W's "On Certainty" is a Subset of the FSRC

[Veritas Aequitas]

I have reviewed Wittgenstein's On Certainty and the fundamental theme therein is grounded on the principles of the Framework and System of Emergence, Realization of Reality and Knowledge [FSRC].
I used FSK as a convenience but it imply FSRC.

So far I have reviewed paragraphs 1 - 410 of 'On Certainty' and they all aligned with the principles of the FSRC.
Based on my previous reading of the whole of "On Certainty" I am confident the majority of the rest 266 paragraphs are in the same mode.

To save time and space, here are paragraphs 1-16 [see next post for details] which indicate they all aligned with the FRSC as agreed by AI [wR]:

[ME] Topic: Wittgenstein's On Certainty.
My thesis is Wittgenstein's On Certainty fundamental is 'whatever exists is conditioned upon a Framework and System of Knowledge [FSK] and the language-game is a subset of the FSK.
I believe Wittgenstein represent "know" in terms of 'personal knowing' instinctual-animal-like-knowing and knowing as conditioned to a FSK [e.g. science, cosmology, mathematics, history, linguistic etc.]

Here are paragraphs 1-16 where I have made comments in [..] brackets in alignment to my thesis above.
Are my comments reasonable?
.................

Here are AI's comments:

Your comments in the brackets are mostly reasonable!
They accurately reflect the core of your thesis about Wittgenstein's concept of "knowing" in "On Certainty."

Here's a breakdown of your points and some additional considerations:
Strengths of Your Comments:
• Highlighting Framework and System of Knowledge (FSK): You correctly identify that Wittgenstein emphasizes the role of frameworks and systems of knowledge in shaping what we consider "knowing."
• Distinguishing Personal and FSK-based Knowing: You differentiate between personal, instinctual knowing and knowing conditioned by an FSK, which aligns with Wittgenstein's critique of Moore's foundationalist approach to certainty.

Points for Further Exploration:
• Nuances of "Personal Knowing": Wittgenstein might not explicitly categorize "knowing" as purely personal or instinctual. It could be a combination of basic experiences and the language-game we're embedded in.
• Degrees of Certainty within FSKs: Not all FSKs offer the same level of certainty. Science provides a high degree in some areas, while history might have more uncertainty. Your comments could explore this nuance.
• Clarity and Objectivity: You suggest personal knowing might lack objectivity. However, Wittgenstein might argue that "objectivity" itself is shaped by an FSK.

Here's a breakdown of each paragraph and your comments:

Paragraphs 1-2:
• Comment: Reasonable. You highlight the distinction between personal knowing and knowing based on a Framework and System of Knowledge (FSK).

Paragraph 3:
• Comment: Reasonable. The "possibility of satisfying oneself" can be seen as relying on the rules and procedures within a specific language game (e.g., scientific observation).

Paragraph 4:
• Comment: Reasonable. You raise a good point about the FSK being unclear. Here, it could be the FSK of everyday experience or even biology.

Paragraphs 5 & 6:
•Comment: Reasonable. These paragraphs emphasize the role of the FSK in determining what counts as true or false.

Paragraph 7:
• Comment: This is debatable. "Knowing" here could be based on both personal experience (seeing a chair) and the FSK of language and shared practices.

Paragraph 8:
• Comment: Reasonable. You highlight the difference between certainty within a specific FSK and the question of overall objectivity.

Paragraph 9:
• Comment: Reasonable. Knowing here could be based on personal conviction (seeing someone sick) or a medical FSK (diagnosis).

Paragraph 10:
•Comment: Reasonable. You correctly point out the need to specify an FSK (science, arithmetic) for knowledge claims.

Paragraphs 11-13:
• Comment: Reasonable. These paragraphs highlight the ambiguity of "I know" and the need to consider the FSK involved.

Paragraphs 14-16:
• Comment: Reasonable. These paragraphs discuss establishing certainty within an FSK and the limitations of personal assurances.


Here are some suggestions for revising your comments:
• Paragraph 1: Instead of "personal, instinct" you could use "pre-reflective experience" or "basic certainty."
• Paragraph 4, 8, 10: You could acknowledge the possibility that personal experience might play a role within certain FSKs (e.g., feeling a pulse in medicine).
• Paragraph 8, 15, 16: Instead of "objective certainty" you could use "certainty within a specific FSK" or "varying degrees of justification."

