Wittgenstein’s ‘On Certainty’ is traceable to Kant.
[1] In the CPR, Kant wrote:
- … it still remains a scandal to Philosophy and to Human Reason-in-General that the Existence of Things outside us (from which we derive the whole Material of Knowledge, even for our Inner Sense) must be accepted merely on Faith, and that if anyone thinks good to doubt their Existence, we are unable to counter his doubts by any satisfactory proof. B55
[2] GE Moore attempted to prove [not mathematical] and counter Kant’s challenge with his
"A Defence of Common Sense" and Proof of an External World. [in Chapter 7 Philosophical Papers ]
- “IN THE PREFACE to the second edition of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason some words occur, which, in Professor Kemp Smith’s translation, are rendered as follows: [refer B55 CPR above]”
"A Defence of Common Sense"
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Here_is_one_hand
[3]The later-Wittgenstein countered Moore two above claims presented in “On Certainty”.
In the preface in ‘On Certainty’ Anscombe wrote;
- “What we publish here belongs to the last year and a half of Wittgenstein's life.
In the middle of 1949 he visited the United States at the invitation of Norman Malcolm, staying at Malcolm's house in Ithaca.
Malcolm acted as a goad to his interest in Moore's 'defence of common sense'"
The title 'On Certainty' was perhaps agreed by Anscombe and the publishers with references to the related notes [re Moore's Proof of an External World] in the final years of Wittgenstein.
My thesis is this;
1. Kant challenged realists to prove the existence of an absolutely mind-independent external world.
2. Moore, a realist took up Kant’s challenge with ‘Proof of an External World.’
3. Wittgenstein questioned the validity of Moore’s counter to Kant.
So, if Wittgenstein questioned the validity of Moore’s argument, then, it is implied Wittgenstein is agreeing with Kant that there is no absolutely mind-independent world.
In this case, the later-Wittgenstein is somewhat an antirealist; [he did not explicitly claimed he was].
I am refreshing my reading of Wittgenstein’s ‘On Certainty.’
I have read it halfway so far, the main theme of “On Certainty” is reducible to Framework and System where Wittgenstein’s Language Games is a human-based Linguistic FSK [FSRC], e.g. [a few among a long list]
I have read many interpretations and commentaries. Those that did not reduce 'On Certainty' foundation to Framework and System [FSRC] are premature, and lost their way.83. The truth of certain empirical propositions belongs to our frame of reference.
105. All testing, all confirmation and disconfirmation of a hypothesis takes place already within a system.
141. When we first begin to believe anything, what we believe is not a single proposition, it is a whole system of propositions.
410. Our knowledge forms an enormous system. And only within this system has a particular bit the value we give it.
411. If I say "we assume that the earth has existed for many years past" (or something similar), then of course it sounds strange that we should assume such a thing.
But in the entire system of our Language-Games it belongs to the foundations.
The assumption, one might say, forms the basis of action, and therefore, naturally, of thought.
"On Certainty"
Anyone has any counters to my above thesis?
Discuss??
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