moral relativism

[iambiguous]

Nostalgia, Morality, & Mass Entertainment
Adam Kaiser finds a fine case of mass existential longing.

Throughout the post-modern era, when sincere enjoyment was out of favor, one could always ironically engage with ‘childish’ lowbrow media – so long as one did so with a wink and a nod, as if to say, “I don’t seriously enjoy this, I’m just pretending to, for now.” Of course, we always secretly really enjoy it.

Few things are more problematic than our reactions to conflicts of this sort. Conflicts regarding which books, films, works of art, television programs, sporting events etc., are "okay" to choose and which are not.

And it works exactly the same way from both ends of the political spectrum. Those things we'd prefer that our "comrades" not be privy to.

Still, this secret pleasure is always bracketed with the conscious knowledge that the work is ‘objectively bad’, in that it contradicts one’s self-proclaimed values or aesthetic taste – thus giving birth to the irony of the pleasure.

This part pertains more to the relationship you establish with yourself here. It's one thing to keep your "guilty pleasures" away from those you suspect might not be approving -- "Your reading this?! You're watching that"?! -- and another thing altogether coming up with something that enables you to keep doing it anyway.

Then the psychobabble...

This is why one simultaneously judges the person who sincerely enjoys bad or over-nostalgic work while also taking pleasure in it oneself. Still, since ironic pleasure is founded on a self-contradiction – to experience as good that which one knows is bad – it can never be ‘authentic’ or ‘sincere’. So, while irony may seem a possible resolution to the paradox of the popularity of unpopular values in popular culture, we soon realize that irony can never bring true satisfaction. It’s only a consolation prize awarded in the absence of sincere joy.

Sincere joy? Authentic joy? True satisfaction? About what? Though by all means lets first pin down the irony.

And ever and always it seems to revolve around the manner in which our individual lives unfolding out in a a particular world historically, culturally and pertaining to our uniquely personal experiences.

And how often has the sincere and authentic joy that some experience been at the expense of others?

Being authentic and sincere? You tell me. About exterminating the Jews? About a Marxist revolution? About taking America back again to the 1950s? About reelecting Trump?

Nostalgia, morality, and mass entertainment. Your assessment or mine?

[iambiguous]

MORAL NIHILISM
Finntronaut's Philosophy Fair

MORAL NIHILISM is the meta-ethical view that nothing is morally right or wrong – that is to say that no action in this world can be factually said to be correct or incorrect.

Meta-ethics: "In metaphilosophy and ethics, metaethics is the study of the nature, scope, and meaning of moral judgment. It is one of the three branches of ethics generally studied by philosophers, the others being normative ethics and applied ethics." wiki

Next up: meta facts? Really, note conflicting moral judgments that often pop up "on the news", and pin down that which we can all agree is objectively true in regards to describing and resolving them.

My own interest here revolving around the part where meta-ethical conjectures are used to assess behaviors that do come into conflict pertaining to actual human interactions.

So even an action that you personally find to be of the most abhorrent nature – according to moral nihilism – does not have any factual basis to be called such. So, you might imagine grabbing cute little kittens and puppies and slamming them against the wall – or something akin to that – and according to moral nihilism, it could not be factually said that this action of slamming kittens and puppies against the wall is incorrect. You could have an opinion about it, but you couldn’t factually say that it’s incorrect or correct independent of your opinion about it.

Yep, back again to this:

Humans Ought-Not to Torture Human Babies to Death?

Sure, in a world in which an omniscient and omnipotent God exists, one ought not to. And that is because 1] God will know you did it and 2] with regard to most Gods, you will be punished for doing so. Either your death will end in oblivion or you will burn in Hell for all of eternity.

But, in a No God world, how on earth would mere mortals establish that objectively, universally and/or deontologically torturing a human baby [or sending six million Jews to the gas chamber] is inherently/necessarily wrong?

You might do so [for whatever personal reason] and never get caught, never get punished. It's "universally immoral" but for all practical purposes what does that mean then?

Or next month the Big One might come hurtling down to Earth and extinguish all human life. What of "universal morality" then?

