Is morality objective or subjective?

[Gary Childress]

Subjectively or objectively wrong?

I don't know. It depends on what is meant by "subjective" and "objective".

Objective: externally real. True when Gary knows it, but also even when Gary doesn't know it.

Subjective: 'true' only in Gary's mind, but not required in any other.

Which is it, when Gary violates his conscience? Is it externally bad, or just bad to the extent that, for this moment, Gary thinks it is.

If I screw someone over, then I screw someone over whether I know it or not. If that someone can come and explain how I screwed them over, then I can weigh their claim and if I can't conscientiously ignore it, then I screwed them over. "Subjective" and "objective" mean independent of human beings or not independent of human beings. Rocks don't possess morality. Humans do. So, yes, it's subjective in the sense that humans are moral beings and rocks aren't. Subjective is requiring a subject to be present and object means it applies to all objects, even those without subjective experience.

[Immanuel Can]

Hunger is just a feeling, but it is very difficult to ignore it, and that's how it also is with conscience.

Difficult? Not really, apparently.

I find it difficult, and Gary also seems to find it difficult, but you are right, I can't speak for everyone.

Conscience is nowhere near so urgent as hunger, because eventually, you just can't ignore hunger -- and if you do, you'll die.

Yes, that's true. Hunger is a physical sensation, while conscience is an emotional, or psychological, sensation, so there is that difference, but what they have in common is that they both function as motivators. It depends on the circumstances, but in general, it probably is harder to ignore the sensation of hunger than that of conscience, but that makes sense; our enhanced social behaviour does no one much good if we are dead. While we can ignore our conscience, it is an uncomfortable experience, so we do have reason not to ignore it.

But people can ignore their consciences, or even get used to ignoring them, so that the conscience never bothers them again on a particular point.

But most people don't seem to do that.

Actually, the phenomenon of the "seared" conscience is extremely common. If you do something once, it gets "easier" to do it the next time, even if you initially found it upsetting. Every time you do it, after that, it gets easier fast. Within about 8 cycles, you can do things that are absolutely contrary to your conscience, and never worry about it again, apparently.

They did a study of South American torturers, in which they found that the major crisis of conscience only happened the first time, and the second time was only about half as hard...and eventually, ordinary family men became capable of torturing political prisoners all day, then coming home and kissing their wives and playing with their kids.

Apparently, conscience is actually quite a fragile thing, and one that doesn't survive many recursions of violation.

And some people have less conscience, or no conscience about what others have conscience, or lack conscience altogether, as in the case of sociopaths, narcissists, and psychopaths.

True, but do sociopaths, narcissists, and psychopaths tend to worry very much about what God thinks of them?

No, of course. But then, good and evil don't rest on their assessment, in Theistic morality. So we have every right to indict them on that.

Not so, if morality is subjective. Then we have nothing legitimate to say, really.

So what tells us we "owe" it to something to capitulate to our particular consciences, or anybody's conscience?

Our emotions tell us.

But our emotions lie, too. A child's terror at the thought of crocodiles hiding under his bed could be quite strong; but he's got to outgrow that fear, because there's no objective reality to that anxiety. Maybe your conscience is just like that.

[Gary Childress]

I didn't say anything about it being bad.

So it's not bad if people don't know it?

Or do you mean that it really is bad, but you didn't say it was bad?

I mean that Gary and I seem to know how compelling one's conscience can be, but some others, you for example, do not seem to share such awareness.

He wants us to say there is undeniably a God and then he wants to claim that the Bible is the one and only true testament with regard to God.

[Immanuel Can]

I don't know. It depends on what is meant by "subjective" and "objective".

Objective: externally real. True when Gary knows it, but also even when Gary doesn't know it.

Subjective: 'true' only in Gary's mind, but not required in any other.

Which is it, when Gary violates his conscience? Is it externally bad, or just bad to the extent that, for this moment, Gary thinks it is.

If I screw someone over, then I screw someone over whether I know it or not. If that someone can come and explain how I screwed them over, then I can weigh their claim and if I can't conscientiously ignore it, then I screwed them over.

