Morality: Intrinsic vs Extrinsic Values

[Veritas Aequitas]

Magnus Anderson argues things has Intrinsic Values.
This topic is applicable to moral values and other values within the philosophical perspective.

Is the value of a vase the property of the vase that is being valued or of the man that is valuing it?

It's a property of the vase. The answer lies in the language itself. We say "The value of a vase".

But note that this is entirely an issue of convention. We could have said that it belongs to those to whom it is of value. But we didn't.

Value denotes how useful something is to someone. It consists of two sides, that which is valuable ( the object ) and those to whom it is of value ( the subjects. ) It's not entirely about the object but it's also not entirely about the subject(s). However, we have decided, by convention, to set the center, or the origin, of this phenomenon to be inside the object rather than any one of the subjects. We did so because we found it to be more convenient, more useful, than the alternative -- and not because it's true.

Also note that the verb "to value" means "to perceive something as valuable". We perceive value. Value is out there, up to us to discover it. We don't just arbitrarily assign it to objects. Water is of value to us, not because we decided that it is valuable, but because it is.

Is this some sort of secondary property equivalent to rocks that reflect a certain wavelength of light being the sort of thing that a normal person with standard issue eyes would come to call "ruby red" and thus the rock can be considered to hold a secondary property of redness? Or is the value just projected onto the object?

Yes, it is. But that's an easier case because color describes the physical object it is associated with and nothing else. Namely, it describes its surface. Value is a bit more complicated because it goes beyond the object itself.

There is no projection taking place. Neither colors nor values are projected into physical objects. They literally belong to them. The idea that they are projections is merely a confusion that is typical for people influenced by philosophers such as Locke, Berkeley, Kant, Schopenhauer and others who can be put into the category of "recovering naive realists", i.e. thinkers who struggle to accept the full implications of indirect perception.

It's super important to understand that language precedes observation and that you cannot observe anything without employing some sort of language. .........

My view is, whatever is fact, truth, knowledge, objectivity are conditioned upon a specific human-based FSR-FSK [model, paradigm, perspective and the like].
Therefore there is no intrinsic value-in-itself; all values are ultimately subjective and intersubjective.

Do you agree with Magnus Anderson's claims there are intrinsic values of things?

Discuss?? Views??

[Veritas Aequitas]

Notes: T.B.A.

[Iwannaplato]

Therefore there is no intrinsic value-in-itself; all values are ultimately subjective and intersubjective.

After all this time arguing that there are objective morals. And finally coming down to that they are intersubjective.

[Skepdick]

Therefore there is no intrinsic value-in-itself; all values are ultimately subjective and intersubjective.

After all this time arguing that there are objective morals. And finally coming down to that they are intersubjective.

Objectively speaking that is what “objectivity”/“objective” means!

If you think otherwise then you are necessarily using some idiosyncratic conceptions of “objectivity” and “objective”.

[LuckyR]

VA, this is an area where I agree with you. That is, the value of an object is solely determined by the observer who gives the object it's value ie not within the object itself.

[Skepdick]

VA, this is an area where I agree with you. That is, the value of an object is solely determined by the observer who gives the object it's value ie not within the object itself.

Which is the entire point I keep making with the red square.

Is the objective value of the phenomenon red" or "blue"?

[Veritas Aequitas]

Re Moral Objectivity;

I wrote in the OP;

• My view is, whatever is fact, truth, knowledge, objectivity are conditioned upon a specific human-based FSR-FSK [model, paradigm, perspective and the like].

From the above, whatever [including moral] fact, truth, knowledge, values, objectivity are conditioned upon a specific human-based FSR-FSK [model, paradigm, perspective and the like].
Because it is human-based, logical and deductively, it follows, the above [including moral objectivity] are ultimately grounded on subjects, thus intersubjective.

Therefore there is no intrinsic value-in-itself; all values [including moral facts and values] are ultimately subjective and intersubjective.

[LuckyR]

VA, this is an area where I agree with you. That is, the value of an object is solely determined by the observer who gives the object it's value ie not within the object itself.

Which is the entire point I keep making with the red square.

