W's "On Certainty" is a Subset of the FSRC

[Veritas Aequitas]

double-posting

[Veritas Aequitas]

See this analysis re paragraph 520.

[520]. Moore has every right to say he knows there's a tree there in front of him. [based on his specified FSK]
Naturally he may be wrong. [if compared to a more credible FSK]
(For it is not the same as with the utterance "I believe there is a tree there".)

But whether he is right or wrong in this case is of no philosophical importance.
If Moore is attacking those who say that one cannot really know such a thing, he can't do it by assuring them that he knows this and that. [his specified FSK may not credible]

For one need not believe him. [if based on another FSK]
If his opponents had asserted that one could not believe this and that, then he could have replied: "I believe it". [whose is more credible must be assessed - using a methodology based on a set of rational criteria]

Moore has every right in insisting his 'I know' is of certainty, but is the FSK that support his 'I know' credible and objective?
As such we need a methodology to assess the credibility and objectivity of Moore's claim against a valid standard.

Discuss??
Views??

[FlashDangerpants]

If you only describe the sane bits of the KFC theory it sounds like a bunch of similar theories. It only takes shape as a theory of its own once you open up about the mad bits ("credibility", "objectivity") that support the insane objectives ("morality-proper").

[Atla]

Only 19 more years until VA finally realizes that the position with the higher score is.. realism. The most credible FSK is the realism-FSK.

Sucks to be VA

[Veritas Aequitas]

Thesis: W's "On Certainty" is a Subset of the FSRC. We need a methodology of assessment of the credibility and objective of each FSRC [FSK].

In the paragraphs below 602-613 W refer to Physics.
W seem to confine his 'Language-Games' to linguistic matters but not to the empirical and science.
In the above case, we can assume W would regard Physics as conforming to some sort of Language-Games.

However, it would be more effective for Physics within the context of 'On Certainty' to be conditioned within a Framework and System of Knowledge [extended to FSRC].
So, in this case, it would be more effective to qualify 'Physics' to the Science-Physics-FRSC.

At some point e.g. para 603, the question is how can we rely and trust the inferences from the science-physics FSK.
To do this, we need to determine the degree of credibility and objective of each FSK based on a methodology of assessment.
(PH and FDP condemned the need for a methodology of assessment, if they don't have one, who are they to rely credibility and objectivity of each FSK? their father, mother??)

Below are my comments on para 602-614 to support the thesis;

602. Should I say "I believe in physics", or "I know that physics is true"? [The 'know' and 'true' is qualified to the science-physics FSK, not based on personal conviction]

603. I am taught that under such circumstances this happens.
It has been discovered by making the experiment a few times.
Not that that would prove anything to us, if it weren't that this experience was surrounded by others which combine with it to form a system. [conditioned upon the science-physics FSRC]
Thus, people did not make experiments just about falling bodies but also about air resistence and all sorts of other things.
But in the end I rely on these experiences, or on the reports of them, I feel no scruples about ordering my own activities in accordance with them. - But hasn't this trust also proved itself?
So far as I can judge - yes. [to have some degree of reliance and truth, there is need for some sort of methodology of assessment of each FSK]

604. In a court of law the statement of a physicist that water boils at about 100C would be accepted unconditionally as truth.
If I mistrusted this statement what could I do to undermine it? Set up experiments myself? What would they prove? [this is why we some sort of methodology of assessment to have degree of trust]

605. But what if the physicist's statement were superstition and it were just as absurd to go by it in reaching a verdict as to rely on ordeal by fire? [physicist must comply with the science-physics FSK, this is why we need some sort of methodology of assessment]

606. That to my mind someone else has been wrong is no ground for assuming that I am wrong now.
- But isn't it a ground for assuming that I might be wrong?
It is no ground for any unsureness in my judgement, or my actions. [there is no absolute ground but FSK as ground]

607. A judge might even say "That is the truth - so far as a human being can know it.” [within a specific FSK] But what would this rider [additional remark] [Zusatz] achieve?
("beyond all reasonable doubt"). [what is truth require to assess the credibility of each FSK]

608. Is it wrong for me to be guided in my actions by the propositions of physics? [needed to be guided by credibility of each FSK]
Am I to say I have no good ground for doing so?
Isn't precisely this what we call a 'good ground'? [upon the credibility of science-physics FSK]

609-612 -Indicate Strong Relativistic Sentiments – Science Physics FSK
609. Supposing we met people who did not regard that as a telling reason. Now, how do we imagine this?
Instead of the physicist, they consult an oracle.
(And for that we consider them primitive.)
Is it wrong for them to consult an oracle and be guided by it?
- If we call this "wrong" aren't we using our Language-Game [FSK] as a base from which to combat theirs? [where diff FSKs are used, we require credibility of each FSK, so need a methodology of assessment]

