Indirect Realism is Not Realistic

[Veritas Aequitas]

Atla had been claiming Indirect Realism is realistic in contrast to say Kant's Empirical Realism - Transcendental Idealism.
The so-called realists has hijacked and bastardized the term 'real' with their ideology of realism.
In serious philosophical consideration Indirect Realism is not realistic as defined below;
What is realistic [of varying degrees] is conditioned upon an embodied human-based FSRC.

Here are the notes that support Indirect Realism is not realistic taken from
https://philosophyalevel.com/aqa-philos ... erception/
...........................

Indirect Realism is the view that:
The external world exists independently of the mind (hence, realism)
But we perceive the external world indirectly, via sense data (hence, indirect)

Indirect realism says the immediate object of perception is sense data. This sense data is caused by, and represents, the mind-independent external world.



Sense data can be described as the content of perceptual experience.
It’s not a physical thing, it exists in the mind. However, sense data is said to be caused by and represent mind-independent physical objects (see diagram above).
Sense data is private. No one else can experience your sense data.
This avoids the problems with direct realism described above. For example, differences in perceptual variation can be explained by differences in sense data. The object itself stays the same throughout even if the sense data changes.

PROBLEMS FOR INDIRECT REALISM

1. BERKELEY: MIND-INDEPENDENT OBJECTS ARE TOTALLY DIFFERENT TO SENSE DATA
Again, indirect realism says what we perceive is sense data that resembles the mind-independent external world. But George Berkeley (the idealism philosopher) questions how it’s possible for mind-dependent sense data to resemble so-called mind-independent objects in any way.
For example, sense data constantly changes, but mind-independent objects do not. The perceptual variation argument demonstrates this: One moment my sense data may be of a square table, the next it’s diamond-shaped. The sense data changes, but the mind-independent object doesn’t – so how can the two things resemble each other?
Further, how can the properties of sense data be like the properties of mind-independent objects? We say that a table is square, but how can my sense data be square? How can the squareness of a (mind-independent) table be like the squareness of sense data? They are two completely different kinds of things!
These major differences between sense data and mind-independent objects undermine the indirect realist claim that sense data is caused by and resembles mind-independent objects.

2. SCEPTICISM AND THE VEIL OF PERCEPTION
A problem for indirect realism is that it leads to scepticism about the nature and existence of the external world.


Look at the two diagrams above. What would be the difference from the perceiver’s perspective between the two?
What difference would it make to the perceiver if there was no physical world at all?
The answer, surely, is nothing.
If we only perceive sense data, and not the object itself, how can we know anything about the external world?
There is no way of telling if the sense data is an accurate representation of the external world – or even that there is an external world at all!
We can’t get beyond the veil of perception (sense data) to access the external world behind it. So, how can indirect realism justify its claim that there is a mind-independent external world that causes sense data if we never actually perceive the mind-independent external world itself?

The Veil Problem:
How can we be sure our sense data accurately represent the external world? Is it like a veil that might distort reality?

Indirect realist replies to scepticism
Russell’s reply: External world is the best hypothesis
Bertrand Russell, an indirect realist, concedes that there is no way we can conclusively defeat this sceptical argument and prove the existence of the external world. So, instead, we must treat the external world as a hypothesis.

Note Russell admitted
"there is no way we can conclusively defeat this sceptical argument and prove the existence of the external world" of offer merely the best hypothesis.

3. The Homunculus Problem:
Who or what interprets the sense data? This can lead to an infinite regress if there's a little "person" in our heads interpreting the data.

From the above, Indirect Realism cannot be realistic.

[Veritas Aequitas]

Notes: KIV

[Veritas Aequitas]

Notes: KIV

[Atla]

VA wishes to be shown wrong once and for all.

1. Looks like an outdated idealist objection. Let's drop the nonsensical mental/material duality of Western philosophy. Sense data is of course "physical", we pick up data using our senses, and then the brain/mind creates a representation using them. How our senses work was greatly established by science, it's not like a picture of a tree literally travels through the ether, what travels are photons etc. And external objects change as well obviously.

2. Looks like a joke. It expects philosophy to give us absolute certainty, an irrational expectation.

Veil problem: how is that a problem? It is automatically accepted that our representations are never 100% accurate.

3. Homunculus? We ARE the brain/mind, or at least the currently active part of the brain/mind, the idea of the homunculus is irrational and also leads to infinite regress, because the little man would also need to have a little mind etc.

From the above, Indirect Realism cannot be realistic.

Are you joking?

[Veritas Aequitas]

VA wishes to be shown wrong once and for all.

