Brink bypassed the Is-Ought Gap and demonstrates Moral Objectivity via,In this chapter [6] I shall examine possible rebuttals based on arguments for and from the existence of an is/ought gap.
Most discussions of the is/ought gap concern its existence, not its implications or importance.
Although nonnaturalists were happy to concede the existence of an is/ought gap, nonnaturalism is no longer thought respectable; most contemporary parties to the discussion seem to assume that the existence of an is/ought gap would in some way undermine the objectivity of ethics.
One reason for thinking that an is/ought thesis would be inimical [opposed] to Moral realism has been quite influential: Noncognitivists have argued that the existence of an is/ought gap would undermine ethical naturalism and commit Moral realism to an absurd kind of nonnaturalism, leaving noncognitivism as the only sane response to the existence of an is/ought gap.
There are other, less well articulated worries about the compatibililty of Moral realism with an is/ought gap, which I shall try to reconstruct: An is/ought gap can be thought to support both nihilism and skepticism.
If any of these claims were true, the existence of an is/ought gap would undermine the metaethical views I have been defending.
I shall argue that these claims are false; the existence of an is/ought gap would undermine neither Moral realism nor a coherence theory of justification in ethics.
Although I shall present and critically discuss the arguments for the existence of an is/ought gap, my main concern is not with the soundness of these arguments.
I shall not attempt a conclusive resolution of the issue concerning the existence of an is/ought gap.
If there is no such gap, so much the better for Moral realism.
My main concern is to explain why - even if there is an is/ought gap - no antirealist or anticoherentist consequences follow.
(Appendix 3 explains why a standard argument against Moral realism based on foundationalism and an is/ought gap fails.)
Brink analyzed the Is-Ought Gap into two theses - logical and semantic;Chapters 2 through 5 present a strong case for the individual plausibility and joint compatibility of Moral realism and a coherentist moral epistemology.
Both the above theses of the Is-Ought Gap has no impact on Moral Realism and Moral Objectivity from the coherentist's approach.Because nonmoral statements consist of
(i..) synthetic statements expressed by sentences using no term in its moral sense, and
(ii) analytic statements,
the is/ought thesis claims that no moral statement can be deduced from a consistent set of premises made up entirely of statements of types (i) and (ii).
This formulation allows us to distinguish two sub theses in the is/ought thesis.
The logical thesis claims that no moral statement can be deduced from statements exclusively of type (i).
The semantic thesis claims that there are no type (ii) statements which by themselves, or in conjunction with type (i) statements, would entail a moral statement.
For more details one will have to read Brink's book.
Views?
p.s. I have lots more of solid sound counters to the Is-Ought Gap which is trivial to moral philosophy; I will post them later.