Advantage of Logic due to Abstraction

[Veritas Aequitas]

In the thread below;
Belief in Abstract Objects is Irrational?
viewtopic.php?t=41775
I argued, belief in abstract objects [from a pragmatic view] is not irrational in countering PH's dogmatic view.

PH's view is that to believe in abstract object is irrational, but that is based on the realists' version of the shallow dichotomy between concrete objects vs abstract objects which is useful merely in some ways but not with reference to a more nuanced and higher level of reality.

Here is a more refined level of consideration re abstract objects;

The sphere of Logic is quite precisely delimited; its sole concern is to give an exhaustive exposition and a strict proof of the Formal Rules of all Thought, whether it be a priori or Empirical, whatever be its Origin or its Object, and whatever hindrances, accidental or natural, it may encounter in our Minds.
That Logic should have been thus successful is an advantage which it owes entirely to its Limitations, whereby it is justified in abstracting indeed, it is under obligation to do so from all Objects of Knowledge and their differences, leaving the Understanding [Intellect] nothing to deal with save itself and its Form.
Kant CPR Bix

Logic [one of the best tool we have] in terms of knowledge [a priori or empirical] is grounded on abstract object.
In abstracting logic only deal with the Form, i.e. the abstract-object and not the substance [whether it exists as real is contentious].

Now

• Logic is grounded on abstraction to generate abstract object.
  Science is grounded on logic, i.e. inductive logic.
  At present, science is most rational, credible and objective knowledge.
  Therefore, the idea of abstract objects is rational.

While science is grounded on Logic [inductive logic] its credibility and objectivity is conditioned and strengthen by its Framework and System of Realization and Knowledge [FSRK].

Thus, those [e.g. PH and others] who insist abstract objects are irrational from the crude point of view are implying scientific facts grounded on abstract objects are irrational?
This is because their thinking is narrow, shallow and dogmatic.

Discuss??
Views??

[Veritas Aequitas]

Notes:

That's fine. Further, a better rebuttal, if you are correctly explaining PH's position, is to merely point out that he uses abstractions in his arguments.

[Age]

Why does this one start so many threads?

Does it feel threatened or countered in some way in its old threads and so starts a new thread off of an old one, in some sort of hope that its beliefs will some how 'now' be agreed with and accepted in the new thread?

[Iwannaplato]

I argued, belief in abstract objects [from a pragmatic view] is not irrational in countering PH's dogmatic view.

That's fine. Further, a better rebuttal, if you are correctly explaining PH's position, is to merely point out that he uses abstractions in his arguments.

But here's the problem for you to say believing in them is practical. You have called the belief in unobservables irrational.
We cannot observe abstractions.

If it is pragmatic to believe in unobservables that you want to believe in, then it opens the door for others to do this.

From a pragmatic point of view, being flexible about beliefs seems to me very useful. Instead of dogmas about using realist and non-realist models why not accept that people have found both realist and non-realist approaches, models, working hypotheses productive?

The ironic thing is you are, in this, the latest fight with PH, taking a more realist position and PH is taking a specific anti-realist stance.

Which says to me that the fight is really just about the fight.

If this makes you want to talk about FSKs and two types of facts and objectivity, etc.

Stop. Snore.

Yes, I am sure with some mental gymnastics you can make this latest argument seems, if very, very uneasily fit with antirealism. However, on some level you must realize that this position is really quite realist. You are arguing that it is pragmatic to believe in unobservable objects. I happen to agree. But it is quite realist to believe in things we must infer.

And it is clearly the case that PH is taking a metaphysical anti-realist stance on universals, for example. And yet both of you are fighting over this issue, despite the switching of roles.

Fine, have your fight. Attack as many of PH assertions you can find some way to do it, if that, rather than something else, is your priority.

Or consider having a more flexible, context dependent metaphysics.

Up to you.

[Veritas Aequitas]

I argued, belief in abstract objects [from a pragmatic view] is not irrational in countering PH's dogmatic view.

That's fine. Further, a better rebuttal, if you are correctly explaining PH's position, is to merely point out that he uses abstractions in his arguments.

