FDP has a Cognitive Moral Deficit in Morality

[Veritas Aequitas]

Simple common sense should tell you that what you have described is impossible. Here let me repeat the thing you need to understand...

Boyd would be out of work for the rest of his life if he wrote the essay you think you read. On a normal forum, you would get banned for this thread. You are an idiot who cannot read.

You keep blabbering but present no arguments.

Note AI's view on the OP;
viewtopic.php?p=702037#p702037

I am giving you another chance to do the right thing. Here below is the explanation of the text in that photo. It is enough, if you are an honest and capable student of philosophy to show that you desperately need to reverse your present argument right away. And it should warn you about your need to read better in the future.




There's a video that did the rounds a while ago where some college age American girl is in police custody and they are asking her if she understands that she just caused a fatal road accident. She says she does understand, but she imediately turns her attention to how she will get to class the next day (spoiler alert, she's not going to class the next day) That's somebody who is unable to link morality to their actions by means of moral motivation. That's what Boyd is describing in this little section of his essay...



Everybody agrees that the girl in that video is fundamentally broken, there's just differences of opinion about how to describe what is broken about her. For him, the basic moral naturalist (a form of realist) position would be that there is a universal truth to the matter that killing people is wrong, and if you have killed somebody then that is clearly and obviously important, and it should matter to you a lot. Boyd recommends his own naturalising realist theory (homeostatic consequentialism) as a very good way of explaining all this.

Against that, he generalises moral antirealism explaining her broken-ness very differently. He thinks that the anti-realist uses something akin to language to link morality to motivation .... as indeed we typically do. My description of Belief Desire Motivation works exactly that way, and Simon Blackburn refers to that BDM as his API which stands for A-priori Principle of Interpretation because beliefs/desires are how we invariably interpret motivation when we ask questions such as "why did he do that?"

If we cannot link somebody's actions to their beliefs and desires, we automatically consider them mad, even if only temporarily. In fact people who do something entirely out of character all of a sudden and act against their own usual set of beliefs and desires will themselves call it a 'moment of madness'.

If we cannot understand a set of beliefs and desires that could motivate somebody in their actions on a general day to day basis, we should consider that person mad, or sociopathic or something like that as a matter of course. This is what Boyd is referring to, and that is how the anti-realist who holds that beliefs and desires explain motivation would be taken to be describing it as a rule.

There's nothing insane about Boyd. This only because a trainwreck because VA can't handle his basic shit properly.

What chance?

You are cherry picking but ignoring all the other related texts.
What I have done is presenting the full s4.7 whereas you are merely checking on one paragraph which you had wrongly interpreted.

Cognitive Deficit to Morality – Lack Empathy
What I have in mind is the very strong intuition which many philosophers share
that the person for whom moral judgments are motivationally indifferent would not only be psychologically atypical [not representative of a type, group, or class.] but would have some sort of cognitive deficit with respect to moral reasoning as well.
The anti-realist diagnoses this deficit as a failure to recognize a definitional or otherwise necessary connection between Moral goodness and reasons for action. [Boyd did not agree with this but proposed his own version below]

Show me in the light of all the other passages prior and that followed, where I am wrong?

[FlashDangerpants]

You keep blabbering but present no arguments.

Note AI's view on the OP;
viewtopic.php?p=702037#p702037

I am giving you another chance to do the right thing. Here below is the explanation of the text in that photo. It is enough, if you are an honest and capable student of philosophy to show that you desperately need to reverse your present argument right away. And it should warn you about your need to read better in the future.




There's a video that did the rounds a while ago where some college age American girl is in police custody and they are asking her if she understands that she just caused a fatal road accident. She says she does understand, but she imediately turns her attention to how she will get to class the next day (spoiler alert, she's not going to class the next day) That's somebody who is unable to link morality to their actions by means of moral motivation. That's what Boyd is describing in this little section of his essay...



