So you don't know what you are talking about.
Compatibilism is impossible
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Iwannaplato
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Re: Compatibilism is impossible
Well, I can't argue with that.
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Flannel Jesus
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Re: Compatibilism is impossible
You ever seen the movie Sunshine? Suppose your fart changes which people are alive at the time, so different people take the trip to the sun. Suppose in the world where you didn't fart, they fail to reignite the sun, but in the world where you did fart, they succeed. Your rectum would have saved the solar system and most assuredly it would affect the weather on Neptune.attofishpi wrote: ↑Thu Dec 14, 2023 10:53 am
Sure, and I considered that, but certainly the Sun will consume the Earth as a red giant prior to that causal chain...then of course you will insist that my fart 'chain' exists within the red giant that will eventually cause something to happen to Neptune.
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Iwannaplato
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Re: Compatibilism is impossible
Consider that your fart and Neptune are part of one thing. One thing that is unfolding. Your fart might not even affect your neighbor. But it's an illusion that there are all these separate objects with little domino chains. There one complex object unfolding.attofishpi wrote: ↑Thu Dec 14, 2023 10:53 am Sure, and I considered that, but certainly the Sun will consume the Earth as a red giant prior to that causal chain...then of course you will insist that my fart 'chain' exists within the red giant that will eventually cause something to happen to Neptune.
Re: Compatibilism is impossible
Can you explain how you came to that conclusion?
Re: Compatibilism is impossible
How could you have a chain or chains of causality if you don't have any system?
Re: Compatibilism is impossible
I don't have a chain of chains.
Re: Compatibilism is impossible
I mean that I don't really know what compatibilism is, and it is glaringly obvious that you don't know what it is, either.
Re: Compatibilism is impossible
Re: Compatibilism is impossible
Compatibilism (= Hobbes/Locke/Hume-style free will) isn't impossible but irrelevant to the crucial question as to whether we have libertarian free will, in the sense that we can (sometimes at least) form decisions or intentions, and perform corresponding actions the causing of which by us is neither predetermined nor random. This sort of free will implies that if we decided to do/did X at time T, we could have decided to do/done otherwise at T.
"[W]e seem to be caught between a rock and a hard place. We seem to have to choose between just dismissing compatibilism as obviously false (and thus being deemed irrational by the professional philosophers who endorse the view) and engaging in a long, difficult argument about how the term “free will” is to be defined. But I think there’s a third alternative. The trick is not to fall into the trap of trying to argue that compatibilism is false; the trick is to argue instead that it’s irrelevant—that even if it’s true, it simply doesn’t matter.
To see why compatibilism is irrelevant, we need to distinguish two kinds of free will (actually, if we want to, we can distinguish many kinds of free will, but I’ll be able to make my point by discussing only two of them). The first kind of free will is the kind that Hume has in mind—it’s the ability to do what you want, or to act on your desires. Let’s call this Hume-style free will. The second kind of free will is the kind that I’ve been talking about in this book. It’s the kind that you have if your decisions are neither predetermined by prior events nor completely random. Let’s call this not-predetermined free will, or for short, NPD free will.
Given the distinction between Hume-style free will and NPD free will, we can make the following four points:
1. Hume-style free will is obviously compatible with determinism; in other words, it’s obviously compatible with the idea that all of our decisions
are completely caused by events that occurred in the distant past.
2. NPD free will is obviously not compatible with determinism. In fact, it’s built into the very definition of NPD free will that it’s not compatible with determinism. That’s why it’s called not-predetermined free will.
3. Human beings obviously have Hume-style free will. This isn’t even controversial. After all, Hume-style free will is just the ability to act on your desires. Anyone who’s ever eaten a cookie because she wanted one knows that we have this kind of free will.
4. It’s not obvious at all whether we have NPD free will. Some people think it’s an illusion; others think it’s real. In short, there is a raging debate about whether we have NPD free will. In fact, the arguments against free will that we discussed in chapter 2—the scientific argument and the random-or-predetermined argument—are best thought of as arguments against NPD free will.
But given these four points, Hume’s whole view seems completely unhelpful. All he’s really done is pointed out the obvious—that Hume-style free will is compatible with determinism and that we have Hume-style free will. But this doesn’t do anything to change the fact that there is an important open question about whether we have NPD free will.
Perhaps Hume would respond to this by saying that part of his point is that what I’m calling “Hume-style free will” is real free will. I’ll respond to this in the same way that my teenage daughter responds to me when I tell her that she has to be home by midnight: Whatever. I just don’t care what “real” free will is. In fact, I don’t even know what it means to say that Hume-style free will is real free will. This sounds to me like a dispute about words. I don’t care about the expression “free will.” The question I care about is a question about human beings—it’s the question of whether we have a certain, specific kind of free will, namely, what I’m calling NPD free will. But, frankly, I don’t care what we call this kind of free will. If Hume wants to take the expression “free will” for his own, he can have it. I can use a different term. Indeed, at the moment, I am using a different term—I’m using “NPD free will.” But, again, it doesn’t matter whether we call it “NPD free will” or just “free will.” All that matters is whether we have it. That’s the important question about free will—the question of whether human beings have not-predetermined free will.
You might respond to this by claiming that even if NPD free will is important, Hume-style free will is important too. Well, I think that’s right; I think it’s extremely important that we have Hume-style free will, and I would never suggest otherwise. But the question of whether we have Hume-style free will is not important. This is simply because we already know the answer to that question. It’s entirely obvious that we have Hume-style free will. The interesting question—and the controversial question—is whether we also have NPD free will. And the point I’m making here is that this question is interesting and important regardless of what we call this kind of free will."
(Balaguer, Mark. Free Will. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2014. pp. 49-53)