But here's the problem for you to say believing in them is practical. You have called the belief in unobservables irrational.
We cannot observe abstractions.

If it is pragmatic to believe in unobservables that you want to believe in, then it opens the door for others to do this.

From a pragmatic point of view, being flexible about beliefs seems to me very useful. Instead of dogmas about using realist and non-realist models why not accept that people have found both realist and non-realist approaches, models, working hypotheses productive?

The ironic thing is you are, in this, the latest fight with PH, taking a more realist position and PH is taking a specific anti-realist stance.

Which says to me that the fight is really just about the fight.

If this makes you want to talk about FSKs and two types of facts and objectivity, etc.

Stop. Snore.

Yes, I am sure with some mental gymnastics you can make this latest argument seems, if very, very uneasily fit with antirealism. However, on some level you must realize that this position is really quite realist. You are arguing that it is pragmatic to believe in unobservable objects. I happen to agree. But it is quite realist to believe in things we must infer.

And it is clearly the case that PH is taking a metaphysical anti-realist stance on universals, for example. And yet both of you are fighting over this issue, despite the switching of roles.

Fine, have your fight. Attack as many of PH assertions you can find some way to do it, if that, rather than something else, is your priority.

Or consider having a more flexible, context dependent metaphysics.

Up to you.

I have responded earlier re

But here's the problem for you to say believing in them is practical. You have called the belief in unobservables irrational.
We cannot observe abstractions.

Show me where I have claimed belief in unobservables is irrational?

I wrote in the other OP

There are many other abstract things that are considered rational which has high utility values, e.g. from the human-based FSRKs like mathematical, social constructs, economics, legal, financials, etc.
Note for example currencies and share prices from the economics FSRK which has reasonable high objectivity and rationality in contrast to the human-based scientific FSRK as the standard.

The above are unobservables which I believe are rational subject to its FSRK, so, where did I claim unobservables are irrational.


Re PH, I am merely using him as a representative for realists re absolute mind-independence, plus selfishly as a leverage to refresh what I have learned so far, so it is nothing personal.
Philosophical realism is an ideology and there is no way I am with that ideology thus my ANTI-philosophical_realism, e.g., no way for an ANTI-Communist to be a communist or ANTI_Nazi to be a Nazi.

[Veritas Aequitas]

Elsewhere, VA quotes Kant in defence of the existence of abstract things, as follows.

'The sphere of Logic is quite precisely delimited; its sole concern is to give an exhaustive exposition and a strict proof of the Formal Rules of all Thought, whether it be a priori or Empirical, whatever be its Origin or its Object, and whatever hindrances, accidental or natural, it may encounter in our Minds.
That Logic should have been thus successful is an advantage which it owes entirely to its Limitations, whereby it is justified in abstracting indeed, it is under obligation to do so from all Objects of Knowledge and their differences, leaving the Understanding [Intellect] nothing to deal with save itself and its Form.
Kant CPR Bix'

Notice the catastrophic conflation of logic, which deals with language, and 'Thought'. The vaunted 'abstraction' from all objects of knowledge refers simply to the fact that logical validity is about the consistency of assertions, which are linguistic expressions. Logic does not deal with the rules of thought - whatever they may be.

Kant was a man of his time and philosophical training, so it's unsurprising that he repackaged and passed on an ancient confusion. But we can do better.

What is issue re conflation. Logic is grounded on thought with language [ordinary, mathematical, computer, etc.]. I bet when you refer to language, you are confining it to linguistic only.

The rules of thought, thus logic Kant referred to are the 2 basic Laws, i.e. Law of Identity, Law of Non-Contradiction [plus LEM in general], sequitor from Premises to Conclusion, together with the avoidance of fallacies.

The point is the use of linguistic expression, mathematical, etc., are all bald-facts where the differences between particulars are omitted, thus reality is compromised for efficiency sake.

PS. Also elsewhere, IWP asserts that I use abstractions in my argument, which is self-defeating. But our debate here is about the nature of what we call abstractions. And I say that abstract nouns aren't names of things that exist somewhere, somehow, and that can therefore be described - names of abstract or non-physical things. I say that that's an ancient nomenclaturist fiction and delusion.

