FDP has a Cognitive Moral Deficit in Morality

[Veritas Aequitas]

Thesis: FDP as a Moral Skeptic has a Cognitive Moral Deficit in Morality as claimed by Boyd's S4.7 Morality, Motivation, and Rationality - How to be a Moral Realist.

That in itself might be a problem, because we are in danger of agreeing on some stuff and I am a moral skeptic of some sort....
viewtopic.php?p=559314#p559314

Moral skepticism (or moral scepticism in British English) is a class of meta-ethical theories all members of which entail that no one has any moral knowledge.
Many moral skeptics also make the stronger, modal claim that moral knowledge is impossible.
Moral skepticism is particularly opposed to moral realism: the view that there are knowable and objective moral truths.-WIKI

Here is the full section 4.7 (in [=mine], and those notes in blue not bold)

4.7 Morality, Motivation, and Rationality
There remains but one of the challenges to Moral Realism which we are here considering.

Objection: Moral Realism is Impossible – not relation between facts and action
It has often been objected against Moral Realism that there is some sort of logical connection between moral judgments and reasons for action which a moral realist cannot account for.
It might be held, for example, that

the recognition that one course of action is morally preferable to another necessarily provides a reason (even if not a decisive one) to prefer the morally better course of action.
Mere facts (especially mere natural facts) cannot have this sort of logical connection to rational choice or reasons for action.
Therefore, so the objection goes, there cannot be moral facts;
Moral Realism (or at least naturalistic Moral Realism) is impossible.

It is of course true that the naturalistic moral realist must deny that moral judgments necessarily provide reasons for action; surely, for example, there could be nonhuman cognizing systems which could understand the natural facts about Moral goodness but be entirely indifferent to them in choosing how to act.
Moral judgments might provide for them [nonhuman cognizing systems] no reasons for action whatsoever.
Moreover, it is hard to see how the naturalistic moral realist can escape the conclusion that it would be logically possible for there to be a human being for whom moral judgments provided no reasons for action.
The moral realist must therefore deny that the connection between morality and reasons for action is so strong as the objection we are considering maintains.
The appearance of an especially intimate connection must be explained in some other way.

The standard naturalist response is to explain the apparent intimacy of the connection by arguing that the natural property Moral goodness is one such that for psychologically normal humans, the fact that one of two choices is morally preferable will in fact provide some reason for preferring it.

The Homeostatic consequentialist conception of the Good is especially well suited to this response since it defines the Good in terms of the homeostatic unity of fundamental human needs.
It seems to me that this explanation of the close connection between moral judgments and reasons for action is basically right,
but it ignores—it seems to me—one important source of the anti-realist’s intuition that the connection between moral judgments and rational choice must be a necessary one.

Cognitive Deficit to Morality – Lack Empathy
What I have in mind is the very strong intuition which many philosophers share
that the person for whom moral judgments are motivationally indifferent would not only be psychologically atypical [not representative of a type, group, or class.] but would have some sort of cognitive deficit with respect to moral reasoning as well.
The anti-realist diagnoses this deficit as a failure to recognize a definitional or otherwise necessary connection between Moral goodness and reasons for action. [Boyd did not agree with this but proposed his own version below]

I think that there is a deep insight in the view that
people for whom questions of Moral goodness are irrelevant to how they would choose to act - suffer a cognitive deficit.

I propose that the deficit is not—as the anti-realist would have it—a failure to recognize a necessary connection between moral judgments and reasons for action.
Instead, I suggest, if we adopt a naturalistic conception of moral knowledge we can diagnose in such people a deficit in the capacity to make moral judgments somewhat akin to a perceptual deficit.

What I have in mind is the application of a causal theory of moral knowledge to the examination of a feature of moral reasoning which has been well understood in the empiricist tradition since Hume, that is, the role of sympathy [empathy] in moral understanding.

Inherent Capacity for Empathy – Mirror Neurons
It is extremely plausible that for normal human beings
the capacity to access human goods and harms [to inherently intuitively have]
—the capacity to recognize [cognize] the extent to which others are well or poorly off with respect to the homeostatic cluster of moral goods and
the capacity to anticipate correctly the probable effect on others’ well-being of various counterfactual circumstances
—depends upon their capacity for sympathy [empathy],
their capacity to imagine themselves in the situation of others
or even to find themselves involuntarily doing so in cases in which others are especially well or badly off.