Nope, it seems reasonable to me that, in the absence of God, all things can be rationalized. And, really, hasn't almost everything already been rationalized?

For example, you might not see abortion as the torture of a human baby, but others do. And it certainly results in the baby's death. But that's rationalized, right? And not only was the Holocaust rationalized it was embraced by many Nazis as nothing short of a moral crusade to rid the nation of those who were deemed unfit to live.

That's the scary part when those who insist that some behaviors must be sustained or stamped out gain political power...enabling them to act out their own moral dogmas. Maybe it's the color of your skin, or your ethnicity, or your sexual orientation, or your religion or your politics.

Just ask the moral and political objectivists among us what they themselves believe that human beings ought not to do. Who knows, it might be something that you do.

And...

This comes closest to upending my own "fractured and fragmented" frame of mind. People tap me on the shoulder and ask "can you seriously believe that the Holocaust or abusing children or cold-blooded murder is not inherently, necessarily immoral?"

And, sure, the part of me that would never, could never imagine my own participation in things of this sort has a hard time accepting that, yes, in a No God world they are still behaviors able to be rationalized by others as either moral or, for the sociopaths, justified given their belief that everything revolves around their own "me, myself and I" self-gratification.

And what is the No God philosophical -- scientific? -- argument that establishes certain behaviors as in fact objectively right or objectively wrong? Isn't it true that philosophers down through the ages who did embrace one or another rendition of deontology always included one or another rendition of the transcending font -- God -- to back it all up?

For all I know, had my own life been different...for any number of reasons...I would myself be here defending the Holocaust. Or engaging in what most construe to be morally depraved behaviors.

Though, okay, if someone here is convinced that they have in fact discovered the optimal reason why we should behave one way and not any other, let's explore that in a No God world.

What would be argued when confronting the Adolph Hitlers and the Ted Bundys and the 9/11 religious fanatics and the sociopaths among us. Arguments such that they would be convinced that the behaviors they choose are indeed inherently, necessarily immoral.

How would you reason with them?

And, sure, philosophically or otherwise, there might be an argument that effectively rebuts this frame of mind.

Your own perhaps?

[iambiguous]

MORAL NIHILISM
Finntronaut's Philosophy Fair

Moral nihilists are typically divided into two categories: into cognitivists and non-cognitivists.

COGNITIVISM is the idea that moral statements can be true or false. That is to say that a statement such as “Murder is wrong.”, is not merely an emotional utterance akin to saying “Boo on murder!”, but rather it’s an attempted statement of truth about the nature of this world.

Exactly. The idea that moral statements can be true or false. You say something is moral or immoral because you believe that it is moral or immoral. Yet how do you go about demonstrating that it is either one or the other beyond the belief itself? After all, if, over and over and over again, in regard to a particular killing, everyone could agree on whether it was justified or not, that would seem to suggest there is an optimal frame of mind that rational men and women can embrace in order to avoid succumbing to moral nihilism.

And what would that be? From abortion and euthanasia to all manner of other contested deaths, moral conflagrations seem to be the rule. Then there are the sociopaths who rationalize any behaviors [including murder] that sustain their own entirely selfish wants and needs. Then those who are actually able to justify mass murder -- genocide -- in the name of one or another Kingdom of Ends.

A moral nihilist cognitivist naturally would have to say that all moral statements are therefore false – or else they wouldn’t be moral nihilists, as they wouldn’t fall under the category of believing that nothing is morally right or wrong; if they believed that some moral statements were true, then they would fall under the category of moral realism instead. The cognitivist moral nihilists are typically called “error theorists”.

Or, for those of my ilk, the presumption is that in a No God world there does not appear to be a font -- a moral foundation -- for establishing either objective or universal morality. And it's not that moral statements are either true or false but that the truth itself is predicated on certain sets of assumptions. Thus, abortion is seen by some to be the murder of human babies. In other words, inherently immoral either as a result of one or another religious path or one or another secular deontological assessment. While others assume instead that it's not a human being at all but a "clump of cells". And that politically forcing women to given birth is in fact what is immoral in a world where only women can get pregnant.