Everybody agrees that the girl in that video is fundamentally broken, there's just differences of opinion about how to describe what is broken about her. For him, the basic moral naturalist (a form of realist) position would be that there is a universal truth to the matter that killing people is wrong, and if you have killed somebody then that is clearly and obviously important, and it should matter to you a lot. Boyd recommends his own naturalising realist theory (homeostatic consequentialism) as a very good way of explaining all this.

Against that, he generalises moral antirealism explaining her broken-ness very differently. He thinks that the anti-realist uses something akin to language to link morality to motivation .... as indeed we typically do. My description of Belief Desire Motivation works exactly that way, and Simon Blackburn refers to that BDM as his API which stands for A-priori Principle of Interpretation because beliefs/desires are how we invariably interpret motivation when we ask questions such as "why did he do that?"

If we cannot link somebody's actions to their beliefs and desires, we automatically consider them mad, even if only temporarily. In fact people who do something entirely out of character all of a sudden and act against their own usual set of beliefs and desires will themselves call it a 'moment of madness'.

If we cannot understand a set of beliefs and desires that could motivate somebody in their actions on a general day to day basis, we should consider that person mad, or sociopathic or something like that as a matter of course. This is what Boyd is referring to, and that is how the anti-realist who holds that beliefs and desires explain motivation would be taken to be describing it as a rule.

There's nothing insane about Boyd. This only because a trainwreck because VA can't handle his basic shit properly.

What chance?

You are cherry picking but ignoring all the other related texts.
What I have done is presenting the full s4.7 whereas you are merely checking on one paragraph which you had wrongly interpreted.

Cognitive Deficit to Morality – Lack Empathy
What I have in mind is the very strong intuition which many philosophers share
that the person for whom moral judgments are motivationally indifferent would not only be psychologically atypical [not representative of a type, group, or class.] but would have some sort of cognitive deficit with respect to moral reasoning as well.
The anti-realist diagnoses this deficit as a failure to recognize a definitional or otherwise necessary connection between Moral goodness and reasons for action. [Boyd did not agree with this but proposed his own version below]

Show me in the light of all the other passages prior and that followed, where I am wrong?

I was explaining the stuff in the passages prior and that followed. Can't you read?

[Veritas Aequitas]

I am giving you another chance to do the right thing. Here below is the explanation of the text in that photo. It is enough, if you are an honest and capable student of philosophy to show that you desperately need to reverse your present argument right away. And it should warn you about your need to read better in the future.




There's a video that did the rounds a while ago where some college age American girl is in police custody and they are asking her if she understands that she just caused a fatal road accident. She says she does understand, but she imediately turns her attention to how she will get to class the next day (spoiler alert, she's not going to class the next day) That's somebody who is unable to link morality to their actions by means of moral motivation. That's what Boyd is describing in this little section of his essay...



Everybody agrees that the girl in that video is fundamentally broken, there's just differences of opinion about how to describe what is broken about her. For him, the basic moral naturalist (a form of realist) position would be that there is a universal truth to the matter that killing people is wrong, and if you have killed somebody then that is clearly and obviously important, and it should matter to you a lot. Boyd recommends his own naturalising realist theory (homeostatic consequentialism) as a very good way of explaining all this.

Against that, he generalises moral antirealism explaining her broken-ness very differently. He thinks that the anti-realist uses something akin to language to link morality to motivation .... as indeed we typically do. My description of Belief Desire Motivation works exactly that way, and Simon Blackburn refers to that BDM as his API which stands for A-priori Principle of Interpretation because beliefs/desires are how we invariably interpret motivation when we ask questions such as "why did he do that?"

If we cannot link somebody's actions to their beliefs and desires, we automatically consider them mad, even if only temporarily. In fact people who do something entirely out of character all of a sudden and act against their own usual set of beliefs and desires will themselves call it a 'moment of madness'.

If we cannot understand a set of beliefs and desires that could motivate somebody in their actions on a general day to day basis, we should consider that person mad, or sociopathic or something like that as a matter of course. This is what Boyd is referring to, and that is how the anti-realist who holds that beliefs and desires explain motivation would be taken to be describing it as a rule.

