Leibniz's mill and the "Hard problem of consciousness"

Is the mind the same as the body? What is consciousness? Can machines have it?

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raw_thought
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Re: Leibniz's mill and the "Hard problem of consciousness"

Post by raw_thought »

"we never worry that 'when I dissect a rabbit I cannot find a rabbit in there' or 'where in the car engine is the bit that makes it go?'"
Londoner
The analogy does not work. The visualized triangle is not a part of the brain. It is nowhere in the brain. To say ( to repeat myself ) that the triangle is embedded in the brain in a non-triangular form is like saying that holding a CD of Mozart is identical to hearing the music.
I did not ask for someone to visualize their brain, I asked them to visualize a triangle. Even if I had asked someone to visualize their brain, that person would not be looking at their actual brain.
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Hobbes' Choice
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Re: Leibniz's mill and the "Hard problem of consciousness"

Post by Hobbes' Choice »

I don't think this is anymore a problem.
During the infancy of materialism there was an assumption of a dualism between mind and matter, body and soul. I just don't think this is relevant since all these terms are human interested metaphors and only approximate attempts at characterising reality.
As our understanding of matter is more sophisticated now: that it is not as "hard" as we thought being constructed of a bewildering array of sub atomic particles separated by massive amounts of empty space, and that the clear distinctions between matter and energy seem less than transparent, the idea of "spirit" is no longer on the song sheet.
It's not just that the dualism between body and soul is not correct; it is no longer even wrong - just not relevant.
Wyman
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Re: Leibniz's mill and the "Hard problem of consciousness"

Post by Wyman »

raw_thought wrote:"My point is that one can visualize a form and that form is not physical."
ME

"What would we understand by 'physical'? "
Londoner
One does not make atoms form into a triangle when one visualizes a triangle. Nor do the neurons fire in a triangular form when one visualizes a triangle.
And even if they did ( and that is ridiculous ) It is silly to say that when one visualizes a triangle, one is seeing neurons firing in a triangular shape.
I think we all get what you're saying, but at bottom, your claim is a scientific hypothesis. Calling different hypotheses 'silly' and insisting that images are 'not physical' is neither argument nor valid empirical support. You can never support such a hypothesis by armchair reflection. Only when neuro-physicists are able to really get in there and are able to make relevant empirical observations will these questions possibly be answered.

It is the same when Chalmers claims that it is just 'obvious' to him that an atom by atom replication of a human could exist without consciousness (the zombie argument). How in the world could he know that? Or that if someone knew 'all the physical facts about consciousness' there would still be left over facts about consciousness that were not included (the Mary's room argument and supervenience argument). We are so incredibly far from knowing 'all the physical facts' that such a concept is laughable. The claim of knowing what it is that knowledge of all physical facts would exclude is the height of arrogance and ridiculousness. We cannot know what is excluded by an omniscient scientific mind unless we know what is included first. Anyone who bases an argument on 'it's just obvious' and to say otherwise is 'silly' is not arguing at all and is no better than those who claim to 'just know' that God exists - it's a faith claim.
Londoner
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Re: Leibniz's mill and the "Hard problem of consciousness"

Post by Londoner »

raw_thought wrote:"

"What would we understand by 'physical'? "
Londoner
One does not make atoms form into a triangle when one visualizes a triangle. Nor do the neurons fire in a triangular form when one visualizes a triangle.
And even if they did ( and that is ridiculous ) It is silly to say that when one visualizes a triangle, one is seeing neurons firing in a triangular shape.
Is that any different to saying that to 'see' a thing is not to 'be' the thing?

If indeed atoms formed themselves into a triangle, in my brain or outside it, then I couldn't visualize that triangle. That is because to visualize something I have to be separate from that thing, I must be observing those arranged atoms, or looking at some sort of brain scan. That seems to me to be about 'subject-verb-object' relationship of 'visualize' rather than the workings of the brain.
"we never worry that 'when I dissect a rabbit I cannot find a rabbit in there' or 'where in the car engine is the bit that makes it go?'"

