From Subjective Facts to Objective Facts

[popeye1945]

Facts are meanings; thus, they are subjective; the physical world is also subjective; we call this subjective world apparent reality. The subjective evaluations made by biological consciousness are the meanings of what is experienced by a conscious subject. The conscious subject is within a field of energy and how those energies alter the biology/body of a conscious subject is what is experienced as objects by a conscious subject. All meanings are experiences of the body due to the influences of the energies that surround the subject consciousness. So, everything of apparent reality or the physical world is the way it seems relative to its being experienced, the physical world/apparent reality is a biological readout, a readout of subjective experience, the only thing that can be said to be objective is the energies of the physical world and/or the cosmos. Energies processed through biology become subjective objects. This is assuming what is intended in the topic title facts are physical objects or states between objects in the physical world. Perhaps I need to underline, ultimate reality is not a world of objects or the relations between objects; it is but the relations between energies, there are only objects for biological/conscious subjects which is itself an energy field.

[Agent Smith]

I'm happy to see that we've come so far. Subjective facts are objective facts, but it looks like we still haven't figured out why or how or ... ?

You might have to wait a bit longer.

When it comes to Mr Vertiarse is pays to not hold your breath.

Ok.

[Skepdick]

I posted that page because it answers in a firly standard way, the this is red thing that Skepdick has been trying to float here for years.

Idiot. Why does a non-question require an answer? That "thing I am floating" demonstrates the entire confusion of Philosophy: Is the statement "this color is red" descriptive of this color; or prescriptive on the term "red"? You just did a whole song-and-dance on why one thing can't be both true and false at the same time. So is it true that it's descriptive and false that it's prescriptive; or is it true that it's prescriptive and false that it's descriptive?

It's a prescriptive statement! Trivially demonstrated when I switch it up so as to assault your intuitions.

This color is red.
This color is red.
This color is red.

That is NOT a descriptive "is". That is a prescriptive/imperative "is"! It's the assignment operator! It instructs you to assign this color to the term "red"!

So you keep speaking of "redness", but you are using it denotationally presumably because you presuppose realism; whereas I keep speaking of redness using it connotationally without any a priori ontological commitment which allows me to have facts without ontology! This color is red!

Statements such as this color is red (if accepted) change your state of mind. They are effectful statements. They are imperatives!

Every time you theorize and you accept the imperatives of a theory (under the guise of descriptives) you are effectively reprograming your own mind.

If you actually understood the concept of idempotence it might all make sense to you.

The reason that this color is red doesn't trigger you is because the assignment opration is idempotent. If you've already assigned this color to "red" in your head then there's no change to the relationship between this color and the term "red". The operation has no effect on your mind beyond the initial application.

Whereas the imperative statement this color is red (in the context of your mind) attempts to remap the term "red" from this color to this color. The operation would have an effect on your mind.

If you didn't detect this change; or you had no prior assignment of meaning to the term "red" then I would have successfully "persuaded you" that this color is red.

[Agent Smith]

This thread describes in a nutshell the predicament which itself is the crux om which Jesus breathed his last.

[Iwannaplato]

I posted that page because it answers in a firly standard way, the this is red thing that Skepdick has been trying to float here for years.

Idiot. Why does a non-question require an answer? That "thing I am floating" demonstrates the entire confusion of Philosophy: Is the statement "this color is red" descriptive of this color; or prescriptive on the term "red"? You just did a whole song-and-dance on why one thing can't be both true and false at the same time. So is it true that it's descriptive and false that it's prescriptive; or is it true that it's prescriptive and false that it's descriptive?

It's a prescriptive statement! Trivially demonstrated when I switch it up so as to assault your intuitions.

This color is red.
This color is red.
This color is red.

That is NOT a descriptive "is". That is a prescriptive/imperative "is"! It's the assignment operator! It instructs you to assign this color to the term "red"!

