Is morality objective or subjective?

[Gary Childress]

Some more food for thought.

what do the terms "objective" and "subjective" mean with respect to morality?

ChatGPT
In the context of morality, "objective" and "subjective" refer to different ways of understanding the nature of moral judgments and principles:

Objective Morality: Objective morality refers to the belief that moral principles or truths exist independently of individual beliefs, feelings, or cultural perspectives. In other words, objective moral standards are considered to be universally true regardless of personal opinions or cultural norms. According to this view, certain actions are inherently right or wrong, and moral judgments can be based on criteria that exist beyond individual or societal preferences.

Subjective Morality: Subjective morality, on the other hand, holds that moral judgments are dependent on individual or cultural perspectives, beliefs, and values. According to this view, what is considered right or wrong varies from person to person or culture to culture. Moral judgments are seen as relative and influenced by subjective experiences, emotions, and cultural norms.

To illustrate the difference:

An objective moralist might argue that killing innocent people is inherently wrong, regardless of anyone's personal beliefs or cultural context. They might appeal to universal moral principles or natural laws to support this claim.

A subjective moralist, however, might argue that the morality of killing innocent people depends on the circumstances, cultural beliefs, or individual perspectives. They might argue that in certain situations, such as self-defense or wartime, killing may be justified, or they might claim that moral judgments are entirely dependent on personal or cultural values.

These terms are used to characterize different philosophical positions regarding the nature of morality and the basis of moral judgments. The debate between objective and subjective morality is complex and has been explored by philosophers throughout history.

[Immanuel Can]

can morality be objective if there is no god?

ChatGPT
Yes, morality can be considered objective even in the absence of a belief in God. Many philosophical frameworks propose objective morality without relying on divine authority. Here are some ways in which morality can be considered objective without reference to a deity:

Ethical Naturalism: Ethical naturalism asserts that moral truths can be derived from natural facts about the world. This perspective suggests that moral principles are grounded in observable aspects of reality, such as human well-being, social cooperation, or the consequences of actions. For example, the ethical theory of utilitarianism holds that actions are morally right if they lead to the greatest happiness for the greatest number of people, without invoking supernatural entities.

Moral Realism: Moral realism posits that moral facts exist independently of human beliefs and cultural norms. Proponents of moral realism argue that moral principles are objective features of the world, akin to facts about the natural sciences. While moral realism doesn't inherently rely on the existence of God, it often proposes that moral truths are grounded in some non-divine aspect of reality, such as human nature or universal principles.

Social Contract Theory: Social contract theories suggest that moral principles are derived from agreements or contracts made among rational individuals in a hypothetical state of nature. These agreements are based on mutual self-interest and the need for social cooperation. While social contract theories may vary in their specifics, they often propose objective moral principles that arise from rational deliberation and consensus among individuals, without necessitating belief in a deity.

Kantian Deontology: Immanuel Kant's deontological ethics proposes that moral principles are derived from reason and the concept of duty. According to Kant, certain actions are inherently right or wrong based on universal moral laws, such as the categorical imperative. Kantian ethics doesn't depend on the existence of God but rather on the rational autonomy of moral agents and the intrinsic value of human dignity.

These are just a few examples of how morality can be conceived as objective without reference to a divine source. Different philosophical perspectives offer various ways to ground objective morality in natural, rational, or social aspects of reality.

Question, IC: Is the above answer from ChatGPT incorrect?

Well, that's tricky. It looks right, at first, but it's actually wrong. But you have to watch the wording closely to see where it goes wrong. The facts are basically right, for the most part; but the conclusion that any of these proves objective morality is not accurate...if, indeed, that is even what we are supposed to understand from the wording selected in ChatGPT.

The phrase "can be considered" is deceptive, you see. It can mean, something like "is," but in a weak, wordy form, or it can mean "some people exist who consider (emphasis on their act of considering)".

If the second sense is right, then the list is appropriate: it's saying only that there are various people who wrongly "consider" objectivism to be groundable on Kantianism, or Utilitarianism, or Aristotelianism, or whatever. That's what they "consider." But, what ChatGPT doesn't add is that they are wrong if they "consider" things that way.

How do we know they are wrong? Well, for one thing, all of these ethical frameworks listed disagree in pretty profound ways. They begin with different suppositions about what the basic moral axiom might be, and very often, end with different conclusions. What's lacking is a meta-ethical way to arbitrate among them. We can't tell if we should be Kantians or Benthamites or Neo-Aristotelians or Randians or Ethics of Care proponents, or whatever. None of them has been able to provide the sort of metaethical certification that would give it the decisive and arbitrating advantage over all the other possible views. And none has been able to show itself objective: and we surely need that, for an objective morality.

