Belief in Abstract Objects is Irrational?

[God]

VA has no idea what "abstract" even means. God, ghosts, spirits for example aren't abstract at all, they are concrete.

No one can solve the mistery how VA gets every basic philosophical concept so wrong. It just doesn't make any sense.

What is concrete vs abstract is only claimed specifically from the ideological Philosophical Realism's perspective. I reject philosophical realism because it is grounded on illusions.
From the ANTI-philosophical_realist [Kantian], god in theism, ghosts, spirits, are ultimately claims of abstract things which has negligible degree of rationality and objectivity.

Why Philosophical Realism is Illusory
viewtopic.php?t=40167

Then your thread is alredy moot, since PH is not a Kantian anti-realist who just time-traveled forward from the late 18th century. Nor was Kant mentioned in the OP and thread title. But even then, I can't really get God to say it

In Kantian anti-realism, are gods, ghosts and fairies abstract?

Kantian philosophy is primarily concerned with epistemology and metaphysics, focusing on the nature of human knowledge and the limits of human understanding. Immanuel Kant did not explicitly discuss gods, ghosts, or fairies in his philosophical works in the same way he addressed abstract concepts.

Kant's anti-realism is mainly associated with his transcendental idealism, which asserts that the objects of our experience are shaped by the structures of our own cognition. According to Kant, we can never know things as they are in themselves (noumena); instead, we only have access to phenomena, which are shaped by our mental categories and sensory experiences.

The classification of gods, ghosts, and fairies would depend on how one conceptualizes them. If these entities are considered as transcendent, existing independently of human cognition, Kantian philosophy would suggest that we cannot have knowledge about them as they are in themselves. However, if these entities are seen as products of human thought, imagination, or cultural constructs, then they would fall within the realm of phenomena shaped by human cognitive structures.

In essence, whether gods, ghosts, and fairies are considered abstract in Kantian anti-realism would depend on the perspective taken regarding their ontological status and their relation to human cognition.

In anti-realism, are gods, ghosts and fairies abstract or concrete?

Anti-realism generally refers to the view that certain types of entities or properties do not exist independently of human thought or perception. In the context of anti-realism, the classification of entities like gods, ghosts, and fairies as abstract or concrete can depend on the specific philosophical framework being considered.

Abstract Anti-Realism:

In some anti-realistic perspectives, these entities might be considered abstract in the sense that they are seen as products of human imagination, cultural beliefs, or subjective experiences.
Gods, ghosts, and fairies may be regarded as mental constructs or cultural symbols that lack independent existence outside of human minds.
Concretely Mental Anti-Realism:

Some anti-realists might argue that while these entities are not independently existing in the external world, they do have a kind of existence as mental or psychological phenomena.
In this view, gods, ghosts, and fairies are concrete in the sense that they exist within the realm of human consciousness and thought.
Eliminative Anti-Realism:

On a more radical form of anti-realism, these entities might be dismissed altogether as having no meaningful existence, not even as abstract or mental constructs.
This eliminative stance denies the reality or significance of gods, ghosts, and fairies in any form.
It's important to note that anti-realism encompasses a variety of perspectives, and different philosophers may have nuanced views on the nature of existence and reality. The classification of entities like gods, ghosts, and fairies within an anti-realist framework can vary based on the specific arguments and positions adopted by philosophers within that framework.

Definitely not quoting Me. Try renaming your "God", Atla.

[Peter Holmes]

Assertion. '...all distinctions (including the concrete-abstract distinction) are themselves abstractions.'

Not so. Yes, outside language, there are no linguistic identities - no linguistic samenesses and differences - in reality. And features of reality aren't obliged to conform to our ways of talking about them.

But the things we call cats and dogs are what they are, how ever we name and describe them, and whether we say they're the same as or different from each other. It's as mistaken to deny distinctions outside language as it is to insist on linguistic distinctions in reality. The dazzling power of language is evident in both delusions.

The difference between a dog and a tree is not an abstraction. And language doesn't work by means of abstraction.

[Skepdick]

Assertion. '...all distinctions (including the concrete-abstract distinction) are themselves abstractions.'

Not so. Yes, outside language, there are no linguistic identities - no linguistic samenesses and differences - in reality. And features of reality aren't obliged to conform to our ways of talking about them.

The expression "features of reality" expresses an abstraction. Peter "Dumb Cunt" Holmes is talking about arbitrary subsets of ALL reality.

A subset he carved out from the whole with his mind's scissors. Soon as he's done cutting he calls the cut-out a "thing".

But the things we call cats and dogs are what they are, how ever we name and describe them, and whether we say they're the same as or different from each other. It's as mistaken to deny distinctions outside language as it is to insist on linguistic distinctions in reality. The dazzling power of language is evident in both delusions.

Q.E.D He continues to chop up reality into arbitrary distinctions. Cutting wherever he sees fit.

