How Physics is Driving Philosophical Realism to Extinction

[Veritas Aequitas]

Philosophical Realism as adopted by PH and realists is defined below;

1. Philosophical Realism is .. about a certain kind of thing .. is the thesis that this kind of thing has mind-independent existence, i.e. that it is not just a mere appearance in the eye of the beholder.

2. This includes a number of positions within epistemology and metaphysics which express that a given thing instead exists independently of knowledge, thought, or understanding.

3. [Philosophical] Realism can also be a view about the properties of reality in general, holding that reality exists independent of the mind, as opposed to non-realist views which question the certainty of anything beyond one's own mind.

4. Philosophers who profess [Philosophical] realism often claim that truth consists in a correspondence between cognitive representations and reality.

5. [Philosophical] Realists tend to believe that whatever we believe now is only an approximation of reality but that the accuracy and fullness of understanding can be improved.

6. In some contexts, [Philosophical] realism is contrasted with [Philosophical] idealism. Today it is more usually contrasted with anti-realism, for example in the philosophy of science.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_realism

Radical Embodied Cognition is a basically Philosophical Realism, i.e. there is real independent objective reality out there, where "the percepts we have must be direct reflections of information that is in the real world."

"If space-time doesn't exist then that cup is not a 3D object fixed in a particular location in space, despite the fact that my perception tells me it is.
And if this is true [Philosophical Realism] is a dead theory."

Radical embodied cognition is committed to the idea that perception involves some form of "pick up" of information from the environment. The mind constructs nothing. Therefore the percepts we have must be direct reflections of information that is in the real world. For example, our percept of a cup is the direct result of light interacting with a unitary object that has a definite location in space.

If it turned out that in the actual world there was not unitary object corresponding to the cup and it had no definite location in space, there would be a significant mismatch between what exists in the world and what is perceived about the world. Therefore our percepts of a unitary cup in a definite location must be a construction of the mind.

If the above assumptions about REC's claims are true and we indeed found that the world is such a weird place as in the example, then REC must be wrong. REC is committed to a fairly standard view of a veridical space-time world.

Quantum physics has revealed that a standard space-time world does not hold at the particle level. So if we lived in that world and took our perceptual measurements in it and if we perceived particles in definite locations (as seems to happen when we measure them with our instruments) then we would have to assume that perception is constructed and not just a direct pick up of information. REC would not be a viable theory at the quantum level.

Recent work in physics has suggested that something like quantum weirdness applies also to the very large, that space-time doesn't exist at all.
If space-time doesn't exist then that cup is not a 3D object fixed in a particular location in space, despite the fact that my perception tells me it is.
And if this is true REC is a dead theory.

Put differently, if ecological psychology wants to be serious about the interaction of the physical world and the body giving rise to all things human, then it HAS to take discoveries in physics seriously because that is the means by which the true nature of the world can be revealed. In this sense, REC can be falsified by developments in physics.

PH is relying on his philosophical realism [dead theory] to deny morality is objective.

On the other hand, my view is anti-philosophical_realism [Kantian], i.e. there are human based moral FSK facts which are objective, thus morality is objective.

[Veritas Aequitas]

KIV Notes:

[Flannel Jesus]

I think you bite off more than you can chew in the way you frame these threads. I think you'd benefit from JUST talking about philosophical realism, and not moral realism at all, in a thread like this. You're trying to take two steps at once instead of just taking one.

Just start with philosophical realism, and then move to the implications of anti-philosophical-realism re mortality after.

[Flannel Jesus]

So, just focusing on Philosophical Realism:

You've basically treated radical embodied cognition as if it's synonymous with philosophical realism, and so for you, if the former is disproven, the latter is as well. That seems to me like it's a pretty huge mistake. Considering that you use "philosophical realism" as the position that there are any objective mind independent facts at all, the majority of forms that philosophical realism takes are not going to be of the "radical embodied cognition" variety. Hell, even a brain-in-a-vat world view can be philosophical realism.

[Agent Smith]

This, this looks rosy and that, that looks doggish and that, that, don't even get me started on that one!

But madam, we've redone the room a million, billion times!

Tut tut! We don't want to offend the ambassador of Gumistan, now do we? Redo it now!!

Sigh, Peter, Peter! Rosy!!! Doggish!!!

[Peter Holmes]

If there is no cup, there are also no humans to invent the cup. And no humans to have moral opinions. And no objectivity = no moral objectivity. If you eat the cake, it's gone. Back to the drawing board.

[Iwannaplato]

The problem, right off, that I see with the OP is that it is jumping around somewhat incoherently.
Why for example are we dealing with radical embodied cognition? Why the radical version?
Then a bit fussier: why not embodied cognition theory?
It is a kind of realism. Though I don't see it as saying they are direct reflections of the real world.

Why reflections of information?

