Graham W. Boyd argues that choice is an illusion.
https://philosophynow.org/issues/112/Th ... ces_Not_Us
The Brain’s Risk/Reward System Makes Our Choices, Not Us
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Philosophy Now
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Dalek Prime
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Re: The Brain’s Risk/Reward System Makes Our Choices, Not Us
Depends on how one views 'us' as 'us'. Within the human physiological framework, it is our brain that makes the decisions. Is the brain, and thus our minds, not 'us'? If it's not, then clearly our decisions are not ours to make. But I would suggest that the brain/mind are us, for without it, we could never make those decisions at all. Nor would they matter, because we wouldn't exist, or at least be conscious of it, not unlike any other inanimate object. It's all in what one accepts as the premise; mind as alien controller, or as 'us'. I say the latter, as it is what gives rise to perhaps the only important part of us as humans; self-aware consciousness.
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Impenitent
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Re: The Brain’s Risk/Reward System Makes Our Choices, Not Us
there can be no responsibility (moral or otherwise) without choice
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henry quirk
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"The Brain’s Risk/Reward System Makes Our Choices, Not Us"
Since I am my brain (in my body, in the world), I 'do' choose...I assess risk and reward...for sure, there's all kinds of 'automation' (from the cells on up) but I sit on top of the mountain that is me, choosing all the time, weighing this against that, consciously establishing criteria for each circumstance.
And: 'nerts' to all the folks who say otherwise.
And, no, I didn't read the full article...won't do so till I pick up a hard copy.
Since I am my brain (in my body, in the world), I 'do' choose...I assess risk and reward...for sure, there's all kinds of 'automation' (from the cells on up) but I sit on top of the mountain that is me, choosing all the time, weighing this against that, consciously establishing criteria for each circumstance.
And: 'nerts' to all the folks who say otherwise.
And, no, I didn't read the full article...won't do so till I pick up a hard copy.
Re: The Brain’s Risk/Reward System Makes Our Choices, Not Us
We ARE our "reward system" manifest in physical form. The rest is the illusion. Boyd has it backwards (earmark of the era). We are the physical consequence of all of the pushing and pulling of our seed. We are living entities merely because we have preference - good vs bad. We are the "reward system" dynamics in the flesh, both victim and villain.Philosophy Now wrote:Graham W. Boyd argues that choice is an illusion.
https://philosophynow.org/issues/112/Th ... ces_Not_Us
ALL conscious life is motivated and guided by PHT, the Perception of Hopes and Threat. The rest is merely the consequential mechanics (Behavioral/Spirit relevance over Mechanics/Material relevance).
Re: The Brain’s Risk/Reward System Makes Our Choices, Not Us
I’m seeing a lot to comment on in Graham W. Boyd’s Philosophy Now article The Brain’s Risk/Reward System Makes Our Choices, Not Us in that he provides a materialist model for consciousness that seems reasonable while leaving room for scrutiny –the same mixed feelings I tend to have with more analytic/science based philosophies (such as that of Dennett’s. But given the wealth of responses (the bounces (he has offered me (it will likely be the focus of this immersion. And I do it with the deepest respect, regret, and consideration that he is no longer here to defend himself.
That said, I would start with baby steps:
“Following Benjamin Libet’s seminal studies (originally published in Behavioral & Brain Sciences Vol.8, 1985), it is clear that consciousness is late on the scene of any brain activity. This means that consciousness is an epiphenomenon: it is produced by brain activity, but does not itself influence brain activity. Given this, I suggest that final decisions from the brain are simply fed into a construct we call the self.”
I start with this because Libet’s experiment has been one of main cornerstones (a holy grail even (of the hardcore materialist’s argument. Or at least it has seemed so to me since I have had it thrown in my face many times on these boards. However, if we really look into it, it is not as impressive as the materialist’s seem to think it is.
And for anyone unfamiliar: they basically took subjects and put a clock in front of them, brain activity sensors on their head, and a button in each hand and asked them to suddenly push either the right or left button and record, according to the clock, when they had reached the decision to do so. What the brain scanning technology showed was that the choice could be seen about 10 seconds before the subject realized, according the clock before them, they had made the choice, thereby (according to the materialists, undermining the notion of free will. And there really are a lot of technical problems with how this experiment was conducted.