I've noticed this example for a while and found it odd, but I wasn't sure why. Further I am not sure the full context/intent.
So, I'll throw out a few things.
What struck me as odd, is generally sentences beginning with 'this' and the other demonstrative pronouns are pointing at something. Or better put used as part of an act of pointing at something and perhaps describing it. I point at a car and say, This is red. Or This is my car. Or This is the one I want you to work on. In most situations pointing at a car and saying This is red is unusual, since we probably already both agree on that. So, it might be in a situation where some color is classified differently by different people or someone is color blind.

If the color of part of my sentence is the subject of my demonstration, I would probably make that clear.

This sentence is in red text.

The first part of this sentence is red and the rest is black.

Just to make it clear that the sentence is not pointing away from itself to something else, as it usually is.

I get the prescriptive and descriptive difference and hence the different 'is' es.

I think I get imdepotent, this video helped me...
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6dVNdFwqeKs
for me links to explanations based on programming (only) don't really help. The pregnant cow example helped and reminded me of our earlier discussion where you talked about temperature.

And I understand how, if the sentence refers to red, it's idempotent, because he was already aligned with that, so nothing happens when that sentence is said, but if we are assigned a new wavelength (shade/hue) to the word red, then it's not idempotent.

Could you reconnect this with morals?

Or link me to where you've done this.

[Skepdick]

So, I'll throw out a few things.
What struck me as odd, is generally sentences beginning with 'this' and the other demonstrative pronouns are pointing at something. Or better put used as part of an act of pointing at something and perhaps describing it. I point at a car and say, This is red. Or This is my car. Or This is the one I want you to work on. In most situations pointing at a car and saying This is red is unusual, since we probably already both agree on that. So, it might be in a situation where some color is classified differently by different people or someone is color blind.

I am using the word "this" in the sense of self-reference. I could just as well say this: I resemble a red color so as to be interpreted as a self-description. And self-description is where everything gets wonky.

I resemble a red color.
I resemble a red color.

If the color of part of my sentence is the subject of my demonstration, I would probably make that clear.

There is no "my sentence" in the demonstration. The sentence is constructed so as to stand on its own feet irrespective of WHO says it.
It's a self-referential statement so it should be interpreted from the perspective of the sentence itself (as if the sentence had a mind and intentions).

Said differently (but the same) yet: don't attribute the intention to me (the person who constructed the sentence). Attribute the intention to the sentence itself. Attribute a "theory of mind" to the language.

I am a sentence and I have a "color" property.
I am a sentence and I have a "color" property.
I am a sentence and I have a "color" property.
I am a sentence and I have a "color" property.

Just to make it clear that the sentence is not pointing away from itself to something else, as it usually is.

Precisely the point. It has the property of "self-reference". Self-reference is recursion. Recursion is a model of computation. We have an entire discipline of science to study self-reference... It's called computer science. More colloquially it could be described as "thinking about thinking".

And now that we have things like ChatGPT widely adopted by the world we can talk about having an "intelligent conversation" with a computer program called a "language model".

The scientific foundation to replicating and automating our own "intelligent use of language" is currently computer science.

I get the prescriptive and descriptive difference and hence the different 'is' es.

Could you reconnect this with morals?

The semantic/mental property shared by a moral statement such as "thou shall not kill" and a prescriptive statement such as "this color is red" is that they are both commands/instructions/imperatives.

They command you to DO something.

One commands you to NOT kill.
The other commands you to call this color "red".

By what principle am I obliged to obey either command?

And so anybody who's peddling for normative use of language is implicitly DOING that thing we call "normalising."

Normalizing words; or normalising non-killing. It's all normative. Normativity is the mechaism of morality.

[Iwannaplato]

The semantic/mental property shared by a moral statement such as "thou shall not kill" and a prescriptive statement such as "this color is red" is that they are both commands/instructions/imperatives.

They command you to DO something.

One commands you to NOT kill.
The other commands you to call this color "red".

By what principle am I obliged to obey the command to call this color "red"? I refuse!

OK. So, is what you are saying is that people are confusing prescriptive statements with descriptive ones and then applying some kind of epistemological assault on those statements inappropriately? Or?