There's nothing insane about Boyd. This only because a trainwreck because VA can't handle his basic shit properly.

What chance?

You are cherry picking but ignoring all the other related texts.
What I have done is presenting the full s4.7 whereas you are merely checking on one paragraph which you had wrongly interpreted.

Cognitive Deficit to Morality – Lack Empathy
What I have in mind is the very strong intuition which many philosophers share
that the person for whom moral judgments are motivationally indifferent would not only be psychologically atypical [not representative of a type, group, or class.] but would have some sort of cognitive deficit with respect to moral reasoning as well.
The anti-realist diagnoses this deficit as a failure to recognize a definitional or otherwise necessary connection between Moral goodness and reasons for action. [Boyd did not agree with this but proposed his own version below]

Show me in the light of all the other passages prior and that followed, where I am wrong?

I was explaining the stuff in the passages prior and that followed. Can't you read?

I could not follow from "the girl in that video is fundamentally broken" and blah blah.

It would be more appropriate for you to list down each paragraph that follow and show where I am wrong? i.e. from

I think that there is a deep insight in the view that
people for whom questions of Moral goodness are irrelevant to how they would choose to act - suffer a cognitive deficit.

I propose that the deficit is not—as the anti-realist would have it—a failure to recognize a necessary connection between moral judgments and reasons for action.
Instead, I suggest, if we adopt a naturalistic conception of moral knowledge we can diagnose in such people [for whom questions of Moral goodness are irrelevant ] a deficit in the capacity to make moral judgments somewhat akin to a perceptual deficit.

What I have in mind is the application of a causal theory of moral knowledge to the examination of a feature of moral reasoning which has been well understood in the empiricist tradition since Hume, that is, the role of sympathy [empathy] in moral understanding.

[Iwannaplato]

4) it's really irritating that VA starts a new damn thread for points that fit perfectly in previous threads

This thread is not getting dropped. VA needs to learn he owes me an appology for his behaviour here.

Oh, that's fine. And he ignores this once request now surly complaint on my part. I just need to repeat it sometimes.
He's a signal to noise destroyer. By all means, seek an apology here.

[FlashDangerpants]

What chance?

You are cherry picking but ignoring all the other related texts.
What I have done is presenting the full s4.7 whereas you are merely checking on one paragraph which you had wrongly interpreted.



Show me in the light of all the other passages prior and that followed, where I am wrong?

I was explaining the stuff in the passages prior and that followed. Can't you read?

I could not follow from "the girl in that video is fundamentally broken" and blah blah.

A clear admission that you cannot read.

It would be more appropriate for you to list down each paragraph that follow and show where I am wrong? i.e. from

I think that there is a deep insight in the view that
people for whom questions of Moral goodness are irrelevant to how they would choose to act - suffer a cognitive deficit.

I propose that the deficit is not—as the anti-realist would have it—a failure to recognize a necessary connection between moral judgments and reasons for action.
Instead, I suggest, if we adopt a naturalistic conception of moral knowledge we can diagnose in such people a deficit in the capacity to make moral judgments somewhat akin to a perceptual deficit.

What I have in mind is the application of a causal theory of moral knowledge to the examination of a feature of moral reasoning which has been well understood in the empiricist tradition since Hume, that is, the role of sympathy [empathy] in moral understanding.

The words ought to be enough. Look at the beginining of the first paragrapgh in this photo (top of the page)

See how it talks about the naturalist approach to describing the way moral concerns generate preferences in choice?

Now look at where I wrote ... "For him, the basic moral naturalist (a form of realist) position would be that there is a universal truth to the matter that killing people is wrong, and if you have killed somebody then that is clearly and obviously important, and it should matter to you a lot. Boyd recommends his own naturalising realist theory (homeostatic consequentialism) as a very good way of explaining all this."

