Hume's Matters of Fact is Unique

[Veritas Aequitas]

I believe when most posters [PH, IC, others] here refer to Hume's No Ought From Is [NOFI] i.e. "is" as reference to matters of fact, they presume that Hume's matter of fact is the same of the matter-of-fact as in philosophical Realism within the external world.

• Philosophical Realism [PR] – is the view that a certain kind of thing (ranging widely from abstract objects like numbers to moral statements to the physical world itself) has mind-independent existence, i.e. that it exists even in the absence of any mind perceiving it or that its existence is not just a mere appearance in the eye of the beholder.
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_realism

But that is not the case, Hume's matters-of-fact is unique and distinctively different from the PR's sense of 'matters-of-fact' which exists as a feature of reality that is absolutely independent of the human conditions [or mind].

Here is a summary of the position of Hume's matter of fact;
https://iep.utm.edu/hume/#H2

PERCEPTIONS
A. Ideas – from Impressions [..B]
-1. From memory
-2. From imagination
---a. From fancy
---b. From Understanding
-----(1) Involving relations of ideas
-----(2) Involving matters of fact
B. Impressions
-1. Of sensation (external) - external world, Unknown causes
-2. Of reflection (internal) – From Ideas [A] in a certain way


Hume's matter-of-fact is from Understanding, Imagination, Ideas.
Ideas are
1. from Impression which are either from external sensation from external world or
2. from internal Impression from Ideas.
There is no circularity here because these ideas are new ideas repackaged from the original ideas to in turn cause the impressions of reflection.

But as the external world to Hume is not a mind-independent external world but rather it is an external world that is fabricated by the mind.
see:
Hume: External World is a Fabrication
viewtopic.php?t=40791

As such, what is matters-of-fact in Hume's case are fabrication [projections] of the mind. Hume's matters-of-fact cannot be absolutely mind-independent.

Hume's basis of morality is also based on a human-based moral FSK. [TBA. to justify]

Therefore philosophical realists like PH and IC has not basis to rely on Hume's 'No Ought from Is' to reject empirical objective moral facts from a credible moral FSK.

The critical point here is;
Hume's matters-of-fact is not the same as the philosophical realists' matters-of-fact that is absolutely independent of the human conditions [mind].

Discuss?? View??

[Veritas Aequitas]

Notes: T.B.A

[Iwannaplato]

If PH and IC are using Hume in an appeal to authority - Hume said X, so it's true - then the OP might be useful to the discussion it is tangential to. But if they are simply using his formulation, without appealing to his authority, then this is not useful to the original discussion in any way.

So, if PH is saying...Well, Hume said you can't get ought from is, so it's true (directly or implicitly), then showing Hume was antirealist here might be meaningful.

But otherwise, it's a waste.

Since the orginal discussion is about objective morals, anyone using Hume in an appeal to authority will have problems because he is not clear whether he believes in those things.

Hume famously closes the section of the Treatise that argues against moral rationalism by observing that other systems of moral philosophy, proceeding in the ordinary way of reasoning, at some point make an unremarked transition from premises whose parts are linked only by “is” to conclusions whose parts are linked by “ought” (expressing a new relation) — a deduction that seems to Hume “altogether inconceivable” (T3.1.1.27). Attention to this transition would “subvert all the vulgar systems of morality, and let us see, that the distinction of vice and virtue is not founded merely on the relations of objects, nor is perceiv’d by reason” (ibid.).

Few passages in Hume’s work have generated more interpretive controversy.

Perhaps, it would be best to argue it out as individuals, with no one appealing to Hume's (or Kant's) authority.

[FlashDangerpants]

There must be some background I am unaware of, why is he calling out Immanuel Can of all people on a discussion of Hume's Fork?
IC and Pete do not understand Hume in similar terms and IC claims to have arguemnts against Hume.

[Iwannaplato]

There must be some background I am unaware of, why is he calling out Immanuel Can of all people on a discussion of Hume's Fork?
IC and Pete do not understand Hume in similar terms and IC claims to have arguemnts against Hume.

Let's take a charitable guess. IC accepts what Hume means, accepts a realist view of oughts, but disagrees. PH agrees with Hume.

But truly I think the reaction should be: who cares?

This is not a Hume scholar debate where the goal is to find out where Hume stands on an issue. This is a disagreement over objective morals. So, it really doesn't matter what Hume thinks. If PH used Hume in an appeal to authority, well, that would be a no no. He needs to argue his case without merely appealing to Hume. If he didn't do this...it doesn't matter. He probably just used Hume's formulation. So it doesn't matter what Hume """""""really"""""""""" meant.

I think VA thinks that if he can show Hume agrees with him he's demonstrated something. Likewise with Kant and chatgpt (with revervations, lol)

[Peter Holmes]

It really is only the arguments that matter - not the people who produce them. I think empiricism - like any other kind of foundationalism - is demonstrably mistaken - including Hume's empiricism. But I think he was right to point out the logical block between non-moral (such as factual) premises and moral conclusions.

[FlashDangerpants]

There must be some background I am unaware of, why is he calling out Immanuel Can of all people on a discussion of Hume's Fork?
IC and Pete do not understand Hume in similar terms and IC claims to have arguemnts against Hume.

Let's take a charitable guess. IC accepts what Hume means, accepts a realist view of oughts, but disagrees. PH agrees with Hume.

But truly I think the reaction should be: who cares?

I mentioned it because I've taken IC to task for failing to understand the is/ought gap in the past.