But if morality is subjective, you only "screwed them over" (or more precisely: it was only wrong for you to do what you did) if Gary feels it. Their sense of injury or injustice is not objective: they have no legitimate right to tell you how to feel. So if you don't think you did, you didn't.

Is that what you really believe, Gary?

[Immanuel Can]

So it's not bad if people don't know it?

Or do you mean that it really is bad, but you didn't say it was bad?

I mean that Gary and I seem to know how compelling one's conscience can be, but some others, you for example, do not seem to share such awareness.

He wants us to say there is undeniably a God and then he wants to claim that the Bible is the one and only true testament with regard to God.

No. I just want you to face the problem.

[Gary Childress]

Objective: externally real. True when Gary knows it, but also even when Gary doesn't know it.

Subjective: 'true' only in Gary's mind, but not required in any other.

Which is it, when Gary violates his conscience? Is it externally bad, or just bad to the extent that, for this moment, Gary thinks it is.

If I screw someone over, then I screw someone over whether I know it or not. If that someone can come and explain how I screwed them over, then I can weigh their claim and if I can't conscientiously ignore it, then I screwed them over.

But if morality is subjective, you only "screwed them over" (or more precisely: it was only wrong for you to do what you did) if Gary feels it. Their sense of injury or injustice is not objective: they have no legitimate right to tell you how to feel. So if you don't think you did, you didn't.

Is that what you really believe, Gary?

I mean if they say I screwed them over by having masturbated before, then I'm probably not going to take it seriously. If they say I screwed them over by doing something that's actually harmful to them, then yes, I cannot deny I did something harmful to them if that's what I did.

[Gary Childress]

I mean that Gary and I seem to know how compelling one's conscience can be, but some others, you for example, do not seem to share such awareness.

He wants us to say there is undeniably a God and then he wants to claim that the Bible is the one and only true testament with regard to God.

No. I just want you to face the problem.

What problem am I not facing?

[Gary Childress]

Objective: externally real. True when Gary knows it, but also even when Gary doesn't know it.

Subjective: 'true' only in Gary's mind, but not required in any other.

Which is it, when Gary violates his conscience? Is it externally bad, or just bad to the extent that, for this moment, Gary thinks it is.

If I screw someone over, then I screw someone over whether I know it or not. If that someone can come and explain how I screwed them over, then I can weigh their claim and if I can't conscientiously ignore it, then I screwed them over.

But if morality is subjective, you only "screwed them over" (or more precisely: it was only wrong for you to do what you did) if Gary feels it. Their sense of injury or injustice is not objective: they have no legitimate right to tell you how to feel. So if you don't think you did, you didn't.

Is that what you really believe, Gary?

Of course they have a legitimate right to complain if I did something detrimental to them.

[Immanuel Can]

If I screw someone over, then I screw someone over whether I know it or not. If that someone can come and explain how I screwed them over, then I can weigh their claim and if I can't conscientiously ignore it, then I screwed them over.

But if morality is subjective, you only "screwed them over" (or more precisely: it was only wrong for you to do what you did) if Gary feels it. Their sense of injury or injustice is not objective: they have no legitimate right to tell you how to feel. So if you don't think you did, you didn't.

Is that what you really believe, Gary?

If they say I screwed them over by doing something that's actually harmful to them, then yes, I cannot deny I did something harmful to them if that's what I did.

That you did it is not in dispute, of course. But the moral status of what you did is. If morality is subjective, then you only did an immoral thing if you personally decide to regard it as immoral. If you don't, then there was nothing immoral about it -- even if they feel there was.

Is that your position?

[Immanuel Can]

He wants us to say there is undeniably a God and then he wants to claim that the Bible is the one and only true testament with regard to God.

No. I just want you to face the problem.

What problem am I not facing?

That no sensible account can be made of a subjective morality.

[Harbal]

Difficult? Not really, apparently.

I find it difficult, and Gary also seems to find it difficult, but you are right, I can't speak for everyone.

Conscience is nowhere near so urgent as hunger, because eventually, you just can't ignore hunger -- and if you do, you'll die.