Now look at the second para and then read my explanation. I am covering there what he means by the necessary connection part, which is the BDM or the API depending on your surce. Now I admit that is asking a bit much of you, it is in the realm of real philosophy and that is not your territory, but there's no way of avoiding it. You wouldn't be able to explain that sentence so we will have to go with my correct examples even if they are too clever for you. The extra para I wrote about beliefs and desires explains why Blackburn and I consider the BDM thing to be a priori in order to flesh out the final sentence of the previous paragraph.

This by itself is enough to demolish any notion that moral antirealists are "people for whom questions of Moral goodness are irrelevant to how they would choose to act". We are in his description of us people who make "a necessary connection between moral judgments and reasons for action". It is self-contradictory to assert that anybody can be both those things at once. If you had a single ounce of ability you would never need my help to see that. But now you have fallen that far, it is important that you at least have an ounce of honesty about it.

That's all there is to the matter. I have now explained what Boyd was saying in the passage you took to be describing an argument that I am lacking cognitive function. We now can see that mine is not the cognitive function that we ought to be questioning.

[Veritas Aequitas]

........
That's all there is to the matter. I have now explained what Boyd was saying in the passage you took to be describing an argument that I am lacking cognitive function. We now can see that mine is not the cognitive function that we ought to be questioning.

I cannot see your point clearly if you do not stick to the para concern, i.e.

Cognitive Deficit to Morality – Lack Empathy
What I have in mind is the very strong intuition which many philosophers share
that the person for whom moral judgments are motivationally indifferent would not only be psychologically atypical [not representative of a type, group, or class.] but would have some sort of cognitive deficit with respect to moral reasoning as well.
The anti-realist diagnoses this deficit as a failure to recognize a definitional or otherwise necessary connection between Moral goodness and reasons for action. [Boyd did not agree with this but proposed his own version below]

this is the starting point;

the person for whom moral judgments are motivationally indifferent would not only be psychologically atypical [not representative of a type, group, or class.] but would have some sort of cognitive deficit with respect to moral reasoning as well.

The above refer to moral skeptics like you 'whom moral judgments are motivationally indifferent' .. and have have some sort of cognitive deficit with respect to moral reasoning as well.

I think that there is a deep insight in the view that
people for whom questions of Moral goodness are irrelevant to how they would choose to act - suffer a cognitive deficit.

It is such people like you who suffer a cognitive deficit in general. [A]

I propose that the deficit is not—as the anti-realist would have it—a failure to recognize a necessary connection between moral judgments and reasons for action.
Instead, I suggest, if we adopt a naturalistic conception of moral knowledge we can diagnose in such people a deficit in the capacity to make moral judgments somewhat akin to a perceptual deficit.

The anti-realist has their own interpretation for [A] but Boyd has his own interpretations on why you suffer a cognitive deficit from his "naturalistic conception of moral knowledge" a deficit in the capacity to make moral judgments somewhat akin to a perceptual deficit.

Boyd went on to give more details to support his argument which include why people like you are not able to cognize moral facts.

What I have in mind is the application of a causal theory of moral knowledge to the examination of a feature of moral reasoning which has been well understood in the empiricist tradition since Hume, that is, the role of sympathy [empathy] in moral understanding.

[FlashDangerpants]

........
That's all there is to the matter. I have now explained what Boyd was saying in the passage you took to be describing an argument that I am lacking cognitive function. We now can see that mine is not the cognitive function that we ought to be questioning.

I cannot see your point clearly if you do not stick to the para concern, i.e.

If you could read properly that wouldn't be a problem. I don't know how to dumb this down for your level of comprehension so you will just have to try harder.

Cognitive Deficit to Morality – Lack Empathy
What I have in mind is the very strong intuition which many philosophers share
that the person for whom moral judgments are motivationally indifferent would not only be psychologically atypical [not representative of a type, group, or class.] but would have some sort of cognitive deficit with respect to moral reasoning as well.
The anti-realist diagnoses this deficit as a failure to recognize a definitional or otherwise necessary connection between Moral goodness and reasons for action. [Boyd did not agree with this but proposed his own version below]

this is the starting point;

the person for whom moral judgments are motivationally indifferent would not only be psychologically atypical [not representative of a type, group, or class.] but would have some sort of cognitive deficit with respect to moral reasoning as well.