The essential idea behind error theory – as originally formulated by J.L. Mackie – is that when moral statements are uttered, there is an attempt happening by the speaker to identify a moral fact about the world, and that this attempt is always in error. Thus the name: ERROR THEORY.

Unless, of course, someone here can effectively argue for the existence of moral facts pertaining to a particular set of circumstances whereby even when any number of objective facts are established as applicable to all of us there are still those centuries old squabbles regarding the "right thing to do".

The most prominent argument for error theory is known as “the argument from queerness” (or strangeness – it has nothing to do with homosexuality). The idea behind the argument from queerness is that if there were moral properties in the world, then these moral properties would be unlike any other properties that we can perceive in the world; the properties would be strange. So, this is an empirical argument saying that we cannot perceive in the world moral properties, and therefore it would be empirically invalid to believe in moral properties.

So, anyone care to bring this particular intellectual contraption down out of the technical, philosophical clouds and note how it is applicable to their own value judgments -- their own moral philosophy -- such that "error theory" is not applicable to the arguments that they make here in regard to their very own one true path to moral enlightenment.

Or even immortality and salvation?

[iambiguous]

The Necessity of Moral Realism
According to M.E. Fox and A.C.F.A. d’Avalos, logic dictates that at least some moral propositions must be true.

“Eating people is wrong” is an indicative moral proposition rather than an imperative moral statement such as “you ought not to eat people”. Indicative moral propositions like “eating people is wrong” are meaningful and are truth-assessable.

Tell that to the Yellowjackets.

Or, seriously, to these folks: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_i ... 0in%201972.

And, as a "philosophical issue", how is it not just another example of "conflicting goods"?

To wit: https://www.ablison.com/pros-and-cons-of-cannibalism/

All this means is that the statement “eating people is wrong” is either true or false. All indicative moral propositions, if they are meaningful, are either true or false. Moral realism is the theory that at least one indicative moral propositions is true. If any ethical claim of the form “x is right” or “x is wrong” is true, then ethics is objective.

You know what's coming...

Okay, if you deem yourself to be a moral realist, note a particular context in which conflicting goods exist -- such as cannibalism -- and translate this particular intellectual contraption into behaviors that you would embrace or eschew yourself in order to demonstrate that eating other human beings is either truly moral or truly immoral.

The moral sceptic, however, thinks that his view is more ‘realistic’ than moral realism. He believes that although all meaningful moral ‘is’ claims are either true or false, the truth of the matter is that all moral claims are in fact false. A systematic ‘error’ occurs because the properties to which indicative moral propositions refer do not exist.

Same thing. If you deem yourself to be a moral skeptic, what of your own behaviors in regard to conflicting goods? How are you not "fractured and fragmented" as "I" am in regard to such things as cannibalism?

In other words, not so much what you believe "in your head" is true about it, but what can be demonstrated -- scientifically? philosophically? theologically? -- to in fact be applicable objectively to all of us.

[iambiguous]

The Necessity of Moral Realism
According to M.E. Fox and A.C.F.A. d’Avalos, logic dictates that at least some moral propositions must be true.

An Argument for Moral Realism

The argument we shall advance in this paper is quite simple. It’s that the meaningfulness of moral language presupposes the objective existence of moral properties. That is, if moral claims are the sort of statements that can be in the first place either true or false, then it follows that some of them are in fact true. In other words, that moral scepticism is false.

We don't call this an "argument for moral realism" for nothing. In other words, if you believe that the point being made here is true then, given a particular context in which moral conflagrations have plagued our species going all the way back to the pre-Socratic philosophers in the West for centuries, what are the moral properties that everyone is able to agree exist objectively?

Instead, in my view, in a No God universe, the moral language that we use here on planet Earth is derived from our agreeing or disagreeing in regard to the definition and the meaning that we give to the words we use in the language itself. The part I root subjectively/subjunctively in dasein.

If, for example, we agree that objectively the unborn are human beings and that forcing pregnant women to give birth is not objectively immoral in and of itself, okay, we argue that abortion is, what, inherently and necessarily immoral? Philosophically immoral?

To wit...

