartesian theatre, but there does have to be consciousness, that we are in agreement. But, as I have elucidated elsewhere here, there is no need for a subject object divide, I.e. to divide consciousness into perceiving subject and the perceived object. I agree, THAT would be begging the homunculus, but, just because there is a representation, doesn’t mean anyone is actually observing it. The sense of observing can itself also be a representation, or content on the “screen of the mind”, albeit a very persistent one.
Direct Realism asserts, roundaboutly, I am conscious, I am aware, the cup I fashioned from clay and fired in the kiln sits before me, I directly apprehend it, it's real and apart from me, I am pleased with it becuz I remember the struggle I had to get the clay shaped as I desired. See what I'm doin' here? I'm dismissin' qualities like consciousness and replacin' 'em with myself. I am conscious, not I have consciousness. Seen this way, it's clear there's an apprehender and an apprehended (subject & object).
I may be accused of playin' language games, but I'm doin' just opposite and tryin' to master the words rather than be mastered by them.
A beautiful and poetic description of being. Of course, while you can identify as all of these aspects OF your organism, we could take each one of them away, one by one, and YOU would still be here, just a you which is less capable of sensing the world.
Pretty good for a neanderthal, yeah?
Where I come from, that would be called crippling. Yes, you can blind me, deafen me, sever my spine; you can cripple me and I remain, but no one would sensibly say I'm whole. My capacity to apprehend, to self-suffice, is destroyed
But, arguably, there would be certain parts of you, presumably important parts of your brain, which, without those, you would no longer be. We could keep the blood pumping to your brain via a heart lung machine, renewing the oxygen and nutrient mixture, removing the waste products, allowing your brain to continue even if your heart and lungs gave out.
Yep. A I say up-thread, mind seems to originate in the brain. It, however, does not seem to confine itself to just the brain. In fact, I believe the disembodied or un-situated state you describe would kill the mind. You'd have the meat but the soul would be eradicated.
What I’m saying is, we can identify as literally our whole organism, or we can focus on certain aspects of ourself and identify with those.
The former is normal and natural becuz it is the state of us: we are, each of us, the entirety of our physicality.
The latter is unnatural and can't be sustained without effort. Intuitively we know we're not collections of parts. There are no legs goin' on long walks, there are no free-floatin' nervous systems, Boltzmann brains are fictions. We can dissect, actually and figuratively, but -- as I say -- nuthin' about a minute investigation of my parts will tell anyone anything about me.
But on some level, it might just be an idea, the idea of you.
No, I am a discrete, seamless whole, a reality.
In fact, why stop at the boundary of your body? You take food into yourself, which at some stage becomes “you”. But there is no clear line as to when that happens. How about the air which you inhale and exhale? Isn’t that just as much a crucial part of you as any other resource your body requires for survival? Or the water you drink?
Not knowin' the moment nutrition or consumables transitions to bein' me, seems irrelevant. I eat pizza. In fact I gorge myself. The difference between Henry and pizza is clear. At some point I become un-bloated, my discomfort passes; the pizza has transitioned.
Or the ecosystem you inhabit which you need to sustain you? In fact, why stop there, because we need this earth, and of course, this earth would not have been without the sun, which we also need the light and heat from to survive, to maintain a certain body heat, to stimulate the melanin in our skin and release vitamin d. To set our body clock. We literally are part of the whole universe, which is all interconnected. We need it all. So, why not identify with that? At some point you could just say, it’s all me? At that stage, what is the difference between saying, I am everything, and I am nothing? Maybe I am just this collection of things.
As I say up-thread: we're permeable and yes, from a larger perspective we're indistinguishable from the world we're in. But permeability isn't synonymous with no discreteness and a larger perspective isn't necessarily a superior or more accurate one.
*as a deist, it is my belief man is a composite being, an union of matter and spirit (or matter and information, if you prefer)...mind is result of this union
Terrapin Station wrote: ↑Mon May 24, 2021 12:47 pm
Because that has absolutely nothing to do with the epistemological dilemma I'm talking about.
What I'm talking about is a situation that can be formalized this way:
(1) F only involves x
(2) Y (re F) is not possible given G
(3) We know (2) via F
(4) To know (2) requires y as opposed to x
The above is obviously a problem, because (1) through (4) can't be conjointly the case. It's an epistemological dilemma, a set of premises/conditions that are contradictory when taken together. A proper response needs to show how to solve the contradiction from an epistemological perspective. It either needs to modify one or more premises, or it needs to show why the premises aren't conjointly contradictory despite the appearance that they are.