The above refer to moral skeptics like you 'whom moral judgments are motivationally indifferent' .. and have have some sort of cognitive deficit with respect to moral reasoning as well.

You have no basis for asserting that I am motivationally indifferent to moral judgments. All of the possible evidence is that I am not indifferent to such things at all. You also have no text supporting that absurd claim. It is not my fault that you cannot read.

Further to this .... and you really need to pay attention to what I am writing here .... I have already pointed out that Boyd refers to moral antirealists such as I as having a tendency to explain exactly that sort of motivation as a necessary connection between moral judgments and reasons for action. This shows that he agrees that I am a moral being who makes moral judgments and is motivated to action by them. I have likewise given you a description of that sort of model in the form of the Belief Desire Model (aka the a priori principle of interpretation) which covers that exact ground.

Look at the words "psychologically atypical" that you blithely skip over in that sentence by the way. What makes you think all of the people who stand against you in this matter are psychologically atypical. And really, given that you are the guy who put the Quran into a spreadsheet and has how many folders full of philosophical papers you haven't read?.... what on Earth makes you think that you are the guy to call me psychologically atypical in this matter?

Here is a video of somebody who is actually unmotivated by moral judgment. She has just killed two people with her car and wants to know when she will get that car back so she can go to school tomorrow. That is what Boyd is talking about. It is very important that you don't say that me and Pete and Sculptor are just like her. You would never come back from that.

I think that there is a deep insight in the view that
people for whom questions of Moral goodness are irrelevant to how they would choose to act - suffer a cognitive deficit.

It is such people like you who suffer a cognitive deficit in general. [A]

I am not a person for whom questions of Moral goodness are irrelevant to how they would choose to act. You have no evidence that I am, you just keep asserting it anyway.

There is a problem with you that is becoming apparent. I described it to bahman as a lack of theory of mind [think psychology KFC rather than philosophical ToM] a while ago when he was in conversation with you about something. Your view of what other people's minds are likely to contain is severely inadequate. You assign to others a random jumble of nonsensical thoughts or else you just assume we all believe the same thing you do.

I propose that the deficit is not—as the anti-realist would have it—a failure to recognize a necessary connection between moral judgments and reasons for action.
Instead, I suggest, if we adopt a naturalistic conception of moral knowledge we can diagnose in such people a deficit in the capacity to make moral judgments somewhat akin to a perceptual deficit.

The anti-realist has their own interpretation for [A] but Boyd has his own interpretations on why you suffer a cognitive deficit from his "naturalistic conception of moral knowledge" a deficit in the capacity to make moral judgments somewhat akin to a perceptual deficit.

Boyd went on to give more details to support his argument which include why people like you are not able to cognize moral facts.

What I have in mind is the application of a causal theory of moral knowledge to the examination of a feature of moral reasoning which has been well understood in the empiricist tradition since Hume, that is, the role of sympathy [empathy] in moral understanding.

boyd absolutely does not have "his own interpretations on why suffer a cognitive deficit". I have already explained a perfectly common sense rationalie for why no prefessional philosopher who wants to work again any time in their lifge would ever write such a scandalous argument as the one you ascribe to him.





That this conversation is still ongoing without you making any progress towards sanity is quite disturbing.

[Skepdick]

You have no basis for asserting that I am motivationally indifferent to moral judgments.

Do you have a basis for asserting that he has no basis?

All of the possible evidence is that I am not indifferent to such things at all.

All the possible evidence demonstrates that indifference would be far significantly less immoral than whatever it is you are doing.

[Veritas Aequitas]

........
That's all there is to the matter. I have now explained what Boyd was saying in the passage you took to be describing an argument that I am lacking cognitive function. We now can see that mine is not the cognitive function that we ought to be questioning.

I cannot see your point clearly if you do not stick to the para concern, i.e.