First of all, there is the popular issue with it that points out that there is a big difference between the simple choice between punching the left or right button and the complex decisions we have to make in reality. But I think we can attack it from a deeper, more phenomenological, level that addresses the subtleties involved in what happens in the brain as we are making such decisions. The problem with the conclusion reached from the experiment is that it assumes that the subject’s minds were in some kind of vacuum before they reached the decision they did and that those who hold for the possibility of free will reject the role that the physiological brain is playing in our choices. They act as if the subject just sat there with a totally blank mind and just suddenly decided they would push whichever button.
But an honest and authentic phenomenological consideration of how we reach such decisions would reveal that we tend work our way towards them which might explain the recorded brain activity assumed (given the small amount time in consideration and the subjective nature of declaring the time the choice was consciously made (to be a prediction of the choice the individual would make. And there is the question of whether there was a control experiment in which the subjects were asked to try to fool the experiment with full knowledge of what the experiment involved and the brain scans right in front of them. This might have appeased the question of whether there wasn’t a kind of operationalism in the way the experiment was set up: that which would have led the subject to assume that their mind and brain would be a blank space right up to the point they made their choice.
That said, I would start with baby steps:
“Following Benjamin Libet’s seminal studies (originally published in Behavioral & Brain Sciences Vol.8, 1985), it is clear that consciousness is late on the scene of any brain activity. This means that consciousness is an epiphenomenon: it is produced by brain activity, but does not itself influence brain activity. Given this, I suggest that final decisions from the brain are simply fed into a construct we call the self.”
I start with this because Libet’s experiment has been one of main cornerstones (a holy grail even (of the hardcore materialist’s argument. Or at least it has seemed so to me since I have had it thrown in my face many times on these boards. However, if we really look into it, it is not as impressive as the materialist’s seem to think it is.
And for anyone unfamiliar: they basically took subjects and put a clock in front of them, brain activity sensors on their head, and a button in each hand and asked them to suddenly push either the right or left button and record, according to the clock, when they had reached the decision to do so. What the brain scanning technology showed was that the choice could be seen about 10 seconds before the subject realized, according the clock before them, they had made the choice, thereby (according to the materialists, undermining the notion of free will. And there really are a lot of technical problems with how this experiment was conducted.
First of all, there is the popular issue with it that points out that there is a big difference between the simple choice between punching the left or right button and the complex decisions we have to make in reality. But I think we can attack it from a deeper, more phenomenological, level that addresses the subtleties involved in what happens in the brain as we are making such decisions. The problem with the conclusion reached from the experiment is that it assumes that the subject’s minds were in some kind of vacuum before they reached the decision they did and that those who hold for the possibility of free will reject the role that the physiological brain is playing in our choices. They act as if the subject just sat there with a totally blank mind and just suddenly decided they would push whichever button.
But an honest and authentic phenomenological consideration of how we reach such decisions would reveal that we tend work our way towards them which might explain the recorded brain activity assumed (given the small amount time in consideration and the subjective nature of declaring the time the choice was consciously made (to be a prediction of the choice the individual would make. And there is the question of whether there was a control experiment in which the subjects were asked to try to fool the experiment with full knowledge of what the experiment involved and the brain scans right in front of them. This might have appeased the question of whether there wasn’t a kind of operationalism in the way the experiment was set up: that which would have led the subject to assume that their mind and brain would be a blank space right up to the point they made their choice.
Re: The Brain’s Risk/Reward System Makes Our Choices, Not Us
First of all, Boyd, in the conclusion to his article, spares me the effort of summarizing it (an effort I was actually intimidated by:
“The brain makes its decisions via its emotion-scoring risk/reward system interacting with sensory input from the environment, with its outputs being much less rational than we think. Inputs from the rational system occasionally receive sufficiently high ‘emotion scores’ to successfully compete. This system has no need of any mysterious Cartesian mind to drive it. The self and self-consciousness are both passive constructs, although society’s interaction with the individual determines that they come to be viewed otherwise. So that’s it – all with apologies to Descartes, of course.”