Explaining why developing minds don't question something yada yada yada obviously has nothing to do with the formalization above. But the formalization above is what I've been talking about (just not as a formalization, but with particular variables plugged in).
I will admit, these formalisations are my LEAST favourite part of philosophy, so I tend to avoid them.
It is difficult for me to understand how this applies to the problem at hand, especially since you haven’t defined the variables for me, again, making me have to guess.
I am assuming, F is perception and X is mental representation. I am taking Y to be justified knowledge of the world, G I am not so sure of, but it seems that F seems to exclude it based on 3. 4 seems to again state that we cannot know Y, which I have guessed as justified knowledge of the world.
I feel like I missed the mark there, though with so many different undefined terms it’s not hard to wonder why.
It would be far simpler if you would either fill in those terms, or even better, express the same logic in some sentences.
Right, so at first, I didn't want to fill in the variables, because I want you to first realize that I'm talking about a very specific logical issue. Focusing on what we're plugging into the variables is bringing in a whole host of baggage that is throwing things off from focusing on the logical issue I'm talking about, and we're going on and on about the baggage where there's no focus at all on the logical issue at hand. We could plug any number of things into the variables and the problem would be the same--that conjointly, those four claims are contradictory. And what I'm looking for is either a modification of one or more premises or a defense of why they're not actually contradictory (or perhaps why the contradiction doesn't matter in this case, if one would argue for some paraconsistent solution).
So, with some hesitation, because it will probably just head back to tangents involving the baggage, what we'd plug into the variables in this case (most of which you got right) are that:
F is perception
x is mental phenomena qua mental phenomena, or we could say awareness of mental phenomena as such
y is the observation of externals as such (or awareness of externals) as opposed to mental phenomena qua mental phenomena, and
G is scientific claims about how perception works a la the organs (or just body parts in general) involved, what the organs do with respect to the nervous system, and so on
So, substituting those terms into your logic sequence:
1) Perception only involves mental phenomena/awareness of mental phenomena
2) ‘Awareness of externals as such’ is not possible, given the scientific claims about how perception works, a la the organs, what the organs do WRT the nervous system and so on.
3) we know 2 via perception
4) to know awareness of externals Is not possible, given the scientific claims about how perception works, requires awareness of externals, as opposed to awareness of mental phenomena,
Now, what are you claiming here.
I need you to explain what you mean by ‘awareness of externals as such’, and how and why this is not possible, given our current scientific understanding of perception. Do you mean, direct access to the world? If that is your meaning, I agree with THIS statement.
Now statement 3 is a little ambiguous, because we know #2 via scientific knowledge, which, although collected through perception, also relies on many other objective measurements, and the scientific process has indirect means of getting at the world external to our perception. We also come to knowledge via means other than perception, such as what you are doing here, a purely LOGICAL process, it may involve us seeing the words, but once we have seen them, there is a sequence of semantic logic which can infer new knowledge which was previously unknown.
Now, we can also come to an understanding that awareness of externals is not possible, via our scientific understanding of perception. If our understanding of perception seems to exclude the possibility of knowing the world directly, because our understanding of perception suggests that our brains are representing perception, then this would exclude such a possibility.
I don’t think neuroscience or cog science has come to a definitive conclusion in regards to how perception works, but, it certainly has a particular position, and that IS representationalism. This is the current paradigm of understanding, right now. Of course, with new research and this MAY change. But the claim IS we perceive the world, via some mental medium, or substrate. This mental substrate is essentially consciousness.
So, I would like to know, what is your take on consciousness? Do we have it? Or is it illusion? If we do have it, does the world appear IN it? And if it does, what is the source of consciousness?
Dimebag wrote: ↑Tue May 25, 2021 11:08 am
I need you to explain what you mean by ‘awareness of externals as such’, and how and why this is not possible, given our current scientific understanding of perception. Do you mean, direct access to the world? If that is your meaning, I agree with THIS statement.
This is probably the most important part here. I explained this earlier in the thread a number of different times, in a number of different ways. I'll explain it again.
Logically, there are two different things we can be claiming in this context:
Either
(A) Our conscious awareness is ONLY awareness of mental phenomena
Or
(B) At least sometimes, our conscious awareness is awareness of something other than mental phenomena.
And just to clarify the above, the idea here is awareness with respect to "raw"perceptual data, aside from or prior to attaching concepts, etc.
If the distinction between those two isn't that clear to you, I'll try to explain it in more detail. Just let me know.