Overall, your comments provide a good starting point for understanding Wittgenstein's ideas on "knowing" in "On Certainty." By refining the language and acknowledging some complexities, you can strengthen your analysis.

Further Exploration:
Consider exploring these concepts further:
• Wittgenstein's concept of language games
• Critique of foundationalism
• Skepticism and the limits of knowledge
This will help you build a more nuanced understanding of Wittgenstein's arguments in "On Certainty."

Discuss??
Views??

[Veritas Aequitas]

My commentary that they aligned with the FSRC are in [...] brackets.

"On Certainty" Paragraph 1-16.
1. If you do know that here is one hand, we'll grant you all the rest. [of the external world]
When one says that such and such a proposition can't be proved, of course that does not mean that it can't be derived from other propositions; any proposition can be derived from other ones.
But they may be no more certain than it is itself.
(On this a curious remark by H.Newman.)
[which ‘know’ – personal, instinct [animal-like] or FSK-ed]

2. From its seeming to me - or to everyone - to be so, it doesn't follow that it is so.
What we can ask is whether it can make sense to doubt it. [if within a FSK, there is no doubting within its constitution]

3. If e.g. someone says "I don't know if there's a hand here" he might be told "Look closer".
- This possibility of satisfying oneself is part of the Language-Game. Is one of its [Language-Game’s] essential features. [upon a FSK]

4. "I know that I am a human being.” [which FSK?]
In order to see how unclear the sense of this proposition is, consider its negation.
At most it might be taken to mean "I know I have the organs of a human". (E.g. a brain which, after all, no one has ever yet seen.)
But what about such a proposition as "I know I have a brain"?
Can I doubt it? Grounds for doubt are lacking!
Everything speaks in its favour, nothing against it.
Nevertheless it is imaginable that my skull should turn out empty when it was operated on.
[which FSK, if FSK-ed there is no doubting]

5. whether a proposition can turn out false after all depends on what I make count as determinants for that proposition. [upon a FSK]

6. Now, can one enumerate what one knows (like Moore)? straight off like that, I believe not.
- For otherwise the expression "I know" gets misused.
And through this misuse a queer and extremely important mental state seems to be revealed. [we need to specify a FSK to enable knowledge-proper]

7. My life shows that I know or am certain that there is a chair over there, or a door, and so on.
- I tell a friend e.g. "Take that chair over there", "Shut the door", etc. etc. [is this a personal ‘know’ or FSK-ed “know”?]

8. The difference between the concept of 'knowing' and the concept of 'being certain' isn't of any great importance at all, except where "I know" is meant to mean: I can't be wrong.
In a law-court, for example, "I am certain" could replace "I know" in every piece of testimony.
We might even imagine its being forbidden to say "I know" there.
(A passage in "Wilhelm Meister", where "You know" or "You knew" is used in the sense "You were certain", the facts being different from what he knew.)
[if one specific a FSK, one can be 100% certain, there is no doubting within the constitution of the FSK, but the question is, is this certainty credible and objective; we need to assess the credibility of each FSK]

9. Now do I, in the course of my life, make sure I know that here is a hand - my own hand, that is? [one can depend on personal conviction, instinct or a FSK like science]

10. I know that a sick man is lying here?
Nonsense! I am sitting at his bedside, I am looking attentively into his face.
- So I don't know, then, that there is a sick man lying here?
Neither the question nor the assertion makes sense.
Any more than the assertion "I am here", which I might yet use at any moment, if suitable occasion presented itself.
- Then is "2x2=4" nonsense in the same way, and not a proposition of arithmetic, apart from particular occasions?
"2x2=4" is a true proposition of arithmetic - not "on particular occasions" nor "always"
- but the spoken or written sentence "2x2=4" in Chinese might have a different meaning or be out and out nonsense, and from this is seen that it is only in use that the proposition has its sense.
And "I know that there's a sick man lying here", used in an unsuitable situation, seems not to be nonsense but rather seems matter-of-course, only because one can fairly easily imagine a situation to fit it, and one thinks that the words "I know that...” are always in place where there is no doubt, and hence even where the expression of doubt would unintelligible.
[one must specify the FSK (science, mathematics, etc.) that support one’s “I know” or declare it is based on personal conviction]

11. We just do not see how very specialized the use of "I know" is. [I ‘know’ can personal, instinctual or FSK-ed (science, linguistic etc.)]