Why care cats and dogs "different"?
Are any two dogs different?
Why aren't they exactly the same as all animals?
Are you the same Peter "Dumb Cunt" Holmes that I was speaking to yesterday or a different Peter "Dumb Cunt" Holmes?

Drop the scissors, moron. First explain why you are chopping up reality into arbitrary categories based on arbitrary criteria for sameness and difference.

[Consul]

Assertion. '...all distinctions (including the concrete-abstract distinction) are themselves abstractions.'

Abstract entities in the contemporary ontological sense aren't general ideas in Locke's sense, i.e. mental or verbal representations resulting from a psychological process called abstraction.

However, if concepts aren't mental representations but predicate-meanings (predicate-senses, as Frege would say), they are ontologically abstract entities; and if common nouns are noun-types rather than noun-tokens, they are ontologically abstract entities too. The situation is terminologically confusing, because linguists call common nouns such as "dog" and "gold" concrete nouns. But as ontologists see it, only (mental or physical) tokens of concrete nouns are ontologically concrete, whereas (non-mental and non-physical) types of concrete nouns are ontologically abstract.

There is a general distinction between ontologically concrete linguistic tokens (letter-/word-/sentence-tokens) and ontologically abstract linguistic types (letter-/word-/sentence-types).

"The Way of Abstraction: abstract entities are abstractions from concrete entities. They result from somehow subtracting specificity, so that an incomplete description of the original concrete entity would be a complete description of the abstraction. This, I take it, is the historically and etymologically correct thing to mean if we talk of 'abstract entities'. But it is by no means the dominant meaning in contemporary philosophy."

(Lewis, David. On the Plurality of Worlds. Oxford: Blackwell, 1986. pp. 84-5)

[Consul]

All physical, mental, or social entities are concrete entities (in the ontological sense of "concrete").

What is 'concrete' is with reference to philosophical realism, i.e. something that is absolutely mind-independent.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_realism

I am ANTI-Philosophical_Realism so I do not agree with this concrete vs abstract dichotomy.
Rather what exists, is real, factual and objective is conditioned upon a specific human-based framework and system of realization [of reality] and knowledge [FSRK].

Obviously, mental entities and social entities (institutions, organizations) are not mind-independent; but they are concrete entities.
Anyway, the mere conceptual distinction between (ontological) abstractness and (ontological) concreteness doesn't presuppose any particular ontological commitment. How exactly this distinction is to be defined is a contentious issue; but what is not contentious is that "all physical, mental, or social entities are concrete entities."

Abstract Objects: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/abstract-objects/

[Skepdick]

If ghosts are real, they are not abstract, for example. They are even potentially observables.

How come "ghosts" isn't a "universal" and therefore not observable?

YOu changed it to the singular. I referred to ghosts. I am not saying we ban the word 'rats'. Each ghost would be potentially observable, at least in believers sense of ghosts. I mean, that's part of the phenomenon. But yes the universal ghost, if you are an antirealist, does not exist. The category is not observable, but each thing we call rat, to jump in midstream, is observable, so far.

And, my responses are in the context of VA's beliefs. Or at least what he has said was the case.

There's no difference between a singular ghost and plural ghosts. The path to universalism is just induction.

A single instance of a "ghost" shares something in common with all instances of ghosts.
That's why you call them ghosts. There's a common golden thread - even if that golden thread is simply the way they make you feel.

A universal property; or quality of "ghostness" shared amongst all ghosts. I won't call it an "essence" and I won't compare this to essentialism because "ghostness" needs not be intrinsic any more than "saltiness" is intrinsic.

It's simply what you happen to recognize/classify as a ghost or ghosts. In so far as we all agree on what is and isn't classified as a ghost - we have shared criteria.

[Peter Holmes]

Just the first online definitions I found.

ADJECTIVE
[ˈabstrakt]
existing in thought or as an idea but not having a physical or concrete existence:

[əbˈstrakʃ(ə)n]
NOUN
the quality of dealing with ideas rather than events:

Notice - the bollocks about abstract things and abstraction is built into the words. Things are supposed to exist in thought or as ideas, which are not physical things. Or, shifting deckchairs on the Titanic, abstract things are 'concepts' - as though those are any less fictional or more serious than ideas.

Witness, to paraphrase: 'the noun phrase features of reality expresses an abstraction'. Wtf does that mean? Does the NP dog express a dog? And is 'dog' an abstraction?

We use the word dog, which is a real, physical thing, to talk about real, physical things. And when we do so, the linguistic operation is a real, physical process. So where is any of that abstract?

That's mystical nonsense, and always has been.

[Atla]

Let's remember that Kant may have had autism, and autistics tend to think in one, big, layer-less system. Which I think is reflected throughout his philosophy. Whereas non-autistics tend to think in a multi-layered system, those are the layers of abstraction.

As such, Kant was using the concept of abstraction, but he meant something entirely different by it. The abstract vs concrete dichotomy is simply not part of his philosophy.