Note that this is NOT saying that how our consciousness works, or what it is ontologically, is something other than mental phenomena. It's about what we're conscious of. I explained this earlier by explaining the use/mention distinction. A traditional (printed) photograph is comprised of pigmented solutions on paper, but the photograph is often not _of_ pigmented solutions on paper. It might be a photograph of a cow in a field or whatever. That's analogous to the use/mention distinction.
(A), which is what you appeared to be claiming, is what representationalism amounts to. If you're not claiming (A), you're not a representationalist.
(B) is what direct/naive realists are claiming. If you agree with (B), you're actually a direct/naive realist.
What I said with respect to (1) - (4) above is that conjointly, those claims are contradictory. The contradiction either needs to be resolved, or it needs to be explained why it's not a contradiction or alternatively why a paraconsistent approach would work here.
Note, by the way, that if you're not claiming (A), we get rid of (1) in the set of four statements, and we get rid of the contradiction. But, you appeared to be claiming (A) earlier in the thread, it seems like you're still claiming (A), and if you're not claiming (A), then you are not disagreeing with me or the other direct realists.
Dimebag wrote: ↑Tue May 25, 2021 11:08 am
I need you to explain what you mean by ‘awareness of externals as such’, and how and why this is not possible, given our current scientific understanding of perception. Do you mean, direct access to the world? If that is your meaning, I agree with THIS statement.
This is probably the most important part here. I explained this earlier in the thread a number of different times, in a number of different ways. I'll explain it again.
Logically, there are two different things we can be claiming in this context:
Either
(A) Our conscious awareness is ONLY awareness of mental phenomena
Or
(B) At least sometimes, our conscious awareness is awareness of something other than mental phenomena.
And just to clarify the above, the idea here is awareness with respect to "raw"perceptual data, aside from or prior to attaching concepts, etc.
If the distinction between those two isn't that clear to you, I'll try to explain it in more detail. Just let me know.
Note that this is NOT saying that how our consciousness works, or what it is ontologically, is something other than mental phenomena. It's about what we're conscious of. I explained this earlier by explaining the use/mention distinction. A traditional (printed) photograph is comprised of pigmented solutions on paper, but the photograph is often not _of_ pigmented solutions on paper. It might be a photograph of a cow in a field or whatever. That's analogous to the use/mention distinction.
(A), which is what you appeared to be claiming, is what representationalism amounts to. If you're not claiming (A), you're not a representationalist.
(B) is what direct/naive realists are claiming. If you agree with (B), you're actually a direct/naive realist.
What I said with respect to (1) - (4) above is that conjointly, those claims are contradictory. The contradiction either needs to be resolved, or it needs to be explained why it's not a contradiction or alternatively why a paraconsistent approach would work here.
Note, by the way, that if you're not claiming (A), we get rid of (1) in the set of four statements, and we get rid of the contradiction. But, you appeared to be claiming (A) earlier in the thread, it seems like you're still claiming (A), and if you're not claiming (A), then you are not disagreeing with me or the other direct realists.
I am claiming A, yes. I think everything APPEARING IN our conscious experience, is “made of” conscious experience. As such, everything IN conscious experience is an IMAGE OF, an IMPRINT OF, or is directly RELATED TO the nature things external to it which they represent. As I mentioned, most of the time, our perception is accurate. It might even be 100% accurate but just incomplete, and open to interpretation, as my discussion with Henry Quirk broached. But, it is occurring in the medium of the mind, and thus, the mind is RE-presenting it to us, or, you Could say, if you have issue with that term, it is presenting it to us. As some have suggested, because we don’t have direct access to the things in themselves, there is no way to know just what those things out there are like, so, rather than presenting it again, it is simply presenting it. But, that is getting picky, because the word represent typically means, to stand for, to symbolise etc. THAT is what I mean when I say our perceptions aren’t representations. Because they AREN’T the things in themselves.
Just a quick note here for now, I don’t have time to again go into just why I disagree with point # 2 of your logical sequence, and why it’s not an issue for us to claim direct realism isn’t possible. I will re-address that later when I have more time, thanks, have a good one.
Dimebag wrote: ↑Tue May 25, 2021 11:08 am
I need you to explain what you mean by ‘awareness of externals as such’, and how and why this is not possible, given our current scientific understanding of perception. Do you mean, direct access to the world? If that is your meaning, I agree with THIS statement.
This is probably the most important part here. I explained this earlier in the thread a number of different times, in a number of different ways. I'll explain it again.