For another thing, if you try to put any of them into logical form (as in a syllogism), but start from the premise that non-Theism insists upon, namely, that the universe is not a designed entity but an accidental collocation of atoms, there's no way to get to the conclusion about what is right or wrong. (This is at the heart of Hume's famed is-ought critique, for example. Hume says there's no way to get from a statement of empirical fact to a statement about moral values; and secularly, there isn't: he's right.) So all ethical theories turn instantly arbitrary, then. There's no justification in supposing that an indifferent universe, operating by time and chance, has generated any real thing such as "objective moral value". We're in a reality composed of brute facts, not spooky values. And we ourselves are accidentally-produced beasts (even if brainy ones), and the same rules that apply to lower animals -- namely, only the brute laws of matter and force -- apply also to us. Objectively, there's no moral quality in that. Even survival itself is not required of mere animals...if they happen to want it, that's as contingent as any other fact; and they're no more entitled to expect it than was the passenger pidgeon or the Tasmanian tiger. Beasts go extinct. We are beasts. We may go extinct. Who can say? And what can be "owed" to perishable beasts?

More could be said; but it seems to me these considerations are already so fatal that we can recognize ChatGPT as only having made a claim about what "considerations" people sometimes have about ethics, not that those "considerations" justify any belief in objective morals construed secularly.

[Harbal]

Well, let's do it. But let me ask you this, so I know what my task is. What do you regard as the necessary criteria for proving that something is genuinely "moral"?

What do you mean by "genuinely moral"?

Well, when we ask somebody if what they want to do is "moral," we don't mean "practical," or "popular," or "convenient," or "desirable," or "lucrative," or whatever. We mean something quite different, the kind of quality that makes an action or person, in some sense, "good," or "principled," or "noble."

Yes, I agree with the above, but according to a specific interpretation of "good". To be morally "good", an act or intention would have to be good in respect to other people. It would either have to be deliberately intended to be beneficial to others, or deliberately intended to avoid any detriment to others. It is the implications that something has for other people that determines its moral status. To perform an act that is believed to be in the service of God would not have a moral value, in my opinion, it would be how the consequences of the act affected other human beings that would give it that, whether it be a positive or negative moral value. I think that may well be a point on which we differ.

All I'm asking is what this special quality associated with the word "moral" ought to be, in your view.

I am hoping what I've written above explains that.

And to help, I gave you examples of how an Objectivist would go about responding to that question -- because they have means to respond -- but I can't see that Subjectivist or Solipsists have the same sorts of things in view when they say "moral." And I can't put words in your mouth. So I want to know what you DO think being "moral" entails.

It entails having good intentions towards other people; taking their welfare and benefit into account, and it entails the avoidance of doing harm to other people, or unfairly disadvantaging them in any way.

This is a concise definition of morality that I got from an online dictionary. I think there is much more to morality than can be gleaned from this short sentence, but it does convey the gist of what I understand "morality" to mean:

"A set of personal or social standards for good or bad behaviour and character"

If you do not agree with this definition, then I respectfully ask you not to criticise it, but rather, just provide an acceptable definition of your own.

I did do that, in my previous message. I listed four things that Objectivists can say are qualities of things that are "moral." I'll repeat:

But an Objectivist would say, and I would say, that for an axiom to be genuinely "moral," it would have to have a certain set of features. Among these are that it would have to be conformable to the objective truth (obviously).

I am not being argumentative just for the sake of it, honestly I'm not, but I really don't know what objective moral truth could possibly be.

Secondly, it would have to be logical in view of, and rationalize with, the Moral Objectivist's fundamental assumptions about the universe.

I'm sorry, but I don't know what that means.

Thirdly, it would be obligatory for all persons who are in the relevantly similar situations, so universal, and capable of informing others. Fourthly, it would have to be authoritative...and I could go on.

I think those are unrealistic demands, not to mention undesirable, but I don't want to enter into an argument about it. I will just accept that as being your view.

The definition you gave from the dictionary above has none of them, because it fudges the question. It says, for example, that morality involves "standards" (which would seem to imply they hold for more than one person, or at least hold regardless of one's personal disposition, but that's not definite) and then they say these "standards" can be "social," which makes some sense, but then "personal" could get us back to mere Solipsism again. Whatever else one can say about that definition, therefore, it's too equivocal to tell anybody much. It works only as long as one doesn't think about it very hard.

Okay, that's your opinion and I accept it. I'm not going to try to put up a defence, I've done enough of that, but there is just a point I have to make. As inadequate as you think that any version of subjectively based morality might be, my argument is that it is the only kind there is.

Then I added the problem I think you're going to face in honouring that request:

I have to ask, because it seems obvious to me that Subjectivism has no such criteria. It accepts everything -- and hence, distinguishes nothing-- as "moral." Anything a person can desire or do is equally "moral" to everything else, under Subjectivism, which is the same as to say that the word "moral" itself fails to pick out anything in particular. It voids the word itself of any particular referents, and makes it refer to nothing.

No, that is an appallingly false and unfair description, but we've been through all this several times before, and now we are looking at your alternative.

[Immanuel Can]

What do you mean by "genuinely moral"?

Well, when we ask somebody if what they want to do is "moral," we don't mean "practical," or "popular," or "convenient," or "desirable," or "lucrative," or whatever. We mean something quite different, the kind of quality that makes an action or person, in some sense, "good," or "principled," or "noble."

Yes, I agree with the above, but according to a specific interpretation of "good". To be morally "good", an act or intention would have to be good in respect to other people. It would either have to be deliberately intended to be beneficial to others, or deliberately intended to avoid any detriment to others. It is the implications that something has for other people that determines its moral status.

