W's "On Certainty" is a Subset of the FSRC

[Veritas Aequitas]

When it is relied on a LG [FSRC] its has objective certainty of varying degrees

How can thiws very simple point be difficult to get?
Wittgenstein didn't write that language games have "objective certainty of varying degrees ".
You inserted that to suit yourself didn't you?


You are not reading Wittgenstein properly. You are doing that selfish thing again. You are reading Wittgenstein just to find ways to say he supports you, rather than reading it to find out what Wittgenstein himself is saying. The result is a self-serving mess that nobody who has read Wittgenstein themselves will be taken in by.

You did the same when you read Blackburn and paid no attention to what his argument was, or whether what he said about Kant along the way was true enough in a book that isn't actually about Kant... but instead went looking for an excuse to say he wasn't writing what you would about Kant, so that you could grandstand over the only thing that you can put on an actual show about knowing, because you wanted to be extra mean about Blackburn in hopes I would care.

Although ... you don't read very well... so you probably didn't read Kant any better than you read anyone else.

I did not assert W wrote that language games have "objective certainty of varying degrees ".

I stated I inferred that based on the context of the whole of "On Certainty" and I provided paragraphs from OC to support my claim.
Show that my inference is wrong with reference to paras I quoted or any other paras from OC.

Or your other accusations are merely speculations without justifications.

Although ... you don't read very well... so you probably didn't read Kant any better than you read anyone else.

I have not claimed to have understood Kant 100%, at most 85-90%.
Have you read enough of Kant to make the above judgment?
You can refer to what I have wrote about Kant re his CPR and make your claim, else it better to shut up.

[FlashDangerpants]

When it is relied on a LG [FSRC] its has objective certainty of varying degrees

How can thiws very simple point be difficult to get?
Wittgenstein didn't write that language games have "objective certainty of varying degrees ".
You inserted that to suit yourself didn't you?


You are not reading Wittgenstein properly. You are doing that selfish thing again. You are reading Wittgenstein just to find ways to say he supports you, rather than reading it to find out what Wittgenstein himself is saying. The result is a self-serving mess that nobody who has read Wittgenstein themselves will be taken in by.

You did the same when you read Blackburn and paid no attention to what his argument was, or whether what he said about Kant along the way was true enough in a book that isn't actually about Kant... but instead went looking for an excuse to say he wasn't writing what you would about Kant, so that you could grandstand over the only thing that you can put on an actual show about knowing, because you wanted to be extra mean about Blackburn in hopes I would care.

Although ... you don't read very well... so you probably didn't read Kant any better than you read anyone else.

I did not assert W wrote that language games have "objective certainty of varying degrees ".

I stated I inferred that based on the context of the whole of "On Certainty" and I provided paragraphs from OC to support my claim.
Show that my inference is wrong with reference to paras I quoted or any other paras from OC.

Or your other accusations are merely speculations without justifications.

Although ... you don't read very well... so you probably didn't read Kant any better than you read anyone else.

I have not claimed to have understood Kant 100%, at most 85-90%.
Have you read enough of Kant to make the above judgment?
You can refer to what I have wrote about Kant re his CPR and make your claim, else it better to shut up.

You are reading Wittgenstein just to find ways to say he supports you, rather than reading it to find out what Wittgenstein himself is saying. In the process you are making up the ways in which he supports you. Just like you made up a scandalously inept and corrupt argument to attribute Boyd in that other thread.

[Veritas Aequitas]

How can thiws very simple point be difficult to get?
Wittgenstein didn't write that language games have "objective certainty of varying degrees ".
You inserted that to suit yourself didn't you?


You are not reading Wittgenstein properly. You are doing that selfish thing again. You are reading Wittgenstein just to find ways to say he supports you, rather than reading it to find out what Wittgenstein himself is saying. The result is a self-serving mess that nobody who has read Wittgenstein themselves will be taken in by.

You did the same when you read Blackburn and paid no attention to what his argument was, or whether what he said about Kant along the way was true enough in a book that isn't actually about Kant... but instead went looking for an excuse to say he wasn't writing what you would about Kant, so that you could grandstand over the only thing that you can put on an actual show about knowing, because you wanted to be extra mean about Blackburn in hopes I would care.

Although ... you don't read very well... so you probably didn't read Kant any better than you read anyone else.

I did not assert W wrote that language games have "objective certainty of varying degrees ".