Why not reflections of what is in the real world?

Note below we have (out there?) information which our percepts must be direct reflections of?

First we have the real thing, then we have information, then we have a reflection...? Have we gotten to the cognition yet?

Radical Embodied Cognition is a basically Philosophical Realism, i.e. there is real independent objective reality out there, where "the percepts we have must be direct reflections of information that is in the real world."

Then he moves to the following....

"If space-time doesn't exist then that cup is not a 3D object fixed in a particular location in space, despite the fact that my perception tells me it is.
And if this is true [Philosophical Realism] is a dead theory."

What does he mean by Space time?
Did we suddenly drop embodied cognition theory? Why bring it in in the first place? Was it brought up in another thread and this is a side effect of his starting new threads instead of simply continuing a conversation where it is?

Radical embodied cognition is committed to the idea that perception involves some form of "pick up" of information from the environment. The mind constructs nothing.

I don't think this is correct. REC includes the idea that the body of the perceiver, horse or human say, radically affects perception. The mind contructs a lot. But it is a realism, so it doesn't construct everything, yes, it is affected by what is out there.

Therefore the percepts we have must be direct reflections of information that is in the real world. For example, our percept of a cup is the direct result of light interacting with a unitary object that has a definite location in space.

If it turned out that in the actual world there was not unitary object corresponding to the cup and it had no definite location in space, there would be a significant mismatch between what exists in the world and what is perceived about the world. Therefore our percepts of a unitary cup in a definite location must be a construction of the mind.

Notice he went from a hypothetical to a non-hypothetical conclusion. Red, hypothetical, Blue mere conclusion in non-hypothetical form.

If the above assumptions about REC's claims are true and we indeed found that the world is such a weird place as in the example, then REC must be wrong. REC is committed to a fairly standard view of a veridical space-time world.

Quantum physics has revealed that a standard space-time world does not hold at the particle level. So if we lived in that world and took our perceptual measurements in it and if we perceived particles in definite locations (as seems to happen when we measure them with our instruments) then we would have to assume that perception is constructed and not just a direct pick up of information. REC would not be a viable theory at the quantum level.

Depends how radical that REC is. And, again, why are we dealing with REC?

Recent work in physics has suggested that something like quantum weirdness applies also to the very large, that space-time doesn't exist at all.
If space-time doesn't exist then that cup is not a 3D object fixed in a particular location in space, despite the fact that my perception tells me it is.
And if this is true REC is a dead theory.

So, not 'is driving it to extinction, but rather might drive it to extinction.

Put differently, if ecological psychology

For some reason VA is now using this term. It is related to embodied cognition, as a term, but why suddenly focus on one face of the latter.

wants to be serious about the interaction of the physical world and the body giving rise to all things human, then it HAS to take discoveries in physics seriously because that is the means by which the true nature of the world can be revealed. In this sense, REC can be falsified by developments in physics.

So, we've gone from suggests X that would or it seems would falsify Y, to it has falsified Y. And note much of what embodied cognition theory says would still be extremely useful, but sure, should certain things come to pass then at a foundational level it would need to change its ontology. But much of what they say would continue to be useful and true, with the change in ontology.

PH is relying on his philosophical realism [dead theory] to deny morality is objective.

On the other hand, my view is anti-philosophical_realism [Kantian], i.e. there are human based moral FSK facts which are objective, thus morality is objective.

Why are there no cups in your universe but there are mirror neurons?

I mean, here he is arguing that embodied cognition theory is wrong, but for some reason all their information about how the specifics of bodies affect perception is false
BUT
what other scientists have discovered about mirror neurons in their utterly realist research about what they consider real things out there in the world is still correct?

He's a fair weather friend to anti-realism.

[iambiguous]

Philosophical Realism as adopted by PH and realists is defined below;

1. Philosophical Realism is .. about a certain kind of thing .. is the thesis that this kind of thing has mind-independent existence, i.e. that it is not just a mere appearance in the eye of the beholder.

2. This includes a number of positions within epistemology and metaphysics which express that a given thing instead exists independently of knowledge, thought, or understanding.

3. [Philosophical] Realism can also be a view about the properties of reality in general, holding that reality exists independent of the mind, as opposed to non-realist views which question the certainty of anything beyond one's own mind.

4. Philosophers who profess [Philosophical] realism often claim that truth consists in a correspondence between cognitive representations and reality.

5. [Philosophical] Realists tend to believe that whatever we believe now is only an approximation of reality but that the accuracy and fullness of understanding can be improved.

6. In some contexts, [Philosophical] realism is contrasted with [Philosophical] idealism. Today it is more usually contrasted with anti-realism, for example in the philosophy of science.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_realism

Radical Embodied Cognition is a basically Philosophical Realism, i.e. there is real independent objective reality out there, where "the percepts we have must be direct reflections of information that is in the real world."