The argument for this conclusion begins with a tautology, a statement that is necessarily true because it is logically impossible that it is false. For instance, the tautology “all husbands are married men” is just true by definition. The tautology in question is: Either [either P or Q] or [not-P and not-Q]. This is trivially true. Whatever x is, it is either going to be P or it’s going to be Q or it’s going to be neither P nor Q. Of course, P and Q are individual propositions rather than properties of x, but it gets the point across.

So, abortion becomes "immoral by definition"? On the other hand, logic and morality? Is it more or less logical that unborn babies have a natural right to life than women burdened with unwanted pregnancies have a political right to abortion?

Back to eating people.

The relevance of this tautology to ethics is revealed when P and Q are substituted by indicative moral propositions. In this case, P = “eating people is right” and, Q = “eating people is wrong”. The tautology can now be transformed into a true statement that has some relevance to the real world: Either [either “eating people is right” or “eating people is wrong”] or [“eating people is not right” and “eating people is not wrong”] which of course means the same as, either “eating people is right” or “eating people is wrong” or “eating people is neither right nor wrong”.

So, logically, deontologically, philosophically, etc., which is it? Is it right or wrong or neither one to eat people?

Or, sure, I'm misunderstanding the argument being made here regarding moral realism. If that is the case, what then is the argument being made...and how is it applicable to moral conflagrations like abortion or cannibalism.

[iambiguous]

The Necessity of Moral Realism
According to M.E. Fox and A.C.F.A. d’Avalos, logic dictates that at least some moral propositions must be true.

Meaning and Scepticism

The truth of moral realism follows logically from the meaningfulness of ethics and the truth assessability of moral propositions.

Again and again: If you agree with this then please note examples from your own life. Note behaviors you chose in interacting with others that came into conflict precisely because what was deemed meaningful -- rational, moral -- by you was rejected as just the opposite by others.

The wholly problematic relationship between morality and logic. What epistemologically can we know for certain when it comes down to resolving conflicting goods?

Consider the following set of statements:

If eating animals is wrong then eating dogs is wrong.
Eating animals is wrong.
Eating dogs is not wrong.
This is internally inconsistent. However, it’s not clear that the sceptic can make any sense of the contradiction. If he assigns the truth-value of falsehood to the above statements, then the if/then relation doesn’t hold and consequently the conjunction of the other two (false) statements is not inconsistent.

Talk about an intellectual contraption! Statements. Words defining and defending other words. Reminds me of the sort of thing you encounter all the time here in the "Ethical Theory" forum. Call it, say, the Veritas Aequitas Syndrome.

Out in the real world where dogs are animals and "somehow" it can be demonstrated [philosophically or otherwise] that eating animals is wrong then, sure, you can still eat them, but in doing so you would be wrong.

On the other hand, suppose you are a Christian. You believe that God created us apart from all other living things: "God created man in His own image..."

We are not animals and killing and eating other human beings isn't just wrong...it's a Sin.

Next up: Judgment Day.

Whereas in a No God world, scientists or philosophers may come up with the definitive proof that eating dogs is wrong. There may be laws passed forbidding it. But you do it anyway because in a No God world you may not get caught. And if you are not caught you are not punished.

That's why a God, the God is of fundamental importance here. He is omniscient so there is no possibility of not being caught. He is omnipotent so there is no possibility of not being punished. That's why Gods are invented.

Thus, when someone creates a thread asking "what could make morality objective?", it seems clear [to those like me] that God is the only correct answer.

And that is precisely what those like IC point out over and over again. His own rendition of "in the absence of God all things are permitted".

Then all the "serious philosophers" going back and forth regarding whether an objective morality is within the reach of philosophy itself: viewtopic.php?t=24601

599 pages later and, well, you tell me.

[promethean75]

"What epistemologically can we know for certain when it comes down to resolving conflicting goods?"