The idea that sympathy [empathy] plays this sort of cognitive role is a truism of nineteenth-century faculty psychology, and it is very probably right.

It is also very probably right, as Hume insists, that the operation of sympathy [empathy] is motivationally important:
as a matter of contingent psychological fact,
• when we put ourselves in the place of others in imagination,
• the effects of our doing so include our taking pleasure in others’ pleasures
• and our feeling distress at their misfortune,
• and we are thus motivated to care for the well-being of others.

The psychological mechanisms by which all this takes place may be more complicated than Hume imagined, but the fact remains that one and the same psychological mechanism—sympathy [empathy]—plays both a cognitive and a motivational role in normal human beings.

We are now in a position to see why the morally unconcerned person, the person for whom moral facts are motivationally irrelevant, probably suffers a cognitive deficit with respect to moral reasoning.
Such a person would have to be deficient in sympathy [empathy], because the motivational role of sympathy [empathy] is precisely to make moral facts motivationally relevant.
In consequence, she or he would be deficient with respect to a cognitive capacity (sympathy [empathy]) which is ordinarily important for the correct assessment of moral facts.
The motivational deficiency would, as a matter of contingent fact about human psychology, be a cognitive deficiency as well.

Anyone can show is my thesis wrong?

Discuss??
Views??

[Veritas Aequitas]

Notes:
Here are AI views re 4.7 above:

ChatGpt:
Your understanding is quite accurate. In this section from Richard Boyd's "HOW TO BE A MORAL REALIST," the author is addressing a common objection to moral realism, which claims that there is a logical connection between moral judgments and reasons for action that a moral realist cannot account for.
The objection suggests that mere natural facts cannot logically connect to rational choice or reasons for action, leading to the conclusion that moral realism, especially naturalistic moral realism, is impossible.

Boyd acknowledges that the naturalistic moral realist must deny that moral judgments necessarily provide reasons for action.
However, he argues that the apparent intimacy between morality and reasons for action can be explained by the nature of the natural property of moral goodness. He proposes that for psychologically normal humans, the recognition that one choice is morally preferable does provide some moral reason for preferring it.

Boyd then introduces the anti-realist's intuition that a person who is motivationally indifferent to moral judgments might have a cognitive deficit. The anti-realist attributes this deficit to a failure to recognize a necessary connection between moral judgments and reasons for action. Boyd, however, suggests an alternative explanation.
He proposes that if we adopt a naturalistic conception of moral knowledge and apply a causal theory of moral knowledge, we can understand the deficit in terms of a perceptual deficit rather than a failure to recognize a necessary connection.

Boyd argues that the deficit in morally unconcerned individuals is related to a deficiency in sympathy or empathy. He suggests that normal human beings rely on the capacity for sympathy or empathy to access human goods and harms, recognize the well-being of others, and anticipate the effects of various circumstances on others' well-being. Sympathy or empathy, according to Boyd, plays both a cognitive and a motivational role in normal human beings.
Therefore, a person who is motivationally indifferent to moral facts is likely deficient in sympathy or empathy, which, in turn, represents a cognitive deficit with respect to moral reasoning.

In summary, Boyd is exploring the connection between moral judgments, reasons for action, and the role of sympathy or empathy in normal human beings.
He argues that the [moral] anti-realist's intuition about a cognitive deficit in morally unconcerned individuals can be better explained in terms of a deficiency in sympathy or empathy, which is crucial for the correct assessment of moral facts.

[Me] From the above "We are now in a position to see why the morally unconcerned person, the person for whom moral facts are motivationally irrelevant, probably suffers a cognitive deficit with respect to moral reasoning."
Can I interpret the "morally unconcerned person" as Moral Antirealists, i.e. those who are moral nihilists and those who deny moral facts exist?

ChatGPT
Yes, your interpretation is correct.
In the context provided, the term "morally unconcerned person" refers to individuals who are indifferent or unmotivated by moral judgments, and the author suggests that these individuals likely have a cognitive deficit with respect to moral reasoning.
This aligns with the perspective of moral anti-realists, including moral nihilists or those who deny the existence of moral facts.
The idea is that individuals who reject the reality of moral facts may be, according to the author's argument, lacking in certain cognitive capacities related to moral reasoning, particularly a deficiency in empathy or sympathy.

[Veritas Aequitas]

Notes:

Here is another AI view;

Objection to Moral Realism:
Moral judgments supposedly provide a necessary reason for action (e.g., if something is morally good, you should do it).
Facts, especially natural facts, can't provide such a connection.
Therefore, moral facts can't exist (Moral Realism is false).