(My wife and I disagree about colors quite a lot. Not which to use, but what they are. That's not blue green. And so on. She's a painter so it's an uphill battle for me.)

So, is the example of color you attacking the subjective objective distinction. IOW oh, you wanna take that tack with morals, well, how about colors.

Do most people think of them as solely prescriptive? and not also descriptive?

[Skepdick]

OK. So, is what you are saying is that people are confusing prescriptive statements with descriptive ones and then applying some kind of epistemological assault on those statements inappropriately? Or?

What I am saying is that normativity is THE fundamental mechanism of morality.

"Correcting" others. Prescribing how they think. How they speak. How they act...

(My wife and I disagree about colors quite a lot. Not which to use, but what they are. That's not blue green. And so on. She's a painter so it's an uphill battle for me.)

Yeah! You are arguing over WHO prescribes the language! It's an exercise in electing a leader.

There's only two of you in the debate so innevitably one becomes the leader and one becomes the follower.

In practice it really doesn't matter what you call it green or blue - it's just a word! But her words (as a painter) matter more to her and so she's unlikely to give up her language and adopt yours. Chances are her vocabulary is much richr; more precise and much more expressive than yours anyway - there's literally no benefit to her to adobt your (much poorer and less expressive) vocabulary!

To let you dictate the language around colors in your household would (quite literally) limit your wife's self expression.

So, is the example of color you attacking the subjective objective distinction. IOW oh, you wanna take that tack with morals, well, how about colors.

Do most people think of them as solely prescriptive? and not also descriptive?

Everything about human interaction is prescriptive!

Arguing/persuasion is about changing things. Changing how we think. Changing how we speak. Changing how we act.
Normalising how we think. Normalising how we speak. Normalising how we act.

We are permanently engaging IN the act of moralising. I am doing it to you right now.

[Iwannaplato]

I may have misinterpreted. It seemed to me like you were saying it's all ONLY prescriptive. If I got that wrong, well, what follows will repeat and error a number of times.

What I am saying is that normativity is THE fundamental mechanism of morality.

So, when they think or say they are describing, really, they aren't. In fact they don't realize what they are doing? Or perhaps, they don't know what their only option is? IOW can they not also be describing reality at the same time they are prescribing? And further, are we never describing?

"Correcting" others. Prescribing how they think. How they speak. How they act...

Yeah! You are arguing over WHO prescribes the language! It's an exercise in electing a leader.

There's only two of you in the debate so innevitably one becomes the leader and one becomes the follower.

In practice it really doesn't matter what you call it green or blue - it's just a word! But her words (as a painter) matter more to her and so she's unlikely to give up her language and adopt yours. Chances are her vocabulary is much richr; more precise and much more expressive than yours anyway - there's literally no benefit to her to adobt your (much poorer and less expressive) vocabulary!

To let you dictate the language around colors in your household would (quite literally) limit your wife's self expression.

Well, I have my own expertise in the area, just saying why it's hard to get some formal equality. On other issues it's more back and forth.

Everything about human interaction is prescriptive!

Only?

Arguing/persuasion is about changing things. Changing how we think. Changing how we speak. Changing how we act.
Normalising how we think. Normalising how we speak. Normalising how we act.

Sure, arguing persuading. Are we also persauding ourselves (only?)? If in storm I hear a noise that sounds like a window is open and go check but they are all closed, am I merely persuading myself or am I finding out what's going on?

Aren't our efforts with ourselves and others also to get at description? We could just stay in bed or not control variables in research. I can see how controlling variables and deciding to go to the windows is to persuade, but isn't it also to increase my chances of describing?

Wouldn't one who truly believed it was only prescriptive spend the least effort when finding things out for themselves? Or really, there'd be no 'finding out', one would simply proclaim. I can see with others. Such a person would know he'd need some better tricks to persuade, since they don't realize it's all prescriptive. But with him or herself?

[Sculptor]

Okay so a tennis ball is yellow.
IN what way can a ball have a moral quality?