1. Looks like an outdated idealist objection. Let's drop the nonsensical mental/material duality of Western philosophy. Sense data is of course "physical", we pick up data using our senses, and then the brain/mind creates a representation using them. How our senses work was greatly established by science, it's not like a picture of a tree literally travels through the ether, what travels are photons etc. And external objects change as well obviously.

2. Looks like a joke. It expects philosophy to give us absolute certainty, an irrational expectation.

Veil problem: how is that a problem? It is automatically accepted that our representations are never 100% accurate.

3. Homunculus? We ARE the brain/mind, or at least the currently active part of the brain/mind, the idea of the homunculus is irrational and also leads to infinite regress, because the little man would also need to have a little mind etc.

From the above, Indirect Realism cannot be realistic.

Are you joking?

Your thinking is so bankrupt you don't even understand the issue and the problem.

Re 1:

• or example, sense data constantly changes, but mind-independent objects do not. The perceptual variation argument demonstrates this: One moment my sense data may be of a square table, the next it’s diamond-shaped. The sense data changes, but the mind-independent object doesn’t – so how can the two things resemble each other?

Do you even understand [not agree] the above objection?

As for the others you are merely handwaving.

Suggest your ask ChatGpt to confirm Indirect Realism is the most realistic and without any criticism and weaknesses.
Don't be a coward?

[Atla]

Your thinking is so bankrupt you don't even understand the issue and the problem.

Re 1:

• or example, sense data constantly changes, but mind-independent objects do not. The perceptual variation argument demonstrates this: One moment my sense data may be of a square table, the next it’s diamond-shaped. The sense data changes, but the mind-independent object doesn’t – so how can the two things resemble each other?

Do you even understand [not agree] the above objection?

As for the others you are merely handwaving.

Suggest your ask ChatGpt to confirm Indirect Realism is the most realistic and without any criticism and weaknesses.
Don't be a coward?

Why would anyone seriously argue in 2024 that mind-independent objects don't change with (Einsteinian) time? Are you using a weird 300 years old idealist argument or something?

Your thinking is totally bankrupt. The change of Einsteinian time is not an a priori intuition according to indirect realism. It's "real" and "universal".

[Veritas Aequitas]

Your thinking is so bankrupt you don't even understand the issue and the problem.

Re 1:

• or example, sense data constantly changes, but mind-independent objects do not. The perceptual variation argument demonstrates this: One moment my sense data may be of a square table, the next it’s diamond-shaped. The sense data changes, but the mind-independent object doesn’t – so how can the two things resemble each other?

Do you even understand [not agree] the above objection?

As for the others you are merely handwaving.

Suggest your ask ChatGpt to confirm Indirect Realism is the most realistic and without any criticism and weaknesses.
Don't be a coward?

Why would anyone seriously argue in 2024 that mind-independent objects don't change with (Einsteinian) time? Are you using a weird 300 years old idealist argument or something?

Your thinking is totally bankrupt. The change of Einsteinian time is not an a priori intuition according to indirect realism. It's "real" and "universal".

Suggest your ask ChatGpt to confirm Indirect Realism is the most realistic and without any criticism and weaknesses.
Don't be a coward?

[Atla]

Your thinking is so bankrupt you don't even understand the issue and the problem.

Re 1:

• or example, sense data constantly changes, but mind-independent objects do not. The perceptual variation argument demonstrates this: One moment my sense data may be of a square table, the next it’s diamond-shaped. The sense data changes, but the mind-independent object doesn’t – so how can the two things resemble each other?

Do you even understand [not agree] the above objection?

As for the others you are merely handwaving.

Suggest your ask ChatGpt to confirm Indirect Realism is the most realistic and without any criticism and weaknesses.
Don't be a coward?

Why would anyone seriously argue in 2024 that mind-independent objects don't change with (Einsteinian) time? Are you using a weird 300 years old idealist argument or something?

Your thinking is totally bankrupt. The change of Einsteinian time is not an a priori intuition according to indirect realism. It's "real" and "universal".

Suggest your ask ChatGpt to confirm Indirect Realism is the most realistic and without any criticism and weaknesses.
Don't be a coward?

That's not an argument. ChatGPT is not a judge. And there is no philosophical stance without criticism.

I don't know what you mean by weakness. I deal with consistency, explanatory power, Occam's razor. As far as I'm concerned, indirect realism + nondualism has no "weakness".

Anyway:

Most generally speaking, what is seen as more tenable nowadays, transcendental idealism or indirect realism?

In contemporary philosophy, both transcendental idealism and indirect realism have proponents, but indirect realism tends to be more widely accepted as it aligns with scientific findings and common sense perceptions of reality.