Naturalist Response:
Moral judgments don't necessarily provide reasons for action.
Non-human beings could understand morality but be indifferent to it.
Even some humans might be indifferent.

The Connection Between Morality and Action:
Moral goodness (as defined by human needs) can provide some reason for action for most humans.
However, this doesn't explain why the connection feels so strong.

The Anti-Realist Intuition:
Many philosophers believe someone indifferent to morality would be cognitively impaired.
They see this as a failure to recognize a necessary link between moral goodness and action.

Boyd's Argument:
People indifferent to morality likely have a cognitive deficit, but not as the anti-realist suggests.
With a naturalistic view of knowledge, this deficit is similar to a perceptual one (e.g., colorblindness).

The Role of Sympathy:
Accessing human well-being and understanding others requires sympathy (empathy).
Sympathy allows us to imagine ourselves in others' situations and feel for them.
This empathy plays a role in both understanding morality (cognition) and caring about it (motivation).

Conclusion:
Someone indifferent to morality likely lacks sympathy, a crucial cognitive tool for moral reasoning.
Their motivational indifference stems from a cognitive deficiency in understanding the impact of actions on others.

That is my point you [as a moral skeptic] have a cognitive deficiency in morality.

[Veritas Aequitas]

Notes:

FDP claimed he understood Boyd's point based on merely a cherry picked para from below, but he is wrong.
Below is my detailed analysis to justify why FDP [as a moral skeptic] has a moral cognitive moral deficit in Morality.

S4.7 How To Be A Moral Realist
Richard Boyd

There remains but one of the challenges to Moral Realism which we are here considering.

Objection: Moral Realism is Impossible – no relation between moral facts and action
It has often been objected against Moral Realism that there is some sort of logical connection between moral judgments and reasons for action which a moral realist cannot account for.

Objection to Moral Realism:
Moral judgments are seen as inherently connected to reasons for action.
Since facts (like moral facts in moral realism) don't provide reasons for action,
moral realism must be false.
It might be held, for example, that
the recognition that one course of action is morally preferable to another necessarily provides a reason (even if not a decisive one) to prefer the morally better course of action.
Mere facts (especially mere natural facts) cannot have this sort of logical connection to rational choice or reasons for action.
Therefore, so the objection goes, there cannot be moral facts;
Moral Realism (or at least naturalistic Moral Realism) is impossible.

Naturalistic Moral Realist must deny moral judgments necessarily provide reasons for action; possible for humans where moral judgments provided no reasons for action.
It is of course true that the naturalistic moral realist must deny that moral judgments necessarily provide reasons for action; surely, for example, there could be nonhuman cognizing systems which could understand the natural facts about Moral goodness but be entirely indifferent to them in choosing how to act.
Moral judgments might provide for them [nonhuman cognizing systems] no reasons for action whatsoever.
Moreover, it is hard to see how the naturalistic moral realist can escape the conclusion that it would be logically possible for there to be a human being for whom moral judgments provided no reasons for action.
The moral realist must therefore deny that the connection between morality and reasons for action is so strong as the objection we are considering maintains.
The appearance of an especially intimate connection must be explained in some other way.

Naturist response: preference one choice among two is morally preferable, indicate some moral reason exists
The standard naturalist response is to explain the apparent intimacy of the connection by arguing that the natural property Moral goodness is one such that for psychologically normal humans, the fact that one of two choices is morally preferable will in fact provide some reason for preferring it.

Homeostatic consequentialist conception of the Good re human needs, explain connection between moral judgments and reason for action; but do not explain why it is a necessary one
The Homeostatic consequentialist conception of the Good is especially well suited to this response since it defines the Good in terms of the homeostatic unity of fundamental human needs.
It seems to me that this explanation of the close connection between moral judgments and reasons for action is basically right,
but it ignores—it seems to me—one important source of the anti-realist’s intuition that the connection between moral judgments and rational choice must be a necessary one.

Moral Judgments are motivationally indifferent due to cognitive deficit. Anti-realists argue this deficit due to no necessary connection.
What I have in mind is the very strong intuition which many philosophers share
that the person for whom moral judgments are motivationally indifferent would not only be psychologically atypical [not representative of a type, group, or class.] but would have some sort of cognitive deficit with respect to moral reasoning as well.
The anti-realist diagnoses this [cognitive] deficit as a failure to recognize a definitional or otherwise necessary connection between Moral goodness and reasons for action.

