Is morality objective or subjective?

[Peter Holmes]

Even if there were moral facts, there would still be subjective moral opinions, so these things aren't mutually exclusive.

As I say, I think we all know about subjective morality, so it would be more interesting -I think- to explore how there could even be such things as objective moral truths.

Oh, I see. And we may be talking at cross purposes. My point is, if there are facts of any kind, then opinions about them are irrelevant. Iow, we can and do have our own opinions, but we can't have our own facts. For example, is physics 'subjective' in the way you say morality is?

So yes, to repeat: the important question is: are there moral facts - moral features of reality - so that moral assertions have factual truth-value, regardless of opinion, individual or collective? And I think that's what I've been addressing all along.

And IC's deflection onto a critique of 'moral subjectivism' testifies to the evident failure of claims about moral facts, and arguments for their existence.

[Veritas Aequitas]

Oh, I see. And we may be talking at cross purposes. My point is, if there are facts of any kind, then opinions about them are irrelevant. Iow, we can and do have our own opinions, but we can't have our own facts. For example, is physics 'subjective' in the way you say morality is?

If there are facts [even if there are no facts], opinions, beliefs and judgment of them do translate into real actions.

So yes, to repeat: the important question is: are there moral facts - moral features of reality - so that moral assertions have factual truth-value, regardless of opinion, individual or collective? And I think that's what I've been addressing all along.

There are physical moral facts within all humans and you, e.g. the fact that 'all humans do not torture and kill babies for pleasure' which is represent by its physical neural correlates thus objective within the scientific and moral Framework and System.

Just try to vary your opinions, belief and judgment, it is not likely you and the majority of human will go out there to "torture and kill babies for pleasure" because it is an objective fact, and since dealt within the moral FS, it is a mora fact.

And IC's deflection onto a critique of 'moral subjectivism' testifies to the evident failure of claims about moral facts, and arguments for their existence.

Whilst IC may be ignorant of the actual moral facts, certain commands by an illusory God are in alignment with the inherent moral facts, e.g. the oughtnotness to kill humans. This is dealt within moral luck.

Moral luck describes circumstances whereby a moral agent is assigned moral blame or praise for an action or its consequences, even if it is clear that said agent did not have full control over either the action or its consequences. WIKI

[Peter Holmes]

Oh, I see. And we may be talking at cross purposes. My point is, if there are facts of any kind, then opinions about them are irrelevant. Iow, we can and do have our own opinions, but we can't have our own facts. For example, is physics 'subjective' in the way you say morality is?

If there are facts [even if there are no facts], opinions, beliefs and judgment of them do translate into real actions.

So yes, to repeat: the important question is: are there moral facts - moral features of reality - so that moral assertions have factual truth-value, regardless of opinion, individual or collective? And I think that's what I've been addressing all along.

There are physical moral facts within all humans and you, e.g. the fact that 'all humans do not torture and kill babies for pleasure' which is represent by its physical neural correlates thus objective within the scientific and moral Framework and System.

False. The claim 'all humans do not torture and kill babies for pleasure' is not a moral assertion. It's a factual assertion with a truth-value. It has no moral entailment whatsoever - as neither would its negation: 'all humans torture and kill babies for pleasure'.

As ever, your insertion of a moral entailment is question-begging - you just assume it, with flummery about 'the moral fsk' - or whatever you call it now. And you just don't understand the mistake. Probably never will.

[Age]

Even if there were moral facts, there would still be subjective moral opinions, so these things aren't mutually exclusive.

As I say, I think we all know about subjective morality, so it would be more interesting -I think- to explore how there could even be such things as objective moral truths.

Oh, I see. And we may be talking at cross purposes. My point is, if there are facts of any kind, then opinions about them are irrelevant. Iow, we can and do have our own opinions, but we can't have our own facts. For example, is physics 'subjective' in the way you say morality is?

So yes, to repeat: the important question is: are there moral facts - moral features of reality - so that moral assertions have factual truth-value, regardless of opinion, individual or collective? And I think that's what I've been addressing all along.

And IC's deflection onto a critique of 'moral subjectivism' testifies to the evident failure of claims about moral facts, and arguments for their existence.

you, still, do not yet seem to be able to comprehend and understand that even so-called 'facts' are nothing more than just based upon 'people's opinions, or views', of which differing views and opinions are always based upon 'people's previous opinions, or views', and thus are always 'subjective', by definition.

[Age]

Oh, I see. And we may be talking at cross purposes. My point is, if there are facts of any kind, then opinions about them are irrelevant. Iow, we can and do have our own opinions, but we can't have our own facts. For example, is physics 'subjective' in the way you say morality is?

If there are facts [even if there are no facts], opinions, beliefs and judgment of them do translate into real actions.

So yes, to repeat: the important question is: are there moral facts - moral features of reality - so that moral assertions have factual truth-value, regardless of opinion, individual or collective? And I think that's what I've been addressing all along.

There are physical moral facts within all humans and you, e.g. the fact that 'all humans do not torture and kill babies for pleasure' which is represent by its physical neural correlates thus objective within the scientific and moral Framework and System.