We can know nuthin but the fact that all human beings unanimously agree that TWPMFE should be avoided. From the video thread:

@ 36:00 Harris, Sam presents his 'The Worst Possible Misery For Everyone' thesis as a simplified foundation for 'objective morality'. the fact that everyone but the most abnormal of people naturally prefer that TWPMFE be avoided is sufficient as a foundation for any morality u want to call 'objective'. that's as objective as it needs to be to have a foundation. moreover, there are better ways than others to avoid TWPMFE, which means there are objectively good and bad ways to 'navigate this space' as he put it. For example, sending everyone to a death camp is not as effective at avoiding TWPMFE as giving them Disneyland tickets.

so there u have it, or as close to it as you're gonna get. u have a whole bunch of people who unanimously agree to try and avoid TWPMFE, and certain ways to do that.

https://youtu.be/yqaHXKLRKzg

Now you will note that this makes an intermittent triviality out of morality becuz it states only a basic truism, pain sucks, and does not attempt to take any particular case of conflicting goods for consideration. But u didn't aks that. U aksed for epistemological certainty only.

[promethean75]

Btw in that video Harris, Sam opens his remarks with a defense of the religious and their concern for the shortcomings of secularism. He uses the example of him in a debate with a scientist who's saying that Harris, Sam's claim that forcing women to wear burkas is bad, is merely his opinion. He's tryna show u what the other side of the coin is like and how secular moral relativism can get u into trouble too.

Cool tho that he entered that way. He's distancing himself from both the purely religious view and the abuses that can come of scientism and moral relativism.

[iambiguous]

Logic and Morality
Colin McGinn

Are there any affinities between logic and morality? The question may appear perverse: aren’t logic and morality at opposite ends of the spectrum? Isn’t logic dry and abstract while morality is human and practical? Isn’t one about proofs and the other about opinions?

Affinity: a similarity of characteristics suggesting a relationship

You tell me. Only assess their relationship in regard to a set of circumstances such that at one end there are those like Ayn Rand who argued that the is/ought world is just another inherent, necessary manifestation of the either/or world, and, at the other end, those like me who suggest instead that logic devolves into hopelessly conflicting goods such that it makes more sense to be fractured and fragmented in regard to moral and political value judgments.

Let's try this:

Pick one of these issues...

https://www.procon.org/

...and note which side's arguments are the most logical. Or, perhaps, the side that encompasses the only logical resolution?

Is it more or less logical for Russia to invade Ukraine?
Is it more or less logical to have an abortion?
Is it more or less logical to embrace capitalism rather than socialism?
Is it more or less logical to be liberal rather than conservative?
Is it more or less logical to believe in Christianity?

I think the affinities are real, however, and I propose to sketch them. Both concern guides to conduct: how we should behave, cognitively and practically. Logic gives rules to reason by; morality gives rules for action.

And over and again in the Ethical Theory forum these affinities can be broached, examined, assessed and [sometimes] resolved while making few if any references to actual human interactions that do come into conflict over the pros and cons.

That's why I encourage those who explore morality in that forum to bring their conclusions down to Earth. In other words, bringing them to the Applied Ethics forum where in regard to particular moral and political conflagrations they can be explored given the arguments I make as a moral nihilist.

These rules purport to be correct—to yield valid reasoning and right action. Thus logic and morality are both normative: they tell us what we ought to do. They are not descriptions of what we actually do but prescriptions about what should be done.

Objectively, right?

Though again, as with this...

These prescriptions can take a number of forms: on the one hand, logical laws, rules of inference, and avoidance of logical fallacies; on the other hand, moral laws, rules of conduct, and avoidance of immoral actions. Thus we have the three classical laws of logic (identity, non-contradiction, and excluded middle) and the utilitarian principle, or a list of basic duties (corresponding to consequentialism and deontology). We also have rules for making inferences: modus ponens and the Kantian principle of universalizability, say—as well as warnings against fallacious inference (don’t affirm the consequent, don’t try to infer an “ought” from an “is”). Neither subject is concerned to establish “matters of fact” about the natural world; both are concerned to improve reasoning, make us better people, keep us on the right track. It is good to reason validly and to do what is morally right. Thus logic and morality are procedural and prohibitive, rule-governed and critical. We apply them to facts in order to produce desirable results—true beliefs, right actions—but they are not a form of fact gathering analogous to physics or history.[1] They are practical not theoretical. They are active and engaged not laid-back and detached.

...it's all done in a world of words.