12. - For "I know" seems to describe a state of affairs which guarantees what is known, guarantees it as a fact.
One always forgets the expression "I thought I knew". [if I know is FSK-ed, then it is a fact of qualified-certainty]

13. For it is not as though the proposition "It is so" could be inferred from someone else's utterance: "I know it is so".
Nor from the utterance together with its not being a lie.
- But can't I infer "It is so" from my own utterance "I know etc."?
Yes; and also "There is a hand there" follows from the proposition "He knows that there's a hand there".
But from his utterance "I know...” it does not follow that he does know it.
[if I know is personal [subjective], then he does not know within a FSK – objective of varying degrees]

14. That he does know remains to be shown. [to specify ‘know’ is personal, instinctual or FSK-ed ]

15. It needs to be shown that no mistake was possible.
Giving the assurance "I know" doesn't suffice.
For it is after all only an assurance that I can't be making a mistake, and it needs to be objectively established that I am not making a mistake about that. [if rely on a FSK it has objective certainty of varying degrees]

16. "If I know something, then I also know that I know it, etc.” amounts to: "I know that" means "I am incapable of being wrong about that.” But whether I am so must admit of being established objectively. [If personal one can be wrong, but upon a certain FSK – there is a varying degree of objectivity]

[Veritas Aequitas]

Notes:
Reality, knowledge, truths, facts, objectivity & existence are conditioned upon an embodied human based Framework and System of Emergence, Realization of Reality and Cognition (knowledge) [FSRC].
Wittgenstein’s language-game is a subset of the FSRC, i.e. it is a linguistic FSRC.
In On Certainty, Wittgenstein cover the full extent of the FSRC.

Below are the more relevant paragraphs that support 'On Certainty' is grounded on a general Framework and System [FS], extended to a FSRC.
In On Certainty, it also allude to, there is a range of degrees of reality and the credibility and objectivity of a respective FSK [W mentioned FSKs of language, history, science, mathematics, etc.]

.............
3. If e.g. someone says "I don't know if there's a hand here" he might be told "Look closer". - This possibility of satisfying oneself is part of the Language-Game. Is one of its [Language-Game’s] essential features. [upon a FSK]

18. "I know" often means: I have the proper grounds for my statement. [upon a FSK]
So if the other person is acquainted with the Language-Game [specific FSK], he would admit that ‘I know.’
The other, if he is acquainted with the Language-Game, must be able to imagine how one may know something of the kind.

39. This is how calculation is done, in such circumstances a calculation is treated as absolutely reliable, as certainly correct. [only conditioned upon a FSK]

66. I make assertions about Reality, assertions which have different degrees of assurance.
How does the degree of assurance come out?
What consequences has it?
[indicate the need to assess the credibility and objectivity of FSK involved]

83. The truth of certain empirical propositions belongs to our frame of reference.

90. "I know" has a primitive meaning similar to and related to "I see" ("wissen", "videre"). [There are various types of 'I know' i.e. personal knowing, primitive instinctual[animal] FSK-ed]

97. The mythology may change back into a state of flux, the river-bed of thoughts may shift. But I distinguish between the movement of the waters on the river-bed and the shift of the bed itself; though there is not a sharp division of the one from the other

102. Might I not believe that once, without knowing it, perhaps is a state of unconsciousness, I was taken far away from the earth - that other people even know this, but do not mention it to me?
But this would not fit into the rest of my convictions at all.
Not that I could describe the system of these convictions.
Yet my convictions do form a system, a structure. [upon a FSK]

105. All testing, all confirmation and disconfirmation of a hypothesis takes place already within a system.
And this system is not a more or less arbitrary and doubtful point of departure for all our arguments: no, it belongs to the essence of what we call an argument. The system is not so much the point of departure, as the element in which arguments have their life.

108. "But is there then no objective truth?
Isn't it true, or false, that someone has been on the moon”?
If we are thinking within our system, then it is certain that no one has ever been on the moon.
Not merely is nothing of the sort ever seriously reported to us by reasonable people, but our whole system of physics forbids us to believe it.

109. "An empirical proposition can be tested" (we say).
But how? and through what?
110. What counts as its test?
- "But is this an adequate test?
And, if so, must it not be recognizable as such in logic”?
- As if giving grounds did not come to an end sometime.
But the end is not an ungrounded presupposition: it is an
ungrounded way of acting. [FSRC to test]

126. I am not more certain of the meaning of my words that I am of certain judgments.
Can I doubt that this colour is called "blue"?
(My) doubts form a system.

