Belief in Abstract Objects is Irrational?

[Veritas Aequitas]

Pending evidence for the existence of so-called abstract or non-physical things, belief that they exist is irrational.

PH's views as usual are narrow, shallow, dogmatic and based on ignorance of reality.

First,
There are Two Senses of Reality [& existence]
viewtopic.php?t=40265
i.e.
1. Human-based FSRK sense of existence and reality.
2. The philosophical realism, mind-independence sense of existence and reality.

I have demonstrated the philosophical realism, mind-independence sense of existence and reality [relied upon by PH] is grounded on an illusion and thus delusional, and so, in the most refined sense is irrational.

The Human-based FSRK give a more reasonable and practical sense of existence and reality with varying degrees of credibility, objectivity and rationality.
At present, the most credible, objective and rational FSRK is the scientific FSRK used as a standard from all other FSRK.

Generally, physical things verified via the scientific FSRKs has the highest degrees of objectivity and rationality.
However, there are abstract things from the social sciences, e.g. psychological things are considered rational and has utilities, albeit is degree of objectivity cannot be as high as those of the natural sciences.

There are many other abstract things that are considered rational which has high utility values, e.g. from the human-based FSRKs like mathematical, social constructs, economics, legal, financials, etc.
Note for example currencies and share prices from the economics FSRK which has reasonable high objectivity and rationality in contrast to the human-based scientific FSRK as the standard.

On the other extreme of the continuum, there are those who claimed for the existence of highly abstract things, e.g. god in theism, ghosts, spirits, various pseudo-scientific claims. Whilst they are backed by specific human-based FSRKs, their degrees of rationality could be negligible, thus irrational relative to the rationality of the scientific FSRK.

Btw, even with the highest rational mode of science, the things are dealt on an abstract universal basis not in relation to a particular thing.
Biologists will study a universal-rat not that-specific-thing [animal].

PH's views as usual are narrow, shallow, dogmatic and based on ignorance of reality.
If PH were to improve his philosophical knowledge, he should present his point in a more wider, deeper and less ideological perspective.

Discuss??
Views??

eta: "?" in OP title to avoid confusion

[Veritas Aequitas]

Notes: KIV

[Iwannaplato]

Biologists will study a universal-rat not that-specific-thing [animal].

This supposed universal-rat is not observable. It is deduced, or, really conceptualized into existence. And it is certainly not an object.

Von Frassen

The observable/unobservable distinction plays a key role in constructive
empiricism. According to van Fraassen, constructive empiricism, as opposed to
scientific realism, is defined by two theses. The first thesis is that “[s]cience aims to
give us theories that are empirically adequate […]” (van Fraassen 1980, p.12) rather
than true; the second is that “[…] to accept a theory is (for us) to believe that it is
empirically adequate—that what the theory says about what is observable (by us) is
true” (van Fraassen 1980, p.18; emphasis in the original).
Constructive empiricism straightforwardly equates ‘empirically adequate’ with
‘true about what is observable (by us)’. For the constructive empiricist, the range of
what is observable by us coincides with the range of what is epistemically accessible
to us. Hence, what is observable by us somehow determines both what we can
reasonably expect from a scientific theory and how much belief is involved in its
acceptance.
A corollary to the second thesis is that, according to constructive empiricism,
belief should be withheld with regard to the existence of the unobservable entities that
are postulated by an accepted scientific theory.

Universals are clearly not observable. Does one turn to the left or the right? Where are these objects?

These 'things' are inferred at best.

Constructive empiricism is a philosophical view that holds that scientific theories are not aiming for truth, but only for empirical adequacy, which means that they accurately describe the observable phenomena. Constructive empiricism also maintains that we should not believe in the existence of unobservable entities, such as electrons, quarks, or universals, or the universal rat, but only accept them as useful fictions for the purposes of science.

So, in constructive empiricism, universals would not be considered real and observable, but only as convenient ways of classifying and generalizing the observable properties of things. Universals are abstract concepts that are supposed to capture the common features of different individuals, such as redness, rats, or ritual. However, constructive empiricism would argue that we cannot directly observe or verify the existence of such concepts, and that they are not part of the empirical content of scientific theories. Rather, they are part of the language and logic that we use to formulate and communicate our theories, and they can be replaced by other equivalent expressions without affecting the empirical adequacy of the theories.

Even everyday usage fits with CE

object
noun
/ˈɒbdʒɪkt,ˈɒbdʒɛkt/
1.
a material thing that can be seen and touched.

An observable.

When we can pet the universal rat, then we can call re-evaluate.

[Skepdick]

Universals are clearly not observable.

Observability is a reductionist error. We have 20+ senses. Reason being one of them.

And reason throws exceptions. Such as the exception thrown when I ask you: Is the non-observability of universal.... universally true?

And that's how information is sensed.