The analogy does not work. The visualized triangle is not a part of the brain. It is nowhere in the brain. To say ( to repeat myself ) that the triangle is embedded in the brain in a non-triangular form is like saying that holding a CD of Mozart is identical to hearing the music.
But then I would ask; what is 'the music'? I agree the CD isn't 'the music', but what is? The orchestra? Sound waves? The idea in Mozart's mind? My own brain's reaction to certain sounds? There is no single 'the music' for anything to be identical with.

You say 'holding a CD' is not identical to hearing the music, but what about playing the CD? The CD is not the music, I am not the music, the CD player is not the music...so is there no music? I would say the music is the interaction of all these things, none of which is by itself can claim to be identical to 'the music', yet all of which are aspects of 'the music'.

So, when you say of the neurons that they do not fire in a triangular form, I think they do. They fire in the form that my brain encodes the idea 'triangle'. And there is no other, 'more real', form of triangle that we can compare them to.
raw_thought
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Re: Leibniz's mill and the "Hard problem of consciousness"

Post by raw_thought »

Hobbes' Choice wrote:I don't think this is anymore a problem.
During the infancy of materialism there was an assumption of a dualism between mind and matter, body and soul. I just don't think this is relevant since all these terms are human interested metaphors and only approximate attempts at characterising reality.
As our understanding of matter is more sophisticated now: that it is not as "hard" as we thought being constructed of a bewildering array of sub atomic particles separated by massive amounts of empty space, and that the clear distinctions between matter and energy seem less than transparent, the idea of "spirit" is no longer on the song sheet.
It's not just that the dualism between body and soul is not correct; it is no longer even wrong - just not relevant.
Yes, I know what you believe. But please address what we are talking about. Show me how the following syllogism is invalid or based on false assumptions.
1. it is possible to visualize a triangle. ( I think that is beyond dispute).
2. Either the triangle is physical or it is not.
3. It is obviously not physical as there is nothing physical that is in a triangular shape in the brain that is created by visualizing a triangle. Any scientist will tell you that you do not cause your neurons to fire in a triangular shape ( or that you create a subatomic particle that is triangular ) when you visualize a triangle.
4. therefore, the visualized triangle cannot be physical.
What do you disagree with 1, 2 or 3? Or do you believe that 4 does not follow from 1,2 and 3?
Not relevant? You obviously have not been in academia for awhile. The hard problem is now the main area of research.
Last edited by raw_thought on Tue Mar 07, 2017 7:20 pm, edited 2 times in total.
raw_thought
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Re: Leibniz's mill and the "Hard problem of consciousness"

Post by raw_thought »

"So, when you say of the neurons that they do not fire in a triangular form, I think they do. "
Londoner
So you are saying that when you visualize a triangle you are seeing your neurons fire in a triangular form. I disagree.
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Re: Leibniz's mill and the "Hard problem of consciousness"

Post by raw_thought »

" Calling different hypotheses 'silly' and insisting that images are 'not physical' is neither argument nor valid empirical support."
Wyman
Yes, I think it is silly to say that when I visualize a triangle what I am seeing is my neurons firing in a triangular form. * So you can see your neurons without special equipment?
* or are you saying that we see atoms or subatomic particles that are triangular in shape? What physical thing do we see when we visualize a triangle?Since ( at least to me ) it seems silly to say that we see atoms or neurons firing, what physical triangle are we seeing? Or are you saying that we cannot visualize anything?
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Re: Leibniz's mill and the "Hard problem of consciousness"

Post by raw_thought »

Wyman wrote:
raw_thought wrote:Yes, I know what you believe. Now, show me how the following syllogism is invalid or based on false assumptions.
1. it is possible to visualize a triangle. ( I think that is beyond dispute).
2. Either the triangle is physical or it is not.
3. It is obviously not physical as there is nothing physical that is in a triangular shape in the brain that is created by visualizing a triangle. Any scientist will tell you that you do not cause your neurons to fire in a triangular shape ( or that you create a subatomic particle that is triangular ) when you visualize a triangle.
4. therefore, the visualized triangle cannot be physical.
What do you disagree with 1, 2 or 3? Or do you believe that 4 does not follow from 1,2 and 3?
When you are arguing that qualia are not physical, you cannot put 'It is obviously not physical' as a step in your 'syllogism.'