136. When Moore says he knows such and such, he is really enumerating a lot of empirical propositions which we affirm without special testing; propositions, that is, which have a peculiar logical role in the system of our empirical propositions. [FSRC]

137. … Not because anyone knows their truth, or believes he knows them, but because they all have a similar role in the system of our empirical judgments.

141. When we first begin to believe anything, what we believe is not a single proposition, it is a whole system of propositions.

144. The child learns to believe a host of things.
i.e. it learns to act according to these beliefs.
Bit by bit there forms a system of what is believed, and in that system some things stand unshakeably fast and some are more or less liable to shift.
What stands fast does so, not because it is intrinsically obvious or convincing; it is rather held fast by what lies around it.

286. .. If we compare our system of knowledge [FSK] with theirs then theirs [system of knowledge] is evidently the poorer one by far. [indicate FSKs need to be assessed]

341 That is to say, the questions that we raise and our doubts depend on the fact that some propositions are exempt from doubt, are as it were like hinges on which those turn. [the basic grounds]
342. That is to say, it [exempted from doubt] belongs to the logic of our scientific investigations that certain things are indeed not doubted. [within a FSK]

410. Our knowledge forms an enormous system. And only within this system has a particular bit the value we give it. [conditioned within a FSK]

411. If I say "we assume that the earth has existed for many years past" (or something similar), then of course it sounds strange that we should assume such a thing.
But in the entire system of our Language-Games it belongs to the foundations.
The assumption, one might say, forms the basis of action, and therefore, naturally, of thought

.................
If one cannot infer the theme of a Framework and System within 'On Certainty' as conditioned with a FS of Knowledge [FSK] one is certainly intellectually blind.
The language-game that Wittgenstein introduced within 'On Certainty' is merely a subset of the overall FSK.

[Veritas Aequitas]

Notes:

Thesis: W's "On Certainty" is a Subset of the FSRC. We need a methodology of assessment of the credibility and objective of each FSRC [FSK].

In the paragraphs below 602-613 W refer to Physics.
W seem to confine his 'Language-Games' to linguistic matters but not to the empirical and science.
In the above case, we can assume W would regard Physics as conforming to some sort of Language-Games.

However, it would be more effective for Physics within the context of 'On Certainty' to be conditioned within a Framework and System of Knowledge [extended to FSRC].
So, in this case, it would be more effective to qualify 'Physics' to the Science-Physics-FRSC.

At some point e.g. para 603, the question is how can we rely and trust the inferences from the science-physics FSK.
To do this, we need to determine the degree of credibility and objective of each FSK based on a methodology of assessment.
(PH and FDP condemned the need for a methodology of assessment, if they don't have one, who are they to rely credibility and objectivity of each FSK? their father, mother??)

Below are my comments on para 602-614 to support the thesis;

602. Should I say "I believe in physics", or "I know that physics is true"? [The 'know' and 'true' is qualified to the science-physics FSK, not based on personal conviction]

603. I am taught that under such circumstances this happens.
It has been discovered by making the experiment a few times.
Not that that would prove anything to us, if it weren't that this experience was surrounded by others which combine with it to form a system. [conditioned upon the science-physics FSRC]
Thus, people did not make experiments just about falling bodies but also about air resistence and all sorts of other things.
But in the end I rely on these experiences, or on the reports of them, I feel no scruples about ordering my own activities in accordance with them. - But hasn't this trust also proved itself?
So far as I can judge - yes. [to have some degree of reliance and truth, there is need for some sort of methodology of assessment of each FSK]

604. In a court of law the statement of a physicist that water boils at about 100C would be accepted unconditionally as truth.
If I mistrusted this statement what could I do to undermine it? Set up experiments myself? What would they prove? [this is why we some sort of methodology of assessment to have degree of trust]

605. But what if the physicist's statement were superstition and it were just as absurd to go by it in reaching a verdict as to rely on ordeal by fire? [physicist must comply with the science-physics FSK, this is why we need some sort of methodology of assessment]

606. That to my mind someone else has been wrong is no ground for assuming that I am wrong now.
- But isn't it a ground for assuming that I might be wrong?
It is no ground for any unsureness in my judgement, or my actions. [there is no absolute ground but FSK as ground]

