There is no practical difference between the easy and hard problems of consciousness.
easy - explaining the physical systems that give us and other animals the ability to discriminate, integrate information, and so forth
hard - explaining why and how humans have qualia or phenomenal experiences
There are two kinds of "why" questions,;
a) how (neuroscience and anthropology)
b) why - from what intent
The soft problem is obviously "how". But the hard problem is also only "how". There is no intent, there is only the mechanisms by which it is possible and the mechanism by which it is actual. The so-called explanatory gap between qualia and science is a matter of ignorance not intent; how, not why.
There is also the meta-problem of consciousness, which is philosophical - what does the word consciousness refer to? But that's dependant on neuroscience. Please ignore Chalmers' version which only causes additional confusion.
There are only two problems of consciousness;
a) what aspect of reality are we using the word to refer to?
b) how do those aspects physically affect one another?
the medium problem of consciousness
the medium problem of consciousness
Last edited by Advocate on Sun Nov 27, 2022 5:52 pm, edited 4 times in total.
Re: the medium problem of consciousness
[quote=Skepdick post_id=610335 time=1669294399 user_id=17350]
[quote=Advocate post_id=610332 time=1669294104 user_id=15238]
There is no practical difference between the easy and hard problems of consciousness.
[/quote]
What "problem"?
[/quote]
How.
[quote=Advocate post_id=610332 time=1669294104 user_id=15238]
There is no practical difference between the easy and hard problems of consciousness.
[/quote]
What "problem"?
[/quote]
How.
Re: the medium problem of consciousness
What 'how problem'?
A problem well-stated is a problem half-solved. --Author Disputed
Re: the medium problem of consciousness
The why question also boils down to how. The why is, why is there any experience at all? The how would explain how physical systems produce consciousness, it is the same thing.Advocate wrote: ↑Thu Nov 24, 2022 1:48 pm There is no practical difference between the easy and hard problems of consciousness.
easy - explaining the physical systems that give us and other animals the ability to discriminate, integrate information, and so forth
hard - explaining why and how humans have qualia or phenomenal experiences
There are two kinds of "why" questions,;
a) how (neuroscience and anthropology)
b) why - from what intent
The soft problem is obviously "how". But the hard problem is also only "how". There is no intent, there is only the mechanisms by which is possible and the mechanism by which it is actual. The so-called explanatory gap between qualia and science is a matter of ignorance not intent; how, not why.
There is also the meta-problem of consciousness, which is philosophical - what does the word consciousness refer to? But that's dependant on neuroscience. Please ignostic Chalmers' version which only causes additional confusion.
There are only two problems of consciousness;
a) what aspect of reality are we using the word to refer to?
b) how do those aspects physically affect one another?
There is another view. That consciousness isn’t actually anything at all, beyond the physical.
I had an analogy to a game simulation. In a game simulation, that game world is nothing more than one’s and zeros on circuit boards, producing light waves on a monitor. As a world it doesn’t actually exist. It is just a convincing illusion.
Could consciousness be the same? Just electro-chemical signals firing in a squishy brain/body system? No “extra” something produced? An illusion that bootstraps itself into seeming existence.
If it were true, we would then be left with the “meta” problem, that is, why do we think there is a hard problem.
Theory of mind in psychology asserts that our own minds “project” or imagine other organisms (and anything which behaves in sufficiently complex ways) as containing a mind with sentience. Our mind doesn’t actually detect that other mind, it imagines it. At some stage, this same process turns towards our own minds, projecting a kind of self within our own experience. Could this be that moment of bootstrapping, when a mind which projects existence of minds towards itself? The completion of the strange loop.
Re: the medium problem of consciousness
[quote=Dimebag post_id=610726 time=1669497613 user_id=5396]There is another view. That consciousness isn’t actually anything at all, beyond the physical.[/quote]
It is Only physical, but it is not Merely physical. It is an emergent understanding of the physical, greater than we currently possess.
It is Only physical, but it is not Merely physical. It is an emergent understanding of the physical, greater than we currently possess.
Re: the medium problem of consciousness
Yes, it’s important to not forget the forest for the trees. Neuroscientists and materialists tend to do this, thinking that by simply stating that neurons are involved that the mystery is solved.
There is far more to explain about consciousness, even if it is the neurons of the brain from which it emerges.