[Veritas Aequitas]

Why would anyone seriously argue in 2024 that mind-independent objects don't change with (Einsteinian) time? Are you using a weird 300 years old idealist argument or something?

Your thinking is totally bankrupt. The change of Einsteinian time is not an a priori intuition according to indirect realism. It's "real" and "universal".

Suggest your ask ChatGpt to confirm Indirect Realism is the most realistic and without any criticism and weaknesses.
Don't be a coward?

That's not an argument. ChatGPT is not a judge. And there is no philosophical stance without criticism.

I don't know what you mean by weakness. I deal with consistency, explanatory power, Occam's razor. As far as I'm concerned, indirect realism + nondualism has no "weakness".

Anyway:

Most generally speaking, what is seen as more tenable nowadays, transcendental idealism or indirect realism?

In contemporary philosophy, both transcendental idealism and indirect realism have proponents, but indirect realism tends to be more widely accepted as it aligns with scientific findings and common sense perceptions of reality.

As populum?
Widely accepted does not equate to being more realistic [as defined].
Theological claims are more widely accepted by more than 90% of the 8 billion people on Earth.

I don't question ChatGpt in this case, but it is the rubbish manner you ask your question, so GIGO.

To be more serious, empirical realism [which you did not mention] is the more common view since it is an evolutionary default of an external_ness instinct.
Indirect Realism is the turning of empirical realism into a dogmatic 'my way or the highway' sort of fundamentalistic ideology.

Suggest your ask ChatGpt to confirm Indirect Realism is the most realistic and without any criticism and weaknesses.
Don't be a coward?

[Atla]

Suggest your ask ChatGpt to confirm Indirect Realism is the most realistic and without any criticism and weaknesses.
Don't be a coward?

That's not an argument. ChatGPT is not a judge. And there is no philosophical stance without criticism.

I don't know what you mean by weakness. I deal with consistency, explanatory power, Occam's razor. As far as I'm concerned, indirect realism + nondualism has no "weakness".

Anyway:

Most generally speaking, what is seen as more tenable nowadays, transcendental idealism or indirect realism?

In contemporary philosophy, both transcendental idealism and indirect realism have proponents, but indirect realism tends to be more widely accepted as it aligns with scientific findings and common sense perceptions of reality.

As populum?
Widely accepted does not equate to being more realistic [as defined].
Theological claims are more widely accepted by more than 90% of the 8 billion people on Earth.

I don't question ChatGpt in this case, but it is the rubbish manner you ask your question, so GIGO.

To be more serious, empirical realism [which you did not mention] is the more common view since it is an evolutionary default of an external_ness instinct.
Indirect Realism is the turning of empirical realism into a dogmatic 'my way or the highway' sort of fundamentalistic ideology.

Suggest your ask ChatGpt to confirm Indirect Realism is the most realistic and without any criticism and weaknesses.
Don't be a coward?

Note, since VA is completely losing the debate, the only thing he can do is call me a coward, and expect nonsense from me like showing that Indirect realism has no critics. And he expects me to ask AI to summarize the majority view on these positions without asking about the majority view. VA may think that AI today isn't just a complicated search engine.

Most generally speaking, what is more realistic, transcendental idealism or indirect realism?

Transcendental idealism and indirect realism are philosophical perspectives that address the nature of reality and perception. Indirect realism posits that our perception of reality is mediated by mental representations, while transcendental idealism suggests that reality is shaped by the structures of human cognition. Both have their proponents and criticisms, but indirect realism is often considered more realistic ( ) because it maintains a closer connection between our perceptions and an external world, even if mediated.

[Atla]

To be more serious, empirical realism [which you did not mention] is the more common view since it is an evolutionary default of an external_ness instinct.
Indirect Realism is the turning of empirical realism into a dogmatic 'my way or the highway' sort of fundamentalistic ideology.

You call that "more serious"? Dividing reality into internal and external and then denying the external is a lot more like a fundamentalist ideology. And a pretty dumb one.

We humans seem to have an innate instinct that makes us believe that an external world exists outside of us. Is our instinct probably correct?

The belief in an external world outside of ourselves is a fundamental aspect of human perception and cognition. While it's difficult to prove definitively, the overwhelming consensus among scientists and philosophers is that there is indeed an external reality that exists independently of our perceptions. This belief is supported by empirical evidence, the consistency of our sensory experiences, and the ability to interact with and manipulate the world around us. However, debates about the nature of reality and the reliability of our perceptions continue to be topics of philosophical inquiry.

[Atla]

...

Note to VA: here is an example of asking AI a more advanced question:

Can the version of transcendental idealism which denies any mind-independent objective features of reality, explain the disparity between the a priori intuition of "absolute" space and time and Einsteinian spacetime?