I stated I inferred that based on the context of the whole of "On Certainty" and I provided paragraphs from OC to support my claim.
Show that my inference is wrong with reference to paras I quoted or any other paras from OC.

Or your other accusations are merely speculations without justifications.

Although ... you don't read very well... so you probably didn't read Kant any better than you read anyone else.

I have not claimed to have understood Kant 100%, at most 85-90%.
Have you read enough of Kant to make the above judgment?
You can refer to what I have wrote about Kant re his CPR and make your claim, else it better to shut up.

You are reading Wittgenstein just to find ways to say he supports you, rather than reading it to find out what Wittgenstein himself is saying. In the process you are making up the ways in which he supports you. Just like you made up a scandalously inept and corrupt argument to attribute Boyd in that other thread.

I am very aware how W has evolved from his early very narrow p-realist view in the Tractatus [which he abandoned] for his PI [language-games] and therefrom evolved to a more anti-realist position [of Framework, System, Hinges, River beds] in On Certainty.

In this case I am enlightening you to break your shackle of you sticking to W's PI in interpreting 'On Certainty'.
You have a very ancient reading of W's On Certainty.

I have read 'On Certainty' and therein W has moved on with a more matured philosophical view which allude toward the concept of a Framework and System basis of reality.
I have quoted the related paragraphs.

Note the comment of a thematic unity within OC;

And yet, about the notes that make up On Certainty, G.H. von Wright has this to say:

• During the last year and a half of his life, Wittgenstein wrote almost exclusively about knowledge and certainty.
  These writings possess a thematic unity which makes them almost unique in Wittgenstein’s whole literary output.…Considering that the remarks constitute a first, unrevised manuscript they seem to me remarkably accomplished both in form and content. (1982, 166)

That, in spite of being unpolished, these notes possess a thematic unity unparalleled in Wittgenstein’s other writings3 and seem remarkably accomplished, is not fortuitous [by chance].

They are an attempt by Wittgenstein to unravel the knots of a specific philosophical problem which he felt was posed by some of G.E. Moore’s essays; and this attempt lasted a year and a half.
We are not here, then, in the presence of a compilation of passages written over a 20-year span, as is the case with Philosophical Investigations; or of a compilation effected by someone other than Wittgenstein, as is Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics or Zettel.4
On Certainty is an astonishingly intense treatment of a topic over a period of 18 months.

Understanding Wittgenstein’s On Certainty
Danièle Moyal-Sharrock

W's discussion of knowing, doubting, certainty, knowledge, objectivity across various fields of knowledge [science, mathematics, history, language, etc.] and their comparison can only make sense in the context of OC when they are conditioned upon specific Framework and System of Knowledge.

Show me why I am wrong with justifications instead of merely blabberings.

[FlashDangerpants]

I am very aware how W has evolved from his early very narrow p-realist view in the Tractatus [which he abandoned] for his PI [language-games] and therefrom evolved to a more anti-realist position [of Framework, System, Hinges, River beds] in On Certainty.

He didn't repudiate the whole Tractatus, he changed his mind about the language model in light of issues with the underlying assumptions of logical atomism. Much else continues throughout all his works.

He hadn't been a realist at the start by the way, and he didn't become an antirealist either. The Tractatus does no describe a real world, it describes a world interpreted through facts and language and is very very clearly about what we can and cannot say about it. That is the Wittgenstein who is most similar to you and all your KFC stuff. Not very similar still, he was a genius philosopher and you are definitvely not even an adequate one.

You would do well to look for the continuities in Wittegenstein's work as apparently you are quite blind to them right now. I definitely remember the Grayling lecture covered one of them, namely the bit about Proposition 7: "Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent."

You should also look for the continuity through his work of the notion that dissolving the problems of philosophy is quite a trivial thing. Again, from the Tractatus: "On the other hand the truth of the thoughts communicated here seems to me unassailable and definitive. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the problems have in essentials been finally solved. And if I am not mistaken in this, then the value of this work secondly consists in the fact that it shows how little has been done when these problems have been solved."

He wrote that because in his analysis, all the major problems of philosophy prove to be simple misunderstandings. That includes your treasured realist/antirealist debate which is nothing but a minor dispute over descriptions. That never changes in any version of Wittgenstein and it has been the basis of my refusal to take the realism/antirealism shit seriously.

I was going to point to a third one but I have forgotten it now so I will raise it later if I feel like it.

W's discussion of knowing, doubting, certainty, knowledge, objectivity across various fields of knowledge [science, mathematics, history, language, etc.] and their comparison can only make sense in the context of OC when they are conditioned upon specific Framework and System of Knowledge.