And as part of the setup, I would bring in a point he made in the section: The Autonomy of Decision Making:
“All this bears directly on the question: ‘Can the whole system run autonomously – that is, with our responses, even our thoughts, being determined entirely by the sensory input interacting with the emotional brain?’ Indeed it can. The brain has no need of any homunculus or remote-control television viewer to drive it. And that is by far and away the most important conclusion I have to offer here. So how come it all looks so much otherwise – so much as if we are in control of our reactions as conscious selves? Let me now try to convince you that the self is an artificial construct – that self-consciousness is the product of the brain interacting with incoming information in the way I’ve just discussed, and that all this together gives the false impression of primary consciousness with an active self in charge.”
Now first of all, I would point out that I consider Boyd’s model perfectly reasonable. But more important is that I also consider it useful which is the primary criterion by which I approach any text (in the broad postmodern sense (written or created by another. For one, it supports my personal belief that resonance and seduction plays a way bigger role in theory than many of its practitioners would like to admit. Secondly, it offers some insight into the question that compels me towards more continental approaches: what it is about people that will drive them to actively seek out their own oppression and the absurd, often contradictory, reasoning they use to do so.
The problem is that it fails to fully establish its own point against the possibility of free will. Boyd basically utilizes the same strategy that Dennett did with his multiple drafts theory: merely offer an alternative to the Cartesian Theater and acted like it was proof positive against the Cartesian Theater when all it really did was turn the actors into the spectators. Once again, materialism erroneously assumes that all possibilities for free will (or what I would call participation (live or die on the homunculus problem. No doubt it was a profound realization when it was first brought up. But it is time for the materialists to let it go.
But more important to me is the profound recognition (for me at least (Boyd’s article brought me to (which is why I keep coming back to it:
Once again, Boyd’s model works for me. Still, I have reason to disagree with its conclusion. The thing is that, up until this, I tended to make the argument that the main problem with the continental approach laid more with its detractors than its practitioners in taking it too literally. I, in my zeal for a more poetic/metaphorical approach to philosophy, had no problem with the continental approach being thought of as more like literature.
What Boyd’s article made me realize is that those who lean towards the analytic/scientific side of the philosophical spectrum aren’t that much better off in that their models can no more be directly demonstrated than the poetic/metaphorical musings of the continental approach. And the same goes for Dennett’s multiple drafts model.
The interesting thing is that Boyd makes an argument (vaguely reminiscent of Lacan’s mirror theory (that proposes that our experience of self has more to do with language than actual reality. But isn’t it the socially and politically established privilege given to scientific language that Boyd and Dennett are propping up the truth value of their proposals on?
“The brain makes its decisions via its emotion-scoring risk/reward system interacting with sensory input from the environment, with its outputs being much less rational than we think. Inputs from the rational system occasionally receive sufficiently high ‘emotion scores’ to successfully compete. This system has no need of any mysterious Cartesian mind to drive it. The self and self-consciousness are both passive constructs, although society’s interaction with the individual determines that they come to be viewed otherwise. So that’s it – all with apologies to Descartes, of course.”
And as part of the setup, I would bring in a point he made in the section: The Autonomy of Decision Making:
“All this bears directly on the question: ‘Can the whole system run autonomously – that is, with our responses, even our thoughts, being determined entirely by the sensory input interacting with the emotional brain?’ Indeed it can. The brain has no need of any homunculus or remote-control television viewer to drive it. And that is by far and away the most important conclusion I have to offer here. So how come it all looks so much otherwise – so much as if we are in control of our reactions as conscious selves? Let me now try to convince you that the self is an artificial construct – that self-consciousness is the product of the brain interacting with incoming information in the way I’ve just discussed, and that all this together gives the false impression of primary consciousness with an active self in charge.”
Now first of all, I would point out that I consider Boyd’s model perfectly reasonable. But more important is that I also consider it useful which is the primary criterion by which I approach any text (in the broad postmodern sense (written or created by another. For one, it supports my personal belief that resonance and seduction plays a way bigger role in theory than many of its practitioners would like to admit. Secondly, it offers some insight into the question that compels me towards more continental approaches: what it is about people that will drive them to actively seek out their own oppression and the absurd, often contradictory, reasoning they use to do so.