"If space-time doesn't exist then that cup is not a 3D object fixed in a particular location in space, despite the fact that my perception tells me it is.
And if this is true [Philosophical Realism] is a dead theory."

Radical embodied cognition is committed to the idea that perception involves some form of "pick up" of information from the environment. The mind constructs nothing. Therefore the percepts we have must be direct reflections of information that is in the real world. For example, our percept of a cup is the direct result of light interacting with a unitary object that has a definite location in space.

If it turned out that in the actual world there was not unitary object corresponding to the cup and it had no definite location in space, there would be a significant mismatch between what exists in the world and what is perceived about the world. Therefore our percepts of a unitary cup in a definite location must be a construction of the mind.

If the above assumptions about REC's claims are true and we indeed found that the world is such a weird place as in the example, then REC must be wrong. REC is committed to a fairly standard view of a veridical space-time world.

Quantum physics has revealed that a standard space-time world does not hold at the particle level. So if we lived in that world and took our perceptual measurements in it and if we perceived particles in definite locations (as seems to happen when we measure them with our instruments) then we would have to assume that perception is constructed and not just a direct pick up of information. REC would not be a viable theory at the quantum level.

Recent work in physics has suggested that something like quantum weirdness applies also to the very large, that space-time doesn't exist at all.
If space-time doesn't exist then that cup is not a 3D object fixed in a particular location in space, despite the fact that my perception tells me it is.
And if this is true REC is a dead theory.

Put differently, if ecological psychology wants to be serious about the interaction of the physical world and the body giving rise to all things human, then it HAS to take discoveries in physics seriously because that is the means by which the true nature of the world can be revealed. In this sense, REC can be falsified by developments in physics.

PH is relying on his philosophical realism [dead theory] to deny morality is objective.

On the other hand, my view is anti-philosophical_realism [Kantian], i.e. there are human based moral FSK facts which are objective, thus morality is objective.

Again, just for the record, if any physicists or philosophical realists here would like to take this "ethical theory" stuff down to Earth and explore the "for all practical purposes" implications of it given a particular set of circumstances in which moral prescriptions and proscriptions come into conflict [and not just pertaining to abortion], let me know and I'll create a thread in the Applied Ethics forum.

[Iwannaplato]

If there is no cup, there are also no humans to invent the cup. And no humans to have moral opinions. And no objectivity = no moral objectivity. If you eat the cake, it's gone. Back to the drawing board.

One wonders also, if there is no spacetime, what does it matter whether we realists or anti-realists?
Further since we are objects of perception for each other, it's amazing how in synch our perceptions can be about, for example, the physical movements of other people. Yes, I agree, you raised you left hand and then slapped your left thigh with it. What, when we turn our view to the left of our friend and look at the cup on the table....there is not the slightest connection between my perceptions and something out there?

This means my friend is me, I think.

My perceptions seem to have something to do with the position of my friends arm and what it does. But with the cup. Nothing.

I must have constructed my friend then.

[Impenitent]

a priori space and a priori time in which all phenomena occur can never be combined because they kant

-Imp

[Veritas Aequitas]

So, just focusing on Philosophical Realism:
You've basically treated radical embodied cognition as if it's synonymous with philosophical realism, and so for you, if the former is disproven, the latter is as well. That seems to me like it's a pretty huge mistake. Considering that you use "philosophical realism" as the position that there are any objective mind independent facts at all, the majority of forms that philosophical realism takes are not going to be of the "radical embodied cognition" variety. Hell, even a brain-in-a-vat world view can be philosophical realism.

I think you bite off more than you can chew in the way you frame these threads. I think you'd benefit from JUST talking about philosophical realism, and not moral realism at all, in a thread like this. You're trying to take two steps at once instead of just taking one.

Just start with philosophical realism, and then move to the implications of anti-philosophical-realism re mortality after.

Note [pragmatism aside] the fundamental principle is this;
All Philosophies Reduced to "Realism" vs Idealism
viewtopic.php?f=5&t=28643

"Realism" in this case refer to 'Philosophical Realism'.

• 1. Philosophical Realism [PR] is .. about a certain kind of thing .. is the thesis that this kind of thing has mind-independent existence, i.e. that it is not just a mere appearance in the eye of the beholder.
  
  2. Radical Embodied Cognition [REC] is committed to the idea that perception involves some form of "pick up" of information from the environment. The mind constructs nothing. Therefore the percepts we have must be direct reflections of information that is in the real world. For example, our percept of a cup is the direct result of light interacting with a unitary object that has a definite location in space.

PR fundamentally leveraged on mind-independent existence of things.
REC is also fundamentally leveraged on mind-independent existence of things.
Since Physics [QM] has 'buried' the mind-independence existence of things re this OP,
therefore, PR [mind-independent existence] is 'dead' and buried in the ultimate sense.
Why is the above a mistake?