607. A judge might even say "That is the truth - so far as a human being can know it.” [within a specific FSK] But what would this rider [additional remark] [Zusatz] achieve?
("beyond all reasonable doubt"). [what is truth require to assess the credibility of each FSK]

608. Is it wrong for me to be guided in my actions by the propositions of physics? [needed to be guided by credibility of each FSK]
Am I to say I have no good ground for doing so?
Isn't precisely this what we call a 'good ground'? [upon the credibility of science-physics FSK]

609-612 -Indicate Strong Relativistic Sentiments – Science Physics FSK
609. Supposing we met people who did not regard that as a telling reason. Now, how do we imagine this?
Instead of the physicist, they consult an oracle.
(And for that we consider them primitive.)
Is it wrong for them to consult an oracle and be guided by it?
- If we call this "wrong" aren't we using our Language-Game [FSK] as a base from which to combat theirs? [where diff FSKs are used, we require credibility of each FSK, so need a methodology of assessment]

610. And are we right or wrong to combat it? Of course there are all sorts of slogans which will be used to support our proceedings. [this is why we some sort of methodology of assessment]

611. Where two principles really do meet which cannot be reconciled with one another, then each man declares the other a fool and heretic. [this is why we some sort of methodology of assessment]

612. I said I would 'combat' the other man, - but wouldn't I give him reasons? Certainly; but how far do they go? At the end of reasons comes persuasion. (Think what happens when missionaries convert natives.) [this is why we some sort of methodology of assessment]

613. If I now say "I know that the water in the kettle in the gas-flame will not freeze but boil", I seem to be as justified in this "I know" as I am in any. [‘know’ has to refer to the science-physics FSK]
'If I know anything I know this'.
- Or do I know with still greater certainty that the person opposite me is my old friend so-and-so? [depend on which FSK]
And how does that compare with the proposition that I am seeing with two eyes and shall see them if I look in the glass?
- I don't know confidently what I am to answer here.
- But still there is a difference between cases. [degrees of credibility of each FSK]
If the water over the gas freezes, of course I shall be as astonished as can be, but I shall assume some factor I don't know of, and perhaps leave the matter to physicists to judge. [yes, refer to the science-physics FSK]

[Veritas Aequitas]

Notes: KIV

[Iwannaplato]

OK, I think I understand now how you have formatted this. I think it is a very awkward way to present your positions and the approval of the AI is not useful at all.

[FlashDangerpants]

4. "I know that I am a human being.” [which FSK?]

Lol

[Veritas Aequitas]

OK, I think I understand now how you have formatted this. I think it is a very awkward way to present your positions and the approval of the AI is not useful at all.

Discuss??
Views??

[Veritas Aequitas]

4. "I know that I am a human being.” [which FSK?]

Lol

You are sitting on the broken shoulders of Descartes??

If you reflect upon the whole of 'On Certainty', you will be laughing at yourself.

As I had written there are different types of 'know' in On Certainty, i.e.
personal knowing, instinctual-animal-knowing, FSK-ed [language games, scientific, historical, etc. knowing].
As such, it is critical what is the applicable 'I know' in 4 above.

[FlashDangerpants]

Unless you are able to find someting in Wittgenstein justifying your insane effort to list all the KFCs using a mega-bucket-KFC that sorts them all into a list of the credibles and allows you to "objectively" yet "mathematically" compare the practice of Numerology against that of Buffy Studies even while they make no competing claims and there is no possible reason to need to compare them.... none of this analysis is worth the bother.

If you only describe the sane bits of the KFC theory it sounds like a bunch of similar theories. It only takes shape as a theory of its own once you open up about the mad bits ("credibility", "objectivity") that support the insane objectives ("morality-proper").

[Veritas Aequitas]

Unless you are able to find someting in Wittgenstein justifying your insane effort to list all the KFCs using a mega-bucket-KFC that sorts them all into a list of the credibles and allows you to "objectively" yet "mathematically" compare the practice of Numerology against that of Buffy Studies even while they make no competing claims and there is no possible reason to need to compare them.... none of this analysis is worth the bother.

If you only describe the sane bits of the KFC theory it sounds like a bunch of similar theories. It only takes shape as a theory of its own once you open up about the mad bits ("credibility", "objectivity") that support the insane objectives ("morality-proper").