If you could read properly that wouldn't be a problem. I don't know how to dumb this down for your level of comprehension so you will just have to try harder.

Cognitive Deficit to Morality – Lack Empathy
What I have in mind is the very strong intuition which many philosophers share
that the person for whom moral judgments are motivationally indifferent would not only be psychologically atypical [not representative of a type, group, or class.] but would have some sort of cognitive deficit with respect to moral reasoning as well.
The anti-realist diagnoses this deficit as a failure to recognize a definitional or otherwise necessary connection between Moral goodness and reasons for action. [Boyd did not agree with this but proposed his own version below]

this is the starting point;

the person for whom moral judgments are motivationally indifferent would not only be psychologically atypical [not representative of a type, group, or class.] but would have some sort of cognitive deficit with respect to moral reasoning as well.

The above refer to moral skeptics like you 'whom moral judgments are motivationally indifferent' .. and have have some sort of cognitive deficit with respect to moral reasoning as well.

You have no basis for asserting that I am motivationally indifferent to moral judgments. All of the possible evidence is that I am not indifferent to such things at all. You also have no text supporting that absurd claim. It is not my fault that you cannot read.

Further to this .... and you really need to pay attention to what I am writing here .... I have already pointed out that Boyd refers to moral antirealists such as I as having a tendency to explain exactly that sort of motivation as a necessary connection between moral judgments and reasons for action. This shows that he agrees that I am a moral being who makes moral judgments and is motivated to action by them. I have likewise given you a description of that sort of model in the form of the Belief Desire Model (aka the a priori principle of interpretation) which covers that exact ground.

Look at the words "psychologically atypical" that you blithely skip over in that sentence by the way. What makes you think all of the people who stand against you in this matter are psychologically atypical. And really, given that you are the guy who put the Quran into a spreadsheet and has how many folders full of philosophical papers you haven't read?.... what on Earth makes you think that you are the guy to call me psychologically atypical in this matter?

Here is a video of somebody who is actually unmotivated by moral judgment. She has just killed two people with her car and wants to know when she will get that car back so she can go to school tomorrow. That is what Boyd is talking about. It is very important that you don't say that me and Pete and Sculptor are just like her. You would never come back from that.

I think that there is a deep insight in the view that
people for whom questions of Moral goodness are irrelevant to how they would choose to act - suffer a cognitive deficit.

It is such people like you who suffer a cognitive deficit in general. [A]

I am not a person for whom questions of Moral goodness are irrelevant to how they would choose to act. You have no evidence that I am, you just keep asserting it anyway.

There is a problem with you that is becoming apparent. I described it to bahman as a lack of theory of mind [think psychology KFC rather than philosophical ToM] a while ago when he was in conversation with you about something. Your view of what other people's minds are likely to contain is severely inadequate. You assign to others a random jumble of nonsensical thoughts or else you just assume we all believe the same thing you do.

I propose that the deficit is not—as the anti-realist would have it—a failure to recognize a necessary connection between moral judgments and reasons for action.
Instead, I suggest, if we adopt a naturalistic conception of moral knowledge we can diagnose in such people a deficit in the capacity to make moral judgments somewhat akin to a perceptual deficit.

The anti-realist has their own interpretation for [A] but Boyd has his own interpretations on why you suffer a cognitive deficit from his "naturalistic conception of moral knowledge" a deficit in the capacity to make moral judgments somewhat akin to a perceptual deficit.

Boyd went on to give more details to support his argument which include why people like you are not able to cognize moral facts.

What I have in mind is the application of a causal theory of moral knowledge to the examination of a feature of moral reasoning which has been well understood in the empiricist tradition since Hume, that is, the role of sympathy [empathy] in moral understanding.

boyd absolutely does not have "his own interpretations on why [..I] suffer a cognitive deficit". I have already explained a perfectly common sense rationalie for why no prefessional philosopher who wants to work again any time in their lifge would ever write such a scandalous argument as the one you ascribe to him.

That this conversation is still ongoing without you making any progress towards sanity is quite disturbing.

