Anselm argument and problem within

[Age]

Anything could be doubted. But, not everything can be refuted.

There is a difference between meaningfully doubting something and saying you doubt something without actual doubting occurring.

Why would someone say that they 'doubt' something, if they do not meaningfully doubt it?

'We' are in a philosophy forum here, do you envision posters here would just say, 'I doubt something', without actually doubting that thing?

For example, one cannot doubt the triangularity of triangles if one is aware of the semantic. But one can doubt whether they ate x or y yesterday (here, meaningful doubt occurs)

So, you are just more or less using the 'doubt' word here in a way the 'refute' words mean exactly, right?

Also, why when one is doubting what they might have eaten yesterday, then this, to you, 'meaningful doubting', occurs?

So, just formulate an irrefutable argument, which is just a sound and valid argument, that God exists, then 'that' cannot be refuted.

I believe the new ontological argument I posted cannot be meaningfully doubted or rejected.

Do you believe that it could be refuted?

Also, what your so-called 'new ontological argument' concludes more or less is: 'We know the word God refers to a perfect existence and a perfect being, and that "philosopher19" claims that 'existence' and 'being' are one and the same thing, and that the God word, the existence word, and the omnipresent word denote the same thing.

Which, for your information, I doubt and reject, very meaningfully. I would not be surprised if others do as well.

Now, back to what I was pointing out and saying here, what cannot be refuted are sound and valid arguments. So, until you provide one what is meaningfully True here is that your so-called 'new ontological argument' here is not sound and valid, and therefore can be being, meaningfully, doubted, rejected, and refuted.

[Philosopher19]

Why would someone say that they 'doubt' something, if they do not meaningfully doubt it?

People could doubt something else but say they doubt what you're saying because the semantics you want them to focus on with the language you're using has not resulted in them focusing on those semantics. They have instead focused on different semantics.

So, you are just more or less using the 'doubt' word here in a way the 'refute' words mean exactly, right?

I'm not sure.

Also, why when one is doubting what they might have eaten yesterday, then this, to you, 'meaningful doubting', occurs?

Because one can legitimately be not sure about what they ate yesterday because, say, they don't remember. But when one is aware of the semantic of triangle, one cannot legitimately be unsure about whether triangles are triangular.

Now, back to what I was pointing out and saying here, what cannot be refuted are sound and valid arguments. So, until you provide one what is meaningfully True here is that your so-called 'new ontological argument' here is not sound and valid, and therefore can be being, meaningfully, doubted, rejected, and refuted.

I believe I presented an argument. I numbered it 1 to 4. If you see any part of it as refutable or dubitable, then which part? Is it 1, 2, 3 or 4 and why?

[Age]

Why would someone say that they 'doubt' something, if they do not meaningfully doubt it?

People could doubt something else but say they doubt what you're saying because the semantics you want them to focus on with the language you're using has not resulted in them focusing on those semantics.

Of course people could do this, but, again, why would people want to doubt 'something else', but say they doubt what another saying?

They have instead focused on different semantics.

Like what you have been doing and showing here?

So, you are just more or less using the 'doubt' word here in a way the 'refute' words mean exactly, right?

I'm not sure.

Okay.

Think about what you could actually 'doubt' and what you could actually 'refute'.

Does the number of those things align?

Also, why when one is doubting what they might have eaten yesterday, then this, to you, 'meaningful doubting', occurs?

Because one can legitimately be not sure about what they ate yesterday because, say, they don't remember.

So, what one just cannot remember is 'meaningful', correct?

But when one is aware of the semantic of triangle, one cannot legitimately be unsure about whether triangles are triangular.

While one is agreeing with and accepting 'the definition' of 'a word', then it is fairly obvious that 'that one' would not be doubting 'the thing', itself, which 'that word' is denoting or referring to, right?

Now, back to what I was pointing out and saying here, what cannot be refuted are sound and valid arguments. So, until you provide one what is meaningfully True here is that your so-called 'new ontological argument' here is not sound and valid, and therefore can be being, meaningfully, doubted, rejected, and refuted.

I believe I presented an argument.

I think you will find that what you believe here is true.

However, whether your argument is sound and valid is a completely whole other thing.

I numbered it 1 to 4. If you see any part of it as refutable or dubitable, then which part? Is it 1, 2, 3 or 4 and why?

Because one cannot, yet, be sure of what you are actually meaning here, then any part of your argument here can be doubted, meaningfully, well according to your logic here.

For example;

1. What you claim as 'perfectly' existing, exists solely upon 'the definitions' one is providing and/or is agreeing with and accepting as being true. So, if one is agreeing with and accepting 'the definition' of the word 'God', for example, which includes that 'that thing' exists, then 'that one' would have already arrived at 'the conclusion' God exists. Nothing else would need to have been said here.