Wait. Do you realize the implication of what you've just decided? You've decided that morality is NOT Solipsistic. It's not just whatever anybody thinks. It involves other people. Morality is about how you treat others, not about how you act with regard to twinges you personally have.

I agree. Morality is not about what one man thinks/wants/feels. It's performed in respect to other people. We might even argue (and I would) that we can have other kinds of beings that "count" ethically. For example, many people believe in the "ethical treatment of animals," or "environmental ethics." Again, I would have to agree: morality has to do with what you do with the natural world itself, not just what you do with other people, and certainly not only what you do all by yourself.

But the important question is this: is God an entity that counts in the ethical field? Can one behave morally or immorally in relation to God? And you say...

To perform an act that is believed to be in the service of God would not have a moral value, in my opinion,

Well, since you refuse even to consider the possibility that God exists, that seems automatic. But it's arbitrary, unless you can prove that God does not exist. If he does, you'd clearly be wrong about that. If animals and plants can play a rule in ethical calculations, it would be unthinkable that the Supreme Being does not even rise to their level in matters of moral judgment.

...it would be how the consequences of the act affected other human beings that would give it that,

The problem with that, though, is where do human beings get their value from? The Declaration of Independence says it is "endowed by their Creator." Locke says it's a product of rightfully belonging to God Himself. But secularism only makes any sense if we're not any kind of specially exalted creature at all, but only another kind of beast, fashioned not by the Designer, but by time, chance and the accidentaly coming-together of random atoms.

Hume saw this. And he was no Theist, for sure.

All I'm asking is what this special quality associated with the word "moral" ought to be, in your view.

I am hoping what I've written above explains that.

Only part of it. Morality has to do with other people: well and good. But what makes people worthy to count in the moral equation? We need to explain that, too.

...there is just a point I have to make. As inadequate as you think that any version of subjectively based morality might be, my argument is that it is the only kind there is.

Yes, that's your assumption, I know. But what you have to understand is that it means there's no actual morality at all...just an illusion that some people have. Some people THINK they owe the perishable beasts they live with (i.e. other human beings) some kind of special consideration, and others THINK maybe they don't. But there's no obvious reason we'd owe perishable beasts anything at all, let alone moral importance. That's the harsh truth of the matter.

Then I added the problem I think you're going to face in honouring that request:

I have to ask, because it seems obvious to me that Subjectivism has no such criteria. It accepts everything -- and hence, distinguishes nothing-- as "moral." Anything a person can desire or do is equally "moral" to everything else, under Subjectivism, which is the same as to say that the word "moral" itself fails to pick out anything in particular. It voids the word itself of any particular referents, and makes it refer to nothing.

No, that is an appallingly false and unfair description,

I'm sorry, but it's the plain truth. It would be more polite, perhaps, to lie and say that one can be a Subjectivist and still rationalize believing in morality. But one can't. Nietzsche had this right. Hume had it right. It's a bitter pill, but as Nietzsche famously wrote, "Swallow your poison; for you need it badly."

[Harbal]

I agree. Morality is not about what one man thinks/wants/feels. It's performed in respect to other people. We might even argue (and I would) that we can have other kinds of beings that "count" ethically. For example, many people believe in the "ethical treatment of animals," or "environmental ethics." Again, I would have to agree: morality has to do with what you do with the natural world itself, not just what you do with other people, and certainly not only what you do all by yourself.

Yes, I do include the treatment of animals, but I was trying to keep my explanation as brief as possible. I also agree that what you do "all by yourself" is not a matter of morality if it has no implications for anyone else. For example, if someone was deposited and left on some planet that had no other sentient creatures on it, it would be impossible for that person to do anything that had any moral implications.

But the important question is this: is God an entity that counts in the ethical field? Can one behave morally or immorally in relation to God? And you say...

To perform an act that is believed to be in the service of God would not have a moral value, in my opinion,

Well, since you refuse even to consider the possibility that God exists, that seems automatic. But it's arbitrary, unless you can prove that God does not exist. If he does, you'd clearly be wrong about that. If animals and plants can play a rule in ethical calculations, it would be unthinkable that the Supreme Being does not even rise to their level in matters of moral judgment.

God's existence, or absence, makes no difference to the principle. The moral value of a decision or act comes from the intention behind it and the consequences of it, it is put there by its originator, not created by him/her. You seem to say that everything that God does is morally right simply by virtue of God's doing it, but that is where I disagree with you.

...it would be how the consequences of the act affected other human beings that would give it that,

The problem with that, though, is where do human beings get their value from? The Declaration of Independence says it is "endowed by their Creator." Locke says it's a product of rightfully belonging to God Himself. But secularism only makes any sense if we're not any kind of specially exalted creature at all, but only another kind of beast, fashioned not by the Designer, but by time, chance and the accidentaly coming-together of random atoms.

I don't think we are any kind of "specially exalted" creature, and I do think we are just another kind of beast. I do think human beings are a special case, but that is only because I am a member of the species. I believe our sense of morality and our capacity for caring about the welfare of one another is a product of human evolution; it enables us to much more successfully function as a social species.

...there is just a point I have to make. As inadequate as you think that any version of subjectively based morality might be, my argument is that it is the only kind there is.