The version of transcendental idealism that denies any mind-independent objective features of reality would likely struggle to explain the disparity between the a priori intuition of "absolute" space and time and Einsteinian spacetime. This is because such a view typically emphasizes the subjective nature of reality, rooted in human cognition, rather than acknowledging the possibility of objective features existing independently of the mind. In contrast, Einsteinian spacetime posits a dynamic, interconnected framework that challenges the classical notions of absolute space and time, suggesting an objective reality that exists regardless of human perception. Therefore, the denial of mind-independent objective features may not adequately accommodate the profound shift in our understanding of space and time brought about by Einsteinian relativity.

Can indirect realism explain the same?

Indirect realism, which posits that we perceive external objects indirectly through the mediation of ideas or sense data, can offer an explanation for the disparity between the a priori intuition of "absolute" space and time and Einsteinian spacetime. According to this view, our perception of space and time is constructed from our sensory experiences, which are subject to interpretation and influenced by various factors.

In the context of Einsteinian spacetime, indirect realism could suggest that our perception of space and time is shaped by the sensory data we receive, but it doesn't necessarily reflect an objective, mind-independent reality. Instead, our understanding of space and time evolves based on our experiences and the conceptual frameworks we develop, which may be influenced by scientific theories such as relativity.

Indirect realism allows for the acknowledgment of the dynamic nature of our perceptual experiences and conceptual frameworks, which can accommodate the profound shift in our understanding of space and time brought about by Einsteinian relativity. However, it's essential to recognize that indirect realism still maintains a distinction between our perceptions and the external reality they purportedly represent, leaving open the question of the ultimate nature of spacetime.

[Atla]

...

Yawn

Can the version of transcendental idealism which denies any mind-independent objective features of reality, explain the established modern science of perception?

Transcendental idealism, as espoused by philosophers like Immanuel Kant, posits that the structure of reality as we perceive it is shaped by the inherent structures of our minds. However, denying any mind-independent objective features of reality might conflict with established modern science, which often assumes an external, objective reality. While transcendental idealism can offer insights into how our perceptions are constructed, it may not fully explain all aspects of modern scientific understanding of perception, which often incorporates both subjective and objective elements.

Can indirect realism explain the same?

Indirect realism, also known as representational realism, suggests that while we perceive the world indirectly through our senses, there still exists a mind-independent reality that our perceptions represent. This view aligns more closely with established modern science of perception, as it acknowledges both the subjective nature of perception and the existence of an external, objective reality. Therefore, indirect realism may offer a more comprehensive explanation of the established modern science of perception compared to a version of transcendental idealism that denies any mind-independent objective features of reality.

[Atla]

...

meh

Can the version of transcendental idealism which denies any mind-independent objective features of reality, explain the consistency of perceptual illusions?

The version of transcendental idealism that denies any mind-independent objective features of reality could potentially explain the consistency of perceptual illusions by positing that our perception constructs the illusionary features based on the inherent structures of our cognitive faculties rather than the external world. In this view, perceptual illusions arise due to the limitations or biases of our perceptual mechanisms rather than reflecting objective properties of the external world.

Can indirect realism explain the same?

Yes, indirect realism could also explain the consistency of perceptual illusions. Indirect realism posits that we perceive the world indirectly through our sensory experiences, which are mediated by our perceptual systems. Perceptual illusions occur when there is a discrepancy between the information provided by our senses and the true nature of the external world. This can happen due to various factors such as sensory limitations, cognitive biases, or environmental conditions. So, indirect realism can account for the consistency of perceptual illusions by attributing them to the way our perceptual systems process and interpret sensory information.

Which explanation is more likely to be correct according to empirical observation?

According to empirical observation, indirect realism is more likely to align with our understanding of reality. Empirical evidence consistently suggests that there is an external world that exists independently of our perception. Through scientific experiments and observations, we gather data that supports the existence of objective features and properties of the external world.

While perceptual illusions and biases are acknowledged within indirect realism, they are seen as deviations from accurate perception rather than evidence against the existence of an external reality. Empirical studies in psychology and neuroscience often explore how these illusions arise from the workings of our perceptual systems, while still affirming the existence of an external world.

Transcendental idealism, while offering valuable philosophical insights, may be less directly supported by empirical observation as it posits that our perception is fundamentally shaped by the structures of our minds. However, empirical evidence does not definitively rule out transcendental idealism; rather, it may suggest that indirect realism is a more straightforward interpretation of empirical observations.

Can you demonstrate just one thing that your kind of transcendental idealism gets right and indirect realism doesn't?

[Impenitent]

of course the vat from which all impressions arise is external from the brain...

what matrix?

-Imp