PH, Is Your Philosophy-of Mind-Independence, Mind-Independent?

[Veritas Aequitas]

To PH and all other philosophical realists;
Is Your Philosophy-of Mind-Independence, absolutely Mind-Independent?

• Philosophical Realism – .... is the view that a certain kind of thing has mind-independent existence, i.e. that it exists even in the absence of any mind perceiving it or that its existence is not just a mere appearance in the eye of the beholder.
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_realism

The fundamental of philosophical realism is that reality and things are absolutely independent of the human mind and human conditions [mind, brain and body]. This absolutely mind-independence is grounded in all the various types of realism, i.e. naive realism, scientific realism, metaphysical realism and other relevant realism stated in the above WIKI article.

Example;

• Naive realism, also known as direct realism, is a philosophy of mind rooted in a common sense theory of perception that claims that the senses provide us with direct awareness of the external world.
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosoph ... ct_realism

The above external world in that case is absolutely mind-independent from the human conditions and senses that perceive that absolutely mind-independent external world.
The naive realist will insist the moon pre-existed humans and will continue to exists ever he or all other humans are gone.

What is absolutely mind-independent of the philosophical realists is in contrast to the relative mind-independence of the Empirical Realist [my beliefs] where it is ultimately subsumed within Transcendental Idealism thus cannot be absolutely mind-independent.

So,
To PH and all other philosophical realists;
Is Your Philosophy-of Mind-Independence, absolutely Mind-Independent?

[Atla]

What is absolutely mind-independent of the philosophical realists is in contrast to the relative mind-independence of the Empirical Realist [my beliefs] where it is ultimately subsumed within Transcendental Idealism thus cannot be absolutely mind-independent.

Your contrast is ignoring the issue of direct vs indirect perception, without which, the whole argument is pointless. Kant only refuted the mind-independence of the appearances.

Prove that reality isn't absolutely mind-independent (I'm using your wrong definition of absolute here), without resorting to direct perception. Science and psychology have refuted direct perception, so it's a non-starter.

[Iwannaplato]

What is absolutely mind-independent of the philosophical realists is in contrast to the relative mind-independence of the Empirical Realist [my beliefs] where it is ultimately subsumed within Transcendental Idealism thus cannot be absolutely mind-independent.

Your contrast is ignoring the issue of direct vs indirect perception, without which, the whole argument is pointless. Kant only refuted the mind-independence of the appearances.

Prove that reality isn't absolutely mind-independent (I'm using your wrong definition of absolute here), without resorting to direct perception. Science and psychology have refuted direct perception, so it's a non-starter.

I think it would be pleasant if we all started talking about the issue without resort to dependent and independent as the reigning adjectives.

Because realism in contrast to some non-realisms is actually saying that things (out there) influence, due to their nature, what we perceive.

So there is a relationship. If we frame realism as say 'absolute mind independence', it starts to sound like things and perceivers have nothing to do with eachother, EVER, let alone via causal chains, and that's not realism. It's just that realism mean that things, out there, can be known, to varying degrees via appearances BUT that does not mean that our experience of the things, out there, is necessary for their existence: like the Moon is still there when we aren't looking according to realists, for example.

Things having no connection to minds in perception (an -ism I haven't hears of yet)
and
Things continue to exist even when not perceived (realism)

have been conflated
now
for what feels like many lifetimes.

I'm ready to reincarnate as a squirrel.

[Atla]

I think it would be pleasant if we all started talking about the issue without resort to dependent and independent as the reigning adjectives.

Because realism in contrast to some non-realisms is actually saying that things (out there) influence, due to their nature, what we perceive.

So there is a relationship. If we frame realism as say 'absolute mind independence', it starts to sound like things and perceivers have nothing to do with eachother, EVER, let alone via causal chains, and that's not realism. It's just that realism mean that things, out there, can be known, to varying degrees via appearances BUT that does not mean that our experience of the things, out there, is necessary for their existence: like the Moon is still there when we aren't looking according to realists, for example.