Yes, that's your assumption, I know. But what you have to understand is that it means there's no actual morality at all...just an illusion that some people have. Some people THINK they owe the perishable beasts they live with (i.e. other human beings) some kind of special consideration, and others THINK maybe they don't. But there's no obvious reason we'd owe perishable beasts anything at all, let alone moral importance. That's the harsh truth of the matter.

But we know that people are capable of having moral feelings and intentions, or at least I know it, and I assume that you do. I don't see what difference God or objective moral truth would make to that. Even if we believe that there is actually objective moral truth, that in itself would not make us take any notice of it. There would be no reason for anyone to do that unless they had a sense of morality to start with. You would already have to have a sense of right and wrong to even be able to understand the concept of objective moral truth. How are you able to judge that obeying God is the right thing to do if you haven't already got that sense?

[Will Bouwman]

Changing somebody's mind has to be voluntary, Will.

So you have to want to believe in God. QED.

In a sense, yes.

Well again, QED.

If you don't, you never will, of course, even if God exists. Your antipathy to the idea will induce you never to accept anything -- even a miracle performed right in front of your own eyes, if such happened -- as "not evidence."

Well, you talk about probability and I bang on about underdetermination; so we both know that God is not the only possible explanation for any phenomenon, even something that you would call a miracle much more readily than me. When you say 'you' as in "your antipathy", I will assume that you mean you in a general sense, rather then me specifically, because I can accept everything you offer as "evidence" for your God as just that. What you don't want to accept is that the same piece of evidence can support different hypotheses, such that evidence for God is evidence for God and nothing else.

But it's very minimal enthusiasm that's required. Christ talked about "faith as small as a mustard seed," and faith as equivocal and dim as "a smoking flax." All that's required is some small measure of willingness to believe that "[God ]exists that He is the Rewarder of those who seek Him," as Hebrews says.

I don't think you would describe yours as a "very minimal enthusiasm", but then I wouldn't describe my willingness to believe in some god as "some small measure". I don't think that something godlike is the most implausible explanation advanced by serious people for the origin of the universe; but again it is just one of many underdetermined hypotheses. Faith is less an of opening the heart, more a closing of the mind.
With regard to the specific God you believe in, I think there are much more likely sources of the Biblical account than divine inspiration. In the context of the current debate, let's not forget that apart from seeds, Jesus is also alleged to have said "Depart from Me, ye cursed, into everlasting fire prepared for the devil and his angels." Matthew 25:41. Jesus is the first religious figure to mention eternal torture for anyone who doesn't cut the mustard. The inspiration for this might be your God, but a far more likely source, in my view, is Plato's Myth of Er. Here's an extract:

He once upon a time was slain in battle, and when the corpses were taken up on the tenth day already decayed, was found intact, and having been brought home, at the moment of his funeral, on the twelfth day as he lay upon the pyre, revived, and after coming to life related what, he said, he had seen in the world beyond. He said that when his soul went forth from his body he journeyed with a great company and that they came to a mysterious region where there were two openings side by side in the earth, and above and over against them in the heaven two others, and that judges were sitting between these, and that after every judgement they bade the righteous journey to the right and upwards through the heaven with tokens attached to them in front of the judgement passed upon them, and the unjust to take the road to the left and downward, they too wearing behind signs of all that had befallen them, and that when he himself drew near they told him that he must be the messenger to mankind to tell them of that other world, and they charged him to give ear and to observe everything in the place. And so he said that here he saw, by each opening of heaven and earth, the souls departing after judgement had been passed upon them, while, by the other pair of openings, there came up from the one in the earth souls full of squalor and dust, and from the second there came down from heaven a second procession of souls clean and pure, and that those which arrived from time to time appeared to have come as it were from a long journey and gladly departed to the meadow and encamped there as at a festival, and acquaintances greeted one another, and those which came from the earth questioned the others about conditions up yonder, and those from heaven asked how it fared with those others. And they told their stories to one another, the one lamenting and wailing as they recalled how many and how dreadful things they had suffered and seen in their journey beneath the earth - it lasted a thousand years --while those from heaven related their delights and visions of a beauty beyond words. https://eurosis.org/cms/files/projects/ ... lic_HB.pdf

So we know for a fact that people make up stories about people being resurrected and bringing 'good news' and dire warnings from beyond the grave. And we know for a fact that some people want to believe them.

[Immanuel Can]

I agree. Morality is not about what one man thinks/wants/feels. It's performed in respect to other people. We might even argue (and I would) that we can have other kinds of beings that "count" ethically. For example, many people believe in the "ethical treatment of animals," or "environmental ethics." Again, I would have to agree: morality has to do with what you do with the natural world itself, not just what you do with other people, and certainly not only what you do all by yourself.

Yes, I do include the treatment of animals, but I was trying to keep my explanation as brief as possible. I also agree that what you do "all by yourself" is not a matter of morality if it has no implications for anyone else. For example, if someone was deposited and left on some planet that had no other sentient creatures on it, it would be impossible for that person to do anything that had any moral implications.

Right. Why would one even need the word "moral"? It would mean exactly the same as "whatever I want to do," if there were only one person in the world.