I dunno, it's not my argument so there's 11 more pages of this essay to read before I can answer that. I was just reading a book on my way home from work, and the page I was on more or less directly addressed this stuff that Skepdick always bangs on about. So I took a photo of the page I was reading for the sheer serendipity of it and not much beyond.

If I think this essay makes a good enough case, perhaps I will raise it as a topic. for now, I will just point out that its title is "Values and Secondary Qualities" and I'm gonna have to leave a little to your imagination for a day or two.

But the gist is probably going to be that secondary properties such as redness are those that inspire a recognition of redness within the audience, and so the properties of events and situations that give rise to moral dispositions are likely to be the thing he propses as secondary evaluative properties. And that bit about being understood to be true in virtue of ... rather than actually being true in virtue of is going to have to do some irrationally heavy lifting.

So it looks like you are going to conclude that all moral "secondary" characteristics are actually in the observer and not an inherent property of the object??
Clearly for "redness" there are inherent qualities in the "red" ball that would suggest to most people that it looks the same colour; namely "red". But as we know, the actual perception of red is inherent in the observer, know as a quale, and may be different for each person, but due to the inherent quality of the ball's "colour" most people can agree on the colour.
And since we know that many people can disagree fundamentally about the colour of things we should be aware of the importance of context. Thus for now famous "blue/gold; white/black" dress, even secondary qualities are not as objective as we would wish them to be.
It is hard to see how a ball might be good or evil in any meaningful inherent sense of having its own "secondary quality"; when basic physical qualities are subject to so much argumentation.

[Sculptor]

This thread describes in a nutshell the predicament which itself is the crux om which Jesus breathed his last.

Did he have a predicament?
Which one was that?

[Agent Smith]

This thread describes in a nutshell the predicament which itself is the crux om which Jesus breathed his last.

Did he have a predicament?
Which one was that?

Believe me, you don't wanna know.

[Sculptor]

This thread describes in a nutshell the predicament which itself is the crux om which Jesus breathed his last.

Did he have a predicament?
Which one was that?

Believe me, you don't wanna know.

I don't do belief.
So tell me!

[Skepdick]

I may have misinterpreted. It seemed to me like you were saying it's all ONLY prescriptive. If I got that wrong, well, what follows will repeat and error a number of times.

What I am saying is that prescriptive/descriptive distinction carries with itself a baggage - it's neither here nor there. It's about whether the statement is surprising or not.

If there's no association in your head between this color and the term "red", the association gets created the first time you see somebody use the term like that. It's surprising because the use of the word is new to you. Every consecutive time the association is already there so it's not surprising - you know how people use "red"

If I then told you this color is red that should surprise you because that's a novel use of that term.

It's descriptive to me because that's how I use "red" - it's prescriptive to you because that's not how you use "red".

So, when they think or say they are describing, really, they aren't.

In so far as they are trying to communicate stuff to you they are "prescribing" the sort of manifestations that they want to appear in your head.

If I say "red" I want this color to manifest in our head not this one.

In fact they don't realize what they are doing? Or perhaps, they don't know what their only option is? IOW can they not also be describing reality at the same time they are prescribing? And further, are we never describing?

Communication can never be descriptive. I am altering your mind to experience what I want you to experience.

I mean sure, in a colloquial sense I am describing that the coffee cup on my desk is red. That is to say it's this color.

Everything about human interaction is prescriptive!

Only?
[/quote]
For the purposes of "describing reality correctly" (devoid of any context) it's a fool's errand. There can be sufficient descriptions for particular purposes given some pragmatic context, but there doesn't seem to be context-free descriptions.

The more generic and context-free a description the less useful and pragmatically irrelevant it is.

"The universe exists". OK true. And then?

Sure, arguing persuading. Are we also persauding ourselves (only?)? If in storm I hear a noise that sounds like a window is open and go check but they are all closed, am I merely persuading myself or am I finding out what's going on?

For the purposes of keeping your carpet dry that seems like a sufficient description of what's going on.

Aren't our efforts with ourselves and others also to get at description?

For its own sake? I hope not!