The problem is that it fails to fully establish its own point against the possibility of free will. Boyd basically utilizes the same strategy that Dennett did with his multiple drafts theory: merely offer an alternative to the Cartesian Theater and acted like it was proof positive against the Cartesian Theater when all it really did was turn the actors into the spectators. Once again, materialism erroneously assumes that all possibilities for free will (or what I would call participation (live or die on the homunculus problem. No doubt it was a profound realization when it was first brought up. But it is time for the materialists to let it go.
But more important to me is the profound recognition (for me at least (Boyd’s article brought me to (which is why I keep coming back to it:
Once again, Boyd’s model works for me. Still, I have reason to disagree with its conclusion. The thing is that, up until this, I tended to make the argument that the main problem with the continental approach laid more with its detractors than its practitioners in taking it too literally. I, in my zeal for a more poetic/metaphorical approach to philosophy, had no problem with the continental approach being thought of as more like literature.
What Boyd’s article made me realize is that those who lean towards the analytic/scientific side of the philosophical spectrum aren’t that much better off in that their models can no more be directly demonstrated than the poetic/metaphorical musings of the continental approach. And the same goes for Dennett’s multiple drafts model.
The interesting thing is that Boyd makes an argument (vaguely reminiscent of Lacan’s mirror theory (that proposes that our experience of self has more to do with language than actual reality. But isn’t it the socially and politically established privilege given to scientific language that Boyd and Dennett are propping up the truth value of their proposals on?
Re: The Brain’s Risk/Reward System Makes Our Choices, Not Us
“What is the root of these assaults on our autonomy? Why do intellectuals and scientists feel such a strong impulse to show us that we are powerless, controlled by forces beyond our own control?” –From Steve Taylor’s Reclaiming Freedom
From the perspective of one who has gotten as deep into continental philosophy as I have (and I mean it: damn the French and their weird obscure philosophies anyway! (I would argue that it is primarily a reaction to Capitalism and the Free Will alibi of FreeMarketFundamentalism as expressed through libertarianism in its political/social form.
A lot of it comes out of the materialist approaches of the likes of Deleuze and Foucault, as well as the American Pragmatism of Rorty: that which has the agenda of opening up the discourse by undermining the old platonic hierarchies based on transcendent principles. The idea is, as Deleuze and Guattarri point out, to engage in a communal creative act based on ourselves as nodal points in a vast system of exchanged energies.
In that sense, we are perfectly free to take it in a conditional way. All we have to do is hypothetically accept the materialist perspective for the sake of a kind of democratic creative discourse that works outside of the perimeters of the Capitalist language game, that defined by the hardcore materialist’s emphasis on a language game defined by the criterion of the scientific method.
That said, I want to return to a point made by Boyd:
“The first question to be answered is: Who or what is running the show? In Part 1 I will attempt to explain human decision-making without the need for a hidden homunculus. Part 2 will then go on to look at how the brain can operate within this environment to generate the impression of an individual being driven by a highly conscious self.”
I ran into a similar problem with Dennett’s Consciousness Explained. He, like Boyd, offered an alternative explanation to the Cartesian Theater with the multiple drafts theory. And like Boyd’s, it did provide a reasonable alternative to the homunculus. But the problem with this can be seen in Dennett’s failure to dismiss the Cartesian Theater as much as just make the actors the spectators as well.
They, in their analytic zeal, assume, because one of their kind managed to hit a nerve with it, that the possibility of Free Will is somehow dependent on the homunculus dynamic, that their dismissal of it is somehow the final word on the subject. But why would we need it when all we really need is the perceiving thing projecting out of the body participating in the environment it is engaging with and adapting to? Why would the actors working in the Cartesian Theater be any less valid perceiving things than an audience?
From the perspective of one who has gotten as deep into continental philosophy as I have (and I mean it: damn the French and their weird obscure philosophies anyway! (I would argue that it is primarily a reaction to Capitalism and the Free Will alibi of FreeMarketFundamentalism as expressed through libertarianism in its political/social form.