How would anyone know what configuration subatomic particles take in the brain? Also, 'any scientist will tell you' is not an argument. So #3 is completely wrong on all counts.
OK you disagree with #3 . You believe that it is not silly to believe that we can see our neurons and or atoms without special equipment.
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Hobbes' Choice
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Re: Leibniz's mill and the "Hard problem of consciousness"

Post by Hobbes' Choice »

raw_thought wrote:
Hobbes' Choice wrote:I don't think this is anymore a problem.
During the infancy of materialism there was an assumption of a dualism between mind and matter, body and soul. I just don't think this is relevant since all these terms are human interested metaphors and only approximate attempts at characterising reality.
As our understanding of matter is more sophisticated now: that it is not as "hard" as we thought being constructed of a bewildering array of sub atomic particles separated by massive amounts of empty space, and that the clear distinctions between matter and energy seem less than transparent, the idea of "spirit" is no longer on the song sheet.
It's not just that the dualism between body and soul is not correct; it is no longer even wrong - just not relevant.
Yes, I know what you believe. But please address what we are talking about. Show me how the following syllogism is invalid or based on false assumptions.
1. it is possible to visualize a triangle. ( I think that is beyond dispute).
2. Either the triangle is physical or it is not.
What the fuck is "physical"? this is the whole point of my post - is it not. You are making the same dualistic mistake right here.

3. It is obviously not physical as there is nothing physical that is in a triangular shape in the brain that is created by visualizing a triangle. Any scientist will tell you that you do not cause your neurons to fire in a triangular shape ( or that you create a subatomic particle that is triangular ) when you visualize a triangle.
You have departed from the rules of syllogism here.

4. therefore, the visualized triangle cannot be physical.
What do you disagree with 1, 2 or 3? Or do you believe that 4 does not follow from 1,2 and 3?
Not relevant? You obviously have not been in academia for awhile. The hard problem is now the main area of research.
4. is not a conclusion. I can be and is physical. The real question is what IS physical.

A photo is not the same as the 3D scene it depicts, yet it is a recording of such a scene. It exists in 2D (virtually), yet allows the memory to recall the scene. The photo is still physical object. There is no doubt that a memory is physical. You can remove it with a blunt spoon, just like you can burn a photo. What we learn here is that "physical" (whatever it is) can contain more than meets the eye. In the same way a sheet of paper or a book can record the ideas which are contained on the page. Just because this is the case, does not mean a book is any less physical if there are more or less ideas on the page.
Wyman
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Re: Leibniz's mill and the "Hard problem of consciousness"

Post by Wyman »

raw_thought wrote:" Calling different hypotheses 'silly' and insisting that images are 'not physical' is neither argument nor valid empirical support."
Wyman
Yes, I think it is silly to say that when I visualize a triangle what I am seeing is my neurons firing in a triangular form. * So you can see your neurons without special equipment?
* or are you saying that we see atoms or subatomic particles that are triangular in shape? What physical thing do we see when we visualize a triangle?Since ( at least to me ) it seems silly to say that we see atoms or neurons firing, what physical triangle are we seeing? Or are you saying that we cannot visualize anything?
Where did this 'special equipment' caveat suddenly come from? You've never mentioned that before. Curious
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Greta
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Re: Leibniz's mill and the "Hard problem of consciousness"

Post by Greta »

Hobbes' Choice wrote:
2. Either the triangle is physical or it is not.
What the fuck is "physical"? this is the whole point of my post - is it not. You are making the same dualistic mistake right here.
IMO reality as we perceive it through the lens of current models is dual, and raw-thought has provided an example. However, I suspect that deeper links between brain activity and the objects of consciousness will eventually be demystified.