We could just stay in bed or not control variables in research. I can see how controlling variables and deciding to go to the windows is to persuade, but isn't it also to increase my chances of describing?

The incompleteness of your description becomes apparent when you keep asking "Why?"

Wouldn't one who truly believed it was only prescriptive spend the least effort when finding things out for themselves?

It is truly prescriptive. You've left out a lot of detail. And you've brought a lot of detail into focus (rain, thunder, windows). Your goal (keeping your carpets dry) is what made you bring all that stuff into focus while leaving out the details about the color of the sky, and the smell of the ozone in the air; and the size of the raindrops; and the volume of water pouring down.

You can find stuff out for yourself as much as you want. At what level of detail/fidelity would you describe it? How much depth or breath would you deem sufficient? At what level of abstraction would you analyse that which you are finding out? All the way down to quantum? All the way up to cosmology? How would you contextualise your findings?

If you don't know any of these things - you have no relevance filter. Which knowledge is relevant and which is irrelevant? You'd just be acquiring general knowledge. Know-that. Not know-how.

[Iwannaplato]

Communication can never be descriptive. I am altering your mind to experience what I want you to experience.

I mean sure, in a colloquial sense I am describing that the coffee cup on my desk is red. That is to say it's this color.

And in the sense that they get a description. They may use this in a number of ways. Some perhaps fit my purposes. Some not.

So, my prescription, which may be down to 'think of it like this' may lead to a range of actions. They get a potential resource - one that may or may not work and to various degrees in different contexts - whatever my intentions.

Everything about human interaction is prescriptive!

Only?
[/quote]

For the purposes of "describing reality correctly" (devoid of any context) it's a fool's errand. There can be sufficient descriptions for particular purposes given some pragmatic context, but there doesn't seem to be context-free descriptions.

I can go along with that, with the proviso that descriptions can be used in ways beyond the scope of my intentions.

If I simply tell someone to do something, they either do it or not - perhaps to some degree, and with varying degrees of sloppiness and via their interpretations.

But the descriptive element may rest in them and be used later in a variety of ways.

Sometimes this will lead to problems because the description doesn't work outside the context where it did work. But some descriptions give a wider range of applications. And some describers get good or bad reputations due to, yes, the appropriateness of their description/prescription to context, but also in some cases because their (intended to be to some degree general) descriptions can be used in a variety of contexts. Sort of like some models/theories in science lead to better hypotheses used in research. Some don't.

The more generic and context-free a description the less useful and pragmatically irrelevant it is.

"The universe exists". OK true. And then?

That's at the extreme end of generality. Might it not be the case that stuff more in the middle of spectrum can offer a wide range of applications. If we are in a cave and I hear a bear grumble and move towards me and my sun in the dark and I know he has no idea what a bear is, me shouting 'run' fiercely is a good prescriptive option. However sitting with him at the homestead, describing this as a large omnivorous and dangerous animal with the following habits I know and reaction they have coming near their cubs and some generalities about their goals, habits and concerns could allow my son to deal with some future situations that are specific but I don't know those specifics. I'm not, as you say, going down to the quantum level, but he doesn't need that.

Of course my description above is not context free. I am generally giving him a how to survive bear encounters information.

But it's more context free than some descriptions. I'm trying to load him up with something to work with in general. Perhaps as an expert I know how bears tend to differentiate between very specific environments (this kind of grove, swampland, banks of rivers) and very specific information about body language or whatever.

But I try to give him a core base description that increases safety now.

But even here it's a pretty focused encounter. I know something generally I want to get in my kid's mind.

But humans are also exploring with less clear goals and contexts. Building up stores of info and models. This can be useful but the encounter may be elicited by someone wanting to building up a range of knowledge, a lot of descriptions. Which will then be field tested by life and encounters with books, researchers, people, building sites, microscope use, whatever.

Just as your knowledge of programming is finding a wider range of applications than you might have intended. And, yes, you pass this on in specific contexts, but they may now be used by use in the future in ways unintended and not connected.