As I have told you already... when you talk like that about your KFC theory it sounds exactly like a million others. The problem comes into it when you start making everyting in the KFC be about lists, and sorting lists, and then this one magic list that other KFC good and bad according to random numbers.

You will not get support for that latter stuff from Wittgenstein through honest reading. I know you own't let that stop you though.

[Veritas Aequitas]

I am very aware how W has evolved from his early very narrow p-realist view in the Tractatus [which he abandoned] for his PI [language-games] and therefrom evolved to a more anti-realist position [of Framework, System, Hinges, River beds] in On Certainty.

He didn't repudiate the whole Tractatus, he changed his mind about the language model in light of issues with the underlying assumptions of logical atomism. Much else continues throughout all his works.

He hadn't been a realist at the start by the way, and he didn't become an antirealist either. The Tractatus does no describe a real world, it describes a world interpreted through facts and language and is very very clearly about what we can and cannot say about it. That is the Wittgenstein who is most similar to you and all your KFC stuff. Not very similar still, he was a genius philosopher and you are definitvely not even an adequate one.

Note this, the various contentious interpretations of W's views:

The later Wittgenstein is widely held to be a relativist, indeed a constructivist.
By contrast, this paper argues that all appearances to the contrary Wittgenstein was a realist, and that this fact becomes almost conspicuous in his late-1940s manuscripts. His realism was a common-sense one, the only kind of realism worthy of the name.

Wittgenstein’s common-sense realism has unique traits:
first, an uncompromising stress on deviations from ordinary language as a source of (bad) philosophy.
Secondly, his awareness of the significance of the pictorial & the motor.
Thirdly, his emphasis on established use, that is, on traditions. In the later Wittgenstein, philosophical realism and social conservatism converge.
https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/ ... -0004/html#:

W's views from early to mid- to very-late has been interpreted variously [& contentiously] as realist, anti-realist, common-sense realist, and as mentioned above, a relativist, indeed a constructivist.

As argued here, my views are that the very late-W evolved as an antirealist, a relativist, indeed a constructivist as conditioned upon a FSRC [Framework and System] with his language-games as a subset of the general FSRC reflected in his 'On Certainty'.

The above quote mentioned W is a common-sense realist.
It cannot be because Moore was a common-sense realist and 'On Certainty' main purpose was to counter Moore's common sense realism. [Moore's In Defense of Common-Sense]

As I had argued, in a very nuance perspective and context, an antirealist can also be a realist in different perspective.
I argue the very-late-W was an empirical realist but that is subsumed within his antirealism [meta-] of relativism and constructivism.
Do you have an argument against that from the texts of On Certainty.

Re the Tractatus, W abandoned its significant central theme. There was nothing significant from the Tractatus that W carried forward to the PI [relativist language-games] and the 180 degrees paradigm shift On Certainty [constructivist and FRSC].

You would do well to look for the continuities in Wittegenstein's work as apparently you are quite blind to them right now. I definitely remember the Grayling lecture covered one of them, namely the bit about Proposition 7: "Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent."

I don't think you understand the full perspective of the above within the whole of W's work:

Here's AI's view [wR] re "Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent.";

• Narrow Perspective:
  Language is limited in its ability to express everything.
  There are certain things, experiences, or concepts that simply cannot be accurately captured through words.
  Forcing these things into language can lead to confusion, misunderstanding, or even meaningless statements.
  In such cases, silence is the best course of action.
  
  Wider Perspective:
  This quote goes beyond the limits of language.
  It suggests that there are aspects of reality that are fundamentally beyond human comprehension.
  These might be mystical experiences, the nature of consciousness, or the absolute.
  While we can try to grapple with these concepts, ultimately, silence may be the only appropriate response due to the limitations of human understanding.
  
  The quote itself is a bit paradoxical.
  Wittgenstein uses language to talk about the limits of language.
  
  W's Later Work - On Certainty
  In his later work, he focused more on the practical uses of language and how meaning arises through context and shared experiences.

Context and shared experiences implied FSRC.
W "Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent." has no significance in his later work e.g. PI [use language-games] and On Certainty [re FSRC].
In 'On Certainty' W argued one can use language in any sense and it is certain [a qualified certainty] as long as it is qualified within a specified Framework and System [in my case FSRC].
I have given my argument in this OP.

