Morality: Philosophical Realism's Dilemma

[Harbal]

I speak truth.

Except when you don't.

[Skepdick]

I speak truth.

Except when you don't.

Got any examples of those exceptions you speak about; or are you feeling all kinds of libelous today?

[Veritas Aequitas]

This is a serious claim;
FJ: "So far the arguments are mainly non sequiturs, fallacies, or just plain bad."
If not all, give at least a few examples which you think are obvious in supporting your above.

viewtopic.php?t=40197

This one is particularly egregious. In trying to prove that realists are solipsists, you have to include premises which realists don't accept - thus not actually proving anything about what realists think at all.

Where I raise an argument in an OP, I will have to defend it until I am convinced I am wrong, then I will have to admit and concede my argument is false.
So far, there is no reason for me to concede with that argument.

I don't think I grasp what you are trying to point out.

One reason for your point,
FJ: "you have to include premises which realists don't accept"
is likely p-realists are actually adopting those said premises but they are ignorant they are doing so, thus insist they do not accept those said premises.

I will reread the whole thread again to try to understand the bottleneck.

Anymore?
I don't want to leave any significant issue unattended.

[Harbal]

I speak truth.

Except when you don't.

Got any examples of those exceptions you speak about;

Certainly, Sir, what colour would you like. I have them in blue, red, blue and red. Or yellow, but I have to order those in.

They come in three sizes: small, medium and Christmas Pudding.

Now do you understand how irritating it is?

[Veritas Aequitas]

The [Model-Theoretic] Argument purports to show that the Representation Problem—
to explain how our mental symbols and words get hooked up to mind-independent objects and
how our sentences and thoughts target mind-independent states of affairs—
is insoluble.

According to the Model-Theoretic Argument, there are simply too many ways in which our mental symbols can be mapped onto items in the world.
The consequence of this is a dilemma for the realist.

The first horn of the dilemma is that s/he must accept that what our symbols refer to is massively indeterminate.

The second horn is that s/he must insist that
even an ideal theory, whose terms and predicates can demonstrably be mapped veridically onto objects and properties in the world
might still be false, i.e., that such a mapping might not be the right one, the one ‘intended’.

Neither alternative can be defended, according to anti-realists.
Concerning the first alternative, massive indeterminacy for perfectly determinate terms is absurd.
As for the second, for realists to contend that even an ideal theory could be false is to resort to unmotivated dogmatism, since on their own admission we cannot tell which mapping the world has set up for us.
Such dogmatism leaves the realist with no answer to a skepticism which undermines any capacity to reliably represent the world, anti-realists maintain.
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win ... lenge/#3.5

[Iwannaplato]

The [Model-Theoretic] Argument purports to show that the Representation Problem—
to explain how our mental symbols and words get hooked up to mind-independent objects and
how our sentences and thoughts target mind-independent states of affairs—
is insoluble.

According to the Model-Theoretic Argument, there are simply too many ways in which our mental symbols can be mapped onto items in the world.
The consequence of this is a dilemma for the realist.

The first horn of the dilemma is that s/he must accept that what our symbols refer to is massively indeterminate.

The second horn is that s/he must insist that
even an ideal theory, whose terms and predicates can demonstrably be mapped veridically onto objects and properties in the world
might still be false, i.e., that such a mapping might not be the right one, the one ‘intended’.

Neither alternative can be defended, according to anti-realists.
Concerning the first alternative, massive indeterminacy for perfectly determinate terms is absurd.
As for the second, for realists to contend that even an ideal theory could be false is to resort to unmotivated dogmatism, since on their own admission we cannot tell which mapping the world has set up for us.
Such dogmatism leaves the realist with no answer to a skepticism which undermines any capacity to reliably represent the world, anti-realists maintain.
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win ... lenge/#3.5

And, of course, you did not mention or quote that the article you link to above goes on to give realist responses to these arguments.
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win ... lenge/#Res
Either you only read part of the entry in Stanford or this was disingenous.

And, again, no addressing the exclusion of other terms in that virtue list for the same reasons empathy would be excluded.