The irrefutability of solipsism and the recognition that consciousness is not physical
Posted: Tue Nov 21, 2017 8:09 pm
Apologies in advance for the lack of rigor and sophistication I'm about to display. Also for verbosity. I just want to be as clear as possible.
tl;dr: If you recognize the impossibility of disproving solipsism, then it should be clear that consciousness is not meaningfully physical.
It can be argued that it's impossible to conclusively rule out solipsism. (I say "can be argued" because, although it seems clear enough to me, I'm sure many of you are smart enough to rule it out anyway.) In any case, I'd like to outline the intuitive argument.
The one thing you can be certain of is that "something seems to be happening." I wish I could be more precise, but I don't think I can. Nonetheless, if you look and listen, you will discover an unequivocal certainty that something seems to be happening. Very quickly thereafter (perhaps so quickly that you overlook the aforementioned flawless certainty) your intellect might deconstruct the concepts "seem," "something," "certainty," etc. and introduce doubt. But stay with (or return to) that initial "flash of recognition" if you're able.
Okay, so you are sure that something seems to be happening. You cannot be sure -- even in principle -- that such a thing is happening anywhere else. Maybe there's consciousness elsewhere, but this consciousness is the only tool you'd have to verify it. Even if you saw the world through someone else's eyes, it would be happening "over here," so to speak. Similarly, nobody (and nothing) else can verify your consciousness.
Now, if you recognize that (a) there is this undoubtable sheer fact of consciousness (shorthand for "something seems to be happening"), and (b) it cannot be verified in anyone else, then it cannot be the case that consciousness is physical. How could there be a physical property that cannot be verified, even in principle, by anybody else (or by any instrument)? No, the one thing you can be certain of cannot meaningfully be physical.
If you accept that you cannot disprove solipsism, then can you reasonably believe that consciousness is a physical property?
tl;dr: If you recognize the impossibility of disproving solipsism, then it should be clear that consciousness is not meaningfully physical.
It can be argued that it's impossible to conclusively rule out solipsism. (I say "can be argued" because, although it seems clear enough to me, I'm sure many of you are smart enough to rule it out anyway.) In any case, I'd like to outline the intuitive argument.
The one thing you can be certain of is that "something seems to be happening." I wish I could be more precise, but I don't think I can. Nonetheless, if you look and listen, you will discover an unequivocal certainty that something seems to be happening. Very quickly thereafter (perhaps so quickly that you overlook the aforementioned flawless certainty) your intellect might deconstruct the concepts "seem," "something," "certainty," etc. and introduce doubt. But stay with (or return to) that initial "flash of recognition" if you're able.
Okay, so you are sure that something seems to be happening. You cannot be sure -- even in principle -- that such a thing is happening anywhere else. Maybe there's consciousness elsewhere, but this consciousness is the only tool you'd have to verify it. Even if you saw the world through someone else's eyes, it would be happening "over here," so to speak. Similarly, nobody (and nothing) else can verify your consciousness.
Now, if you recognize that (a) there is this undoubtable sheer fact of consciousness (shorthand for "something seems to be happening"), and (b) it cannot be verified in anyone else, then it cannot be the case that consciousness is physical. How could there be a physical property that cannot be verified, even in principle, by anybody else (or by any instrument)? No, the one thing you can be certain of cannot meaningfully be physical.
If you accept that you cannot disprove solipsism, then can you reasonably believe that consciousness is a physical property?