Seems you have a very strong defense mechanism [thick skull] to resist my thesis despite the clues I have given re para 1-16. [which the internet-omnipresent AI agrees with - I am not taking AI [wR] as authoritative but merely provide at least some clues.]
It is not possible for me to list the 676 paragraphs, but later I will pick up the critical passages that supported my thesis.

[FlashDangerpants]

Unless you are able to find someting in Wittgenstein justifying your insane effort to list all the KFCs using a mega-bucket-KFC that sorts them all into a list of the credibles and allows you to "objectively" yet "mathematically" compare the practice of Numerology against that of Buffy Studies even while they make no competing claims and there is no possible reason to need to compare them.... none of this analysis is worth the bother.

If you only describe the sane bits of the KFC theory it sounds like a bunch of similar theories. It only takes shape as a theory of its own once you open up about the mad bits ("credibility", "objectivity") that support the insane objectives ("morality-proper").

Seems you have a very strong defense mechanism [thick skull] to resist my thesis despite the clues I have given re para 1-16. [which the internet-omnipresent AI agrees with - I am not taking AI [wR] as authoritative but merely provide at least some clues.]
It is not possible for me to list the 676 paragraphs, but later I will pick up the critical passages that supported my thesis.

Why waste your time on all 676? Your work with the first 16 is shit. All you've done is assert nonsense about KFC-buckes in [blue brackets]. You can continue to the end of the book or just declare victory now and stop, it makes difference, no knowledge about Wittgenstein is uncovered by it and we already knew everything it tells us about you.

[Veritas Aequitas]

Why waste your time on all 676? Your work with the first 16 is shit. All you've done is assert nonsense about KFC-buckes in [blue brackets]. You can continue to the end of the book or just declare victory now and stop, it makes difference, no knowledge about Wittgenstein is uncovered by it and we already knew everything it tells us about you.

Below are the more relevant paragraphs that support 'On Certainty' is grounded on a general Framework and System, extended to a FSRC.
In On Certainty, it also allude to, there is a range of degrees of reality and the credibility and objectivity of a respective FSK [W mentioned FSKs of language, history, science, mathematics, etc.]

the post here;
viewtopic.php?p=702338#p702338

[FlashDangerpants]

Why waste your time on all 676? Your work with the first 16 is shit. All you've done is assert nonsense about KFC-buckes in [blue brackets]. You can continue to the end of the book or just declare victory now and stop, it makes difference, no knowledge about Wittgenstein is uncovered by it and we already knew everything it tells us about you.

Below are the more relevant paragraphs that support 'On Certainty' is grounded on a general Framework and System, extended to a FSRC.
In On Certainty, it also allude to, there is a range of degrees of reality and the credibility and objectivity of a respective FSK [W mentioned FSKs of language, history, science, mathematics, etc.]

the post here;
viewtopic.php?p=702338#p702338

If you only describe the sane bits of the KFC theory it sounds like a bunch of similar theories. It only takes shape as a theory of its own once you open up about the mad bits ("credibility", "objectivity") that support the insane objectives ("morality-proper").

[Veritas Aequitas]

So far I have analyzed up to para 530 of On Certainty,
here is para

521. Moore's mistake lies in this - countering the assertion that one cannot know that, by saying "I do know it".

Wittgenstein mentioned there are various types of 'know' i.e. 'knowing based on personal conviction' knowing based on common sense-FSRC, knowing based on other FSRC, e.g. historical, science, mathematical, and others.

Here are paragraph that support W view of Frames and System of Knowledge;
viewtopic.php?p=702338#p702338
e.g.
83. The truth of certain empirical propositions belongs to our frame of reference.

The point here is Moore's ‘know’ is based on his chosen FSK which is based the common-sense FSRC.
It is a mistake for Moore to insist 'his know' is a certain truth, i.e. based merely on the common sense FSRC.
Wittgenstein stated Moore' cannot claim absolute certainty.

Wittgenstein did question, how can we assess the credibility of each claim wherein doubt can can arise.

However, W did not go into detail can be compare the credibility and objectivity of each FSK chosen and relied upon.
This is why my call to assess the credibility and objectivity using a methodological that is based on a rational set of criteria.

In using the scientific-FSRC as the gold standard, we can more or less assess Moore's 'know' relying upon the common-sense FSRC is not as credible as the scientific FSRC.

Example as astrologer can be very certain of his claims but that is only qualified upon his astrology-FSRC, but a scientist will doubt the astrologist's certainty when contrasted with the scientific-FSRC.