Logically, there are two different things we can be claiming in this context:
Either
(A) Our conscious awareness is ONLY awareness of mental phenomena
Or
(B) At least sometimes, our conscious awareness is awareness of something other than mental phenomena.
And just to clarify the above, the idea here is awareness with respect to "raw"perceptual data, aside from or prior to attaching concepts, etc.
If the distinction between those two isn't that clear to you, I'll try to explain it in more detail. Just let me know.
Note that this is NOT saying that how our consciousness works, or what it is ontologically, is something other than mental phenomena. It's about what we're conscious of. I explained this earlier by explaining the use/mention distinction. A traditional (printed) photograph is comprised of pigmented solutions on paper, but the photograph is often not _of_ pigmented solutions on paper. It might be a photograph of a cow in a field or whatever. That's analogous to the use/mention distinction.
(A), which is what you appeared to be claiming, is what representationalism amounts to. If you're not claiming (A), you're not a representationalist.
(B) is what direct/naive realists are claiming. If you agree with (B), you're actually a direct/naive realist.
What I said with respect to (1) - (4) above is that conjointly, those claims are contradictory. The contradiction either needs to be resolved, or it needs to be explained why it's not a contradiction or alternatively why a paraconsistent approach would work here.
Note, by the way, that if you're not claiming (A), we get rid of (1) in the set of four statements, and we get rid of the contradiction. But, you appeared to be claiming (A) earlier in the thread, it seems like you're still claiming (A), and if you're not claiming (A), then you are not disagreeing with me or the other direct realists.
I am claiming A, yes. I think everything APPEARING IN our conscious experience, is “made of” conscious experience. As such, everything IN conscious experience is an IMAGE OF, an IMPRINT OF, or is directly RELATED TO the nature things external to it which they represent. As I mentioned, most of the time, our perception is accurate. It might even be 100% accurate but just incomplete, and open to interpretation, as my discussion with Henry Quirk broached. But, it is occurring in the medium of the mind, and thus, the mind is RE-presenting it to us, or, you Could say, if you have issue with that term, it is presenting it to us. As some have suggested, because we don’t have direct access to the things in themselves, there is no way to know just what those things out there are like, so, rather than presenting it again, it is simply presenting it. But, that is getting picky, because the word represent typically means, to stand for, to symbolise etc. THAT is what I mean when I say our perceptions aren’t representations. Because they AREN’T the things in themselves.
Just a quick note here for now, I don’t have time to again go into just why I disagree with point # 2 of your logical sequence, and why it’s not an issue for us to claim direct realism isn’t possible. I will re-address that later when I have more time, thanks, have a good one.
Right.
So just to reiterate, re the 4 statements, no one said that (2) is an "issue." (2) is there because (2) is being claimed, and that's that.
The issue is that the 4 statements, taken conjointly, are contradictory.
At any rate, just to give another aid for this, the two different stances are (A) that what we're aware of is only mental phenomena, so for example let's say that we're aware of a rock:
Then we have
| Mind - Rock |
Where the rock we're aware of is actually just a mental phenomenon.
As opposed to (B) What we're aware of is something external to the mind:
| Mind | ------------------> Rock
The problem is that if we're saying (B) isn't possible, then we have a problem with claiming that we're observing eyes, say, because what's really going on is
| Mind - eye |
Where what we're observing is just a mental phenomenon. We're not observing an actual eye, which would require this:
| Mind | --------------> Eye
So when we make claims about eyes from this stance:
| Mind - eye |
We're making claims about things in our mind that we may just as well be fantasizing--there's no way for us to know, because there's no way, given the view that (B) is impossible, to ever get to
| Mind | -------------> anything not mind in order to serve as any sort of basis for or check against any claim about how anything really is.
This is probably the most important part here. I explained this earlier in the thread a number of different times, in a number of different ways. I'll explain it again.
Logically, there are two different things we can be claiming in this context:
Either
(A) Our conscious awareness is ONLY awareness of mental phenomena
Or
(B) At least sometimes, our conscious awareness is awareness of something other than mental phenomena.
And just to clarify the above, the idea here is awareness with respect to "raw"perceptual data, aside from or prior to attaching concepts, etc.
If the distinction between those two isn't that clear to you, I'll try to explain it in more detail. Just let me know.
Note that this is NOT saying that how our consciousness works, or what it is ontologically, is something other than mental phenomena. It's about what we're conscious of. I explained this earlier by explaining the use/mention distinction. A traditional (printed) photograph is comprised of pigmented solutions on paper, but the photograph is often not _of_ pigmented solutions on paper. It might be a photograph of a cow in a field or whatever. That's analogous to the use/mention distinction.