Things having no connection to minds in perception (an -ism I haven't hears of yet)
and
Things continue to exist even when not perceived (realism)

have been conflated
now
for what feels like many lifetimes.

I'm ready to reincarnate as a squirrel.

My growing suspicion is that VA has never ever considered the kind of realism you are talking about, because it is based on indirect perception. Maybe he's not even capable of considering it.

To VA, realism = naive realism (and maybe some close variants of naive realism). He cannot conceive of said relationship, because a relationship is between two things and VA only sees one.

I mean he may be right when he sees PH as some kind of naive realist, but that's about it.

[Wizard22]

Why is this forum stuck on the notion that there are things which you can believe (the moon exists beyond my lifetime), versus things which you can know or not know (you cannot know what exists beyond your lifetime)?

And for how long? Ten trillion years? What's the time-scale? The moon could be exploded by a supernova or swallowed by a black hole. So again, what's the time-scale, Veritas Aequitas?? How about a trillion trillion years? What "exists" then, anything at all???

[rootseeker]

Science and psychology have refuted direct perception, so it's a non-starter.

In what way has science refuted direct perception? It seems like the brain can directly perceive electrical signals, so in that sense a brain can directly perceive electrons, and the mind therefore directly perceives electricity. It also seems like neurons can directly perceive neurotransmitters and therefore the mind can perceive these in various forms such as a full signal from the stomach..

[Iwannaplato]

I think it would be pleasant if we all started talking about the issue without resort to dependent and independent as the reigning adjectives.

Because realism in contrast to some non-realisms is actually saying that things (out there) influence, due to their nature, what we perceive.

So there is a relationship. If we frame realism as say 'absolute mind independence', it starts to sound like things and perceivers have nothing to do with eachother, EVER, let alone via causal chains, and that's not realism. It's just that realism mean that things, out there, can be known, to varying degrees via appearances BUT that does not mean that our experience of the things, out there, is necessary for their existence: like the Moon is still there when we aren't looking according to realists, for example.

Things having no connection to minds in perception (an -ism I haven't hears of yet)
and
Things continue to exist even when not perceived (realism)

have been conflated
now
for what feels like many lifetimes.

I'm ready to reincarnate as a squirrel.

My growing suspicion is that VA has never ever considered the kind of realism you are talking about, because it is based on indirect perception. Maybe he's not even capable of considering it.

To VA, realism = naive realism (and maybe some close variants of naive realism). He cannot conceive of said relationship, because a relationship is between two things and VA only sees one.

I mean he may be right when he sees PH as some kind of naive realist, but that's about it.

If we take the classical Newtonian world of causes we have no action at a distance (sort of). So, in realism we have objects outside us and sometimes we interact with them.

Interact is another word I'd prefer or the now dead 'dependent' and 'independent'. I mean, dead as in don't beat a dead horse. Instead of it being dead because we concluded the matter, I think it's dead because it (or they) have been conflated and equivocated (equis!!) so many times.

So, in realism, there are causal chains and in perception the causal chains are coming from things and we tend to believe that they say something about those things.

Now we have qm and frankly I don't think we know all about action at a distance yet. Realism can absorb at least the 20th centuries qm, but now perhaps there are some interactions at a distance.

Is the quantum Zeno affect in migrating birds a kind of direct realism? The magentic fields which are a part of the earth affecting but really touching directly, interacting directly with magnetic-sensitive radical-ion-pairs in the birds retina.

They might experience it something like sight, but in a way it's not like there's an object out there (only) since the magnetic fields are everywhere (on earth) and the bird is immersed in them. There you might have direct realism.

Or not, we still have the mediation of neuronal messages. Though the eyes can be argued to be part of the brain....ah.

The whole mind indepedent realism thingie is not saying there is no interaction. It is saying that stuff outside of us, it's existence isn't enlivened by our existence. The Moon could go on when humans are no longer present.

Another word that I think is better to include: persists (and words built from it).

Things can persist when not perceived. In that sense they are independent.