Boyd differed from the anti-realist’s view of no necessary connection; instead to Boyd argued it is akin to a perceptual deficit
I think that there is a deep insight in the view that
people for whom questions of Moral goodness are irrelevant to how they would choose to act - suffer a cognitive deficit.
I propose that the deficit is not—as the anti-realist would have it—a failure to recognize a necessary connection between moral judgments and reasons for action.
Instead, I suggest, if we adopt a naturalistic conception of moral knowledge we can diagnose in such people a deficit in the capacity to make moral judgments somewhat akin to a perceptual deficit.

The perceptual deficit is in terms of Hume’s Causal Theory of moral knowledge to moral reasoning re empathy
What I have in mind is the application of a causal theory of moral knowledge to the examination of a feature of moral reasoning which has been well understood in the empiricist tradition since Hume, that is, the role of sympathy [empathy] in moral understanding.

Inherent Capacity for Empathy – [Mirror Neurons] to access human goods and harms [via homeostatic cluster]
It is extremely plausible that for normal human beings
the capacity to access human goods and harms [to inherently intuitively have]
—the capacity to recognize the extent to which others are well or poorly off with respect to the homeostatic cluster of moral goods and
the capacity to anticipate correctly the probable effect on others’ well-being of various counterfactual circumstances
—depends upon their capacity for sympathy [empathy],
their capacity to imagine themselves in the situation of others
or even to find themselves involuntarily doing so in cases in which others are especially well or badly off.

The idea that sympathy [empathy] plays this sort of cognitive role is a truism of nineteenth-century faculty psychology [psychology FSRC], and it is very probably right.

Empathy is motivational re contingent psychological fact has cognitive and motivational role in normal humans
It is also very probably right, as Hume insists, that the operation of sympathy [empathy] is motivationally important:
as a matter of contingent psychological fact,
• when we put ourselves in the place of others in imagination,
• the effects of our doing so include our taking pleasure in others’ pleasures
• and our feeling distress at their misfortune,
• and we are thus motivated to care for the well-being of others.

The psychological mechanisms by which all this takes place may be more complicated than Hume imagined, but the fact remains that one and the same psychological mechanism—sympathy [empathy]—plays both a cognitive and a motivational role in normal human beings.

Morally unconcerned person suffers a cognitive moral deficit, with deficient in cognitive capacity re empathy & awareness of this moral fact [moral FRSC] – contingent to human psychology FSRC.
We are now in a position to see why the morally unconcerned person, the person for whom moral facts are motivationally irrelevant, probably suffers a cognitive deficit with respect to moral reasoning.
Such a person would have to be deficient in sympathy [empathy], because the motivational role of sympathy [empathy] is precisely to make moral facts motivationally relevant.
In consequence, she or he would be deficient with respect to a cognitive capacity (sympathy [empathy]) which is ordinarily important for the correct assessment of moral facts.
The motivational deficiency would, as a matter of contingent fact about human psychology, be a cognitive deficiency as well.

[Veritas Aequitas]

Notes:
Moral Fact Deniers Has Cognitive Deficit in Morality
viewtopic.php?t=29659

[FlashDangerpants]

You have written out an argument which claims that anybody who doesn't agree with you philosophically is brain damaged. Is that a horrible error you would like to quickly reverse?

[Veritas Aequitas]

You have written out an argument which claims that anybody who doesn't agree with you philosophically is brain damaged. Is that a horrible error you would like to quickly reverse?

It is not MY argument, it is Boyd's argument in the OP above which implied that people [moral skeptics, moral facts deniers] like you have a Cognitive Deficit in Morality.

[FlashDangerpants]

You have written out an argument which claims that anybody who doesn't agree with you philosophically is brain damaged. Is that a horrible error you would like to quickly reverse?

It is not MY argument, it is Boyd's argument in the OP above which implied that people [moral skeptics, moral facts deniers] like you have a Cognitive Moral in Morality.

No it isn't. You must be mad if you think aprofessioal philosopher would write an argument claiming that all the philosophers who disagree with him have brain damage. Totally batshit.

Boyd would be out of work for the rest of his life if he wrote the essay you think you read. On a normal forum, you would get banned for this thread. You are an idiot who cannot read.

[Atla]

Thesis: FDP as a Moral Skeptic has a Cognitive Moral Deficit in Morality as claimed by Boyd's S4.7 Morality, Motivation, and Rationality - How to be a Moral Realist.