Though, sure, in regard to our own behaviors and our own moral philosophies let's explore the author's points given a particular context.

[iambiguous]

Logic and Morality
Colin McGinn

It would be wrong to contrast the two in respect of formality. It is true that we have formal logic as taught in university logic courses, while morality can scarcely claim anything comparable (though there is deontic logic).

"Deontic logic is a branch of logic that has been the most concerned with the contribution that the following sorts of notions make to what follows from what (or what supports what, more generally): permissible (permitted) impermissible (forbidden, prohibited) obligatory (duty, required) omissible (non-obligatory)" SEP

Anyone here an advocate of deontic logic? Would you be willing to examine it pertaining to a particular set of circumstances in which there are conflicting assessments of permissible, impermissible and obligatory behavior.

But the logic and morality I am talking about are pre-formal—they are embedded in our natural competence at dealing with the world and are probably innately based.

Pre-formal, natural competence? What on Earth does that mean?

On the other hand, if they were innately based -- intrinsically, genetically intertwined? -- why is it that down through the ages and across the globe, so many different people deal with the world in so many different [and often conflicting] ways? Why have logicians and epistemologists not gotten together and announced to the world how philosophically they have finally pinned morality down deontologically?

Then, given a particular context, whatever this...

Logical reasoning existed before Aristotle tried to codify it, and morality pre-dates attempts at explicit refined statement. These are primitive forms of human competence, not dissimilar to language competence before grammarians came along. The distinction between logic and morality is relatively recent and may not have been salient to early humans. We know quite well what is meant by the “ethics of belief”, and we are not shy about pointing out fallacies in other people’s moral reasoning. Sound reasoning is sound reasoning—and it is what we should be aiming at.

...means?

Again, just go here -- https://www.procon.org/ -- and note an issue of importance to you. Then note which side encompasses the soundest reasoning.

[iambiguous]

Logic and Morality
Colin McGinn

The distinction between logic and morality is relatively recent and may not have been salient to early humans.

Logic, morality and early humans?

Tell that to these guys: https://youtu.be/OXDOAzpXIww?si=qb2U04ABSbi1TUUA

https://ilovephilosophy.com/viewtopic.p ... d#p2354907

Then [for better or worse] came the invention of philosophy and what may or may not be legitimate attempts to create a deontological morality. If only theoretically? What never changes here however is, in my view, the complex -- ineffable? -- interaction between genes and memes over thousands of years.

We know quite well what is meant by the “ethics of belief”, and we are not shy about pointing out fallacies in other people’s moral reasoning. Sound reasoning is sound reasoning—and it is what we should be aiming at.

Your sound reasoning regarding what you believe to be ethically true or their sound reasoning? Or, instead, is my own reasoning sound when suggesting that all of this is hopelessly subjective and ever and always evolving in time and space as the embodiment of dasein?

The distinction between logic and morality is not as sharp as we tend to think these days (I suspect it is less sharp in the ancient world than in the post-Christian word). Shoddy logical reasoning is deplored, as immoral action is.

Sharp or dull, let's take your own distinction down out of the philosophical clouds and examine it given the distinctions that I make pertaining to conflicting value judgments.

See if we and others can note when particular reasons given are shoddy leading to deplorable behaviors.

You should keep your promises and you should follow modus ponens; we can worry about fine points of logic versus morality later. If we suppose that animals possess rudimentary forms of logic and morality, are they really distinct modules in the animal mind? Logic and morality bleed into each other.

"Modus ponens: mode of reasoning from a hypothetical proposition according to which if the antecedent be affirmed the consequent is affirmed (as, if A is true, B is true; but A is true; therefore, B is true)"

Same thing though: given what actual set of circumstances?

[iambiguous]

Logic and Morality
Colin McGinn

We think there is no morality in logic textbooks and that moral issues can’t be resolved by formal logic: but that is surely too narrow a view of both fields. Logic is up to its ears in normative notions, and morality is a domain of logical reasoning.

Okay, then broaden our perspective. Note examples from "logic textbooks" that in your view would allow us to conclude that "morality is a domain of logical reasoning". How have you utilized logic yourself in arriving at your own moral philosophy?