The point is you are insisting 'abstract-objects' are irrational.
But you are ignorant you are using 'abstract-objects' at a meta-level to argue your point.
If you insist, abstract objects are irrational, then your conclusion based on abstract objects is irrational.

Like many of us, I know how to use what are misleadingly called abstract nouns. And I know how to use what are misleadingly called concrete nouns, such as dog. My point is that the word dog does not name an abstraction from all the particulars that we call dogs - because there's no such thing, just as there's no such thing as the concept of a dog - a fantasy that evaporates on even cursory investigation.

That is my point.
You insist the concept [abstract noun] of a dog is irrational and on this basis you are a weird human.
The point is regardless what you thing is irrational, it is very rational for any normal person to use the term 'dog' for very rational purposes.
If a furry animal bite a person, it would be very effective to tell the doctor it is a dog that had bitten him, so that it assist the doctor to be effective to cure the person of rabies.

Thing is - if an abstract noun is not supposed to be the name of something, then talk about abstract things is incoherent.

As I had stated, everything that can be put into word or language at the meta-level is an abstract thing, even though in the common or linguistic sense, it is claimed to be concrete.
Whether it is rational and objective must depend upon the FSRK is it conditioned upon.
As such, an abstracted God or Ghost would be irrational [negligible rationality] based on its FSRK in contrast/relative to the scientific FSRK as the standard [as agreed].

No fact of abstract objects [meta*] can stand alone, it must be conditioned upon a specific human-based FSRK relative to the scientific FSRK.

* meta = not in your narrow realist mind-independent sense.

[Iwannaplato]

Show me where I have claimed belief in unobservables is irrational?

To antirealists unobservables are by definition mind-independent. If you cannot perceive them, they are mind independent. You've said a million times that that believing in such things is an evolutionary default, and then even gotten insulting about those who do believe. Further you've used people like Von Frassen to bolster your arguments and Von Frassen does not rule out their existence, but suggests 1) we should not believe in them and 2) should consider them useful fictions at most. Your position on unobservables has always been more radical than his.

I wrote in the other OP

There are many other abstract things that are considered rational which has high utility values, e.g. from the human-based FSRKs like mathematical, social constructs, economics, legal, financials, etc.
Note for example currencies and share prices from the economics FSRK which has reasonable high objectivity and rationality in contrast to the human-based scientific FSRK as the standard.

The above are unobservables which I believe are rational subject to its FSRK, so, where did I claim unobservables are irrational.

Yes, you don't notice the contradiction, it seems.

Re PH, I am merely using him as a representative for realists re absolute mind-independence, plus selfishly as a leverage to refresh what I have learned so far, so it is nothing personal.

Philosophical realism is an ideology and there is no way I am with that ideology thus my ANTI-philosophical_realism, e.g., no way for an ANTI-Communist to be a communist or ANTI_Nazi to be a Nazi.[/quote]I understand that you think your position on abstractions and against PH there is anti-realist. But his is the antirealist position. He is not a metaphysical antirealist in general, but on the specific issue of universals and abstractions he is an antirealist. Just as some people are antirealists about morals. Or antirealists about unobservables. As Atla has said many times, one can have a mixture of antirealism and realism and most people here do, even if they don't like to classify themselves in a complicated way.

His position is precisely antirealist on abstractions/universals. You are disagreeing with him. It seems he falls generally into the materialist/physicalist monist camp. So, anything that we cannot clearly describe as matter, he is an antirealist in relation to it. One could also say that he is parsimonious in relation to classifying things. If you can manage without another way of describing something, then avoid doing that. A bit along the occam's razor approach.

But, the irony here is that his position is a kind of metaphysical antirealist on this issue. Metaphysical realism typically posits that abstract entities or universals exist independently of human thought or perception, while metaphysical anti-realism denies the existence of such entities as independent, mind-independent realities. Anti-realism in metaphysics can take various forms, including nominalism, conceptualism, or fictionalism, depending on the specific arguments and positions taken by the individual.