That in itself might be a problem, because we are in danger of agreeing on some stuff and I am a moral skeptic of some sort....
viewtopic.php?p=559314#p559314

Here is the full section 4.7 (in [=mine], and those notes in blue not bold)

4.7 Morality, Motivation, and Rationality
There remains but one of the challenges to Moral Realism which we are here considering.

Objection: Moral Realism is Impossible – not relation between facts and action
It has often been objected against Moral Realism that there is some sort of logical connection between moral judgments and reasons for action which a moral realist cannot account for.
It might be held, for example, that

the recognition that one course of action is morally preferable to another necessarily provides a reason (even if not a decisive one) to prefer the morally better course of action.
Mere facts (especially mere natural facts) cannot have this sort of logical connection to rational choice or reasons for action.
Therefore, so the objection goes, there cannot be moral facts;
Moral Realism (or at least naturalistic Moral Realism) is impossible.

It is of course true that the naturalistic moral realist must deny that moral judgments necessarily provide reasons for action; surely, for example, there could be nonhuman cognizing systems which could understand the natural facts about Moral goodness but be entirely indifferent to them in choosing how to act.
Moral judgments might provide for them [nonhuman cognizing systems] no reasons for action whatsoever.
Moreover, it is hard to see how the naturalistic moral realist can escape the conclusion that it would be logically possible for there to be a human being for whom moral judgments provided no reasons for action.
The moral realist must therefore deny that the connection between morality and reasons for action is so strong as the objection we are considering maintains.
The appearance of an especially intimate connection must be explained in some other way.

The standard naturalist response is to explain the apparent intimacy of the connection by arguing that the natural property Moral goodness is one such that for psychologically normal humans, the fact that one of two choices is morally preferable will in fact provide some reason for preferring it.

The Homeostatic consequentialist conception of the Good is especially well suited to this response since it defines the Good in terms of the homeostatic unity of fundamental human needs.
It seems to me that this explanation of the close connection between moral judgments and reasons for action is basically right,
but it ignores—it seems to me—one important source of the anti-realist’s intuition that the connection between moral judgments and rational choice must be a necessary one.

Cognitive Deficit to Morality – Lack Empathy
What I have in mind is the very strong intuition which many philosophers share
that the person for whom moral judgments are motivationally indifferent would not only be psychologically atypical [not representative of a type, group, or class.] but would have some sort of cognitive deficit with respect to moral reasoning as well.
The anti-realist diagnoses this deficit as a failure to recognize a definitional or otherwise necessary connection between Moral goodness and reasons for action. [Boyd did not agree with this but proposed his own version below]

I think that there is a deep insight in the view that
people for whom questions of Moral goodness are irrelevant to how they would choose to act - suffer a cognitive deficit.

I propose that the deficit is not—as the anti-realist would have it—a failure to recognize a necessary connection between moral judgments and reasons for action.
Instead, I suggest, if we adopt a naturalistic conception of moral knowledge we can diagnose in such people a deficit in the capacity to make moral judgments somewhat akin to a perceptual deficit.

What I have in mind is the application of a causal theory of moral knowledge to the examination of a feature of moral reasoning which has been well understood in the empiricist tradition since Hume, that is, the role of sympathy [empathy] in moral understanding.

Inherent Capacity for Empathy – Mirror Neurons
It is extremely plausible that for normal human beings
the capacity to access human goods and harms [to inherently intuitively have]
—the capacity to recognize [cognize] the extent to which others are well or poorly off with respect to the homeostatic cluster of moral goods and
the capacity to anticipate correctly the probable effect on others’ well-being of various counterfactual circumstances
—depends upon their capacity for sympathy [empathy],
their capacity to imagine themselves in the situation of others
or even to find themselves involuntarily doing so in cases in which others are especially well or badly off.

The idea that sympathy [empathy] plays this sort of cognitive role is a truism of nineteenth-century faculty psychology, and it is very probably right.

It is also very probably right, as Hume insists, that the operation of sympathy [empathy] is motivationally important:
as a matter of contingent psychological fact,
• when we put ourselves in the place of others in imagination,
• the effects of our doing so include our taking pleasure in others’ pleasures
• and our feeling distress at their misfortune,
• and we are thus motivated to care for the well-being of others.

The psychological mechanisms by which all this takes place may be more complicated than Hume imagined, but the fact remains that one and the same psychological mechanism—sympathy [empathy]—plays both a cognitive and a motivational role in normal human beings.