610. And are we right or wrong to combat it? Of course there are all sorts of slogans which will be used to support our proceedings. [this is why we some sort of methodology of assessment]

611. Where two principles really do meet which cannot be reconciled with one another, then each man declares the other a fool and heretic. [this is why we some sort of methodology of assessment]

612. I said I would 'combat' the other man, - but wouldn't I give him reasons? Certainly; but how far do they go? At the end of reasons comes persuasion. (Think what happens when missionaries convert natives.) [this is why we some sort of methodology of assessment]

613. If I now say "I know that the water in the kettle in the gas-flame will not freeze but boil", I seem to be as justified in this "I know" as I am in any. [‘know’ has to refer to the science-physics FSK]
'If I know anything I know this'.
- Or do I know with still greater certainty that the person opposite me is my old friend so-and-so? [depend on which FSK]
And how does that compare with the proposition that I am seeing with two eyes and shall see them if I look in the glass?
- I don't know confidently what I am to answer here.
- But still there is a difference between cases. [degrees of credibility of each FSK]
If the water over the gas freezes, of course I shall be as astonished as can be, but I shall assume some factor I don't know of, and perhaps leave the matter to physicists to judge. [yes, refer to the science-physics FSK]

[FlashDangerpants]

See this analysis re paragraph 520.

[520]. Moore has every right to say he knows there's a tree there in front of him. [based on his specified FSK]
Naturally he may be wrong. [if compared to a more credible FSK]
(For it is not the same as with the utterance "I believe there is a tree there".)

But whether he is right or wrong in this case is of no philosophical importance.
If Moore is attacking those who say that one cannot really know such a thing, he can't do it by assuring them that he knows this and that. [his specified FSK may not credible]

For one need not believe him. [if based on another FSK]
If his opponents had asserted that one could not believe this and that, then he could have replied: "I believe it". [whose is more credible must be assessed - using a methodology based on a set of rational criteria]

Moore has every right in insisting his 'I know' is of certainty, but is the FSK that support his 'I know' credible and objective?
As such we need a methodology to assess the credibility and objectivity of Moore's claim against a valid standard.

Are you trying to smuggle your stupid credibility theory into On Certainty now?
You take some total fucking liberties.

[FlashDangerpants]

And this is a contradiction: there's no reality outside a model (an 'FSRC'); but the objectivity of a model can be assessed against reality, using 'the generally accepted criteria any rational person would readily accept'.

Recently VA has been taking on the quite impossible task of converting On Certainty into a subset of his KFC-buckets. If he actually read page 1 of the Tractatus though...

1 The world is all that is the case.
1.1 The world is the totality of [KFC-Buckets], not of things.
1.11 The world is determined by the [KFC-Buckets], and by their being all the [KFC-Buckets].
1.12 For the totality of [KFC-Buckets] determines what is the case, and also whatever is not the case.
1.13 The [KFC-Buckets] in logical space are the world.
1.2 The world divides into [KFC-Buckets].
1.21 Each item can be the case [in accord with KFC-Buckets] or not the case [in accord with KFC-Buckets] while everything else remains the same.

... that sort of fits what he writes much more readily.

[Impenitent]

And this is a contradiction: there's no reality outside a model (an 'FSRC'); but the objectivity of a model can be assessed against reality, using 'the generally accepted criteria any rational person would readily accept'.

Recently VA has been taking on the quite impossible task of converting On Certainty into a subset of his KFC-buckets. If he actually read page 1 of the Tractatus though...

1 The world is all that is the case.
1.1 The world is the totality of [KFC-Buckets], not of things.
1.11 The world is determined by the [KFC-Buckets], and by their being all the [KFC-Buckets].
1.12 For the totality of [KFC-Buckets] determines what is the case, and also whatever is not the case.
1.13 The [KFC-Buckets] in logical space are the world.
1.2 The world divides into [KFC-Buckets].
1.21 Each item can be the case [in accord with KFC-Buckets] or not the case [in accord with KFC-Buckets] while everything else remains the same.

... that sort of fits what he writes much more readily.

but that makes the Vienna Circle extra crispy

-Imp

[Atla]

Only 19 more years until VA finally realizes that the position with the higher score is.. realism. The most credible FSK is the realism-FSK.

Sucks to be VA

And the realism-FSK says that reality isn't dependent on FSKs.

realism-FSK: 8.21235 out of 10
FSKdependence-FSK: 4.27193 out of 10

According to the FSKcomparison-FSK, realism is better (at a confidence value of 8.67995 out of 10) so we shouldn't take all this FSK stuff too seriously.

The timewasting-FSK by the way gives a timewasting value of 9.04551 (!) out of 10 for VA's decade long work on an FSKs system that ultimately concludes that we shouldn't do FSKs.

