A coherent approach to objective Morality -- allegedly...

[Alexander_Reiswich]

you obviously have NOT understood or NOT wanted to take on what I have SAID and POINTED OUT and just want to re-repeat what you have previously SAID and STATED, which was ALREADY UNDERSTOOD.

I have asked you some questions, to CLARIFY, which, If you had answered properly, would lead to better descriptions of the different concepts that you are addressing here.

Please trust me when I say that I would be more than happy to answer any and all of your questions, but I can't do it in a single reply, because a) it would take too much time and b) the posts become too fragmented and difficult to follow.

For this reason I would prefer to cover your questions a few at a time, so that I can actually understand whether we have cleared up a particular question, before moving on to the next ones.

It's good to know that we're on the same page regarding "objectivity vs subjectivity" (although I'm still searching for more explicit terminology, but I'll leave that for another time).

Let me respond to your next specific set of questions:

But HOW could a so-called 'objective concept' NOT include NOR rely on the 'viewpoint' of a 'subject', that is; of a human being?

For example we ALL could be referencing 'morality', itself, but is 'morality' EVER a so-called 'external object'?

If no, then there could NEVER exist an 'objective concept', which in turn would also mean there is NO 'objective morality', NOR 'Morality' here, correct?

If no, then WHY NOT?

Let's say we have a subject named Jim. Jim regularly eats chocolate ice cream. He frequently talks about how he loves chocolate ice cream. He acts visibly disappointed when he doesn't get to eat chocolate ice cream. In other words: all empirical evidence available to us suggests that Jim really likes chocolate ice cream.

Now, Jim's preference regarding chocolate ice cream is subjective in the sense I described before. However, the statement "Jim likes chocolate ice cream" is purely descriptive and non-evaluative. It's simply a statement of fact.

This tells us that objective statements can be made regarding subjective preferences. This isn't limited to matters of taste, of course; it can be applied to any kind of subjective belief or conviction.

For example, based on exactly the same empirical approach I described before, we can also conclude that Jim believes that other people have a right to their own property, and it's not OK for others to infringe upon that right.

Again, Jim's particular belief is subjective, but our conclusion about his belief is objective.

So based on Jim's behavior, it's possible for us to determine how serious he is about that particular belief. If Jim regularly treats other people's property without much care, takes what isn't his and doesn't seem to mind when others do the same to other people's property, then we can empirically conclude that Jim does not in fact really belief that other people have a right to their own property. This would be true even if Jim said that he does -- his actions would override his words and prove him to be dishonest or delusional.

Regardless of whether Jim believes in this moral proposition, the point is that we can, in theory, have an accurate, objective estimation of his respect for that rule. This is what I mean when I say that we don't have to rely on subjective values when reasoning about morality objectively, because from an objective viewpoint, neither that rule nor Jim's respect for it have any moral value. All that matters is the objective truth of the degree to which Jim respects that rule.

In other words, both the rule and Jim's belief in that rule are variables. Meaning regardless of their value, they can be "processed" purely logically, without considering whether they're "good" or "bad" in some sense.

So for example, if Jim is a known thief that has no respect for anyone's property rights, and Bob steals from Jim, then we can conclude that Bob acted according to Jim's own standard. In other words, Bob's act of stealing from Jim was objectively "respectful", because it honored Jim's own standard that he lives by. Subjectively, Jim can disagree of course. But once again, his actions override his words and prove him to be dishonest or delusional.

And that's what I mean by "objective morality". By objectively inferring a subjects standard (which is treated as a "external object"), we can make objective descriptions pertaining to whether their actions respect or disrespect those standards, as well as whether the actions of other people relative to them respect or disrespect their standards.

This process in itself is non-evaluative and therefore amoral. But it lends itself to an "injection" of morality: if the subject utilizing it elects that it is morally right to respect other peoples legitimately earned rights / the standards by which they treat others, then it becomes a moral framework for reasoning about how to ensure that people's rights / standards can best be respected. Conversely, by electing that it's morally right to not respect other people's rights / standards, it can be used to reason about how to ensure that people's rights / standards are not respected.

I'm sure you will have some thoughts, questions and arguments about this proposition, so I'll stop here and await your response before proceeding with the next questions.

[Age]

you obviously have NOT understood or NOT wanted to take on what I have SAID and POINTED OUT and just want to re-repeat what you have previously SAID and STATED, which was ALREADY UNDERSTOOD.