That would render the apparent dualism as one thing; a monist reality and answer your question - what the fuck is "physical?". At this stage we don't have enough information to answer that question. There are practical and tentative definitions of energy and matter but a deeper understanding of their existence and their nature will hopefully come in the future.
Londoner
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Re: Leibniz's mill and the "Hard problem of consciousness"

Post by Londoner »

raw_thought wrote:"So, when you say of the neurons that they do not fire in a triangular form, I think they do. "
Londoner
So you are saying that when you visualize a triangle you are seeing your neurons fire in a triangular form. I disagree.
I'm saying that there is no 'triangular form', only thoughts of triangular forms.

You use the word 'visualize' which makes us think in terms of the conventional idea of 'seeing', where there is an object 'out there' and also one in our heads, the second being in some sense caused by the first. But when asked to imagine a triangle we do not 'see' it in that sense. It is entirely in our heads, it exists in no other sense. So its form, if we want to say imaginary things have a form, is 'a thought'. And thoughts are the products of the activity in those neurons. So it is the neurons, or nothing.
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Re: Leibniz's mill and the "Hard problem of consciousness"

Post by Hobbes' Choice »

Londoner wrote:
raw_thought wrote:"So, when you say of the neurons that they do not fire in a triangular form, I think they do. "
Londoner
So you are saying that when you visualize a triangle you are seeing your neurons fire in a triangular form. I disagree.
I'm saying that there is no 'triangular form', only thoughts of triangular forms.

You use the word 'visualize' which makes us think in terms of the conventional idea of 'seeing', where there is an object 'out there' and also one in our heads, the second being in some sense caused by the first. But when asked to imagine a triangle we do not 'see' it in that sense. It is entirely in our heads, it exists in no other sense. So its form, if we want to say imaginary things have a form, is 'a thought'. And thoughts are the products of the activity in those neurons. So it is the neurons, or nothing.
"physical" is not just matter. The mechanistic world view we inherited from the age of Descartes, Leibniz and Newton was predicated on the idea of spirit or soul sundered from the material world.
Physical is the sense of energetic matter, somewhat more sophisticated from the mechanistic world view.
Whatever consciousness is; it is physical. The problem is more about devising metaphors to describe the physical, and not seeing the fact that ideas have to be 'hard', as indeed they must.
Ideas are not immaterial. They inhere in neurones, like it or not. Whilst we might want to dream that we live on incorporeally, there is not a shred of evidence for this, and all the evidence points to the certain fact that what we are, who we are, and how we feel all relies on our physicality.
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Greta
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Re: Leibniz's mill and the "Hard problem of consciousness"

Post by Greta »

Hobbes' Choice wrote:Whatever consciousness is; it is physical. The problem is more about devising metaphors to describe the physical, and not seeing the fact that ideas have to be 'hard', as indeed they must.
Ideas are not immaterial. They inhere in neurones, like it or not. Whilst we might want to dream that we live on incorporeally, there is not a shred of evidence for this, and all the evidence points to the certain fact that what we are, who we are, and how we feel all relies on our physicality.
As I suggested earlier, the "immaterial" is the undiscovered material.

However, I am not convinced that death must necessarily result in loss of subjective being altogether, which is an unproven assumption. Based on what we know today that seems likely but, then again, it once seemed likely that the Earth was flat and the geocentre of the universe. Like those former controversies, our notions of life and death may be a perspective issue.

IMO both atheists and theists are in a hurry to resolve the debate one way or another. That is sensible and practical - put the issue to bed and then get on with living.

