Morality: PH is a Closet Idealist

[Veritas Aequitas]

PH do not believe in the self as an independent soul or substance as claimed by Descartes.
On this basis PH is a closet Idealist and a cowardly one.

People who believe in separate individuals, as VA does,

Most of the realist and the anti-realist views on the Self have been developed in reference to the Cartesian Self.

Antirealists deny the existence of the Self by arguing that there is no such thing as the Self.
Rather the Self [absolute] is an illusion, a fiction of the mind.
There would not be such a thing that we call the Self if there was no one to perceive it.
They further deny the evaluation-independence claim, arguing that the concept of the Self is invented by cultural, social, and linguistic conventions, and it is nothing but a useful conceptual tool for organizing human experience.
Unlike what a Cartesian claims, there is no substance such as the Self, the Self is not a determinate, timeless, unified, and bounded thing.
In fact, for the Antirealists, this malleable nature of the Self is evidence that the Self cannot be an evaluation-independent and real thing in the way that chemical elements such as gold are (e.g., Dennett, 1991; Foucault, 1979; Rorty, 1989).

Strawman as usual.

You seem to be going into a "tailspin" with your philosophy.

The article from which the above is quoted,
Self, Philosophical Considerations
Serife Tekin

give an account of the many faces of 'what is self' but is not efficient in presenting a good summary.

However, if we summarize the many faces of "what is self" re Realism vs Anti-realism from the Kantian perspective, it will be a realistic summary.

For Kant there is;
1. Empirical Realism [relative mind-independence] which is subsumed within
2. Transcendental Idealism [no absolute mind-independence]

From the Empirical Realist position, for Kant there is the empirical self [a thing] which can be verified and justified via the empirical FSKs. But this empirical self [a thing] cannot be the absolute mind-independent self of Descartes' realism.
As such, from the Kantian perspective I do not agree to an absolute mind-independent individual self, i.e. a soul that will survive physical death.

From the Transcendental Idealism perspective, the mind-independent self, the substance soul that can survive physical death is rejected; this is because under transcendental idealism of the human conditions, it is impossible for the self to be absolutely mind-independent.

Hardcore philosophical realists like PH has to be anti-realist when it comes to the self and claim that a mind-independent soul is impossible' this contradict their principle of evaluation independence when it comes to the self as a thing, i.e.

1. For non-self thing, they are hardcore absolute mind-independent philosophical realists.
2. For the self-thing, they turned and claim the self is not evaluation independent and flipped to be anti-realists, i.e. idealist, which is more realistic than 1.

To be more consistently realistic, people like PH should apply 2 to 1, i.e. that non-self-things cannot be evaluation independent, i.e. mind-independent or human-condition independent.

But they cannot do it due to the strong psychological cognitive dissonance that drive them to be hardcore philosophical realists in terms of non-self-things.

My point;
Philosophical Realists like PH and his like are closet idealists.

[Veritas Aequitas]

Notes: KIV

[Iwannaplato]

Strawman as usual.

Nope. The way you talk about PH indicates you consider him separate from you. Two separate minds. If you think you are parts of the same mind, then you have a strange way of relating to yourself.

You seem to be going into a "tailspin" with your philosophy.

I tried a wide range of ways to reach you. It led to frustration, often to even get an on point response - iow not necessarily at all agreement, but things like direct answers to questions or justification for assertions when asked for. Rather than continue to be frustrated, now I am having fun. Generally I consider my arguments either correct or using your kinds of arguments to show their silliness. But I am enjoying myself much more, since I no longer expect an on point response from you.

[FlashDangerpants]

the Self cannot be an evaluation-independent and real thing in the way that chemical elements such as gold are (e.g., Dennett, 1991; Foucault, 1979; Rorty, 1989).

Erm...

[Harbal]

PH do not believe in the self as an independent soul or substance as claimed by Descartes.
On this basis PH is a closet Idealist and a cowardly one.

Anyone wanting to know what Peter Holmes believes would do far better to ask him what he believes, rather than rely on your interpretation of what he believes.

[Iwannaplato]

Philosophical Realists like PH and his like are closet idealists.

More of this us vs them, distinct realist selves. VA would be a closet realist if there was such as thing as VA. But there is no separate entity VA, even if labeled with the name on 'his' birth certificate. No self that persists through time: antirealism. No distinct selves: antirealism. VA is a portion of the the self that presents officially as non-realist, but is very realist around selves and having a self.

[Atla]

Can anyone keep track of all the things that PH & gang are and aren't?

The list seems to grow longer and longer..

[Veritas Aequitas]

the Self cannot be an evaluation-independent and real thing in the way that chemical elements such as gold are (e.g., Dennett, 1991; Foucault, 1979; Rorty, 1989).

Erm...

That was not my statement, rather the quotation was introduced by IWP from the article linked above.
article

I agree with the above statement, "the Self cannot be an evaluation-independent and real thing in the way that chemical elements such as gold are"

[Veritas Aequitas]

According to the article linked above;

Realism [Philosophical*] has two fundamental commitments about the world posited by scientific theories:

• 1. existence and
  2. evaluation-independence.