[Boyd]"the person for whom moral judgments are motivationally indifferent would not only be psychologically atypical [not representative of a type, group, or class.] but would have some sort of cognitive deficit with respect to moral reasoning as well."
Boyd was not referring to those whose moral functions are damaged as in psychopaths and others who are evil.
As a Moral Realist he was targeting the moral-antirealists [those who deny there are moral facts], not the 1% of psychopaths and the like [e.g. in that video].

I took into account the whole of S4.7, note this;

We are now in a position to see why the morally unconcerned person, the person for whom moral facts are motivationally irrelevant, probably suffers a cognitive deficit with respect to moral reasoning.
Such a person would have to be deficient in sympathy [empathy], because the motivational role of sympathy [empathy] is precisely to make moral facts motivationally relevant.
In consequence, she or he would be deficient with respect to a cognitive capacity (sympathy [empathy]) which is ordinarily important for the correct assessment of moral facts.
The motivational deficiency would, as a matter of contingent fact about human psychology, be a cognitive deficiency as well.

When Boyd mentioned 'moral facts' it is with reference to his beliefs there are moral facts.
But to the morally unconcerned person, like you [as a moral skeptic] do not accept there are moral facts, thus motivationally irrelevant.
You do not have the cognitive capacity for real morality, you have a moral compass, thus has a cognitive [perceptual] moral deficit.

When Boyd mentioned 'moral reasoning' he is talking about those who can do real moral reasoning and not referring to the morally unconcerned person like you as a moral skeptic.
You talk about morality [metaethically] a lot in this discussion but you as a moral skeptic do not adopt any beliefs in the context of actual morality.

Note I have argued ALL humans are embedded with an inherent moral function and potential.
But as a moral skeptic, your inherent moral function has failed to activate or is very weak for some reason [..I am not implying you are a psychopath or the moral function is damaged].
This is why I believe you are a morally unconcerned person in your psyche thus unable to cognize or perceive the actual inherent moral function within you.

The fact is the inherent moral function is a later evolutionary adaption to modulate the 'oughtness to kill' for food from turning toward humans.
As such this moral function is unfolding very slowly relative to evolutionary time, this is why the majority of people are weak in their moral competences impulses.
As a moral skeptic you are at the 5% percentile of those who are weak in morality [no moral competence].

If you have any sense of right or wrong, that is related to customs, social, legal, politics, crimes, which are independent from morality-proper.

[FlashDangerpants]

When Boyd mentioned 'moral facts' it is with reference to his beliefs there are moral facts.
But to the morally unconcerned person, like you [as a moral skeptic] do not accept there are moral facts, thus motivationally irrelevant.
You do not have the cognitive capacity for real morality, you have a moral compass, thus has a cognitive [perceptual] moral deficit.

This is a two-fold failure on your part to do with your lack of theory of mind.

On the one hand, you are continuing to attribute to Boyd something which he cannot possibly have written beccause it is a scandalous argument. This shows that you misread arguments as much because you have a problem understanding what people might even plausibly be thinking as because of your stupid speed reading technique that is obviously optimised entirely for speed over actual reading.

On the other, still you don't link other people's actions to plausible beliefs, desires or opinions they hold. You are content to go with any old shit. You have decided that in order to make your misreading of a passage from a book stick, you are willing to believe that I don't have moral beliefs or that I choose not to act upon them and that any murdering I don't do is because of some other thing instead of me thinking it is wrong to murder.

That's why I wrote the OP at [psychological-KFC] VA's paint tin Theory of Mind The problem is that you initially form and then immovably commit to the most absurd psychological explanations of other people.

[Veritas Aequitas]

On the one hand, you are continuing to attribute to Boyd something which he cannot possibly have written beccause it is a scandalous argument. This shows that you misread arguments as much because you have a problem understanding what people might even plausibly be thinking as because of your stupid speed reading technique that is obviously optimised entirely for speed over actual reading.

AI is not perfect but in this case AI's understanding of the S4.7 [agreed with mine] is definitely more accurate than yours.