This part...

If you are trying to resolve a complex moral issue, such as abortion or animal rights, you will find yourself invoking principles drawn from logic and from normative ethics—as we currently understand those fields.

But how is the manner in which we do come to understand these issues not embedded existentially in dasein? Abortion and animal rights down through the ages historically and across the globe culturally. And in regard to your own personal experiences.

Note your own principles here and defend them as, what, entirely logical and rational?

On the other hand...

But from a ground level perspective these distinctions are blurred and irrelevant: you are just reasoning with whatever bears upon the topic. You are applying your logical and moral competence to a real-world problem with a view to doing what is right. When you avoid deriving an “ought” from an “is” are you doing logic or morality?

Ground level perspectives? Down here is it my logical and moral competence, your logical and moral competence or their logical and moral competence that comes closest to, what, the objective truth?

Sure, up in the theoretical clouds we can debate definitions and deductions. But what does that really have to do with "real world problems"?

To wit...

When you declare that all sentient beings have rights is that intended as a moral principle or a logical one? It functions as an abstract axiom used to draw conclusions—it is irrelevant whether it crops up in a standard logic text (they don’t even include modal logic). We shouldn’t have too narrow a view of logic, and we shouldn’t neglect the abstract character of much moral reasoning. I am inclined to say simply that moral reasoning just is logical reasoning—logical reasoning about questions of value.

Got that? Okay, given a particular "real-world" moral conflagration of note and your own understanding of the relationship between morality and logic, explain to us why you choose one set of behaviors rather than another.

[iambiguous]

Logic and Morality
Colin McGinn

What about the point that logic is fixed, rigid and universal while morality is changeable, fluid and relative? Isn’t morality controversial and logic indisputable? But this is a naïve and tendentious way to think: logic has its controversies and morality is a lot more universal than many people suppose.

Anyone posting here who is not naive and tendentious concur with this? You do? Okay, let's focus in on a particularly explosive ethical conflagration and given a context explore the relationship between logic and morality there.

Let's start here:

Logic: "Logic is often seen as the study of the laws of thought, correct reasoning, valid inference, or logical truth. It is a formal science that investigates how conclusions follow from premises in a topic-neutral manner, i.e. independent of the specific subject matter discussed." wiki

Morality: "In its descriptive sense, "morality" refers to personal or cultural values, codes of conduct or social mores from a society that provides these codes of conduct in which it applies and is accepted by an individual." wiki

You choose the issue and the contexts.

In the interim [as per usual] the assessment stays up in the intellectual clouds..

I won’t rehearse the usual criticisms of moral relativism, subjectivism, emotivism, etc.; suffice it to say that morality is really a subject in objectively good standing. Also, logic is not free of internal strife: some find modal logic suspect, others favor intuitionistic logic, still others adopt a highly inclusive conception of logic (even accepting logical contradictions).

I've always imagined that logic is to words what arithmetic is to numbers. In other words, the equal sign. We use words to convey and to encompass ourselves out in the world around us. The words either equal what is in fact true objectively or they don't. On the other hand, unlike mathematics where the focus is generally confined to the either/or world...numbers used, say, by engineers to construct physical objects in relation to other physical objects or to invent new technologies that are equally applicable to everyone...language has to contend with conflicting value judgments. And here there is no moral equivalent of the equal sign. On the contrary there are these folks...

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_r ... traditions
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_p ... ideologies

...all claiming that right and wrong, good and evil, true and false all come down to their own set of assumptions about the definition and the meaning of the words used in the assessments themselves.

The essential point is that both logic and morality are normative systems designed to facilitate desirable outcomes; and both admit of a degree of formal articulation rooted in intuitive human faculties.

Right. But for those intent only on exploring human ethics "theoretically", the equal sign tends to revolve almost entirely around definitions and deductions. For some [like the Ayn Randroids] philosophy itself is actually there to intertwine logic and morality into, well, Objectivism.

[iambiguous]

MORAL NIHILISM
Finntronaut's Philosophy Fair

MORAL NIHILISM is the meta-ethical view that nothing is morally right or wrong – that is to say that no action in this world can be factually said to be correct or incorrect.