'All humans do not fly airplanes for pleasure', and this is the fact. Therefore, and according to your so-called 'logic' here, this is objective with some made up 'framework and system' and therefore is a 'moral fact' as well, right?

But, if I have this wrong in absolutely anyway "veritas aequitas", then just explain how and why, exactly.

Just try to vary your opinions, belief and judgment, it is not likely you and the majority of human will go out there to "torture and kill babies for pleasure" because it is an objective fact, and since dealt within the moral FS, it is a mora fact.

When you said and wrote the last two 'it' words here "veritas aequitas" what does those two 'it' words refer to, exactly?

And IC's deflection onto a critique of 'moral subjectivism' testifies to the evident failure of claims about moral facts, and arguments for their existence.

Whilst IC may be ignorant of the actual moral facts, certain commands by an illusory God are in alignment with the inherent moral facts, e.g. the oughtnotness to kill humans. This is dealt within moral luck.

But you, "veritas aequitas", are the first one to claim that some human beings 'should' be killed or murdered. So, how, exactly, does this 'fit in' with your claim here?

Moral luck describes circumstances whereby a moral agent is assigned moral blame or praise for an action or its consequences, even if it is clear that said agent did not have full control over either the action or its consequences. WIKI

[Age]

If there are facts [even if there are no facts], opinions, beliefs and judgment of them do translate into real actions.

So yes, to repeat: the important question is: are there moral facts - moral features of reality - so that moral assertions have factual truth-value, regardless of opinion, individual or collective? And I think that's what I've been addressing all along.

There are physical moral facts within all humans and you, e.g. the fact that 'all humans do not torture and kill babies for pleasure' which is represent by its physical neural correlates thus objective within the scientific and moral Framework and System.

False. The claim 'all humans do not torture and kill babies for pleasure' is not a moral assertion. It's a factual assertion with a truth-value. It has no moral entailment whatsoever - as neither would it's negation: 'all humans torture and kill babies for pleasure'.

Although you are right about 'that claim' having no 'moral assertion' and is just a 'factual assertion' it still does have some sort of 'moral entailment' to it, in the sense that what you human beings do, and/or how you mis/behave, it could be said and argued is all about 'morality' or a 'moral issue'.

So, although 'the claim', 'all human beings do not torture and kill babies for pleasure', in and of itself has no implied meaning nor claim about what is Right nor Wrong in Life, there is a 'moral issue' in there, somewhere, obviously.

That is if one wants to go looking for it.

As ever, your insertion of a moral entailment is question-begging - you just assume it, with flummery about 'the moral fsk' - or whatever you call it now. And you just don't understand the mistake. Probably never will.

How many posters here 'understand' 'the mistake/s', which 'we' all keep making here?

[phyllo]

As I say, I think we all know about subjective morality, so it would be more interesting -I think- to explore how there could even be such things as objective moral truths.

Well, there would be verifiable reasons for why something is moral/immoral.

For example, if theft is allowed, people would have to expend a large amount of time, effort and money to secure their property. Those are resources that could be used in better ways.

It wouldn't be just a subjective evaluation of "theft feels bad to me".

[Peter Holmes]

If there are facts [even if there are no facts], opinions, beliefs and judgment of them do translate into real actions.


There are physical moral facts within all humans and you, e.g. the fact that 'all humans do not torture and kill babies for pleasure' which is represent by its physical neural correlates thus objective within the scientific and moral Framework and System.

False. The claim 'all humans do not torture and kill babies for pleasure' is not a moral assertion. It's a factual assertion with a truth-value. It has no moral entailment whatsoever - as neither would it's negation: 'all humans torture and kill babies for pleasure'.

Although you are right about 'that claim' having no 'moral assertion' and is just a 'factual assertion' it still does have some sort of 'moral entailment' to it, in the sense that what you human beings do, and/or how you mis/behave, it could be said and argued is all about 'morality' or a 'moral issue'.

Not so. I'm referring to logical entailment: how non-moral premises can never entail moral conclusions.

P: All humans think X is morally wrong. / All humans don't 'do X'.
C: Therefore, X is morally wrong.

The conclusion simply doesn't follow from either premise. X can be 'caring for babies' or 'torturing, etc, babies', and the argument remains invalid. We have to inject or assume the moral opinion from outside the argument, as you do below when you say 'there is a 'moral issue' in there'.

So, although 'the claim', 'all human beings do not torture and kill babies for pleasure', in and of itself has no implied meaning nor claim about what is Right nor Wrong in Life, there is a 'moral issue' in there, somewhere, obviously.

That is if one wants to go looking for it.

As ever, your insertion of a moral entailment is question-begging - you just assume it, with flummery about 'the moral fsk' - or whatever you call it now. And you just don't understand the mistake. Probably never will.

How many posters here 'understand' 'the mistake/s', which 'we' all keep making here?

Not for me to say. I just point out when they appear not to.

[Lorikeet]

What makes morality/ethics objective is the consequences of denying them.
All can deny them as products of the human mind, meant to control and exploit....but the consequences of immoral behaviour are independent from human interventions.
Belief is not required.
God is not necessary.