I have asked you some questions, to CLARIFY, which, If you had answered properly, would lead to better descriptions of the different concepts that you are addressing here.

Please trust me when I say that I would be more than happy to answer any and all of your questions, but I can't do it in a single reply, because a) it would take too much time and b) the posts become too fragmented and difficult to follow.

For this reason I would prefer to cover your questions a few at a time, so that I can actually understand whether we have cleared up a particular question, before moving on to the next ones.

It's good to know that we're on the same page regarding "objectivity vs subjectivity" (although I'm still searching for more explicit terminology, but I'll leave that for another time).

Let me respond to your next specific set of questions:

But HOW could a so-called 'objective concept' NOT include NOR rely on the 'viewpoint' of a 'subject', that is; of a human being?

For example we ALL could be referencing 'morality', itself, but is 'morality' EVER a so-called 'external object'?

If no, then there could NEVER exist an 'objective concept', which in turn would also mean there is NO 'objective morality', NOR 'Morality' here, correct?

If no, then WHY NOT?

Let's say we have a subject named Jim. Jim regularly eats chocolate ice cream. He frequently talks about how he loves chocolate ice cream. He acts visibly disappointed when he doesn't get to eat chocolate ice cream. In other words: all empirical evidence available to us suggests that Jim really likes chocolate ice cream.

Now, Jim's preference regarding chocolate ice cream is subjective in the sense I described before. However, the statement "Jim likes chocolate ice cream" is purely descriptive and non-evaluative. It's simply a statement of fact.

This tells us that objective statements can be made regarding subjective preferences. This isn't limited to matters of taste, of course; it can be applied to any kind of subjective belief or conviction.

For example, based on exactly the same empirical approach I described before, we can also conclude that Jim believes that other people have a right to their own property, and it's not OK for others to infringe upon that right.

Again, Jim's particular belief is subjective, but our conclusion about his belief is objective.

So based on Jim's behavior, it's possible for us to determine how serious he is about that particular belief. If Jim regularly treats other people's property without much care, takes what isn't his and doesn't seem to mind when others do the same to other people's property, then we can empirically conclude that Jim does not in fact really belief that other people have a right to their own property. This would be true even if Jim said that he does -- his actions would override his words and prove him to be dishonest or delusional.

Regardless of whether Jim believes in this moral proposition, the point is that we can, in theory, have an accurate, objective estimation of his respect for that rule. This is what I mean when I say that we don't have to rely on subjective values when reasoning about morality objectively, because from an objective viewpoint, neither that rule nor Jim's respect for it have any moral value. All that matters is the objective truth of the degree to which Jim respects that rule.

In other words, both the rule and Jim's belief in that rule are variables. Meaning regardless of their value, they can be "processed" purely logically, without considering whether they're "good" or "bad" in some sense.

So for example, if Jim is a known thief that has no respect for anyone's property rights, and Bob steals from Jim, then we can conclude that Bob acted according to Jim's own standard. In other words, Bob's act of stealing from Jim was objectively "respectful", because it honored Jim's own standard that he lives by. Subjectively, Jim can disagree of course. But once again, his actions override his words and prove him to be dishonest or delusional.

And that's what I mean by "objective morality". By objectively inferring a subjects standard (which is treated as a "external object"), we can make objective descriptions pertaining to whether their actions respect or disrespect those standards, as well as whether the actions of other people relative to them respect or disrespect their standards.

This process in itself is non-evaluative and therefore amoral. But it lends itself to an "injection" of morality: if the subject utilizing it elects that it is morally right to respect other peoples legitimately earned rights / the standards by which they treat others, then it becomes a moral framework for reasoning about how to ensure that people's rights / standards can best be respected. Conversely, by electing that it's morally right to not respect other people's rights / standards, it can be used to reason about how to ensure that people's rights / standards are not respected.

I'm sure you will have some thoughts, questions and arguments about this proposition, so I'll stop here and await your response before proceeding with the next questions.

you obviously have NOT understood or NOT wanted to take on what I have SAID and POINTED OUT and just want to re-repeat what you have previously SAID and STATED, which was ALREADY UNDERSTOOD.

I have asked you some questions, to CLARIFY, which, If you had answered properly, would lead to better descriptions of the different concepts that you are addressing here.

[Alexander_Reiswich]

you obviously have NOT understood or NOT wanted to take on what I have SAID and POINTED OUT and just want to re-repeat what you have previously SAID and STATED, which was ALREADY UNDERSTOOD.