(A), which is what you appeared to be claiming, is what representationalism amounts to. If you're not claiming (A), you're not a representationalist.
(B) is what direct/naive realists are claiming. If you agree with (B), you're actually a direct/naive realist.
What I said with respect to (1) - (4) above is that conjointly, those claims are contradictory. The contradiction either needs to be resolved, or it needs to be explained why it's not a contradiction or alternatively why a paraconsistent approach would work here.
Note, by the way, that if you're not claiming (A), we get rid of (1) in the set of four statements, and we get rid of the contradiction. But, you appeared to be claiming (A) earlier in the thread, it seems like you're still claiming (A), and if you're not claiming (A), then you are not disagreeing with me or the other direct realists.
I am claiming A, yes. I think everything APPEARING IN our conscious experience, is “made of” conscious experience. As such, everything IN conscious experience is an IMAGE OF, an IMPRINT OF, or is directly RELATED TO the nature things external to it which they represent. As I mentioned, most of the time, our perception is accurate. It might even be 100% accurate but just incomplete, and open to interpretation, as my discussion with Henry Quirk broached. But, it is occurring in the medium of the mind, and thus, the mind is RE-presenting it to us, or, you Could say, if you have issue with that term, it is presenting it to us. As some have suggested, because we don’t have direct access to the things in themselves, there is no way to know just what those things out there are like, so, rather than presenting it again, it is simply presenting it. But, that is getting picky, because the word represent typically means, to stand for, to symbolise etc. THAT is what I mean when I say our perceptions aren’t representations. Because they AREN’T the things in themselves.
Just a quick note here for now, I don’t have time to again go into just why I disagree with point # 2 of your logical sequence, and why it’s not an issue for us to claim direct realism isn’t possible. I will re-address that later when I have more time, thanks, have a good one.
Right.
So just to reiterate, re the 4 statements, no one said that (2) is an "issue." (2) is there because (2) is being claimed, and that's that.
The issue is that the 4 statements, taken conjointly, are contradictory.
At any rate, just to give another aid for this, the two different stances are (A) that what we're aware of is only mental phenomena, so for example let's say that we're aware of a rock:
Then we have
| Mind - Rock |
Where the rock we're aware of is actually just a mental phenomenon.
As opposed to (B) What we're aware of is something external to the mind:
| Mind | ------------------> Rock
The problem is that if we're saying (B) isn't possible, then we have a problem with claiming that we're observing eyes, say, because what's really going on is
| Mind - eye |
Where what we're observing is just a mental phenomenon. We're not observing an actual eye, which would require this:
| Mind | --------------> Eye
So when we make claims about eyes from this stance:
| Mind - eye |
We're making claims about things in our mind that we may just as well be fantasizing--there's no way for us to know, because there's no way, given the view that (B) is impossible, to ever get to
| Mind | -------------> anything not mind in order to serve as any sort of basis for or check against any claim about how anything really is.
Okay, I have re-read statement 2 after you contextualised it for me, it wasn’t clear that you were summarising MY CLAIM THERE, rather I thought that was a statement you were claiming in relation to representationalism not having direct access.
So, in that case, my biggest problem is with statements 3 and 4.
We know about representationalism, not only from our perception, but also from much logical deduction which has occurred using the scientific method. You see, although our perceptions don’t allow us direct access to the world, we can use science to deduce facts about the outside world. We have competing hypothesis to explain a particular phenomenon we observe, and we test those hypotheses, and are able to learn something not directly perceivable.
Furthermore, although our perceptions are indirect, they are of the real world. They are faithful enough to survive, to make reliable theories of the world which give accurate predictions. There is something real they are capturing about the world, they are pragmatically true, in the sense that they do the job. They may not be able to see electrons wizzing around, or detect gravity waves etc, but they are here for a reason, to aid our survival, and for that they do a splendid job. And with them, we have been able to produce tools which allow us to see far beyond what our senses are capable of seeing. The Hubble telescope allowed us to see the countless galaxies at the far reaches of the universe in a patch of seemingly empty sky. Microscopes allow us to probe the microscopic landscape, and we have even uncovered our own genetic makeup, which was seemingly inaccessible. We can probe the brain using powerful imaging techniques, to infer details about the brain and what it’s doing. You give far too little credit to the power of science to discover actual truth.