[Veritas Aequitas]

Show me where I have claimed belief in unobservables is irrational?

To antirealists unobservables are by definition mind-independent. If you cannot perceive them, they are mind independent. You've said a million times that that believing in such things is an evolutionary default, and then even gotten insulting about those who do believe. Further you've used people like Von Frassen to bolster your arguments and Von Frassen does not rule out their existence, but suggests 1) we should not believe in them and 2) should consider them useful fictions at most. Your position on unobservables has always been more radical than his.

There are many types of ANTI-Physical_Realism [antirealism -shortened].
I have stated many times, mine is the Kantian sort of antirealism.

I believe in scientific facts that are conditioned upon the human-based FSRK, which is not mind-independent.
Scientific facts like the existence of Quarks, electrons gravity, and the like, are not directly observable [unobservable within common sense] but they can be inferred indirectly from observations of their effects. This is how science-physics recognized they are physical and real.
Thus I have never claimed quarks, electron, gravity and the like are mind-independent.

I wrote in the other OP

There are many other abstract things that are considered rational which has high utility values, e.g. from the human-based FSRKs like mathematical, social constructs, economics, legal, financials, etc.
Note for example currencies and share prices from the economics FSRK which has reasonable high objectivity and rationality in contrast to the human-based scientific FSRK as the standard.

The above are unobservables which I believe are rational subject to its FSRK, so, where did I claim unobservables are irrational.

Yes, you don't notice the contradiction, it seems.

I don't see any contradiction.
Where?
I am sure you have misinterpreted the above as contradiction from a mixed-up of perspectives.

Re PH, I am merely using him as a representative for realists re absolute mind-independence, plus selfishly as a leverage to refresh what I have learned so far, so it is nothing personal.
Philosophical realism is an ideology and there is no way I am with that ideology thus my ANTI-philosophical_realism, e.g., no way for an ANTI-Communist to be a communist or ANTI_Nazi to be a Nazi.

I understand that you think your position on abstractions and against PH there is anti-realist. But his is the antirealist position. He is not a metaphysical antirealist in general, but on the specific issue of universals and abstractions he is an antirealist. Just as some people are antirealists about morals. Or antirealists about unobservables. As Atla has said many times, one can have a mixture of antirealism and realism and most people here do, even if they don't like to classify themselves in a complicated way.

His position is precisely antirealist on abstractions/universals. You are disagreeing with him. It seems he falls generally into the materialist/physicalist monist camp. So, anything that we cannot clearly describe as matter, he is an antirealist in relation to it. One could also say that he is parsimonious in relation to classifying things. If you can manage without another way of describing something, then avoid doing that. A bit along the occam's razor approach.

But, the irony here is that his position is a kind of metaphysical antirealist on this issue. Metaphysical realism typically posits that abstract entities or universals exist independently of human thought or perception, while metaphysical anti-realism denies the existence of such entities as independent, mind-independent realities. Anti-realism in metaphysics can take various forms, including nominalism, conceptualism, or fictionalism, depending on the specific arguments and positions taken by the individual.

1. A p-realist believes things exist in an absolutely mind-independent state.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_realism
2. PH believes there are no mind-independent abstractions and universals because they don't exists and are merely invention of the mind.
3. Therefore he is a realist with reference to 2.

We are not dealing with Platonic universals or forms in this case.
Plato was a realist with his universals and forms.
Plato did not link universals and form as abstractions-as-related-to-the-OP.
I presume PH is not a platonist, so he is antirealist in reference to Plato just as he is anti-realist to moral realism.
But this is not relevant to the OP.

I am well aware and had stated many times, one can be a realist and also an antirealist, but it is dependent on the context. I raised this thread.
A Realist is also an Idealist [anti-realist]
viewtopic.php?f=5&t=32913

As far as this OP is concern, PH is a philosophical realist, i.e. he believe abstract objects and universals [non-platonic] don't exist as real in a mind-independent state.

[Iwannaplato]

There are many types of ANTI-Physical_Realism [antirealism -shortened].
I have stated many times, mine is the Kantian sort of antirealism.