I believe Pete gets understands the thing in similar terms to me; that propositions that describe that which exists in the world around us and propositions that purport to explain what we should do about that are too disimilar in type for either to seamlessly entail the other. So if somebody makes the strange decision to argue from ought to is rather than is to ought, they would face a similar validity problem to the more usual way round.

Pete probably takes it a step further than me (or Hume iirc) in that I stop there and say that some new form of logic which can bridge that gap would need to be discovered or invented for there to be movement. Pete I belive is more hardline and says that no factual premise can support any moral conclusion full stop. That difference is probably moot as I regard that bridging task as probably impossible, but I would make tht claim on the basis of other arguments, whereas Pete I think sees no need there.

But IC has argued against me that this thing only goes one way round.
viewtopic.php?p=608054&hilit=copulation#p608054
He often presents an argument that moral realism must be true because moral antirealism has the morally unacceptable outcome of moral uncertainty. IC argues from ought to is, so he cannot share this stage in any meaningful sense.

[Skepdick]

There must be some background I am unaware of, why is he calling out Immanuel Can of all people on a discussion of Hume's Fork?
IC and Pete do not understand Hume in similar terms and IC claims to have arguemnts against Hume.

Does there ever come a point in your silly philosopher-life where you realize that the arguments' meaning depends entirely
on the logical system they are being expressed/evaluated in?

If you make an argument in a timeless logical system there is no problem if the conclusions come before the premises.

Any declarative statement is already true in the future, UNLESS something prevents it from becoming true along the way.

Causality is reversed. There will be a cup of coffee on my desk in 2 minutes therefore I must go make it.

Edit (3 minutes later) the above has been confirmed true.

[Skepdick]

IC argues from ought to is, so he cannot share this stage in any meaningful sense.

There's no difference - it's just a Mathematical inverse. It's basic Category Theory; and Categorical Semantics are perfectly meaningful. Why should it be anyone's problem that you don't know what the last 80 years of Mathematics means?

The issue comes from you claiming that there is a gap between the two. A discontinuity which prevents me from going in either direction.
Where is it? I don't see it. I can go from is to ought (via induction) ; and from ought to is (via co-induction). as much as I want to and I haven't encountered any gaps in my way.

Are you saying we ought to introduce a gap? Why? What do we gain by doing so? Make the argument and we'll consider it.

Your version of Philosophy is dead. As dead as it gets. Cope with it somehow. The formal sciences have swallowed your domain.

[Iwannaplato]

It really is only the arguments that matter

Making this thread...pointless.

[Veritas Aequitas]

It really is only the arguments that matter - not the people who produce them. I think empiricism - like any other kind of foundationalism - is demonstrably mistaken - including Hume's empiricism. But I think he was right to point out the logical block between non-moral (such as factual) premises and moral conclusions.

You often referred to Hume's NOFI,
but as pointed out in the OP, Hume's matter-of-fact [realistic] is different from your version of matter-of-fact which is illusory.

PH: It really is only the arguments that matter - not the people who produce them.
If it is only the argument that matter, then produce your own argument and do not refer to Hume [the people] at all in this case.

Hume arguments followed from his empirical foundation premises of how matters-of-fact arise from ideas which is related to the human conditions [here again]

• PERCEPTIONS
  A. Ideas – from Impressions [..B]
  -1. From memory
  -2. From imagination
  ---a. From fancy
  ---b. From Understanding
  -----(1) Involving relations of ideas
  -----(2) Involving matters of fact
  B. Impressions
  -1. Of sensation (external) - external world, Unknown causes
  -2. Of reflection (internal) – From Ideas [A] in a certain way

PH: I think empiricism - like any other kind of foundationalism - is demonstrably mistaken - including Hume's empiricism.
If you think Hume's basic premise is wrong, then you cannot rely on Hume's conclusion of No Ought From is [NOFI] as your premise, it is non-sequitor, it does not follow.

The most you can hypothesize is,
One cannot derive a prescription [modal verb] from a fact* [noun] or what-is-described without any reference to Hume.
* in view that it is contentious, you have to qualify your 'what is fact' i.e. that feature of reality that is just-is, being-so, that is/are the case, states of affairs, independent of subject[s] opinion, beliefs and judgment.

Have you read Hume's Treatise and Enquiry thoroughly?
I am now digging deeper into Hume's Treatise and Enquiry, as I had done with Kant, to read his books at least 20 times over up to 50 times with the relevant research.

[Veritas Aequitas]

Re IC,
despite not agreeing with Hume [an atheist, antirealist] main philosophy, IC [theist, realist] had always threw Hume's NOFI at my face in our discussions re morality.

As with PH [or any philosophical realist who relied on Hume's NOFI], it is a contradiction for them to rely on Hume's antirealist argument for NOFI.

[FlashDangerpants]

Re IC,
despite not agreeing with Hume [an atheist, antirealist] main philosophy, IC [theist, realist] had always threw Hume's NOFI at my face in our discussions re morality.

As with PH [or any philosophical realist who relied on Hume's NOFI], it is a contradiction for them to rely on Hume's antirealist argument for NOFI.

Pete's take on the is/ought gap is perfectly good.
IC's take on it is inadequate, but still better than yours.

The is/ought question is what it is, and has become what it has become. It stands alone as a well knoen problem. There's no point trying to make it depend for eternity on any secondary argument from Hume.

[Skepdick]

Pete's take on the is/ought gap is perfectly good.
IC's take on it is inadequate, but still better than yours.

So the self-proclaimed moral skeptic is making assertions of "good" and "better" pertaining to the moral subjectivist's opinions about philosophical matters?

Fuck me. A miracle!