According to the existence claim, both the everyday world of objects and their properties—the subject of scientific theorizing—do exist.

According to the evaluation-independence claim, the objects and properties posited by a scientific theory exist independent from what human beings think about them or how they are linguistically articulated.

The above two fundamental commitments are grounds for the Philosophical Realism of PH & Flash & other p-realists.

* there are many types of realism, thus in this context realism has to be qualified as specifically Philosophical-Realism and Scientific-Realism.

[Atla]

According to the article linked above;

Realism [Philosophical*] has two fundamental commitments about the world posited by scientific theories:

• 1. existence and
  2. evaluation-independence.

According to the existence claim, both the everyday world of objects and their properties—the subject of scientific theorizing—do exist.

According to the evaluation-independence claim, the objects and properties posited by a scientific theory exist independent from what human beings think about them or how they are linguistically articulated.

The above two fundamental commitments are grounds for the Philosophical Realism of PH & Flash & other p-realists.

* there are many types of realism, thus in this context realism has to be qualified as specifically Philosophical-Realism and Scientific-Realism.

Yeah and such realism about the self is probably correct, so what? The self is probably a part of the human head, and technically consists of atoms and EM fields and so on.

It's true that the self represents itself in an illusory way, the "philosophical ego" is illusory. So the self is not quite what we normally think it is. But that doesn't make it completely anti-realistic.

[Veritas Aequitas]

It's true that the self represents itself in an illusory way, the "philosophical ego" is illusory. So the self is not quite what we normally think it is.
But that doesn't make it completely anti-realistic.

These are the following stance in the realism vs antirealism view of the Self.

1. The hardcore philosophical-realist who insist the Self is so real [as a soul] and evaluation independent to the extent that the immutable Self will survive physical death to the beyond; this is typical of the theists.

2. The hardcore philosophical realist insist on absolute mind independent things but not the Self as a normal thing. In this case he is philosophical-realist about things but anti-realist re his Self and other Selves. [Dennett, Rorty, Hume]

3. The hardcore philosophical realist who insist on absolute mind-independent things but is Agnostic 'What the Self is" i.e. the Self is likely to be a real independent thing. [George Graham ]

4. The Anti-philosophical_realist who view the Self as a psychological construct and thus cannot be mind-independent. [Foucault]

5. The Anti-philosophical_realist who insist on absolute mind-independent things but insist the Self is real as an immutable Self will survive physical death to the beyond; this is typical of the theists. [Berkeley]

6. The Pragmatist who insist the Self is a Real thing. [William James]

that doesn't make it completely anti-realistic.

This is view 3, i.e.

• The hardcore philosophical realist who insist on absolute mind-independent things but is Agnostic 'What the Self is" i.e. the Self is likely to be a real independent thing. [George Graham ]

This is the sort of hardcore philosophical realists who transposed the idea of noumenon on the Self.
The point is the noumenon is such a faraway thing that can be speculated, they are unable to do the same for the Self which within.
As such, they merely remain Agnostic to secure that psychological consonance to soothe their pains of cognitive dissonance if they are to give up on the idea of the Self as a real thing.

The point is,
the hardcore philosophical realists on things [non-self] [e.g. PH] but is an anti-realist about the self or the Agnostic [either realist or anti-realist] [e.g. Atla] SHOULD give up the idea of philosophical-realism totally regarding non-self things and the Self.
However, it is extremely difficult for them to do so because of the psychological bondage to absolute mind-independence [philosophical realism] as clinging to an evolutionary default [illusory] as a useful illusion.

[Atla]

This is view 3, i.e.

• The hardcore philosophical realist who insist on absolute mind-independent things but is Agnostic 'What the Self is" i.e. the Self is likely to be a real independent thing. [George Graham ]

This is the sort of hardcore philosophical realists who transposed the idea of noumenon on the Self.
The point is the noumenon is such a faraway thing that can be speculated, they are unable to do the same for the Self which within.
As such, they merely remain Agnostic to secure that psychological consonance to soothe their pains of cognitive dissonance if they are to give up on the idea of the Self as a real thing.

The point is,
the hardcore philosophical realists on things [non-self] [e.g. PH] but is an anti-realist about the self or the Agnostic [either realist or anti-realist] [e.g. Atla] SHOULD give up the idea of philosophical-realism totally regarding non-self things and the Self.
However, it is extremely difficult for them to do so because of the psychological bondage to absolute mind-independence [philosophical realism] as clinging to an evolutionary default [illusory] as a useful illusion.

Other selves are noumenal to me.

My self is a part of my mind, so my self isn't noumenal to me. (At best, some parts of my self could be noumenal to me, the parts of my self that aren't active phenomena right now.)

I see zero reason to give up realism on the noumenon. It breaks all of science. It breaks everything. Nothing makes sense then.

You should give up your kind of anti-realism, because it makes absolutely no sense. To me, it just looks like something you cling to to soothe some kind of psychological pains.

(But then again you believe in direct perception, so you don't know the first thing about the self.)