I believe in scientific facts that are conditioned upon the human-based FSRK, which is not mind-independent.
Scientific facts like the existence of Quarks, electrons gravity, and the like, are not directly observable [unobservable within common sense] but they can be inferred indirectly from observations of their effects. This is how science-physics recognized they are physical and real.
Thus I have never claimed quarks, electron, gravity and the like are mind-independent.

Unobservable means something that a mind cannot come in contact with. The moment you allow people to infer the existence of things that are not experiencable, then any mind independe entity/thing can be considered real.

Yes, I've read what you say above a number of times.
You don't seem to realize that this doesn't eliminate the contradiction it has with other things you have said.

The FSK does not make these things mind-dependent.

Oh, I made a theory about something that cannot be perceived, so now that thing is dependent on my brain.

Look at the word itself: something that cannot be observed and yet is real.

1. A p-realist believes things exist in an absolutely mind-independent state.

I presume PH is not a platonist, so he is antirealist in reference to Plato just as he is anti-realist to moral realism.
But this is not relevant to the OP.

Yes, he is antirealist in relation to a number of unboservables.

As far as this OP is concern, PH is a philosophical realist, i.e. he believe abstract objects and universals [non-platonic] don't exist as real in a mind-independent state.

Yes, read that a few times and see how it sits on the tongue.

I know that you wouldn't want to assert something that contradicts your position. You seem to think that if you have said X is true, that somehow means you can never assert something that entails or actually means X is false. So, you present evidence that you have said X is true and express how much you wouldn't assert anything else as if the desire and the expression means that you couldn't assert X is false. That would mean neither PH nor anyone else could possibly contradict themselves if such an argument made any sense.

[Veritas Aequitas]

There are many types of ANTI-Physical_Realism [antirealism -shortened].
I have stated many times, mine is the Kantian sort of antirealism.

I believe in scientific facts that are conditioned upon the human-based FSRK, which is not mind-independent.
Scientific facts like the existence of Quarks, electrons gravity, and the like, are not directly observable [unobservable within common sense] but they can be inferred indirectly from observations of their effects. This is how science-physics recognized they are physical and real.
Thus I have never claimed quarks, electron, gravity and the like are mind-independent.

Unobservable means something that a mind cannot come in contact with. The moment you allow people to infer the existence of things that are not experiencable, then any mind independe entity/thing can be considered real.

Yes, I've read what you say above a number of times.
You don't seem to realize that this doesn't eliminate the contradiction it has with other things you have said.

The FSK does not make these things mind-dependent.

Oh, I made a theory about something that cannot be perceived, so now that thing is dependent on my brain.

I do not use the term 'mind-dependent' as it can be misleading.
That facts emerged from a human-based FSK meant that they cannot be mind-independent as the realists claim. [note human-based, so mind is involved]
It meant that one cannot eliminate the human factor from the realization of reality and the knowledge of it.

To explain why would be too complicated for you.
I have explained in these few threads, I don't expect you to get it due to selective attentions in not seeing the 500 pounds gorilla.

Reality: Emergence & Realization Prior to Perceiving, Knowing & Describing
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=40145
What is Emergence & Realization
viewtopic.php?t=40721
VA: Knowledge & Descriptions CANNOT Produce Facts
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=39925 Apr 10, 2023
Perceiving, Knowing & Describing a Thing Not Related to Existence of the Thing
viewtopic.php?t=40715

Look at the word itself: something that cannot be observed and yet is real.

Do you deny 'gravity' [not observed directly] is real and physical?
It is real because science-physics FSK said so and we trust it because it has proven to be credible and objective.

1. A p-realist believes things exist in an absolutely mind-independent state.

I presume PH is not a platonist, so he is antirealist in reference to Plato just as he is anti-realist to moral realism.
But this is not relevant to the OP.

Yes, he is antirealist in relation to a number of unboservables.

As far as I know, PH is anti-realist re Plato universals, moral realism, theism, supernatural, what else?

I know that you wouldn't want to assert something that contradicts your position. You seem to think that if you have said X is true, that somehow means you can never assert something that entails or actually means X is false. So, you present evidence that you have said X is true and express how much you wouldn't assert anything else as if the desire and the expression means that you couldn't assert X is false. That would mean neither PH nor anyone else could possibly contradict themselves if such an argument made any sense.