But the important question is this: is God an entity that counts in the ethical field? Can one behave morally or immorally in relation to God? And you say...

To perform an act that is believed to be in the service of God would not have a moral value, in my opinion,

Well, since you refuse even to consider the possibility that God exists, that seems automatic. But it's arbitrary, unless you can prove that God does not exist. If he does, you'd clearly be wrong about that. If animals and plants can play a rule in ethical calculations, it would be unthinkable that the Supreme Being does not even rise to their level in matters of moral judgment.

God's existence, or absence, makes no difference to the principle. [/quote]
What "principle"? Secular ethics has long sought a universal "principle" to guide ethics, and has never found one. If you have, what is it?

The moral value of a decision or act comes from the intention behind it and the consequences of it,

That's not going to work. The "intention" and the actual "consequences" are notoriously sometimes different. It's like the old Kant-Mill controversy: Kant thinks motivations are everything, and Mill says only the consequences are determinative of morality, and they arrive at opposite moral judgments relative to the same actions.

You seem to say that everything that God does is morally right simply by virtue of God's doing it,

I'd be interested in seeing where you ever got that idea. I've never said that, and it's a little strange. It looks like fatalism of some kind. Maybe you're thinking of Calvinism, or maybe of secular materialist Determinism, but I've never said a thing like that.

The problem with that, though, is where do human beings get their value from? The Declaration of Independence says it is "endowed by their Creator." Locke says it's a product of rightfully belonging to God Himself. But secularism only makes any sense if we're not any kind of specially exalted creature at all, but only another kind of beast, fashioned not by the Designer, but by time, chance and the accidentaly coming-together of random atoms.

I don't think we are any kind of "specially exalted" creature, and I do think we are just another kind of beast. I do think human beings are a special case, but that is only because I am a member of the species. I believe our sense of morality and our capacity for caring about the welfare of one another is a product of human evolution; it enables us to much more successfully function as a social species.

Two problems: one is that morality often undermines survival, so it doesn't help us "function" in a pragmatic sense at all. But secondly, and more importantly, we're back to the twinges: the fact that human beings have twingy "moralistic" feelings doesn't tell us those feeling ought to be obeyed, far less that they have to be. They might be like the famed "vestigial tail"; just something to be gotten past as evolution progresses, just as Nietzsche or the Social Darwinists have said.

...there is just a point I have to make. As inadequate as you think that any version of subjectively based morality might be, my argument is that it is the only kind there is.

Yes, that's your assumption, I know. But what you have to understand is that it means there's no actual morality at all...just an illusion that some people have. Some people THINK they owe the perishable beasts they live with (i.e. other human beings) some kind of special consideration, and others THINK maybe they don't. But there's no obvious reason we'd owe perishable beasts anything at all, let alone moral importance. That's the harsh truth of the matter.

But we know that people are capable of having moral feelings and intentions, or at least I know it, and I assume that you do.

They're just feelings. You don't know what they really signify.

How are you able to judge that obeying God is the right thing to do if you haven't already got that sense?

By revelation and reason. The two are essential together. Conscience then comes after, and is helpful in clarifying what revelation and reason have unveiled.

And that has to be the case: because too many people have consciences that function differently, or don't even function at all.

[Iwannaplato]

Yes, that's your assumption, I know. But what you have to understand is that it means there's no actual morality at all...just an illusion that some people have. Some people THINK they owe the perishable beasts they live with (i.e. other human beings) some kind of special consideration, and others THINK maybe they don't. But there's no obvious reason we'd owe perishable beasts anything at all, let alone moral importance. That's the harsh truth of the matter.

But we know that people are capable of having moral feelings and intentions, or at least I know it, and I assume that you do. I don't see what difference God or objective moral truth would make to that. Even if we believe that there is actually objective moral truth, that in itself would not make us take any notice of it. There would be no reason for anyone to do that unless they had a sense of morality to start with. You would already have to have a sense of right and wrong to even be able to understand the concept of objective moral truth. How are you able to judge that obeying God is the right thing to do if you haven't already got that sense?

His argument is the fruit of a poisoned tree. The same 'there's no obvious reason' to follow one's moral feelings fits perfectly there's no obvious reason to believe in the Christian God. In a sense his argument boils down to 'really you'd need to hallucinate like I do.'

If one points out that as social mammals we have lots of built in motivations to thrive with each other and unless it is beaten out of us we have built in tendencies to feel empathy for the suffering of others. We have other tendencies also.

When one points this out to IC, in the past he has generally said 'Well, look how well that's going.' Well, sure, look how well the monotheism have been going.

[Harbal]

The moral value of a decision or act comes from the intention behind it and the consequences of it,

That's not going to work. The "intention" and the actual "consequences" are notoriously sometimes different. It's like the old Kant-Mill controversy: Kant thinks motivations are everything, and Mill says only the consequences are determinative of morality, and they arrive at opposite moral judgments relative to the same actions.

It's not a question of its working. If a decision is made on what are considered to be good moral grounds, then those who considered it to have been made on good moral grounds would regard it as a morally good decision, even if the consequences turned out to be disastrous. That would just make it a bad decision, but not a morally bad decision. That's how I see it.