2. 'Semantics', themselves, are not necessarily objective at all. So, writing 'semantically/objectively' only ever works when absolutely every one is in agreement and accepting 'the definition' and 'the word' that 'the definition' is in relation to. Calling something a 'perfectly triangle' only works when absolutely every one could be in agreement and accepting 'this', (whatever 'this' is, exactly).

3. Might be Accurate and Correct, but this in no way means absolutely any thing is existing, that there even is any thing existing perfectly, nor that there even is a perfect existence, nor a perfect being existing.

4. 'We' can define the word 'God' with the words 'perfect existence' and/or 'perfect being', but you and others do not you necessarily, consciously, know what a 'perfect existence' or 'perfect being' is, exactly, at all. For example, a 'perfect triangle' has to be described with and by other words, and their definitions for 'us' to know whether a 'perfect triangle' exists or not. One cannot just ask, rhetorically, 'Do we know what a perfect existence/being is? and then just also answer and claim, {a word}, and expect everyone to know what our own personal definition is, exactly. The word 'God' also in now way at all explains nor describes what a 'perfect being' is, exactly, let alone what a 'perfect existence' is, exactly, neither. So, firstly you would have to describe what, and/or who, those things are, exactly, get absolute and total agreement and acceptance from and with every one, and then formulate' what you are trying to argue for here. But, then again, you would not then have to argue for what you are here anyway. As, 'it' would just then be an already irrefutable known Fact.

5. Your conclusion, 'Given 1-4, God indubitably exists', is not yet concluded because you have not yet described, nor explained how and why, (nor), what a 'perfect existence' and 'perfect being' is, exactly.

Also, and further more, for the ones while believing, absolutely, that God does not exist anyway, then they will doubt a 'perfect triangle' could even exist, which, to them, means, absolutely, that God also could not even be a possibility to exist. Just so you are forewarned.

[Skepdick]

So I start counting from 1 and go on forever. Will I reach infinity?

I have no idea what you mean by "reach infinity" it's not a destination/location.

When we speak about "the set of natural numbers" we are talking about ALL of them.
How many are there? Infinitely many.

You can even inductively define all of them. As "[0..]" in Haskell. I promise you - every single natural number is in that set.

Code: Select all

>let n = [0..]

We call this trick Lazy evaluation. Do I have to enumerate ALL of the natural numbers? No. I've only defined them.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lazy_evaluation

[Philosopher19]

Semantics', themselves, are not necessarily objective at all. So, writing 'semantically/objectively' only ever works when absolutely every one is in agreement and accepting 'the definition' and 'the word' that 'the definition' is in relation to.

If you don't believe that semantics are necessarily objective (as in it is objectively the case that triangles are triangular as opposed to something we just all agreed on like which is the best football team in the world), then a meaningful discussion cannot follow.

[Philosopher19]

We call this trick Lazy evaluation. Do I have to enumerate ALL of the natural numbers? No. I've only defined them.

Compare 1, 2, 3, 4 ad infinitum to {1,2,3,4,...}.

You can't just say {1,2,3,4,...} is an informal/lazy notation to stand for the set of all and only the natural numbers, and that the total number of natural numbers in that set is infinity.
Suppose something goes on forever such that it covers more and more distance as it goes on. So it covers 5km, 10km, 15km ad infinitum. I can't say {5km, 15km, 20km, ...km} is an informal notation to stand for all the distance it covered and that that distance is infinite. I believe in the same way that I can't say the total distance covered is infinite, you can't say the total number of natural numbers in that set is infinity.

I promise you - every single natural number is in that set.

That's like me saying all the distance covered is in {0km,5km,10km,...} and that distance is infinite.

The only reason something like a sequence of numbers can go on forever, is because of Infinity. It is not because the sequence of numbers are Infinite.

[Skepdick]

You can't just say...

I can and I did. What prevents me from doing what I did?

The only reason something like a sequence of numbers can go on forever, is because of Infinity. It is not because the sequence of numbers are Infinite.

No idea what you are trying to say; or why you are trying to say it.

A sequence of numbers that never terminates/ends is the same thing as an infinite sequence.

[mickthinks]

Do you agree that anyone who says the angles in a triangle don't add up to 180 degrees is in fact saying false/contradictory?

No, I don't agree. You need to spend a bit of time with non-euclidean geometries, Phil!

1) In hyperbolic geometry, the sum of the interior angles of any triangle is less than two right angles; in elliptic geometry it is larger than two right angles (in Euclidean geometry it is of course equal to two right angles).

I think your definition-of-the-triangle analogy for the ontological proof is going nowhere and it's time to give it up. All you've succeeded in doing with it is demonstrating that you know as little about geometry as you know about Cantor and transfinite cardinals.

[Philosopher19]

I can and I did. What prevents me from doing what I did?