Not sure what is the point.

My principle is this;
whatever is real, exists, true, factual, knowledge and objective is conditioned upon a specific human-based FSRK of which the scientific FSRK is the most objective.

What assertion I made of reality is centered on the above principle.

PH and his like has the opposite view to my above principle.

[Iwannaplato]

I do not use the term 'mind-dependent' as it can be misleading.

I can understand why you don't use it, since it shows the problem. It is a term that is the precise opposite of mind-independent, a phrase you use repeatedly when saying that realism is false.

That facts emerged from a human-based FSK meant that they cannot be mind-independent as the realists claim. [note human-based, so mind is involved]
It meant that one cannot eliminate the human factor from the realization of reality and the knowledge of it.

Which is epistemology not ontology. The moment you say that there is a non-empirical something, you've left metaphysical antirealism. Unobservable means unexperiencable which means non-empirical. (Just to be clear that observe in the philosophy of science is not just about vision).

Realism infers unobservables. That's what realism is in contradistinction to the positions you have had.

To explain why would be too complicated for you.

Yeah, you only insult when you are insulted. Right.

I have explained in these few threads, I don't expect you to get it due to selective attentions in not seeing the 500 pounds gorilla.

A badly paraphrased, yet perfect example of one of your patterns.

You focus on the particular battle and don't notice that what you say in one context contradicts things you've said in other contexts.

Above you haven't addressed the points I raised, let alone come near to countering them.

I assume that's why you come up with an excuse not to do that in the insults.

Look at the word itself: something that cannot be observed and yet is real.

Do you deny 'gravity' [not observed directly] is real and physical?

You're asking me about what I believe, which is a confused response to my pointing out a contradiction in what you believe.

It is real because science-physics FSK said so and we trust it because it has proven to be credible and objective.

Yes, in one place you allow the positing of mind independent things (unobservables) in other places you don't.
You just don't notice the contradictions.
When it suits you, you allow for the inference of things that are not experienced (Kant must be rolling over in his grave). When you see others do this in posts that disagree with yours, you criticize it.

1. A p-realist believes things exist in an absolutely mind-independent state.

I presume PH is not a platonist, so he is antirealist in reference to Plato just as he is anti-realist to moral realism.
But this is not relevant to the OP.

Yes, he is antirealist in relation to a number of unboservables.

As far as I know, PH is anti-realist re Plato universals, moral realism, theism, supernatural, what else?

Tangent, doesn't matter.

I know that you wouldn't want to assert something that contradicts your position. You seem to think that if you have said X is true, that somehow means you can never assert something that entails or actually means X is false. So, you present evidence that you have said X is true and express how much you wouldn't assert anything else as if the desire and the expression means that you couldn't assert X is false. That would mean neither PH nor anyone else could possibly contradict themselves if such an argument made any sense.

Not sure what is the point.

Already covered above. If I point out you are acting like an ontological realist, you tell me you don't believe in realist and you quote yourself where you have asserted a negative judgment of realism. But what you don't do is actually demonstrate that the assertions I am responding to are not realist.

I am pointing out contradicitons. To tell me you have said something earlier that is antirealist doesn't mean there isn't a contradiction here.

It's like saying 'But I am on team constructive empiricism, so I could never say anything realist.' Au contraire.

My principle is this;
whatever is real, exists, true, factual, knowledge and objective is conditioned upon a specific human-based FSRK of which the scientific FSRK is the most objective.

Which is what you are doing here.

You might want to look up the grammatical issue of parallelism, if you are going to make that your principle.
https://www.thoughtco.com/faulty-parall ... ar-1690788

These kinds of errors in English, not quite using words correctly, has led to all sorts of unnecessary confusions, conflations and equivocations. You'll have an entire thread about what a fact is, but you'll put it in sentences in lists with adjectives.

[Veritas Aequitas]

I do not use the term 'mind-dependent' as it can be misleading.