[phyllo]

Pending evidence for the existence of so-called abstract or non-physical things, belief that they exist is irrational.

This extends to ...

Without evidence for the existence of something, either physical or non-physical or abstract, belief that it exists is irrational.

Hardly surprising.

[Consul]

Biologists will study a universal-rat not that-specific-thing [animal].

This supposed universal-rat is not observable. It is deduced, or, really conceptualized into existence. And it is certainly not an object.
…
Universals are clearly not observable. Does one turn to the left or the right? Where are these objects?

Immanent (aka concrete) universals are possible objects of sensory perception, and they are where the concrete particulars are that instantiate them.

However, there is a difference between (immanent or transcendent) nonsubstantial universals aka attributes (properties, qualities, quantities) and (immanent or transcendent) substantial universals aka kinds (species, genera, types). If one believes in the existence of the former, one can but needn't also believe in the existence of the latter. When one observes a rat, one can see its properties (qua immanent universals); but whether one can also see the kind rat (qua immanent kind-universal) is a highly contentious issue.

[Consul]

Generally, physical things verified via the scientific FSRKs has the highest degrees of objectivity and rationality.
However, there are abstract things from the social sciences, e.g. psychological things are considered rational and has utilities, albeit is degree of objectivity cannot be as high as those of the natural sciences.

There are many other abstract things that are considered rational which has high utility values, e.g. from the human-based FSRKs like mathematical, social constructs, economics, legal, financials, etc.
Note for example currencies and share prices from the economics FSRK which has reasonable high objectivity and rationality in contrast to the human-based scientific FSRK as the standard.

On the other extreme of the continuum, there are those who claimed for the existence of highly abstract things, e.g. god in theism, ghosts, spirits, various pseudo-scientific claims. Whilst they are backed by specific human-based FSRKs, their degrees of rationality could be negligible, thus irrational relative to the rationality of the scientific FSRK.

All physical, mental, or social entities are concrete entities (in the ontological sense of "concrete").

[Iwannaplato]

Immanent (aka concrete) universals are possible objects of sensory perception, and they are where the concrete particulars are that instantiate them.

You can see individual rats and get some understand of what someone is referring to when using the universal term, but I don't think you can see the universal rat. You see this rat's nose, not the universal 'the rat nose'. Also, if it makes any difference I was rejecting this idea in the context of VA being a metaphysical antirealist who has cited von frassen as an authority. IOW I don't think he can argue they are real, given his metaphysical antirealism which is in fact stronger than Von Frassens. I think we could say that Von Frassen is agnostic about the existence of specific unobservables, but VA has made it clear he is atheistic about them.

[Peter Holmes]

I find it incredible that there is still serious talk about universals - immanent or otherwise.

We use the word rat to talk about the things we call rats. So the story was that the word rat must be the name of a thing of some kind - an abstraction or universal or Platonic form - that all those particular rats more or less inaccurately instantiate, like imperfect copies, or shadows in Plato's cave.

It's an ancient and laughable delusion - a bewitchment by a linguistic device, mistaking what we say - such as the names we use - for the way things are. It's mysticism pure and simple. I'm flabbergasted.

[Atla]

On the other extreme of the continuum, there are those who claimed for the existence of highly abstract things, e.g. god in theism, ghosts, spirits, various pseudo-scientific claims.

VA has no idea what "abstract" even means. God, ghosts, spirits for example aren't abstract at all, they are concrete.

No one can solve the mistery how VA gets every basic philosophical concept so wrong. It just doesn't make any sense.

[Iwannaplato]

VA has no idea what "abstract" even means. God, ghosts, spirits for example aren't abstract at all, they are concrete.

Yes, I noticed that also. You have to pick your spots with VA.

If ghosts are real, they are not abstract, for example. They are even potentially observables.
I'd say some versions of God are abstract, others not. Yahweh is a quite concrete posited entity.

[phyllo]

If ghosts are real, they are not abstract, for example. They are even potentially observables.

How come "ghosts" isn't a "universal" and therefore not observable?

[Peter Holmes]

If ghosts are real, they are not abstract, for example. They are even potentially observables.

How come "ghosts" isn't a "universal" and therefore not observable?

Quite. A fairy is an observable, concrete particular. But 'fairy' is an unobservable, abstract universal. What complete cobblers.

[Impenitent]

belief in personalities aside...



-Imp

[Iwannaplato]

If ghosts are real, they are not abstract, for example. They are even potentially observables.

How come "ghosts" isn't a "universal" and therefore not observable?

YOu changed it to the singular. I referred to ghosts. I am not saying we ban the word 'rats'. Each ghost would be potentially observable, at least in believers sense of ghosts. I mean, that's part of the phenomenon. But yes the universal ghost, if you are an antirealist, does not exist. The category is not observable, but each thing we call rat, to jump in midstream, is observable, so far.

And, my responses are in the context of VA's beliefs. Or at least what he has said was the case.