Your understanding of representationalism seems more akin to a kind of epistemological solipsism. That is not the claim of indirect realism.
Dimebag wrote: ↑Wed May 26, 2021 12:13 pm
Your understanding of representationalism seems more akin to a kind of epistemological solipsism. That is not the claim of indirect realism.
It necessarily amounts to (or "reduces to") solipsism, as I've been explaining--that's the whole point. Given the claim, there's no way out of this upshot. This is the case for idealism in general. Anything other than solipsism on those views has to be purely a faith-based belief.
Are you or are you not claiming that when we observe a rock, for example, what's going on is this "picture:"
|Mind - rock|
Where what we're aware of, what we're actually observing in terms of our conscious experience, is something mentally-created?
Dimebag wrote: ↑Wed May 26, 2021 12:13 pm
Your understanding of representationalism seems more akin to a kind of epistemological solipsism. That is not the claim of indirect realism.
It necessarily amounts to (or "reduces to") solipsism, as I've been explaining--that's the whole point. Given the claim, there's no way out of this upshot. This is the case for idealism in general. Anything other than solipsism on those views has to be purely a faith-based belief.
Are you or are you not claiming that when we observe a rock, for example, what's going on is this "picture:"
|Mind - rock|
Where what we're aware of, what we're actually observing in terms of our conscious experience, is something mentally-created?
Your diagrams were a little unclear what you were trying to represent, are you trying to say that the rock is IN the mind?
Here is how I would form a diagram to represent representationalism:
|Mind - rock| —————————————- external rock
So in this case, the impression, representation of the external rock, is IN the mind, via light reflecting off the rock, carrying its shape, structure information, and colour information, which are all reconstructed IN the mind, which enter via the eye and retina, where that light pattern, stimulates an associated image, translated into neural impulses, which can travel to the visual cortex, and information such as the boundary of the rock, it’s position in relation to other things, etc, can be extracted and superimposed upon that image, so as to provide a functionally useful representation, which can then be acted upon. Other information which is extracted are things like, the rough distance To the object, whether it is moving or stationary, etc.
Dimebag wrote: ↑Wed May 26, 2021 12:13 pm
Your understanding of representationalism seems more akin to a kind of epistemological solipsism. That is not the claim of indirect realism.
It necessarily amounts to (or "reduces to") solipsism, as I've been explaining--that's the whole point. Given the claim, there's no way out of this upshot. This is the case for idealism in general. Anything other than solipsism on those views has to be purely a faith-based belief.
Are you or are you not claiming that when we observe a rock, for example, what's going on is this "picture:"
|Mind - rock|
Where what we're aware of, what we're actually observing in terms of our conscious experience, is something mentally-created?
Your diagrams were a little unclear what you were trying to represent, are you trying to say that the rock is IN the mind?
Insofar as what you're aware of/what's present to your consciousness, yes.
Again, logically, there are two options here:
Insofar as what's present to your consciousness, what you're actually aware of it's either:
(a) a mental creation, or it's mental phenomena per se
OR
(b) it's not a mental creation, it's something external to your mind.
This isn't asking for the theoretical underpinning, or for beliefs about "what's really going on." It's asking about the phenomena that are present-to-consciousness.
Terrapin Station wrote: ↑Wed May 26, 2021 1:28 pm
It necessarily amounts to (or "reduces to") solipsism, as I've been explaining--that's the whole point. Given the claim, there's no way out of this upshot. This is the case for idealism in general. Anything other than solipsism on those views has to be purely a faith-based belief.
Are you or are you not claiming that when we observe a rock, for example, what's going on is this "picture:"
|Mind - rock|
Where what we're aware of, what we're actually observing in terms of our conscious experience, is something mentally-created?
Your diagrams were a little unclear what you were trying to represent, are you trying to say that the rock is IN the mind?
Insofar as what you're aware of/what's present to your consciousness, yes.
Again, logically, there are two options here:
Insofar as what's present to your consciousness, what you're actually aware of it's either:
(a) a mental creation, or it's mental phenomena per se
OR
(b) it's not a mental creation, it's something external to your mind.
This isn't asking for the theoretical underpinning, or for beliefs about "what's really going on." It's asking about the phenomena that are present-to-consciousness.
Take the position of a person who is completely uninformed about all of this, and let’s also take it to be the case that representationalism is true.
Is there anyway that this person could distinguish, purely from the observing of their own perception, whether direct realism or representationalism were true?
If they were uninformed about the way the human visual system worked, the way the light reflects off of objects to bring an image into our eye etc, I don’t think there would be anything within perception itself per se, that could settle the matter.