However, I am not so practical in retirement, rather obsessed with death because I am of the age that my big sister died five years ago. I do not take lightly the experiences that people have after their lungs and heart stop, running on the residual oxygen in the body for a while. Some people have been clinically dead, knowing they are dead, with the pain subsided (nerves shut down), their senses gone - and they find themselves in blackness - but still conscious. Many then see a welcoming light. Researchers like Blackmore claim that the light is just the brain shutting down, the final neuronal opening before everything dies out. The physical cause is of less interest to me than the amazing experiences people have at the end. How long can these experiences last? We don't know.

The revival of those who have had NDEs brings us to the end of our knowledge. There's much about the fabric of reality that we don't understand. I find myself in no hurry to resolve the question - to plump for an assumption, as I do not believe we have enough information, especially about quantum and Planck scale dynamics, nor about the fabric of the cosmos generally. If Penrose and Hameroff are right and consciousness is closely tied to neuronal microtubules, then quantum strangeness comes into play with death, as well as information retention.

If there is nothing after death then we need to live this life to the fullest (as it's our only chance). If there is post-death subjectivity then we also need to live this life to the fullest (as we'd still be subject to cause and effect post-mortem). The only problems come when people make assumptions about what will happen and they are aggressive about it, eg. military suicide tactics.
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Re: Leibniz's mill and the "Hard problem of consciousness"

Post by Hobbes' Choice »

Greta wrote:
Hobbes' Choice wrote:Whatever consciousness is; it is physical. The problem is more about devising metaphors to describe the physical, and not seeing the fact that ideas have to be 'hard', as indeed they must.
Ideas are not immaterial. They inhere in neurones, like it or not. Whilst we might want to dream that we live on incorporeally, there is not a shred of evidence for this, and all the evidence points to the certain fact that what we are, who we are, and how we feel all relies on our physicality.
As I suggested earlier, the "immaterial" is the undiscovered material.

This is what I like to call an abuse of langauge. When people use immaterial they never mean it in that way. It is always used, and defined as something that is DISTINCT from physical


However, I am not convinced that death must necessarily result in loss of subjective being altogether, which is an unproven assumption. Based on what we know today that seems likely but, then again, it once seemed likely that the Earth was flat and the geocentre of the universe. Like those former controversies, our notions of life and death may be a perspective issue.

And THIS is what I call an unfounded assertion, and one that moreover is counter to reason and evidence.

IMO both atheists and theists are in a hurry to resolve the debate one way or another. That is sensible and practical - put the issue to bed and then get on with living.

There is no issue here, just idle notions from theists governed by myths from the dawn of human fear.


However, I am not so practical in retirement, rather obsessed with death because I am of the age that my big sister died five years ago. I do not take lightly the experiences that people have after their lungs and heart stop, running on the residual oxygen in the body for a while. Some people have been clinically dead, knowing they are dead, with the pain subsided (nerves shut down), their senses gone - and they find themselves in blackness - but still conscious. Many then see a welcoming light. Researchers like Blackmore claim that the light is just the brain shutting down, the final neuronal opening before everything dies out. The physical cause is of less interest to me than the amazing experiences people have at the end. How long can these experiences last? We don't know.

I'm sorry about your sister. People die. It is sad and we miss them. But they only survive in memories.


The revival of those who have had NDEs brings us to the end of our knowledge.
The thing about NDEs is the N bit. Think it over!

There's much about the fabric of reality that we don't understand. I find myself in no hurry to resolve the question - to plump for an assumption, as I do not believe we have enough information, especially about quantum and Planck scale dynamics, nor about the fabric of the cosmos generally. If Penrose and Hameroff are right and consciousness is closely tied to neuronal microtubules, then quantum strangeness comes into play with death, as well as information retention.
Blah, blah.
If there is nothing after death then we need to live this life to the fullest (as it's our only chance). If there is post-death subjectivity then we also need to live this life to the fullest (as we'd still be subject to cause and effect post-mortem). The only problems come when people make assumptions about what will happen and they are aggressive about it, eg. military suicide tactics.

post-death subjectivity is a meaningless phrase.
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