Yes, that's true. Hunger is a physical sensation, while conscience is an emotional, or psychological, sensation, so there is that difference, but what they have in common is that they both function as motivators. It depends on the circumstances, but in general, it probably is harder to ignore the sensation of hunger than that of conscience, but that makes sense; our enhanced social behaviour does no one much good if we are dead. While we can ignore our conscience, it is an uncomfortable experience, so we do have reason not to ignore it.

But people can ignore their consciences, or even get used to ignoring them, so that the conscience never bothers them again on a particular point.

But most people don't seem to do that.

Actually, the phenomenon of the "seared" conscience is extremely common. If you do something once, it gets "easier" to do it the next time, even if you initially found it upsetting. Every time you do it, after that, it gets easier fast. Within about 8 cycles, you can do things that are absolutely contrary to your conscience, and never worry about it again, apparently.

I wouldn't know, I always seem to correct myself before I cross the 8 cycle threshold.

They did a study of South American torturers, in which they found that the major crisis of conscience only happened the first time, and the second time was only about half as hard...and eventually, ordinary family men became capable of torturing political prisoners all day, then coming home and kissing their wives and playing with their kids.

Isn't religious observance higher in South American countries than in, say, mine? Excuse me while I consider the implications of that.

True, but do sociopaths, narcissists, and psychopaths tend to worry very much about what God thinks of them?

No, of course. But then, good and evil don't rest on their assessment, in Theistic morality. So we have every right to indict them on that.

Not so, if morality is subjective. Then we have nothing legitimate to say, really.

Why do you say that to me as if you assume I will see the problem you are alluding to? Surely it can't be because, despite my subjective position, you realise I am able to distinguish between right and wrong.

Our emotions tell us.

But our emotions lie, too. A child's terror at the thought of crocodiles hiding under his bed could be quite strong; but he's got to outgrow that fear, because there's no objective reality to that anxiety. Maybe your conscience is just like that.

It probably would be were I still a child.

[Gary Childress]

No. I just want you to face the problem.

What problem am I not facing?

That no sensible account can be made of a subjective morality.

What would you like me to do differently so that I can properly "face" that problem?

[Immanuel Can]

They did a study of South American torturers, in which they found that the major crisis of conscience only happened the first time, and the second time was only about half as hard...and eventually, ordinary family men became capable of torturing political prisoners all day, then coming home and kissing their wives and playing with their kids.

Isn't religious observance higher in South American countries than in, say, mine?

The study was interested in the question of the psychology of a professional torturer. And they discovered it was the same as anybody else: if you violate your conscience, it goes away. And then very normal people can be induced to do very wicked things.

The same was found in the case of Nazi secret policemen and torturers in WW2. Many of them were ordinary Germans and Poles, but once they had bowed to the demand that they harm others, and had violated their consciences, there was little difficulty in doing it again.

In neither study was "religion" (whatever you think that is) either examined or eliminated as a variable. So no conclusion about the relative value of any particular "religion" can be deduced. But the strength of conscience...that's a different matter.

True, but do sociopaths, narcissists, and psychopaths tend to worry very much about what God thinks of them?

No, of course. But then, good and evil don't rest on their assessment, in Theistic morality. So we have every right to indict them on that.

Not so, if morality is subjective. Then we have nothing legitimate to say, really.

Why do you say that to me as if you assume I will see the problem you are alluding to?

Because you're intelligent, and it's not hard to see.

Surely it can't be because, despite my subjective position, you realise I am able to distinguish between right and wrong.

Actually, I very much believe that. But do you mean you are able to distinguish objective right and wrong, or merely that you know when you feel "wrongish" and "rightish"? Because I think your explanation there is going to require you to say you think you have some intuition about what right and wrong really are, not just about your own feelings.

[Gary Childress]

What problem am I not facing?

That no sensible account can be made of a subjective morality.

What would you like me to do differently so that I can properly "face" that problem?

[Immanuel Can]

What problem am I not facing?

That no sensible account can be made of a subjective morality.

What would you like me to do differently so that I can properly "face" that problem?

Are you doing your best to distract from the obvious point stated above by trying to make every term in an obvious question "problematic", or are you having trouble with your medication levels?