"Metaethics is a branch of analytic philosophy that explores the status, foundations, and scope of moral values, properties, and words. Whereas the fields of applied ethics and normative theory focus on what is moral, metaethics focuses on what morality itself is.

How hard can it be to figure out what "morality itself is"? After all, has there ever been a community of human beings in which, one way or another, "rules of behavior" were not established? Even going all the way back to homo sapiens living in caves, prescribed and proscribed behaviors were around. It's just that with the advent of philosophy, folks like Plato, Aristotle, Kant and others actually imagined morality could be encompassed deontologically. And it's been that way ever since. It's only a matter of whether God -- or "the Gods" -- is factored into the rewards and the punishments. Or one or another secular/ideological dogma. Then, the complex intertwining of "might makes right", "right makes might" or "democracy and the rule of law" kicks in.

So even an action that you personally find to be of the most abhorrent nature – according to moral nihilism – does not have any factual basis to be called such. So, you might imagine grabbing cute little kittens and puppies and slamming them against the wall – or something akin to that – and according to moral nihilism, it could not be factually said that this action of slamming kittens and puppies against the wall is incorrect. You could have an opinion about it, but you couldn’t factually say that it’s incorrect or correct independent of your opinion about it.

Yep, that's how it works alright. That Hamas and the IDF exist is a fact. That they are killing each other is a fact. That they are killing babies and children is a fact.

Okay, is it a fact that one side is doing so immorally and the other side is not? Are both sides, in fact, doing so immorally? Or, since both sides justify doing so in the name of God, are both sides, in fact, doing so morally...righteously?

If a sociopath grabs kittens and puppies and slams them against a wall is that in fact immoral?

How would you go about demonstrating that to the sociopath?

[iambiguous]

MORAL NIHILISM
Finntronaut's Philosophy Fair

Moral nihilists are typically divided into two categories: into cognitivists and non-cognitivists.

COGNITIVISM is the idea that moral statements can be true or false. That is to say that a statement such as “Murder is wrong.”, is not merely an emotional utterance akin to saying “Boo on murder!”, but rather it’s an attempted statement of truth about the nature of this world.

Here, of course, the first truly mind-boggling order of business is to take that surreal leap to free will. Without human autonomy all moral statements are interchangeable in the only possible world.

Thus: click.

So, let's start with this: "Suspect at large in deadliest U.S. mass killing this year". Eighteen dead. Murdered. What then is the cognitivist argument that this is, what, inherently immoral? Though, please, no arguments linked to God unless His existence can be established.

A moral nihilist cognitivist naturally would have to say that all moral statements are therefore false – or else they wouldn’t be moral nihilists, as they wouldn’t fall under the category of believing that nothing is morally right or wrong...

No, in my view, this is only applicable to those moral nihilists [cognitivists or not] who are in turn moral objectivists. Not only do they embrace moral nihilism themselves but are convinced that all other rational men and women are obligated to embrace it as well. And while some here will insist that includes me, it actually does not.

...if they believed that some moral statements were true, then they would fall under the category of moral realism instead.

That again. Though I'm still waiting for the moral realists among us to explore these "moral facts" with me down out of the philosophical clouds. Moral facts and abortion. Moral facts and gun control. Moral facts and this or that war being waged "here and now".

Instead, even further up into the intellectual clouds...

The cognitivist moral nihilists are typically called “error theorists”. The essential idea behind error theory – as originally formulated by J.L. Mackie – is that when moral statements are uttered, there is an attempt happening by the speaker to identify a moral fact about the world, and that this attempt is always in error. Thus the name: ERROR THEORY. The most prominent argument for error theory is known as “the argument from queerness” (or strangeness – it has nothing to do with homosexuality). The idea behind the argument from queerness is that if there were moral properties in the world, then these moral properties would be unlike any other properties that we can perceive in the world; the properties would be strange. So, this is an empirical argument saying that we cannot perceive in the world moral properties, and therefore it would be empirically invalid to believe in moral properties.

You tell me.

Given a particular moral conflagration of note let's explore these moral statements, moral facts, moral properties and...moral errors?