You seem to say that everything that God does is morally right simply by virtue of God's doing it,

I'd be interested in seeing where you ever got that idea. I've never said that, and it's a little strange. It looks like fatalism of some kind. Maybe you're thinking of Calvinism, or maybe of secular materialist Determinism, but I've never said a thing like that.

That was just my impression based on your past comments, but if I misunderstood you, I apologise. I am actually pleased to learn that I got that wrong.

I don't think we are any kind of "specially exalted" creature, and I do think we are just another kind of beast. I do think human beings are a special case, but that is only because I am a member of the species. I believe our sense of morality and our capacity for caring about the welfare of one another is a product of human evolution; it enables us to much more successfully function as a social species.

Two problems: one is that morality often undermines survival, so it doesn't help us "function" in a pragmatic sense at all.

Yes, a propensity to behave morally might, in a given instance, disadvantage an individual, but, overall, it is beneficial to the success of the species.

But secondly, and more importantly, we're back to the twinges: the fact that human beings have twingy "moralistic" feelings doesn't tell us those feeling ought to be obeyed, far less that they have to be.

We are motivated to obey the urging of the twinges in order to satisfy them, in much the same way as we respond to an itch by scratching it. It's the fact that it works that matters, not why it works.

But we know that people are capable of having moral feelings and intentions, or at least I know it, and I assume that you do.

They're just feelings. You don't know what they really signify.

But it is the fact that we have the feelings, and that they motivate us to act in a particular way, that is the point.

How are you able to judge that obeying God is the right thing to do if you haven't already got that sense?

By revelation and reason. The two are essential together. Conscience then comes after, and is helpful in clarifying what revelation and reason have unveiled.

You might be able to reason that it would by wise to obey what you believe to be the will of God, but your sense of reason won't tell you if doing so is morally good, you would need to already have a sense of morality for that.

And that has to be the case: because too many people have consciences that function differently, or don't even function at all.

Exactly, people see moral issues differently, and that is precisely what makes morality subjective.

I anticipate your saying, "but that doesn't work", to which I would reply, I am telling you what morality actually is, not what it ideally should be.

[Gary Childress]

How do we know they are wrong? Well, for one thing, all of these ethical frameworks listed disagree in pretty profound ways. They begin with different suppositions about what the basic moral axiom might be, and very often, end with different conclusions. What's lacking is a meta-ethical way to arbitrate among them. We can't tell if we should be Kantians or Benthamites or Neo-Aristotelians or Randians or Ethics of Care proponents, or whatever. None of them has been able to provide the sort of metaethical certification that would give it the decisive and arbitrating advantage over all the other possible views. And none has been able to show itself objective: and we surely need that, for an objective morality.

For another thing, if you try to put any of them into logical form (as in a syllogism), but start from the premise that non-Theism insists upon, namely, that the universe is not a designed entity but an accidental collocation of atoms, there's no way to get to the conclusion about what is right or wrong. (This is at the heart of Hume's famed is-ought critique, for example. Hume says there's no way to get from a statement of empirical fact to a statement about moral values; and secularly, there isn't: he's right.) So all ethical theories turn instantly arbitrary, then. There's no justification in supposing that an indifferent universe, operating by time and chance, has generated any real thing such as "objective moral value". We're in a reality composed of brute facts, not spooky values. And we ourselves are accidentally-produced beasts (even if brainy ones), and the same rules that apply to lower animals -- namely, only the brute laws of matter and force -- apply also to us. Objectively, there's no moral quality in that. Even survival itself is not required of mere animals...if they happen to want it, that's as contingent as any other fact; and they're no more entitled to expect it than was the passenger pidgeon or the Tasmanian tiger. Beasts go extinct. We are beasts. We may go extinct. Who can say? And what can be "owed" to perishable beasts?

Fair enough. But then we're left with what version of God to believe in. Do we believe in the God of the Bible who does some pretty horrible things sometimes and even commanded his followers at various points to do horrible things? Does it all come down to might makes right or the alpha being gets to say what is moral and what is not, even if it has detrimental effects on others who may not want horrible things to happen to them?

You claim to know God in some intimate way. What would you do if you suddenly got a voice in your head (or whatever way it is that God contacts a person) that told you that killing a particular person was "God's will"? And what if you knew the person and didn't think there was a justifiable reason to kill that person? Would you not question God and ask why you have been commanded to kill that person? Does that not betray a separate moral sense in you? Or would you just kill the person in question without second thought in the confidence that it's God's will and no such questioning is needed?

Does the fact that there are passages in the Bible which seem morally repugnant to many modern ears not tell us that human beings have an innate sense of right and wrong ourselves, independent of any God? I mean, maybe there is a God. I don't rule that out. But is it the God of the Bible? Or was the Bible constructed by fallible human beings who have their fallible reasons for constructing it the way they did?

Some scholars say the Bible is a collection of works that human beings wrote and then later human beings sifted through the works to figure out which ones to include in the 'official' version and which not to. How did those early human beings decide between various works as some being inspired by God and some not? Did they not use their own sense of what are the right works to include and what aren't? Or did God materialize before them and tell them which works to include?