Is the objective value of the phenomenon red" or "blue"?

Just to clarify my comment that you quoted, not every descriptor of an object, qualifies as "value". For the sake of simplicity (actually oversimplicity), let's use the unit of dollars to measure value and, say pounds to measure weight. If I pick up a rock, I could give it a value of zero dollars or $10. But I don't get to choose how much it weighs.

[Skepdick]

Just to clarify my comment that you quoted, not every descriptor of an object, qualifies as "value". For the sake of simplicity (actually oversimplicity), let's use the unit of dollars to measure value and, say pounds to measure weight. If I pick up a rock, I could give it a value of zero dollars or $10. But I don't get to choose how much it weighs.

Dollars represent the price of value, not value. The price of the rock could be $10 today and $20 tomorrow. The value of the rock hasn't changed - only its price has. Price is subjective - value is objective.

And of course you can choose how much it weighs. You get to choose the units which represent weight. Pounds. Kilograms. That's just a representation of its mass.

The weight of the rock could change depending on gravity, but its mass won't.

Weight is subjective - mass is objective.

[Iwannaplato]

Objectively speaking that is what “objectivity”/“objective” means!

I agree.

If you think otherwise then you are necessarily using some idiosyncratic conceptions of “objectivity” and “objective”.

I don't think it would be idiosyncratic if I thought objectivity meant something else. That belief is incredibly common - does this make it objective? . But I happen to think it would be wrong.

[Skepdick]

Objectively speaking that is what “objectivity”/“objective” means!

I agree.

If you think otherwise then you are necessarily using some idiosyncratic conceptions of “objectivity” and “objective”.

I don't think it would be idiosyncratic if I thought objectivity meant something else. That belief is incredibly common - does this make it objective? . But I happen to think it would be wrong.

Gosh. Hell's definitely facing a global freezing...

So there you have it. That common philosophical belief of what "objectivity" means is wrong.

[Iwannaplato]

Gosh. Hell's definitely facing a global freezing...

So there you have it. That common philosophical belief of what "objectivity" means is wrong.

And if really objectivity is intersubjectivity, where does that leave us?

And despite my now saying that twice, I still think objectivity is a kind of intersubjectivity. Or perhaps several kinds.

[Skepdick]

And if really objectivity is intersubjectivity, where does that leave us?

And despite my now saying that twice, I still think objectivity is a kind of intersubjectivity. Or perhaps several kinds.

It's a continuum.

0 is where everybody disagrees about every assertion. Total subjectivity.
1 is where everybody agrees about every assertion. Total objectivity.

But that's probably the distributed consensus engineer in me speaking.

As Chomsky said consent is manufactured.
But so is dissent.

[Iwannaplato]

And if really objectivity is intersubjectivity, where does that leave us?

And despite my now saying that twice, I still think objectivity is a kind of intersubjectivity. Or perhaps several kinds.

It's a continuum.

0 is where everybody disagrees about every assertion. Total subjectivity.
1 is where everybody agrees about every assertion. Total objectivity.

But that's probably the distributed consensus engineer in me speaking.

As Chomsky said consent is manufactured.
But so is dissent.

So, we'll never have total objectivity (unless some kind of ((to me)) dystopic society ensures that every single person believes X.
And even then total objectivity could then turn out to have been wrong.

[Skepdick]

And if really objectivity is intersubjectivity, where does that leave us?

And despite my now saying that twice, I still think objectivity is a kind of intersubjectivity. Or perhaps several kinds.

It's a continuum.

0 is where everybody disagrees about every assertion. Total subjectivity.
1 is where everybody agrees about every assertion. Total objectivity.

But that's probably the distributed consensus engineer in me speaking.

As Chomsky said consent is manufactured.
But so is dissent.

So, we'll never have total objectivity (unless some kind of ((to me)) dystopic society ensures that every single person believes X.
And even then total objectivity could then turn out to have been wrong.

I don't think ideals are ever a good social goal.

I'd settle for minimising rather than eliminating disagreement, but unchecked disagreement becomes pathological. Like any other extremism.