I can understand why you don't use it, since it shows the problem. It is a term that is the precise opposite of mind-independent, a phrase you use repeatedly when saying that realism is false.

Mind-dependent is only the precise opposite of mind-independent in the literal and semantic sense. But in doing philosophy we may have to more precise beyond the semantics.
The term "mind-independent" is merely a 'place-holder' for many other points with a lot of nuanced perspective.
People like PH do not even agree 'mind' exists are a real thing.
I am using "mind-independent" as a convenience and take it as long as there is some consensus with the other, but for philosophical sake I have to be more precise when a deeper, more contentious differing views are involved.
It is pathetic that I have to explain this point.

That facts emerged from a human-based FSK meant that they cannot be mind-independent as the realists claim. [note human-based, so mind is involved]
It meant that one cannot eliminate the human factor from the realization of reality and the knowledge of it.

Which is epistemology not ontology. The moment you say that there is a non-empirical something, you've left metaphysical antirealism. Unobservable means unexperiencable which means non-empirical. (Just to be clear that observe in the philosophy of science is not just about vision).

Realism infers unobservables. That's what realism is in contradistinction to the positions you have had.

Not too sure of your point?

Yes, p-realism infers unobservable and claim it is really-real but it is actually illusory.
Why Philosophical Realism is Illusory
viewtopic.php?t=40167
This is why I always 'condemns' such ontology and attempt to bring the subject back to the more realistic epistemology.

I have explained in these few threads, I don't expect you to get it due to selective attentions in not seeing the 500 pounds gorilla.

A badly paraphrased, yet perfect example of one of your patterns.

You focus on the particular battle and don't notice that what you say in one context contradicts things you've said in other contexts.

Above you haven't addressed the points I raised, let alone come near to countering them.

I assume that's why you come up with an excuse not to do that in the insults.

If someone had not addressed my point which is very often, I will just state 'you missed my point.' If it is a critical point I will represent my point more clearly or start a separate thread to focus on the issue.
When you see me not addressing your point, it is likely due to you're a bad communicator & ineffective communication specific to that case.
So don't whine instead represent your point more clearly if it is a serious issue.

It is real because science-physics FSK said so and we trust it because it has proven to be credible and objective.

Yes, in one place you allow the positing of mind independent things (unobservables) in other places you don't.
You just don't notice the contradictions.
When it suits you, you allow for the inference of things that are not experienced (Kant must be rolling over in his grave). When you see others do this in posts that disagree with yours, you criticize it.

If there is something omitted, then represent your point if it is a serious issue.
I have never failed to response correctly to 1+1=?.
The exception is only when the person is in 'ignored' for various reasons.

I know that you wouldn't want to assert something that contradicts your position. You seem to think that if you have said X is true, that somehow means you can never assert something that entails or actually means X is false. So, you present evidence that you have said X is true and express how much you wouldn't assert anything else as if the desire and the expression means that you couldn't assert X is false. That would mean neither PH nor anyone else could possibly contradict themselves if such an argument made any sense.

Not sure what is the point.

Already covered above. If I point out you are acting like an ontological realist, you tell me you don't believe in realist and you quote yourself where you have asserted a negative judgment of realism. But what you don't do is actually demonstrate that the assertions I am responding to are not realist.

If it is a serious issue, represent your point more clearly to something like 1+1=?

My principle is this;
whatever is real, exists, true, factual, knowledge and objective is conditioned upon a specific human-based FSRK of which the scientific FSRK is the most objective.

Which is what you are doing here.

You might want to look up the grammatical issue of parallelism, if you are going to make that your principle.
https://www.thoughtco.com/faulty-parall ... ar-1690788

These kinds of errors in English, not quite using words correctly, has led to all sorts of unnecessary confusions, conflations and equivocations. You'll have an entire thread about what a fact is, but you'll put it in sentences in lists with adjectives.

As long as I have not claimed a square-circle, grammar is not a serious issue.

For interest sake, show me why the below is not valid philosophically?
My principle is this;
whatever is real, exists, true, factual, knowledge and objective is conditioned upon a specific human-based FSRK of which the scientific FSRK is the most objective.