We are now in a position to see why the morally unconcerned person, the person for whom moral facts are motivationally irrelevant, probably suffers a cognitive deficit with respect to moral reasoning.
Such a person would have to be deficient in sympathy [empathy], because the motivational role of sympathy [empathy] is precisely to make moral facts motivationally relevant.
In consequence, she or he would be deficient with respect to a cognitive capacity (sympathy [empathy]) which is ordinarily important for the correct assessment of moral facts.
The motivational deficiency would, as a matter of contingent fact about human psychology, be a cognitive deficiency as well.

Anyone can show is my thesis wrong?

Discuss??
Views??

And what was this supposed to be? Boyd seems to intentionally conflate two completely different issues: the non-existence of moral facts in the natural world, and the motivational indifference of people with deficient or non-existent empathy.

[Veritas Aequitas]

You have written out an argument which claims that anybody who doesn't agree with you philosophically is brain damaged. Is that a horrible error you would like to quickly reverse?

It is not MY argument, it is Boyd's argument in the OP above which implied that people [moral skeptics, moral facts deniers] like you have a Cognitive Moral in Morality.

No it isn't. You must be mad if you think aprofessioal philosopher would write an argument claiming that all the philosophers who disagree with him have brain damage. Totally batshit.

Boyd would be out of work for the rest of his life if he wrote the essay you think you read. On a normal forum, you would get banned for this thread. You are an idiot who cannot read.

I have presented the full S4.7, show in detail [not cherry pick] where I am wrong.

Strawman. You are trying to be deceptive and bullshit.
Boyd did not claim nor referred to 'brain damage' but merely "cognitive deficit".

[Iwannaplato]

1) if we are going to appeal to Boyd, he was a scientific realist, so he would conclude that VA has a Cognitive Ontological Deficit in Ontology.
(I like the unnecessary repetition of VA's thread title so I parallel it here)

[FlashDangerpants]

It is not MY argument, it is Boyd's argument in the OP above which implied that people [moral skeptics, moral facts deniers] like you have a Cognitive Moral in Morality.

No it isn't. You must be mad if you think aprofessioal philosopher would write an argument claiming that all the philosophers who disagree with him have brain damage. Totally batshit.

Boyd would be out of work for the rest of his life if he wrote the essay you think you read. On a normal forum, you would get banned for this thread. You are an idiot who cannot read.

I have presented the full S4.7, show in detail [not cherry pick] where I am wrong.

Strawman. You are trying to be deceptive and bullshit.
Boyd did not claim nor referred to 'brain damage' but merely "cognitive deficit".

Simple common sense should tell you that what you have described is impossible. Here let me repeat the thing you need to understand...

Boyd would be out of work for the rest of his life if he wrote the essay you think you read. On a normal forum, you would get banned for this thread. You are an idiot who cannot read.

[Iwannaplato]

2) Make the argument in your own words please. It's is not clear how you want us to integrated the title of the thread, article, your brief assertions, and FDP's position is some coherent whole.

[Veritas Aequitas]

1) if we are going to appeal to Boyd, he was a scientific realist, so he would conclude that VA has a Cognitive Ontological Deficit in Ontology.
(I like the unnecessary repetition of VA's thread title so I parallel it here)

Off topic, that would be a separate issue re Scientific Realism vs Scientific-Anti_Realism.

I am a moral objectivist and moral realist so I do not have Cognitive Moral Deficit in Morality based on these Boyd's terms.

[Veritas Aequitas]

No it isn't. You must be mad if you think aprofessioal philosopher would write an argument claiming that all the philosophers who disagree with him have brain damage. Totally batshit.

Boyd would be out of work for the rest of his life if he wrote the essay you think you read. On a normal forum, you would get banned for this thread. You are an idiot who cannot read.

I have presented the full S4.7, show in detail [not cherry pick] where I am wrong.

Strawman. You are trying to be deceptive and bullshit.
Boyd did not claim nor referred to 'brain damage' but merely "cognitive deficit".

Simple common sense should tell you that what you have described is impossible. Here let me repeat the thing you need to understand...

Boyd would be out of work for the rest of his life if he wrote the essay you think you read. On a normal forum, you would get banned for this thread. You are an idiot who cannot read.

You keep blabbering but present no arguments.

Note AI's view on the OP;
viewtopic.php?p=702037#p702037