Philosophy Now Forum

So, after going through the compatibilist thread for a while (like 12 pages), something Immanuel Can wrote made me ask this question.

Let’s suspend our judgement and just assume that free will Is true. Let us also assume there is a God which knows the physical state of the world, which also includes all the physical states of our brains, and what those physical states amount to. Given that knowledge, could that God possibly know what choice we are going to choose, before we make it, assuming libertarian free will which seems to be the kind of free will that was being discussed in the compatabilism thread?

If that God could know, what special knowledge does that God have? Is it simply knowledge of all times, past present and future, or is it that this God actually knows what choices will be made? If it is the second option, what exactly could that knowledge be, other than the ability to know something which is essentially random?

This God could not know our future choices like Laplace’s Demon knows everything, because when a choice is supposedly made, even though there are informational inputs to the choice, it is not some weighing of the best possible outcome which determines the choice, but rather, something intervenes, and essentially rolls the dice between those options.

What I would also like to know is, given free will, and in a case of several options, is it correct to say that some options might be more likely, or, are all choices equally likely?

Let’s say I normally go for a run in the morning, but this morning it’s raining. Is it more likely that I will choose not to go for the run now, because of the rain? Or does this state of the world have no causal pull on my choice? What is it, that I am using, to make my choice?

So there are a few things to discuss here.

Feel free to address one or all of them.

The topic was well thought out.

Indeed, it is precisely in its assumptions that in my opinion an answer should be sought.

Because free will, which is assumed to be true, consists in being unconditional origin of events.

And this unconditional origin is compared with what God knows.

But at this point some truths have already been arbitrarily established, which in reality are by no means taken for granted.

First, it is implied that the unconditional origin and God are different entities.
Furthermore, it is assumed that God is an entity that has the faculty of knowing: God knows.
Not to mention the becoming of the world, which is also other than God.

In my opinion we should question these "truths" before facing freedom.

We could start by observing that God = Being.

Therefore God does not know. It has no need to know.
Because God is.

Only those who are not, need to know.

While who he is, he needs nothing but himself.

Furthermore, in fact, being God = Being, there is nothing but it.

God is the negation of the negation.

So that there is nothing that happens at the expense of other possibilities.
Being possible = real.

Dimebag wrote: ↑Fri Jul 01, 2022 12:39 pm So, after going through the compatibilist thread for a while (like 12 pages), something Immanuel Can wrote made me ask this question.

Let’s suspend our judgement and just assume that free will Is true. Let us also assume there is a God which knows the physical state of the world, which also includes all the physical states of our brains, and what those physical states amount to. Given that knowledge, could that God possibly know what choice we are going to choose, before we make it, assuming libertarian free will which seems to be the kind of free will that was being discussed in the compatabilism thread?

Compatibilism is wrong. Free will is the ability of the mind and has nothing to do with the brain states. There is no conflict between God's knowledge and free will. The conflict starts when you become aware of this knowledge and desire to do otherwise.

Dimebag wrote: ↑Fri Jul 01, 2022 12:39 pm If that God could know, what special knowledge does that God have? Is it simply knowledge of all times, past present and future, or is it that this God actually knows what choices will be made? If it is the second option, what exactly could that knowledge be, other than the ability to know something which is essentially random?

Free will looks random from the third-person perspective when the options are equally liked. But there is an element of wanting from the first-person perspective.

Dimebag wrote: ↑Fri Jul 01, 2022 12:39 pm This God could not know our future choices like Laplace’s Demon knows everything, because when a choice is supposedly made, even though there are informational inputs to the choice, it is not some weighing of the best possible outcome which determines the choice, but rather, something intervenes, and essentially rolls the dice between those options.

Yes, the mind can interevine. There is no conflict within God's knowledge and free will.

Dimebag wrote: ↑Fri Jul 01, 2022 12:39 pm What I would also like to know is, given free will, and in a case of several options, is it correct to say that some options might be more likely, or, are all choices equally likely?

There are different types of decisions, conditional, free, and unconditional. Conditional like when you like A more than B and decide to pick up A because you like it. Free like when A and B are equally liked. Unconditional like when you like A more than B but you pick up B for no specific reason.

Dimebag wrote: ↑Fri Jul 01, 2022 12:39 pm Let’s say I normally go for a run in the morning, but this morning it’s raining. Is it more likely that I will choose not to go for the run now, because of the rain? Or does this state of the world have no causal pull on my choice? What is it, that I am using, to make my choice?

So there are a few things to discuss here.

Feel free to address one or all of them.

If you don't go running because you don't like the rain then this is a conditional decision. You however can go unconditionally.