[Peter Holmes]

How do we know they are wrong? Well, for one thing, all of these ethical frameworks listed disagree in pretty profound ways. They begin with different suppositions about what the basic moral axiom might be, and very often, end with different conclusions. What's lacking is a meta-ethical way to arbitrate among them. We can't tell if we should be Kantians or Benthamites or Neo-Aristotelians or Randians or Ethics of Care proponents, or whatever. None of them has been able to provide the sort of metaethical certification that would give it the decisive and arbitrating advantage over all the other possible views. And none has been able to show itself objective: and we surely need that, for an objective morality.

For another thing, if you try to put any of them into logical form (as in a syllogism), but start from the premise that non-Theism insists upon, namely, that the universe is not a designed entity but an accidental collocation of atoms, there's no way to get to the conclusion about what is right or wrong. (This is at the heart of Hume's famed is-ought critique, for example. Hume says there's no way to get from a statement of empirical fact to a statement about moral values; and secularly, there isn't: he's right.) So all ethical theories turn instantly arbitrary, then. There's no justification in supposing that an indifferent universe, operating by time and chance, has generated any real thing such as "objective moral value". We're in a reality composed of brute facts, not spooky values. And we ourselves are accidentally-produced beasts (even if brainy ones), and the same rules that apply to lower animals -- namely, only the brute laws of matter and force -- apply also to us. Objectively, there's no moral quality in that. Even survival itself is not required of mere animals...if they happen to want it, that's as contingent as any other fact; and they're no more entitled to expect it than was the passenger pidgeon or the Tasmanian tiger. Beasts go extinct. We are beasts. We may go extinct. Who can say? And what can be "owed" to perishable beasts?

Fair enough. But then we're left with what version of God to believe in. Do we believe in the God of the Bible who does some pretty horrible things sometimes and even commanded his followers at various points to do horrible things? Does it all come down to might makes right or the alpha being gets to say what is moral and what is not, even if it has detrimental effects on others who may not want horrible things to happen to them?

You claim to know God in some intimate way. What would you do if you suddenly got a voice in your head (or whatever way it is that God contacts a person) that told you that killing a particular person was "God's will"? And what if you knew the person and didn't think there was a justifiable reason to kill that person? Would you not question God and ask why you have been commanded to kill that person? Does that not betray a separate moral sense in you? Or would you just kill the person in question without second thought in the confidence that it's God's will and no such questioning is needed?

Does the fact that there are passages in the Bible which seem morally repugnant to many modern ears not tell us that human beings have an innate sense of right and wrong ourselves, independent of any God? I mean, maybe there is a God. I don't rule that out. But is it the God of the Bible? Or was the Bible constructed by fallible human beings who have their fallible reasons for constructing it the way they did?

Some scholars say the Bible is a collection of works that human beings wrote and then later human beings sifted through the works to figure out which ones to include in the 'official' version and which not to. How did those early human beings decide between various works as some being inspired by God and some not? Did they not use their own sense of what are the right works to include and what aren't? Or did God materialize before them and tell them which works to include?

Thanks, Gary. I think you're nailing it. Theistic moral objectivism is obviously irrational and morally repulsive. So the need to deflect attention onto the supposed consequences of morality not being objective is obvious too. 'My [country/god] right or wrong' is vile. But 'my [country/god] is always right' is worse. They both indicate the abandonment of moral conscience.

[Dubious]

I mean, maybe there is a God. I don't rule that out. But is it the God of the Bible? Or was the Bible constructed by fallible human beings who have their fallible reasons for constructing it the way they did?

The bible was written solely by Jews to serve Jewish interests. It should have stayed where it was meant to be and not have contributed to future abortions like Christianity and Islam. If there is a god, it's at best only receiving messages without ever replying to any.

The NT is not the greatest story ever told but it is the greatest propaganda piece ever written.

[Immanuel Can]

The moral value of a decision or act comes from the intention behind it and the consequences of it,

That's not going to work. The "intention" and the actual "consequences" are notoriously sometimes different. It's like the old Kant-Mill controversy: Kant thinks motivations are everything, and Mill says only the consequences are determinative of morality, and they arrive at opposite moral judgments relative to the same actions.

It's not a question of its working.

It is, because your answer doesn't "work" as a logical statement. Consequences and intention are very different and sometimes even oppositional touchstones for working out what is moral.

If a decision is made on what are considered to be

By whom? Who establishes what "good moral grounds" are?

...those who considered it to have been made on good moral grounds would regard it as a morally good decision, even if the consequences turned out to be disastrous.

So now you're going with intentions, and rejecting consequentialism.

I don't think we are any kind of "specially exalted" creature, and I do think we are just another kind of beast. I do think human beings are a special case, but that is only because I am a member of the species. I believe our sense of morality and our capacity for caring about the welfare of one another is a product of human evolution; it enables us to much more successfully function as a social species.

Think of what an odd view that is: that a reflective creature such as we are would say to himself, "Well, what I'm going to do might damage my prospects of achievement or survival, and it probably will doom my community in some way, but I'm just fine with it because I think the species will be benefitted thereby." Does that really sound to you like the thinking anybody does? Species survival is very low on our list of motivations, and comes well down the list after the survival of our friends, our families and ourselves. That's just human nature.