I have asked you some questions, to CLARIFY, which, If you had answered properly, would lead to better descriptions of the different concepts that you are addressing here.

It's obvious that you haven't actually read my response and just copy-pasted the same thing you said before

[Age]

you obviously have NOT understood or NOT wanted to take on what I have SAID and POINTED OUT and just want to re-repeat what you have previously SAID and STATED, which was ALREADY UNDERSTOOD.

I have asked you some questions, to CLARIFY, which, If you had answered properly, would lead to better descriptions of the different concepts that you are addressing here.

It's obvious that you haven't actually read my response and just copy-pasted the same thing you said before

ONCE AGAIN, YOUR ASSUMPTIONS and BELIEFS here are leading you completely and utterly ASTRAY.

[FlashDangerpants]

You have no wriggle room. The best way out for you is to just admit that your theory does actually say almost nothing at all, after which I might not bother trying to take the 'almost' away from you.

Even in theory, you were not able to address the crazy neighbour situation without changing the rules for a special event, this was because the example didn't give you a rational agent whose motives you could rationally interpret into one of your little contracts so instead you imagined millions of other people and initiated the contract with them instead. The pizza thing gave an example of using any old rationale to no particular purpose and to do nothing. And this is all using the colloquial edition of "rational", we're not even looking at the outocme of strictly reasoned arguments here.

And that's the fundamental issue your theory could never even in theory escape. There is no wrong way to interpret the rules, there is no right way to interpret the rules, so the whole thing is just a fancy framework of unsupported terminology that you can point to at random while saying things that feel like common sense to you.

"Almost nothing" is more than nothing, which is actually pretty damn good

The status quo is that we can literally say nothing about objective about morality, other than observations regarding people's opinions on it. So any improvement upon this, no matter how slight, is quite significant.

But I do understand where you're coming from, because what I'm proposing is really just a more explicit formulation of what we already know intuitively, which is this:

- there is no external standard by which the moral value of an action or behavior can be judged, only the internal standard of the person committing the action

- the (subjective) internal standards of individuals can be externally (objectively) ascertained to an imperfect, but workable degree

- treating people according to their own standards is by definition respectful, because it's their own standard

- the perception in other people's minds that one has a particular standard regarding some particular thing is developed on the basis of empirical evidence (objectively). Therefore, in order to credibly retain a certain "reputation" regarding one's standards, certain actions must be performed or avoided

- to be treated by one's own standards is a legitimate (subjective) expectation

- if anything, a society striving for justice and fairness (subjectively) ought to ensure that legitimately earned standards (or rights) are honored, and attempts to violate them are prevented, subdued and redressed

After considering it more, I think it might be unfair to minimize the subjective aspects, as they are as important as the objective ones, in their own ways.

How does any of that help you with the problem I was pointing out? You have no way to make any particular interpretation the correct one. Your pizza thing was quite insane and your answer to the cat thing was special pleading. You do need to have a correct way to apply the rule or the whole enterprise was pointless. This problem doesn't go away. VA has been dealing with the same counter arguments for 10 years because he isn't sophisticated enough to discuss real philosophy and because he just tries to wish all his issues away. don't end up like VA.

You don't get to just decide that your objective thing needs to be more respectful of "the subjective aspects" without a huge cost. There's no balance between subjective and objective for you to strike, if you commit to this you will have failed at the objective thing, and the question is becoming one of whether you are up to the job of learning from a failure.

"The status quo is that we can literally say nothing about objective about morality" is partially correct, we can say descriptive objective things about morality, we cannot seem to say any objective prescriptive things about it because there is no way to select for preferred values descriptively. Talks of any "improvement upon this" is absurdly premature. I for instance am not a fan of lying to myself, so I don't see the fantasies that you and VA indulge as useful, sensible, or desirable.

The point at which you start writing (subjective) and (objective) in brackets looks hopelessly confused. you probably need to rethink the whole thing as this not a second language problem, you've tied yourself up in conceptual knots and the result is just crater a with some smoke drifting out of it.





So I now ask you this ... what exactly is so bad about there not being any objective undergarments of morality? That's a real question, you don't have to answer me, but you probably should have some notion of what your answer is. And if you evaluate it without presupposing moral objectivity, would it actually work, logically, or would it get into weird territory where you have to write '(objectively)' in brackets for no obvious reason?