A lot of it comes out of the materialist approaches of the likes of Deleuze and Foucault, as well as the American Pragmatism of Rorty: that which has the agenda of opening up the discourse by undermining the old platonic hierarchies based on transcendent principles. The idea is, as Deleuze and Guattarri point out, to engage in a communal creative act based on ourselves as nodal points in a vast system of exchanged energies.
In that sense, we are perfectly free to take it in a conditional way. All we have to do is hypothetically accept the materialist perspective for the sake of a kind of democratic creative discourse that works outside of the perimeters of the Capitalist language game, that defined by the hardcore materialist’s emphasis on a language game defined by the criterion of the scientific method.
That said, I want to return to a point made by Boyd:
“The first question to be answered is: Who or what is running the show? In Part 1 I will attempt to explain human decision-making without the need for a hidden homunculus. Part 2 will then go on to look at how the brain can operate within this environment to generate the impression of an individual being driven by a highly conscious self.”
I ran into a similar problem with Dennett’s Consciousness Explained. He, like Boyd, offered an alternative explanation to the Cartesian Theater with the multiple drafts theory. And like Boyd’s, it did provide a reasonable alternative to the homunculus. But the problem with this can be seen in Dennett’s failure to dismiss the Cartesian Theater as much as just make the actors the spectators as well.
They, in their analytic zeal, assume, because one of their kind managed to hit a nerve with it, that the possibility of Free Will is somehow dependent on the homunculus dynamic, that their dismissal of it is somehow the final word on the subject. But why would we need it when all we really need is the perceiving thing projecting out of the body participating in the environment it is engaging with and adapting to? Why would the actors working in the Cartesian Theater be any less valid perceiving things than an audience?
Re:
Do you know the term ..OCD? ..everybody has it to a degree.henry quirk wrote:"The Brain’s Risk/Reward System Makes Our Choices, Not Us"
Since I am my brain (in my body, in the world), I 'do' choose...I assess risk and reward...for sure, there's all kinds of 'automation' (from the cells on up) but I sit on top of the mountain that is me, choosing all the time, weighing this against that, consciously establishing criteria for each circumstance.
And: 'nerts' to all the folks who say otherwise.
And, no, I didn't read the full article...won't do so till I pick up a hard copy.
Re: The Brain’s Risk/Reward System Makes Our Choices, Not Us
..like 80% of people can only perform parrot speeches, and do their daily routines, only very few can objectively see things for what they are, not what they think they are.
..just look at various philosophy fora, tragically clueless people!
..just look at various philosophy fora, tragically clueless people!
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Dalek Prime
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Re: The Brain’s Risk/Reward System Makes Our Choices, Not Us
HexHammer wrote:..like 80% of people can only perform parrot speeches, and do their daily routines, only very few can objectively see things for what they are, not what they think they are. Hex, it's the nature of consciousness that everyone sees everything as the way they think it is.
..just look at various philosophy fora, tragically clueless people!
Re: The Brain’s Risk/Reward System Makes Our Choices, Not Us
..and how do you know? ..did the Tooth Fairy tell you that?Dalek Prime wrote:HexHammer wrote:..like 80% of people can only perform parrot speeches, and do their daily routines, only very few can objectively see things for what they are, not what they think they are. Hex, it's the nature of consciousness that everyone sees everything as the way they think it is.
..just look at various philosophy fora, tragically clueless people!
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Dalek Prime
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Re: The Brain’s Risk/Reward System Makes Our Choices, Not Us
I didn't know your mother was my dentist.HexHammer wrote:..and how do you know? ..did the Tooth Fairy tell you that?Dalek Prime wrote:HexHammer wrote:..like 80% of people can only perform parrot speeches, and do their daily routines, only very few can objectively see things for what they are, not what they think they are. Hex, it's the nature of consciousness that everyone sees everything as the way they think it is.
..just look at various philosophy fora, tragically clueless people!
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Obvious Leo
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Re: The Brain’s Risk/Reward System Makes Our Choices, Not Us
Move along, folks, nothing to be seen here. Same old dualist bullshit from those who simply can't understand that a person doesn't HAVE a mind. A person IS a mind.