When I say "you can't just say" I mean you can't meaningfully say. I can say many things. The things I say can be rational/meaningful, gibberish, or irrational/contradictory. For example, saying one can count to infinity is an example of one saying something irrational/contradictory.

No idea what you are trying to say; or why you are trying to say it.

A sequence of numbers that never terminates/ends is the same thing as an infinite sequence.

I'm trying to say that just because something goes on forever doesn't mean it's infinite (or reaches infinity). For example, I start counting 1,2,3 ad infinitum. My counting goes on forever, but I never reach infinity and my counting is not infinite. So a sequence of numbers that never ends is not the same thing as an infinite sequence.

[Philosopher19]

No, I don't agree. You need to spend a bit of time with non-euclidean geometries, Phil!

I'm well aware of non-euclidian geometry. There is a clear difference between something that resembles a perfect triangle (an imperfect triangle resembles a perfect triangle. It is imperfectly triangular. You can tell this from how its lines are not perfectly straight or how its angles don't add up to 180 degrees) and a perfect/actual triangle (three sided shape with interior angles adding up to 180 degrees. Such is the definition of a true/genuine/actual triangle. This is not something that we just make up. This is part of the nature of Existence and we are aware beings. Some are sincere to this awareness, some are insincere or contradictory to this awareness)

I think your definition-of-the-triangle analogy for the ontological proof is going nowhere and it's time to give it up. All you've succeeded in doing with it is demonstrating that you know as little about geometry as you know about Cantor and transfinite cardinals.

The existence of imperfect triangles does nothing to my argument. And I knew about non-Euclidian geometry before you mentioned it. Again, I've numbered the argument 1 to 4 so that all who see fault with it can easily and clearly highlight it. But here you have just...

[Philosopher19]

Regarding the new ontological argument I posted. Here is a link to the full work if anyone is interested.

http://godisallthatmatters.com/2021/05/ ... ue-cogito/

[FlashDangerpants]

Regarding the new ontological argument I posted. Here is a link to the full work if anyone is interested.

http://godisallthatmatters.com/2021/05/ ... ue-cogito/

Isn't it somewhat self-defeating that the "perfect" triangle you define as something that cannot be doubted is actually something that cannot exist?

[Age]

Semantics', themselves, are not necessarily objective at all. So, writing 'semantically/objectively' only ever works when absolutely every one is in agreement and accepting 'the definition' and 'the word' that 'the definition' is in relation to.

If you don't believe that semantics are necessarily objective (as in it is objectively the case that triangles are triangular as opposed to something we just all agreed on like which is the best football team in the world), then a meaningful discussion cannot follow.

When one misses what another is saying and meaning, or just does not follow what another one is saying and meaning, then it could be said and concluded that a Truly meaningful discussion cannot follow.

I will try again, but I am not sure how you could have missed it the first time. I, obviously, talked about agreement and acceptance of 'definitions' of 'words' and not about things like football teams and which one is better than another. Do these people here, in these days when this is being written, purposely miss what I wrote or are they just so blinded by their own beliefs that they cannot see the actual words, which I put in front of them here on a screen clearly printed for them?

Now, if you and another cannot agree upon and accept a definition for the word 'semantics', for example, then how could 'semantics', itself, be so-called 'necessarily objective'?

Try and answer this, and see if while doing so helps you better understand what I was and am still actually 'meaning' here.

Also, when one believes things like, for example, 'semantics are necessarily objective', then a really Truly meaningful discussion cannot ensue, neither.

[Skepdick]

When I say "you can't just say" I mean you can't meaningfully say.

I can. I did. What I said was meaningful. Your objection doesn't in any way undermine the meaningfulness of my thoughts.

I can say many things. The things I say can be rational/meaningful, gibberish, or irrational/contradictory.

Not sure why you are conflating meaningful expression with qualitative judgment of said expression.

For example, saying one can count to infinity is an example of one saying something irrational/contradictory.

OK. And? For the sake of argument lets suppose that it's irrational; or contradictory. Does that imply it's meaningless?

I'm trying to say that just because something goes on forever doesn't mean it's infinite (or reaches infinity).

I have no idea what you mean by "reach infinity" it's not a destination/location

A sequence of numbers that never terminates/ends is the same thing as an infinite sequence.

What's confusing you with the above?

For example, I start counting 1,2,3 ad infinitum. My counting goes on forever

Precisely what infinite means.

but I never reach infinity and my counting is not infinite.

I have no idea what you mean by "reach infinity" it's not a destination/location

I feel like we are going in circles here.

So a sequence of numbers that never ends is not the same thing as an infinite sequence.

A sequence of numbers that never terminates/ends is the same thing as an infinite sequence.

[mickthinks]

I'm well aware of non-euclidian geometry.

Awareness and understanding are very different things. You seem to believe that non-Euclidean geometries are less perfect than Euclidean geometry.