(The tragicomedy-FSK gives a value of 7.39112 out of 10 on this.. fairly high on tragicomedy.. and the life-is-pain-FSK acknowledges it with a modest 5.88774 out of 10, it's bad but there are things worse.)

[Veritas Aequitas]

See this analysis re paragraph 520.

[520]. Moore has every right to say he knows there's a tree there in front of him. [based on his specified FSK]
Naturally he may be wrong. [if compared to a more credible FSK]
(For it is not the same as with the utterance "I believe there is a tree there".)

But whether he is right or wrong in this case is of no philosophical importance.
If Moore is attacking those who say that one cannot really know such a thing, he can't do it by assuring them that he knows this and that. [his specified FSK may not credible]

For one need not believe him. [if based on another FSK]
If his opponents had asserted that one could not believe this and that, then he could have replied: "I believe it". [whose is more credible must be assessed - using a methodology based on a set of rational criteria]

Moore has every right in insisting his 'I know' is of certainty, but is the FSK that support his 'I know' credible and objective?
As such we need a methodology to assess the credibility and objectivity of Moore's claim against a valid standard.

Are you trying to smuggle your stupid credibility theory into On Certainty now?
You take some total fucking liberties.

As I had stated you're an empty philosophical vessel.
Something is definitely wrong with your 'full of fucking' mind.

I have just read 'On Certainty' in two rounds, focusing on each individual paragraph very closely to confirm the following;
From a meta-analytical view and a more intelligent review, W's "On Certainty" [OC] overall theme fit in with the need to assess the credibility and objectivity of each FSRC specified based on an effective methodology of assessment.


Thesis: W's "On Certainty" is a Subset of the FSRC. We need a methodology of assessment of the credibility and objective of each FSRC [FSK].
viewtopic.php?p=702339#p702339

Another, for example the following para [there are MANY of such paras within On Certainty];

[15.] It needs to be shown that no mistake was possible.
Giving the assurance "I know" doesn't suffice.
For it is after all only an assurance that I can't be making a mistake, and it needs to be objectively established that I am not making a mistake about that.

In On Certainty, W raised the points that there are different types of knowing, i.e.
1. personal knowing based on personal conviction on first person's experience and argument,
2. based on something like instinct, W refer to 'like animal' child.
3. based on different language-games [LG] [which is FSRC].

As such, it is critical that any "I know" must be qualified to either 1, 2, or 3.
In Moore's case it has to be based on some sort of LG [FSRC], which is supposed to be the the common-sense LG [FSRC].
When it is relied on a LG [FSRC] its has objective certainty of varying degrees and if all the rules within the said LG[FSRC] are complied with there is no question of mistake nor any doubting because every proposition is qualified to the specific LG[FSRC].
There is mistake and doubt only when compared to another more credible FSK, e.g. science-FSR doubting claims of the claims of the astrological-FSK, or it new evidences override an old FSRC-qualified claim.

Science is contingent upon a generally accepted standard scientific FSRC.
But within the common-sense LG[FSRC] there could many different LG[FSRC] formulated by different groups of people.
Since every LG[FSRC] has its own qualified credibility and objectivity, how do we ascertain which is more credible and objective?

As such there must be an acceptable and rational method to assess the credibility and objectivity of each FSRC.

Methodology of Rating Objectivity of FSK
viewtopic.php?p=676756&hilit=weight#p676756

Criteria in Rating Credibility & Objectivity of a FSK
viewtopic.php?t=41040

Avoiding Circularity in Assessing Objectivity of FSRC
viewtopic.php?t=42003

[FlashDangerpants]

When it is relied on a LG [FSRC] its has objective certainty of varying degrees

You didn't get that little hit about objectivity within language games from Wittgenstein, did you?
Did you just decide it must be there because that would be in keeping with your own theory?

[Veritas Aequitas]

When it is relied on a LG [FSRC] its has objective certainty of varying degrees

You didn't get that little hit about objectivity within language games from Wittgenstein, did you?
Did you just decide it must be there because that would be in keeping with your own theory?

The term 'language-game' is mentioned literally and implied many times in 'On Certainty'.
At the same time, W alluded to a greater Framework and System above language-game [linguistic -builder] by reference to historical, science, physics, chemistry, biology and other framework and system of knowledge [FSKs].
These later fields of knowledge are too broad to be termed as merely language-games because they have specific constitution, rules and processes.

Many writers had explained this extension to Framework and System is a sign of W's more matured and systematic philosophy above his PI's language game and other bits & pieces without any united theme. Are you aware of this point?

[FlashDangerpants]

When it is relied on a LG [FSRC] its has objective certainty of varying degrees

You didn't get that little hit about objectivity within language games from Wittgenstein, did you?
Did you just decide it must be there because that would be in keeping with your own theory?