Note I had mainly focused on proving that Philosophical Realism is not realistic nor tenable in many other threads and elsewhere.
E.g.
PH's Philosophical Realism is Illusory
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=39992

The Moon Does Not Exist If No Humans 'Look' at It
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=39510

There are Two Senses of 'What is Fact'
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=39587
i.e. The PR illusory sense and the realistic Human-Based-FSK sense.

I have raised many other threads that argued Philosophical Realism is not realistic nor tenable.
This OP is merely the attack on Philosophical Realism from another vista or angle.

My point;
Since PH is relying on his philosophical realism [dead theory] to deny morality is objective, his denial is false and empty.

On the other hand, my view is anti-philosophical_realism [Kantian], i.e. there are human based moral FSK facts which are objective, thus morality is objective.
[this is a general statement, I have given detailed arguments elsewhere]

[Veritas Aequitas]

If there is no cup, there are also no humans to invent the cup. And no humans to have moral opinions. And no objectivity = no moral objectivity. If you eat the cake, it's gone. Back to the drawing board.

Blabbering again.

The point of the OP is in countering the fundamental principle of 'mind-independence' Radical Embodied Cognition and Philosophical Realism. ["mind = modern mind, not Descartes Dualism" - shit! must I bottle feed you on this point all the time?]

The point of the OP is;
if there are no humans, there is no cup.
if there are no humans, there are no moral opinions.
if there are no humans, there are no human-based FSK [objective], so, no human-based moral FSK facts.

It is only when there are humans, that there are human-based FSK [objective], so, there are human-based moral FSK facts which are objective. Thus, Morality is objective.

Note this critical point;
It is only when there are humans, that there are human-based FSK [objective], so, there are human-based philosophical, scientific FSKs to deal with "matter before there were humans", i.e. human-based historical [cosmological evolutionary, etc.] facts.

Space and time are not mind-independent.
'The variables 'when' and 'before' within "matter before there were humans" are not mind-independent.
Therefore to insist there are absolutely independent things [moon, dinosaurs] existing before humans as Philosophical Realists like you do, is to reify an illusion.

[Flannel Jesus]

"dead theory" is a really funny way to describe a belief shared by most scientists and most philosophers...

Since Physics [QM] has 'buried' the mind-independence existence of things re this OP,

It's also at least a little bit obnoxious that you denied that you were saying qm and realism were incompatible in the moon thread, even though every literate person knew that wasn't the case, and here you are saying it again.

I'm glad that you finally have come to say explicitly that your conclusions are not just what's required by raw quantum mechanics, but by your philosophy on realism and FSKs instead. That's all I wanted.

Thank you.

That has been my point from the OP.

So in one thread, you claim it was your point that qm doesn't require these conclusions, gaslighting me about what your point was from the beginning, and yet here you are in another thread once again saying qm requires this.

Qm hasn't buried philosophical realism, your personal philosophy on FSKs, and how you view qm through that lens, has buried philosophical realism for you. That's the correct way to say it.

[Iwannaplato]

So in one thread, you claim it was your point that qm doesn't require these conclusions, gaslighting me about what your point was from the beginning, and yet here you are in another thread once again saying qm requires this.

Qm hasn't buried philosophical realism, your personal philosophy on FSKs, and how you view qm through that lens, has buried philosophical realism for you. That's the correct way to say it.

And then should wonder why it buried it for him since, as he says above, it only suggests things...

Recent work in physics has suggested that something like quantum weirdness applies also to the very large, that space-time doesn't exist at all.
If space-time doesn't exist then that cup is not a 3D object fixed in a particular location in space, despite the fact that my perception tells me it is.
And if this is true REC is a dead theory.

And then here he goes from hypothetical [red] to factual [blue] for no apparant reason here...

If it turned out that in the actual world there was not unitary object corresponding to the cup and it had no definite location in space, there would be a significant mismatch between what exists in the world and what is perceived about the world. Therefore our percepts of a unitary cup in a definite location must be a construction of the mind.

And have you, FJ, figured out why radical embodied cognition is being used as Realism? I do think it is a realist theory, to the extent that it does presume there is something independent.

Did that come from some other thread? Oddly everything he said in his OP is less damaging to REC than most realisms. It would have the easiest time adjusting, since it is a kind of perspectivism, has a serious constructivist aspect, and it at the extreme far end away from naive realism.

I doubt it's an intentional strategy, but strangeness is a great pre-defense. If a person is confusing, it makes sorting out the errors much more complicated.

[Skepdick]

And have you, FJ, figured out why radical embodied cognition is being used as Realism? I do think it is a realist theory, to the extent that it does presume there is something independent.

If all Realism hinges on the "independent" part - I'm pretty curious what; or how asserts this independence.

Every ontological theory has an existential dependence on its creator.