My original thread argued the following;
Moral Fact Deniers Has Cognitive Deficit in Morality
viewtopic.php?t=29659
The author [Boyd] therein claimed those who deny moral facts has a cognitive deficit in moral sense just like perceptual deficit in perception.

Boyd's Moral Realism is a counter to MoralAntiRealists like you as a moral skeptic.

I maintain, you as a moral fact denier and moral skeptic, i.e. a moral-antirealist in opposition to moral realism [Boyd et. al] has a Cognitive Moral Deficit as Boyd argued in S4.7:

Here is another AI view;

Objection to Moral Realism:
Moral judgments supposedly provide a necessary reason for action (e.g., if something is morally good, you should do it).
Facts, especially natural facts, can't provide such a connection.
Therefore, moral facts can't exist (Moral Realism is false).

Naturalist Response:
Moral judgments don't necessarily provide reasons for action.
Non-human beings could understand morality but be indifferent to it.
Even some humans might be indifferent.

The Connection Between Morality and Action:
Moral goodness (as defined by human needs) can provide some reason for action for most humans.
However, this doesn't explain why the connection feels so strong.

The Anti-Realist Intuition:
Many philosophers believe someone indifferent to morality would be cognitively impaired.
They see this as a failure to recognize a necessary link between moral goodness and action.

Boyd's Argument:
People indifferent to morality likely have a cognitive deficit, but not as the anti-realist suggests.
With a naturalistic view of knowledge, this deficit is similar to a perceptual one (e.g., colorblindness).

The Role of Sympathy:
Accessing human well-being and understanding others requires sympathy (empathy).
Sympathy allows us to imagine ourselves in others' situations and feel for them.
This empathy plays a role in both understanding morality (cognition) and caring about it (motivation).

Conclusion:
Someone indifferent to morality likely lacks sympathy, a crucial cognitive tool for moral reasoning.
Their motivational indifference stems from a cognitive deficiency in understanding the impact of actions on others.

That is my point you [as a moral skeptic] have a cognitive deficiency in morality.

You are cracking with your cacking re Keep Fucking Cack.
Something is obviously wrong with you, especially philosophically discussions are supposed to maintain some sense of better manners.
I won't be responding to your other posts in other threads except to argue for my stance in this thread.
From your recent posts you are just a philosophically empty vessel with no solid substance to support your arguments.

[Atla]

The author [Boyd] therein claimed those who deny moral facts has a cognitive deficit in moral sense

Boyd's Argument:
People indifferent to morality likely have a cognitive deficit, but not as the anti-realist suggests.

VA only proves again, that "he" is so cognitively damaged, that "he" genuinely doesn't understand that denying (objective) moral facts and being indifferent to morality are two wildly different things.

This is dangerous too, people like VA represent a danger to society.

[FlashDangerpants]

The author [Boyd] therein claimed those who deny moral facts has a cognitive deficit in moral sense

Boyd's Argument:
People indifferent to morality likely have a cognitive deficit, but not as the anti-realist suggests.

VA only proves again, that "he" is so cognitively damaged, that "he" genuinely doesn't understand that denying (objective) moral facts and being indifferent to morality are two wildly different things.

This is dangerous too, people like VA represent a danger to society.

He's not dangerous. He's just an autistic guy who needs to constantly demand everybody plays his autistic sorting games with him. If he wouldn't bury everything under his fucking deluge of spam threads he would be no worse than Ken.

[FlashDangerpants]

Something is obviously wrong with you, especially philosophically discussions are supposed to maintain some sense of better manners.
I won't be responding to your other posts in other threads except to argue for my stance in this thread.
From your recent posts you are just a philosophically empty vessel with no solid substance to support your arguments.

Look at the title of this thread. You have no right to accuse me of disrespect.

[Skepdick]

This thread is not getting dropped. VA needs to learn he owes me an appology for his behaviour here.

If morality is relative why can't you just chalk it to "you think he owes you an apology - he thinks he doesn't" ?