Non-realism, of the ontological not the epistemological type, is saying something more, than things are dependent on us. It is saying that things are not external. Not that they are internal. The whole realist model is gone. Phenomena become the real.

[Atla]

If we take the classical Newtonian world of causes we have no action at a distance (sort of). So, in realism we have objects outside us and sometimes we interact with them.

Interact is another word I'd prefer or the now dead 'dependent' and 'independent'. I mean, dead as in don't beat a dead horse. Instead of it being dead because we concluded the matter, I think it's dead because it (or they) have been conflated and equivocated (equis!!) so many times.

So, in realism, there are causal chains and in perception the causal chains are coming from things and we tend to believe that they say something about those things.

Yeah but VA seems to think that all realists are naive realists, who believe that they directly perceive the objects out there as they really are. As such, realists cannot believe in the causal chains of perception.

If this sounds completely insane even from VA, that's because it is..

[Peter Holmes]

If we take the classical Newtonian world of causes we have no action at a distance (sort of). So, in realism we have objects outside us and sometimes we interact with them.

Interact is another word I'd prefer or the now dead 'dependent' and 'independent'. I mean, dead as in don't beat a dead horse. Instead of it being dead because we concluded the matter, I think it's dead because it (or they) have been conflated and equivocated (equis!!) so many times.

So, in realism, there are causal chains and in perception the causal chains are coming from things and we tend to believe that they say something about those things.

Yeah but VA seems to think that all realists are naive realists, who believe that they directly perceive the objects out there as they really are. As such, realists cannot believe in the causal chains of perception - a sort of extension of empiricist skepticism.

If this sounds completely insane even from VA, that's because it is..

I'm interested in the problem of naive realism. Can the 'causal chains of perception' be perceived directly? And if not, how can we know about them? It looks like an infinite regress situation - maybe related to empiricist skepticism.

PS Something weird happened - my thought added to your post.

[Atla]

If we take the classical Newtonian world of causes we have no action at a distance (sort of). So, in realism we have objects outside us and sometimes we interact with them.

Interact is another word I'd prefer or the now dead 'dependent' and 'independent'. I mean, dead as in don't beat a dead horse. Instead of it being dead because we concluded the matter, I think it's dead because it (or they) have been conflated and equivocated (equis!!) so many times.

So, in realism, there are causal chains and in perception the causal chains are coming from things and we tend to believe that they say something about those things.

Yeah but VA seems to think that all realists are naive realists, who believe that they directly perceive the objects out there as they really are. As such, realists cannot believe in the causal chains of perception - a sort of extension of empiricist skepticism.

If this sounds completely insane even from VA, that's because it is..

I'm interested in the problem of naive realism. Can the 'causal chains of perception' be perceived directly? And if not, how can we know about them? It looks like an infinite regress situation - maybe related to empiricist skepticism.

PS Something weird happened - my thought added to your post.

Only the contents of our minds can be perceived directly. Everything is inferred from those contents, including the causal chains of perception. There is always an element of faith required when we decide to infer the external world, but that's just how it is.

You seem to be a naive realist where you seem to mistake the contents of your mind for the direct perception of the external world. That's why VA has been attacking you relentlessly for years.

[Iwannaplato]

Yeah but VA seems to think that all realists are naive realists,

Yes, yes. I wasn't directly reponding to you. I was just mulling the issues. Seeing if we could get away from some of the words that are being abused. New words can be abused also, but at least in new ways and requiring a little creativity to undermine them also.

who believe that they directly perceive the objects out there as they really are. As such, realists cannot believe in the causal chains of perception.

If this sounds completely insane even from VA, that's because it is..

My first reaction, now directly responding, is that VA isn't consistant. But otherwise, yes, I think he is reacting to naive realism/direct realism.

[popeye1945]

Meaning is mind dependent.

[Veritas Aequitas]

What is absolutely mind-independent of the philosophical realists is in contrast to the relative mind-independence of the Empirical Realist [my beliefs] where it is ultimately subsumed within Transcendental Idealism thus cannot be absolutely mind-independent.