It is you with a very narrow and shallow minded dogmatic view that you are unable to follow W is his maturing view of reality.

You should also look for the continuity through his work of the notion that dissolving the problems of philosophy is quite a trivial thing. Again, from the Tractatus: "On the other hand the truth of the thoughts communicated here seems to me unassailable and definitive. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the problems have in essentials been finally solved. And if I am not mistaken in this, then the value of this work secondly consists in the fact that it shows how little has been done when these problems have been solved."

He wrote that because in his analysis, all the major problems of philosophy prove to be simple misunderstandings. That includes your treasured realist/antirealist debate which is nothing but a minor dispute over descriptions. That never changes in any version of Wittgenstein and it has been the basis of my refusal to take the realism/antirealism shit seriously.

It is a fact W evolved and matured from the evolutionary default [p-realist, to antirealism to relativism] as demonstrated in his work.
This evolution and maturity from 'early-' to 'later-' is very common among philosophers, i.e. note the early-Heidegger and later-Heidegger, early- and later-Kant,..... and even among lay-people, e.g. early-VA [realist] and later-VA [antirealist].

Your W point in italics above is resolved in On Certainty on the basis of specifying and qualifying to a specific Framework and System [FSRC].
A group can claim anything as true [& reality] only as qualified within its specified FSRC, but whether its qualified truth [& reality] is credible or objective must be assessed via a rational methodology.
How else and what is the best way to compare the credibility and objectivity of claims of reality from astrologers, theologians, shamans, myths-makers, etc.? other than based on a rational method of assessment.

I was going to point to a third one but I have forgotten it now so I will raise it later if I feel like it.

Don't waste your time, read 'On Certainty' again with a fine-toothed comb but his time focus on W's main theme of Framework, System, Hinges, River Bed re I know, certainty, knowledge, doubting and objectivity.
You will then note the above is united within the theme of a human-based FSRC [framework and system of realization of reality and cognition (knowledge)].
How else??

W's discussion of knowing, doubting, certainty, knowledge, objectivity across various fields of knowledge [science, mathematics, history, language, etc.] and their comparison can only make sense in the context of OC when they are conditioned upon specific Framework and System of Knowledge.

As I have told you already... when you talk like that about your KFC theory it sounds exactly like a million others. The problem comes into it when you start making everyting in the KFC be about lists, and sorting lists, and then this one magic list that other KFC good and bad according to random numbers.

You will not get support for that latter stuff from Wittgenstein through honest reading. I know you own't let that stop you though.

I suggest again you read W's On Certainty with a fine-toothed comb in the light of the Framework, System, Hinges, River Beds re I-know, knowing, certainty, knowledge, doubting and objectivity.

Most of the time you are blabbering and complaining [with some cherry-picked quotes] but not in the whole contexts of W's overall work.

W evolved and matured philosophically, you on the other hand is stuck with primordial and primitive thinking.

Do you think, antirealists [relativists, constructivists, Kantian] were stupid to think of something different [a paradigm shift] from the evolutionary default of the ideological-p-realism?

You condemnation of antirealists' view is an auto defense-mechanism [lashing out] to protect your evolutionary default security blanket. Can you counter this?

Btw, I don't have high regard for Wittgenstein's work at all, but I only read and discuss W to debunk those who cling to analytic philosophy in regarding W as 'God' and is stuck with his early-views; at the same time relying on W to condemn my antirealist [Kantian] views.

Wittgenstein a genius??
Nah .. he is likely be 10% of Kant's ability.

[Veritas Aequitas]

Here is one view [among various views] of early-W being Realist but the later-W was a Conventionalist.

The first two propositions of the Tractatus—
"The world is all that is the case" and
"The world is the totality of facts, not of things"—
define what Wittgenstein means by "the world."

Wittgenstein: From Realism to Conventionalism
Sher Zada* ,Shuja Ahmad†
Abstract

This paper discusses and brings into light Ludwig Wittgenstein’s early and later philosophical thought as a movement from realism towards conventionalism.
Taking into account both his early and later works, one can say that the early Wittgenstein was an exponent of realism- A philosophical position that claims reality to be objective/ external and independent of us.

We argue that, while Language remained the central theme in his philosophy, Wittgenstein moved from realism to conventionalism in his later philosophy.
Conventionalism is a philosophical position that emphasizes on conventions and general agreements in a society rather than taking reality as external.

https://journals.qurtuba.edu.pk/ojs/ind ... /view/6/16

Conventionalism in this case imply FRSC basis.