But it's such a centrally important dichotomy, that this time, it's not everyone else who has to adjust to the Kantian terminology, but it's the Kantian-anti-PHIL_o_SOP-hi-cal_realist-([FSR[double that[on monday evenings]]]-FSK)-proper-etc. that has to adjust to the concrete vs abstract terminology.

This was pointed out before of course

Fundamental error: Kant did not distinguish between the concrete, intuitive, perceptual knowledge of objects and the abstract, discursive, conceptual, knowledge of thoughts.

But all distinctions (including the concrete-abstract distinction) are themselves abstractions.

On a monist ontology everything is one. Your mind is just running around with scissors.

Word salad

[Atla]

Definitely not quoting Me. Try renaming your "God", Atla.

The real God is a lot more helpful than you are, thank you. Rename yourself..

[Skepdick]

Word salad

Is that a concrete or an abstract salad?

[Atla]

Word salad

Is that a concrete or an abstract salad?

Abstract I'd say

[phyllo]

I'm not sure what you mean. I should have written "How come "ghosts" aren't "universal" ... "? I think that would have changed the meaning of what I was asking.

Well, it's always good to use the language the person you are saying is using the language incorrectly is using.

OK. In my first post I am pointing out that VA's position given his antirealism should not allow for universals to be real objects.

In Von Frassen's antirealism one can refer to unobservables as part of a useful fiction. He isn't telling people that you can't talk about them, because doing so allows for a model that is useful. So, one can talk about rats. And he would not deny the existence of any particular 'thing' that gets called rat, because any individual example is observable. If the people who believe ghosts are real are correct. IOW they are seeing actual entities and not confusing wind moaning and fuzz in their eyes with ghosts, they are having experiencing of observable objects. Just as someone who sees a rat would be seeing an observable (and not, for example, a shadow or a large dust ball in the corner of their room. They each would be having a sensory experience of an observable.

Ghosts are not like beauty or thinking that cannot be seen, if those objects are in fact real.

Instead of, for example, the sensory experiences of other things that are observable being confused with an afterdeath portion of a former human.

Like, say, rogue waves turned out to be real. You had people saying they saw rogue waves. Scientists said they were mistaken. There could not be large singlular wves in fair weather of that size. There were not abstract entities, just because scientists thought the people who claimed a forty foot wave hit their boat in otherwise calm seas. Yes, perhaps the people's emotions radically affected their perception or they were high or seasick and there was no such phenomenon. But the scientists were wrong, as video cameras in ship bridges and then satellite photographs later showed. It happens that such things happen.

But it was always a claim about a concrete entity. Just as people who experience ghosts are making claims about concrete entities.


And while one cannot point a finger at the universal 'ghotsts' that is for Von frassen a useful fiction about

plural cases of real concrete phenomena, be they rats or ghosts.

And all of that is me arguing that VA does not get to mock PH for being skeptical about universals being real objects, because his own antirealism should make him agree with PH there.

But the idea of agreeing with PH is so abhorrant he disagrees, not realizing that he is contradicting his own constructive empiricism, a la Von Frassen, whom he has quoted a number of times. Now I will guess that VA will say he doesn't agree with everything VF says. But the problem with that is that he is EVEN MORE strongly skeptical about the existence of universals than VF. He has asserted many times that unobservables don't existence. VF is more cautious. He says we should not assert that those useful fictions are real. On the other hand any instance of what gets called a rat, a constructive empiricist or a metaphysical antirealist can certainly consider real, since they are observable (experienceable).

So, you can talk about rats as a category and potentially ghosts as a category, to smooth over conversations. Each individual experienced rat is considered real, via whatever the specifics of your antirealist methodology - and both Von Frassen and VA are fans of science, though my guess is the former understands it better than the latter. You still get to use nouns, since this is a useful fiction, a way of talking about similar real things, even though VF is skeptical about the existence of the universal.

In the case of ghosts, well, you'd have to meet the particular epistemology of the particular antirealist for them to say that any particular ghost is real.

That's certainly an overview of van Fraassen and constructive empiricism.

But really, all I was questioning was why you treated rats and ghosts differently as a category. And I guess the short answer is that by using the plural, you were referring to particular ghosts . Although when you used plural 'rats' in the previous post, it seemed to be about the 'rats category'.

Whatever. Not important.

[Consul]

Just the first online definitions I found.

ADJECTIVE
[ˈabstrakt]
existing in thought or as an idea but not having a physical or concrete existence:

The only things existing "in thought" are thoughts (thinkings) qua mental actions or events, which are concrete entities. If the object of thought, i.e. what is thought about/of, doesn't exist, it doesn't exist "in thought" either.

[God]

Definitely not quoting Me. Try renaming your "God", Atla.

The real God is a lot more helpful than you are, thank you. Rename yourself..

I was here first, I think you'll find.

[Atla]

Definitely not quoting Me. Try renaming your "God", Atla.

The real God is a lot more helpful than you are, thank you. Rename yourself..

I was here first, I think you'll find.

On the forum, yes. But the real God has always been around.