The expert or interviewee may not be the one determining the context. And the context may be a kind of general knowledge (in some area). Often we don't just hang each description or prescription or combination to a well thought out context. This can be problematic, but it also can be, I think, useful.

For the purposes of keeping your carpet dry that seems like a sufficient description of what's going on.

OK, yes, a description.

Aren't our efforts with ourselves and others also to get at description?

For its own sake? I hope not!

I generally agree, though I am just plain curious. Now my curiosity may be an effective trait. I end up gathering stuff, enough of which is useful (taken in the broadest sense) to offset the energy put in to finding out stuff that never is. So, what may see like for it's own sake (curiosity) may be useful. Or it may be useful to follow one'se curiosity even if one has not the slightest idea why it may be useful and without that motivation (as far as we can tell involved).

Also learning about one thing, I dunno tanning hides, may never lead to my tanning hides, but the particular process of learning about it might teach me something about learning. Or it might be a useful analogy for something. Or I might realize years later that while I never developed the slightest interest in tanning hides, I learned something from the way this guy described the process - what he focused on and why, or his passion and what this lead to, or how he dealt with problems. And while none of these thing directly translated into my novel writing process, they modeled something else about art/craft or whatever that was helpful.

I'm going on and on a bit and I realize that you may find none of this has any disagreement with what your saying. In a way I am checking to see that or if it does go against or seem to things you've said.

It is truly prescriptive. You've left out a lot of detail. And you've brought a lot of detail into focus (rain, thunder, windows). Your goal (keeping your carpets dry) is what made you bring all that stuff into focus while leaving out the details about the color of the sky, and the smell of the ozone in the air; and the size of the raindrops; and the volume of water pouring down.

I would say in this specific situation, where I had a fairly specific goal - find out the source of the noise and make sure it's not something problematic for my carpets or a break in, then my description is tailor suited to those possibilities I am trying to rule out.

But, in other parts of life, without a specific stimulus that I want to understand more about immediately, I may be building up pools of information and models, I guess with a built in heuristic/urge (curiosity) that this will be helpful or merely enjoyable.

You can find stuff out for yourself as much as you want. At what level of detail/fidelity would you describe it? How much depth or breath would you deem sufficient? At what level of abstraction would you analyse that which you are finding out? All the way down to quantum? All the way up to cosmology? How would you contextualise your findings?

Curiosity guides this. Then often contexts and problems arise in the process and I am curious about these or do realize an application. But I have a fairly opened ended approach when seeking descriptions...sometimes. Other times I am looking for something more specific and I likely know in advance the level of detail I want.

If you don't know any of these things - you have no relevance filter. Which knowledge is relevant and which is irrelevant? You'd just be acquiring general knowledge. Know-that. Not know-how.

Well, some know that is know how. Or can help with know how. I'm not interested in a bunch of disassociate facts, generally. I don't do well at Trivial Pursuit compared to those who are interested in those things. My mind ignores names a lot. I do not know the name of the street I see out my front windows. I know the one that t-squares it, which is my address street. Some street names seep in, like if they are important bus stops. But I am hilariously terrible at understanding directions by street names. They have to give me visual directions, what I will see. And I know my city of residence better than most people as far as getting lost or navigating between places.

If I know 'a bunch of facts' that I think I generally have a lot of interconnecting information. I did terribly on history tests in school that focused on the names of Kings, but well on essays focusing on topics, trends, related events (though not the dates).

Pardon. I'm exploring this about, which is thinking out loud, which may be rude. I'm just trying to see what I think and do here.

I guess the main point I want to raise is that I think general somewhat contextless descriptions and seeking them out is both natural and useful. And even if I do not have a conscious context for the knowledge, this is not a reason to rule it out. I guess another way to put this is learning models and approaches without clear goals may provide use later, directly or in ways that are unlikely to be predicted (my meeting the great tanner example). So, I think there is value for heading out with descriptions even if the context, goal and prescriptions related to that are not yet known.

But maybe there is a way I need to challenge my approach to learning things. And there have been shifts as I age.