The term 'language-game' is mentioned literally and implied many times in 'On Certainty'.
At the same time, W alluded to a greater Framework and System above language-game [linguistic -builder] by reference to historical, science, physics, chemistry, biology and other framework and system of knowledge [FSKs].
These later fields of knowledge are too broad to be termed as merely language-games because they have specific constitution, rules and processes.

Many writers had explained this extension to Framework and System is a sign of W's more matured and systematic philosophy above his PI's language game and other bits & pieces without any united theme. Are you aware of this point?

I asked you if you got that bit about objectivity from Wittgenstein himself, or if you added it becuase it suits you. Please answer that question.

[Veritas Aequitas]

You didn't get that little hit about objectivity within language games from Wittgenstein, did you?
Did you just decide it must be there because that would be in keeping with your own theory?

The term 'language-game' is mentioned literally and implied many times in 'On Certainty'.
At the same time, W alluded to a greater Framework and System above language-game [linguistic -builder] by reference to historical, science, physics, chemistry, biology and other framework and system of knowledge [FSKs].
These later fields of knowledge are too broad to be termed as merely language-games because they have specific constitution, rules and processes.

Many writers had explained this extension to Framework and System is a sign of W's more matured and systematic philosophy above his PI's language game and other bits & pieces without any united theme. Are you aware of this point?

I asked you if you got that bit about objectivity from Wittgenstein himself, or if you added it becuase it suits you. Please answer that question.

I do not understand your point precisely.

I personally did not get whatever objectivity I believe from Wittgenstein.

Wittgenstein mentioned about 'objectivity', here are few [among many] instances;

15. It needs to be shown that no mistake was possible.
Giving the assurance "I know" doesn't suffice.
For it is after all only an assurance that I can't be making a mistake, and it needs to be objectively established that I am not making a mistake about that.

16. "If I know something, then I also know that I know it, etc.” amounts to: "I know that" means "I am incapable of being wrong about that.” But whether I am so must admit of being established objectively.

108. "But is there then no objective truth? [note two senses of objectivity]
Isn't it true, or false, that someone has been on the moon”?
If we are thinking within our system [upon a FSK], then it is certain that no one has ever been on the moon.
Not merely is nothing of the sort ever seriously reported to us by reasonable people, but our whole system of physics [upon a FSK] forbids us to believe it.
For this demands answers to the questions "How did he overcome the force of gravity”?
"How could he live without an atmosphere”? and a thousand others which could not be answered.
But suppose that instead of all these answers we met the reply: "We don't know how one gets to the moon, but those who get there know at once that they are there; and even you can't explain everything.” [without reference to a FSK- useless]
We should feel ourselves intellectually very distant from someone who said this.

194. With the word "certain" we express complete conviction, the total absence of doubt, and thereby we seek to convince other people. [upon personal conviction] That is subjective certainty.
But when is something objectively certain? [only when upon a specified FSK]
When a mistake is not possible. But what kind of possibility is that? Mustn't mistake be logically excluded?

My principle is;
whatever is objective must be contingent upon an embodied human-based FSRC, i.e. within a collective-of-subjects, thus objectivity is intersubjectivity.

In W's case, there is no objectivity if based on simply "I know'.
To be certain of objectivity, it has to be conditioned within a language-game, but in On Certainty, the idea of language-game is limited when other Framework and Systems like science, physics, history, biology, chemistry are involved.
As such, W's language-games is subsumed within a generic Framework and System of Knowledge [FSK - FSRC] to ensure objectivity is established.
This point is confirmed from my scrutiny of all the 676 paras in "On Certainty'.

Show me a few paras [of whatever] in the context of the whole of 'On Certainty' where my above claim is false?

[FlashDangerpants]

When it is relied on a LG [FSRC] its has objective certainty of varying degrees

How can thiws very simple point be difficult to get?
Wittgenstein didn't write that language games have "objective certainty of varying degrees ".
You inserted that to suit yourself didn't you?


You are not reading Wittgenstein properly. You are doing that selfish thing again. You are reading Wittgenstein just to find ways to say he supports you, rather than reading it to find out what Wittgenstein himself is saying. The result is a self-serving mess that nobody who has read Wittgenstein themselves will be taken in by.

You did the same when you read Blackburn and paid no attention to what his argument was, or whether what he said about Kant along the way was true enough in a book that isn't actually about Kant... but instead went looking for an excuse to say he wasn't writing what you would about Kant, so that you could grandstand over the only thing that you can put on an actual show about knowing, because you wanted to be extra mean about Blackburn in hopes I would care.

Although ... you don't read very well... so you probably didn't read Kant any better than you read anyone else.

Show me a few paras [of whatever] in the context of the whole of 'On Certainty' where my above claim is false?

Why? I said already that you have to come up with something of note in order for me to bother cracking open my copy of the book. You are nowhere near doing that so far.