The necessity for moral rules determines the inevitability of the repercussions when contradicting them.

Morals is simply how men encoded and categorized behaviours they deemed to be essential to cooperative survival and reproduction.

Nothing emerges from nothingness.
Even nothingness, in the metaphysical sense, is not nothing.
Literally, no-thing, if 'thing' is properly understood to be a human interpretation of a pattern, which is present and interactive - it exists.
So, 'things', nor things-in-themselves, do not exist outside brains, and there they exist as neural representations.
But no-thing does not mean non-existent, if by existence we mean ΕΝΕΡΓΕΙΑ - energy....or what the pre-Socratics sought to conceptualize using metaphors like water or fire....the latter being my preference. Heraclitus.

[FlashDangerpants]

As I say, I think we all know about subjective morality, so it would be more interesting -I think- to explore how there could even be such things as objective moral truths.

Well, there would be verifiable reasons for why something is moral/immoral.

For example, if theft is allowed, people would have to expend a large amount of time, effort and money to secure their property. Those are resources that could be used in better ways.

It wouldn't be just a subjective evaluation of "theft feels bad to me".

For that you just moved the same problem onto another entity. By making the 'objective' wrongness conditional on the rightness of property and the 'betterness' of other uses for it. The imperative is hypothecated on the prudential assumption that it is good not to take property away from people, and syuch hypothetical imperatives are not categorical.

[FlashDangerpants]

Pete is unusual mainly in that he seems content to argue the basic sceptical point without feeling any particular need to fill in the gap created by that doubt. The question for him, in this thread anyway, doesn't stray from "is morality subjective or objective?" to other questions such as "if morals can't be known in that sense, then how does our moral reasoning actually work?"

Some thoughts.

1 The 'basic sceptical point' is fundamental. If there is no valid and sound argument for moral objectivity, then moral objectivism is incoherent.

I think you are probably right.

2 The rejection of moral objectivism doesn't entail moral scepticism anyway. That strikes as an IC-type false dichotomy: my way or the highway.

There are lots of types of moral skepticism, at heart all it takes to be a moral skptic is to doubt the viability of moral facts. We shouldn't confuse it for moral abolitionism, nihilism, constructivism or relativism, which are a seperate class of thing.

3 'Our moral reasoning' - and why it has changed - (St Paul: 'Slaves, obey your earthly masters') - and is still changing - can be described and explained, historically and practically. And every change involved/involves a revolt against the supposed 'moral facts' championed by objectivists, religious or secular. Our history testifies against moral objectivism.

That's a quite credible inference from the empirical data available. My preferred addition (stolen from Isaiah Berlin) is to add that there is an explanation for why we should expect it to be tha way, given the incommensurable nature of the objects of moral desire (fairness, justice, truth and blah blah blah...) which are constantly traded off against each other due to the impossibility of harmony.

That might not be the perfect way to take it, but something is needed to demonstrate that the most approipriate inference to be taken from the history of morals is that they lack cohesion and that ten thousand years of effort to refine them has resulted in ten thousand years of confusion. One alternative narrative is that we have spent ten thousand years engaged in a trial and error experiment to uncover true virtue, and that if we all put our heads together we now have enough data to start working out a better way of uncovering moral truth.

I think the project of explaining where our moral values and codes come from - 'filling the actual gap' - is important. So I'm following your developing argument with interest.

Whoops. Truth be told I haven't even deecided where that's going next.

[Immanuel Can]

You mean it doesn't deliver any objective moral information at all.

I neither said that, nor even implied it. In fact, I said the opposite: that I don't need any reference to Objective Moralizing to make the point.

Here's the point: what can Moral Subjectivism, even if we took it to be entirely true, teach anybody?

It's about group morals, if a group agrees on them. Or personal morals.

Then if the "group" of Nazis says, "Jews must be exterminated," that's "moral"? Or even if a "person" does?

And what if the "group" tells the "person" to kill Jews, and she refuses? Is she then "moral" (for sticking with her personal feeling) or "immoral" (for offending the group's command)?

You see, that just won't work.

[phyllo]

For that you just moved the same problem onto another entity. By making the 'objective' wrongness conditional on the rightness of property and the 'betterness' of other uses for it. The imperative is hypothecated on the prudential assumption that it is good not to take property away from people, and syuch hypothetical imperatives are not categorical.

If you don't use the concept of "betterness' then you can't make any decisions at all. Not just in morality but in everything.

The point is that "betterness" is not based entirely in your feelings.

[FlashDangerpants]

For that you just moved the same problem onto another entity. By making the 'objective' wrongness conditional on the rightness of property and the 'betterness' of other uses for it. The imperative is hypothecated on the prudential assumption that it is good not to take property away from people, and syuch hypothetical imperatives are not categorical.

If you don't use the concept of "betterness' then you can't make any decisions at all. Not just in morality but in everything.

The point is that "betterness" is not based entirely in your feelings.

Of what is "betteness" a property other than human judgements? There is nothing objectively better about life than death, or comfortable chairs than hot sharp rocks, we just like one of them more than the other so we make the normative judgement that it is "better".

[phyllo]

GDI