FlashDangerpants wrote: ↑Sat Mar 23, 2024 2:36 pm
Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Sat Mar 23, 2024 6:38 am
I am very aware how W has evolved from his early very narrow p-realist view in the Tractatus [which he abandoned] for his PI [language-games] and therefrom evolved to a more anti-realist position [of Framework, System, Hinges, River beds] in On Certainty.
He didn't repudiate the whole Tractatus, he changed his mind about the language model in light of issues with the underlying assumptions of logical atomism. Much else continues throughout all his works.
He hadn't been a realist at the start by the way, and he didn't become an antirealist either. The Tractatus does no describe a real world, it describes a world interpreted through facts and language and is very very clearly about what we can and cannot say about it. That is the Wittgenstein who is most similar to you and all your KFC stuff. Not very similar still, he was a genius philosopher and you are definitvely not even an adequate one.
Note this, the various contentious interpretations of W's views:
The later Wittgenstein is widely held to be a
relativist, indeed a
constructivist.
By contrast, this paper argues that all appearances to the contrary Wittgenstein was a realist, and that this fact becomes almost conspicuous in his late-1940s manuscripts. His realism was a common-sense one, the only kind of realism worthy of the name.
Wittgenstein’s common-sense realism has unique traits:
first, an uncompromising stress on deviations from ordinary language as a source of (bad) philosophy.
Secondly, his awareness of the significance of the pictorial & the motor.
Thirdly, his emphasis on established use, that is, on traditions. In the later Wittgenstein, philosophical realism and social conservatism converge.
https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/ ... -0004/html#:
W's views from early to mid- to very-late has been interpreted variously [& contentiously] as realist, anti-realist, common-sense realist, and as mentioned above, a
relativist, indeed a
constructivist.
As argued here, my views are that the very late-W evolved as an antirealist, a
relativist, indeed a
constructivist as conditioned upon a FSRC [Framework and System] with his language-games as a subset of the general FSRC reflected in his 'On Certainty'.
The above quote mentioned W is a common-sense realist.
It cannot be because Moore was a common-sense realist and 'On Certainty' main purpose was to counter Moore's common sense realism. [Moore's
In Defense of Common-Sense]
As I had argued, in a very nuance perspective and context, an antirealist can also be a realist in different perspective.
I argue the very-late-W was an
empirical realist but that is subsumed within his antirealism [meta-] of relativism and constructivism.
Do you have an argument against that from the texts of On Certainty.
Re the Tractatus, W abandoned its significant central theme. There was nothing significant from the Tractatus that W carried forward to the PI [relativist language-games] and the 180 degrees paradigm shift On Certainty [constructivist and FRSC].
You would do well to look for the continuities in Wittegenstein's work as apparently you are quite blind to them right now. I definitely remember the Grayling lecture covered one of them, namely the bit about Proposition 7: "Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent."
I don't think you understand the full perspective of the above within the whole of W's work:
Here's AI's view [wR] re
"Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent.";
- Narrow Perspective:
Language is limited in its ability to express everything.
There are certain things, experiences, or concepts that simply cannot be accurately captured through words.
Forcing these things into language can lead to confusion, misunderstanding, or even meaningless statements.
In such cases, silence is the best course of action.
Wider Perspective:
This quote goes beyond the limits of language.
It suggests that there are aspects of reality that are fundamentally beyond human comprehension.
These might be mystical experiences, the nature of consciousness, or the absolute.
While we can try to grapple with these concepts, ultimately, silence may be the only appropriate response due to the limitations of human understanding.
The quote itself is a bit paradoxical.
Wittgenstein uses language to talk about the limits of language.
W's Later Work - On Certainty
In his later work, he focused more on the practical uses of language and how meaning arises through context and shared experiences.
Context and
shared experiences implied FSRC.
W
"Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent." has no significance in his later work e.g. PI [use language-games] and On Certainty [re FSRC].
In 'On Certainty' W argued one can use language in any sense and it is certain [a qualified certainty] as long as it is qualified within a specified Framework and System [in my case FSRC].
I have given my argument in this OP.
It is you with a very narrow and shallow minded dogmatic view that you are unable to follow W is his maturing view of reality.
You should also look for the continuity through his work of the notion that dissolving the problems of philosophy is quite a trivial thing. Again, from the Tractatus: "On the other hand the truth of the thoughts communicated here seems to me unassailable and definitive. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the problems have in essentials been finally solved. And if I am not mistaken in this, then the value of this work secondly consists in the fact that it shows how little has been done when these problems have been solved."
He wrote that because in his analysis, all the major problems of philosophy prove to be simple misunderstandings. That includes your treasured realist/antirealist debate which is nothing but a minor dispute over descriptions. That never changes in any version of Wittgenstein and it has been the basis of my refusal to take the realism/antirealism shit seriously.
It is a fact W evolved and matured from the evolutionary default [p-realist, to antirealism to relativism] as demonstrated in his work.
This evolution and maturity from 'early-' to 'later-' is very common among philosophers, i.e. note the early-Heidegger and later-Heidegger, early- and later-Kant,..... and even among lay-people, e.g. early-VA [realist] and later-VA [antirealist].
Your W point in
italics above is resolved in On Certainty on the basis of specifying and qualifying to a specific Framework and System [FSRC].
A group can claim anything as true [& reality] only as qualified within its specified FSRC, but whether its qualified truth [& reality] is credible or objective must be assessed via a rational methodology.
How else and what is the best way to compare the credibility and objectivity of claims of reality from astrologers, theologians, shamans, myths-makers, etc.? other than based on a rational method of assessment.
I was going to point to a third one but I have forgotten it now so I will raise it later if I feel like it.
Don't waste your time, read 'On Certainty' again with a fine-toothed comb but his time focus on W's main theme of Framework, System, Hinges, River Bed re I know, certainty, knowledge, doubting and objectivity.
You will then note the above is united within the theme of a human-based FSRC [framework and system of realization of reality and cognition (knowledge)].
How else??
Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Sat Mar 23, 2024 6:38 am
W's discussion of knowing, doubting, certainty, knowledge, objectivity across various fields of knowledge [science, mathematics, history, language, etc.] and their comparison can only make sense in the context of OC when they are conditioned upon specific Framework and System of Knowledge.
As I have told you already... when you talk like that about your KFC theory it sounds exactly like a million others. The problem comes into it when you start making everyting in the KFC be about lists, and sorting lists, and then this one magic list that other KFC good and bad according to random numbers.
You will not get support for that latter stuff from Wittgenstein through honest reading. I know you own't let that stop you though.
I suggest again you read W's On Certainty with a fine-toothed comb in the light of the Framework, System, Hinges, River Beds re I-know, knowing, certainty, knowledge, doubting and objectivity.
Most of the time you are blabbering and complaining [with some cherry-picked quotes] but not in the whole contexts of W's overall work.
W evolved and matured philosophically, you on the other hand is stuck with primordial and primitive thinking.
Do you think, antirealists [relativists, constructivists, Kantian] were stupid to think of something different [a paradigm shift] from the evolutionary default of the ideological-p-realism?
You condemnation of antirealists' view is an auto defense-mechanism [lashing out] to protect your evolutionary default security blanket. Can you counter this?
Btw, I don't have high regard for Wittgenstein's work at all, but I only read and discuss W to debunk those who cling to analytic philosophy in regarding W as 'God' and is stuck with his early-views; at the same time relying on W to condemn my antirealist [Kantian] views.
Wittgenstein a genius??
Nah .. he is likely be 10% of Kant's ability.