Now, you might want to then invoke occams razor, saying it’s simpler that we see the world directly rather than indirectly. But this can’t be ascertained from perception itself, it is a logical, abstract inference, and if we allow that, we would also allow scientific inferences as well.
So it seems to me, that both positions would be on the same footing. So taken on face value, both positions are equally possible.
But then we do have at least qualified beliefs about how objects show up in the world, via light reflecting off them, or emanating from them directly.
So, we can go into how we know this if you want? Then we can proceed stepwise into how we know the sensory organs transducer that light into neural impulses, and then from there, go into how we know those neural impulses get processes in the visual cortex, which it is supposed where the representation is occurring.
But, we will be departing philosophy and exploring the world of science, which, until recently had been a part OF philosophy. It is only in the last few hundred years that the practice of science has been viewed as a separate endeavour. Yet both disciplines seek to know truth, even though they have now diverged in the way they ascertain that truth.
Imagine if I had a job to do, a manual job which required say, a drill. But you say, no, I don’t use drills, that’s for those other people. Would you still use say, a hammer to try and make a certain hole?
Well, when you exclude science from you discusssion, you are doing the same thing. People should have the full set of tools, both science and philosophy. Why short change yourself when it comes to truth.
Dimebag wrote: ↑Wed May 26, 2021 9:09 pm
Your diagrams were a little unclear what you were trying to represent, are you trying to say that the rock is IN the mind?
Insofar as what you're aware of/what's present to your consciousness, yes.
Again, logically, there are two options here:
Insofar as what's present to your consciousness, what you're actually aware of it's either:
(a) a mental creation, or it's mental phenomena per se
OR
(b) it's not a mental creation, it's something external to your mind.
This isn't asking for the theoretical underpinning, or for beliefs about "what's really going on." It's asking about the phenomena that are present-to-consciousness.
Take the position of a person who is completely uninformed about all of this, and let’s also take it to be the case that representationalism is true.
Is there anyway that this person could distinguish, purely from the observing of their own perception, whether direct realism or representationalism were true?
If they were uninformed about the way the human visual system worked, the way the light reflects off of objects to bring an image into our eye etc, I don’t think there would be anything within perception itself per se, that could settle the matter.
Now, you might want to then invoke occams razor, saying it’s simpler that we see the world directly rather than indirectly. But this can’t be ascertained from perception itself, it is a logical, abstract inference, and if we allow that, we would also allow scientific inferences as well.
So it seems to me, that both positions would be on the same footing. So taken on face value, both positions are equally possible.
But then we do have at least qualified beliefs about how objects show up in the world, via light reflecting off them, or emanating from them directly.
So, we can go into how we know this if you want? Then we can proceed stepwise into how we know the sensory organs transducer that light into neural impulses, and then from there, go into how we know those neural impulses get processes in the visual cortex, which it is supposed where the representation is occurring.
But, we will be departing philosophy and exploring the world of science, which, until recently had been a part OF philosophy. It is only in the last few hundred years that the practice of science has been viewed as a separate endeavour. Yet both disciplines seek to know truth, even though they have now diverged in the way they ascertain that truth.
Imagine if I had a job to do, a manual job which required say, a drill. But you say, no, I don’t use drills, that’s for those other people. Would you still use say, a hammer to try and make a certain hole?
Well, when you exclude science from you discusssion, you are doing the same thing. People should have the full set of tools, both science and philosophy. Why short change yourself when it comes to truth.
Come on. I just want you to answer whether you're saying one thing over the other. It's important to clarify this, to make sure that you're really understanding what the one side is claiming.
Also, it's not a matter of "excluding science from the discussion." It's a matter of what's logically possible if we wind up claiming one thing over the other.
Insofar as what you're aware of/what's present to your consciousness, yes.
Again, logically, there are two options here:
Insofar as what's present to your consciousness, what you're actually aware of it's either:
(a) a mental creation, or it's mental phenomena per se
OR
(b) it's not a mental creation, it's something external to your mind.
This isn't asking for the theoretical underpinning, or for beliefs about "what's really going on." It's asking about the phenomena that are present-to-consciousness.
Take the position of a person who is completely uninformed about all of this, and let’s also take it to be the case that representationalism is true.
Is there anyway that this person could distinguish, purely from the observing of their own perception, whether direct realism or representationalism were true?
If they were uninformed about the way the human visual system worked, the way the light reflects off of objects to bring an image into our eye etc, I don’t think there would be anything within perception itself per se, that could settle the matter.