But the larger point is this: what makes species surival a moral imperative? The Tasmanian tiger and the dodo bird went extinct. If we are just accidental animals, such as they were, then why should the rules be different for us?

We are motivated to obey the urging of the twinges in order to satisfy them, in much the same way as we respond to an itch by scratching it.

So now it's not a question of morality at all: it's just a question of how you itch?

But it is the fact that we have the feelings, and that they motivate us to act in a particular way, that is the point.

Sometimes we have feelings of jealousy, rage, lust and covetousness. They're highly motivational, too. But a great many of the actions they sponsor we conventionally recognize as highly immoral. So the fact that a feeling "motivates" doesn't tell us a thing about its moral status.

You might be able to reason that it would by wise to obey what you believe to be the will of God, but your sense of reason won't tell you if doing so is morally good, you would need to already have a sense of morality for that.

Well, yes it will. But in addition, we DO have a moral sense, a conscience, flawed as it sometimes is. But conscience is clearly not a perfectly reliable guide, because sometimes it fails to alert us to our moral duties when it should.

Think of conscience like the fire alarm you have in your house. Sometimes it goes off for a good reason, such as an actual fire. Sometimes it goes off when you just burnt some toast, or when the battery malfunctioned. But a smart homeowner checks anyway. Conscience is useful, but it's far from a perfect instructor as to what right and wrong are: it needs to be informed by revelation and reason, so as to detect when it is going right, and when it is going wrong.

Exactly, people see moral issues differently, and that is precisely what makes morality subjective.

No, it only makes some people wrong. What it cannot show is that contradictory choices are both moral. It cannot be both moral and immoral to murder somebody. In every case, it's either a moral death or an immoral one. And that doesn't depend on how psychotic the murder is, or how he "feels" about what he did.

[Immanuel Can]

How do we know they are wrong? Well, for one thing, all of these ethical frameworks listed disagree in pretty profound ways. They begin with different suppositions about what the basic moral axiom might be, and very often, end with different conclusions. What's lacking is a meta-ethical way to arbitrate among them. We can't tell if we should be Kantians or Benthamites or Neo-Aristotelians or Randians or Ethics of Care proponents, or whatever. None of them has been able to provide the sort of metaethical certification that would give it the decisive and arbitrating advantage over all the other possible views. And none has been able to show itself objective: and we surely need that, for an objective morality.

For another thing, if you try to put any of them into logical form (as in a syllogism), but start from the premise that non-Theism insists upon, namely, that the universe is not a designed entity but an accidental collocation of atoms, there's no way to get to the conclusion about what is right or wrong. (This is at the heart of Hume's famed is-ought critique, for example. Hume says there's no way to get from a statement of empirical fact to a statement about moral values; and secularly, there isn't: he's right.) So all ethical theories turn instantly arbitrary, then. There's no justification in supposing that an indifferent universe, operating by time and chance, has generated any real thing such as "objective moral value". We're in a reality composed of brute facts, not spooky values. And we ourselves are accidentally-produced beasts (even if brainy ones), and the same rules that apply to lower animals -- namely, only the brute laws of matter and force -- apply also to us. Objectively, there's no moral quality in that. Even survival itself is not required of mere animals...if they happen to want it, that's as contingent as any other fact; and they're no more entitled to expect it than was the passenger pidgeon or the Tasmanian tiger. Beasts go extinct. We are beasts. We may go extinct. Who can say? And what can be "owed" to perishable beasts?

Fair enough. But then we're left with what version of God to believe in.

Well, that's not even a question we can possibly ask, so long as we don't even believe God exists. It would read, "What kind of God doesn't exist?"

You claim to know God in some intimate way. What would you do if you suddenly got a voice in your head...

That's a possible hypothetical, I suppose. But to my knowledge, it's never happened; and it's certainly not happened to me.

Does the fact that there are passages in the Bible which seem morally repugnant to many modern ears not tell us that human beings have an innate sense of right and wrong ourselves, independent of any God?

Does the fact that women in our modern society slaughter more babies every year than Hitler ever did make you think we're great moral touchstones? It doesn't seem to be "repugnant to modern ears," nor does euthanasia, nor pornography, nor warfare, nor sex slavery...before you offer moderns as good exemplars, maybe you should take a closer look. It seems, rather, that not enough is "repugnant to modern ears."

Some scholars say the Bible is a collection of works that human beings wrote and then later human beings sifted through the works to figure out which ones to include in the 'official' version and which not to.

To what are you referring? What historical events? Are you thinking of the Council of Nicea, or something else?

Manuscript analysis is a big topic. Are you sure you want to get into it here?

[Gary Childress]

Does the fact that there are passages in the Bible which seem morally repugnant to many modern ears not tell us that human beings have an innate sense of right and wrong ourselves, independent of any God?

Does the fact that women in our modern society slaughter more babies every year than Hitler ever did make you think we're great moral touchstones? It doesn't seem to be "repugnant to modern ears," nor does euthanasia, nor pornography, nor warfare, nor sex slavery...before you offer moderns as good exemplars, maybe you should take a closer look. It seems, rather, that not enough is "repugnant to modern ears."

Well genocide and drowning just about everyone on Earth aren't exactly any better than abortion and sex slavery.