Your contrast is ignoring the issue of direct vs indirect perception, without which, the whole argument is pointless. Kant only refuted the mind-independence of the appearances.

Prove that reality isn't absolutely mind-independent (I'm using your wrong definition of absolute here), without resorting to direct perception. Science and psychology have refuted direct perception, so it's a non-starter.

I think it would be pleasant if we all started talking about the issue without resort to dependent and independent as the reigning adjectives.

Because realism in contrast to some non-realisms is actually saying that things (out there) influence, due to their nature, what we perceive.

So there is a relationship. If we frame realism as say 'absolute mind independence', it starts to sound like things and perceivers have nothing to do with eachother, EVER, let alone via causal chains, and that's not realism. It's just that realism mean that things, out there, can be known, to varying degrees via appearances BUT that does not mean that our experience of the things, out there, is necessary for their existence: like the Moon is still there when we aren't looking according to realists, for example.

Things having no connection to minds in perception (an -ism I haven't hears of yet)
and
Things continue to exist even when not perceived (realism)

have been conflated
now
for what feels like many lifetimes.

I'm ready to reincarnate as a squirrel.

To mention 'realism' alone is not sufficient for deeper philosophy.
There is a need to differentiate between the different types of realism.
As I had stated a realist can be an anti-realist and vice-versa.

It is critical that humanity must deal with the dichotomy between Philosophical Realism vs ANTI-Philosophical_Realism because as I had argued,
Philosophical Realism is A Threat to Humanity
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=40094

Why Philosophical Realism is Illusory
viewtopic.php?t=40167

As defined, philosophical realism,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_realism
is that of absolute mind-independence
while Empirical Realism is of relative mind-independence.

In the case with PH & gang, re philosophical realism, what are facts are absolutely independent of the human conditions, opinions, belief and judgment, thus can never be objective moral facts.

If facts are not absolutely independent of the human conditions, then that would contradict the main tenet of philosophical realism as defined.

As such, absolutely mind-independent is critical and imperative for philosophical realism, otherwise philosophical realists will have no ground to reject objective moral facts [re human-based moral FSK].

[Veritas Aequitas]

My growing suspicion is that VA has never ever considered the kind of realism you are talking about, because it is based on indirect perception. Maybe he's not even capable of considering it.

To VA, realism = naive realism (and maybe some close variants of naive realism). He cannot conceive of said relationship, because a relationship is between two things and VA only sees one.

I mean he may be right when he sees PH as some kind of naive realist, but that's about it.

Strawman.
I have never claimed PH is a direct or naive realist.
PH is a philosophical realist of the metaphysical realism and indirect realism kind.

[Veritas Aequitas]

If we take the classical Newtonian world of causes we have no action at a distance (sort of). So, in realism we have objects outside us and sometimes we interact with them.

Interact is another word I'd prefer or the now dead 'dependent' and 'independent'. I mean, dead as in don't beat a dead horse. Instead of it being dead because we concluded the matter, I think it's dead because it (or they) have been conflated and equivocated (equis!!) so many times.

So, in realism, there are causal chains and in perception the causal chains are coming from things and we tend to believe that they say something about those things.

Yeah but VA seems to think that all realists are naive realists, who believe that they directly perceive the objects out there as they really are. As such, realists cannot believe in the causal chains of perception - a sort of extension of empiricist skepticism.

If this sounds completely insane even from VA, that's because it is..

I'm interested in the problem of naive realism. Can the 'causal chains of perception' be perceived directly? And if not, how can we know about them? It looks like an infinite regress situation - maybe related to empiricist skepticism.

PS Something weird happened - my thought added to your post.

Naive realism is that of the common sense or 'vulgar' kind.
In a philosophical forum, it would be stupid of me to claim all philosophical realists are naive realists.

Most posters here are philosophical realists of either metaphysical realism, indirect realism, scientific realism [philosophical], and the like.