Now, you might want to then invoke occams razor, saying it’s simpler that we see the world directly rather than indirectly. But this can’t be ascertained from perception itself, it is a logical, abstract inference, and if we allow that, we would also allow scientific inferences as well.
So it seems to me, that both positions would be on the same footing. So taken on face value, both positions are equally possible.
But then we do have at least qualified beliefs about how objects show up in the world, via light reflecting off them, or emanating from them directly.
So, we can go into how we know this if you want? Then we can proceed stepwise into how we know the sensory organs transducer that light into neural impulses, and then from there, go into how we know those neural impulses get processes in the visual cortex, which it is supposed where the representation is occurring.
But, we will be departing philosophy and exploring the world of science, which, until recently had been a part OF philosophy. It is only in the last few hundred years that the practice of science has been viewed as a separate endeavour. Yet both disciplines seek to know truth, even though they have now diverged in the way they ascertain that truth.
Imagine if I had a job to do, a manual job which required say, a drill. But you say, no, I don’t use drills, that’s for those other people. Would you still use say, a hammer to try and make a certain hole?
Well, when you exclude science from you discusssion, you are doing the same thing. People should have the full set of tools, both science and philosophy. Why short change yourself when it comes to truth.
Come on. I just want you to answer whether you're saying one thing over the other. It's important to clarify this, to make sure that you're really understanding what the one side is claiming.
Also, it's not a matter of "excluding science from the discussion." It's a matter of what's logically possible if we wind up claiming one thing over the other.
As you have noted in our previous exploration, logic can only get us so far, other means of knowing can be necessary to get at the truth. There is no need to resort to solipsism when you can test the world.
Dimebag wrote: ↑Thu May 27, 2021 3:11 am
Take the position of a person who is completely uninformed about all of this, and let’s also take it to be the case that representationalism is true.
Is there anyway that this person could distinguish, purely from the observing of their own perception, whether direct realism or representationalism were true?
If they were uninformed about the way the human visual system worked, the way the light reflects off of objects to bring an image into our eye etc, I don’t think there would be anything within perception itself per se, that could settle the matter.
Now, you might want to then invoke occams razor, saying it’s simpler that we see the world directly rather than indirectly. But this can’t be ascertained from perception itself, it is a logical, abstract inference, and if we allow that, we would also allow scientific inferences as well.
So it seems to me, that both positions would be on the same footing. So taken on face value, both positions are equally possible.
But then we do have at least qualified beliefs about how objects show up in the world, via light reflecting off them, or emanating from them directly.
So, we can go into how we know this if you want? Then we can proceed stepwise into how we know the sensory organs transducer that light into neural impulses, and then from there, go into how we know those neural impulses get processes in the visual cortex, which it is supposed where the representation is occurring.
But, we will be departing philosophy and exploring the world of science, which, until recently had been a part OF philosophy. It is only in the last few hundred years that the practice of science has been viewed as a separate endeavour. Yet both disciplines seek to know truth, even though they have now diverged in the way they ascertain that truth.
Imagine if I had a job to do, a manual job which required say, a drill. But you say, no, I don’t use drills, that’s for those other people. Would you still use say, a hammer to try and make a certain hole?
Well, when you exclude science from you discusssion, you are doing the same thing. People should have the full set of tools, both science and philosophy. Why short change yourself when it comes to truth.
Come on. I just want you to answer whether you're saying one thing over the other. It's important to clarify this, to make sure that you're really understanding what the one side is claiming.
Also, it's not a matter of "excluding science from the discussion." It's a matter of what's logically possible if we wind up claiming one thing over the other.
As you have noted in our previous exploration, logic can only get us so far, other means of knowing can be necessary to get at the truth. There is no need to resort to solipsism when you can test the world.
If the claim is that all that's present-to-consciousness is content that's mentally created, we can't test anything other than mental creations qua mental creations.
other means of knowing can be necessary to get at the truth
Okay, so what can we glean from...
we know the sensory organs transduce...light into neural impulses, and...we know those neural impulses get process(ed) in the visual cortex, which it is supposed where the representation is occurring
...me, I reckon we glean pretty close to nuthin'.
You describe machinery and machine action, not seeing.
As I say: the direct realist does not say light, or molecules, or sound waves have no role in seein', smellin', tastin', hearin' the world; nor does he say organs are merely ornamental. What the direct realist sez is, the organs alone account for nuthin'. The optical system does not see or watch.
