Hume Not Consistent with his No OUGHT from IS

[Advocate]

[quote=Advocate post_id=491939 time=1611411879 user_id=15238]
[quote="Peter Holmes" post_id=491928 time=1611402196 user_id=15099]
[quote=Advocate post_id=491840 time=1611348812 user_id=15238]
[quote="Peter Holmes" post_id=491814 time=1611338140 user_id=15099]
Sorry, but I think this is nonsense. What on earth is the distinction between internal and external ideas - and to what are they internal or external? Minds - which are abstract fictions? This is furkling down the rabbit hole.

Let's try to focus. A linguistic expression can be nothing other than a linguistic expression. (I assume you agree.) And outside language, features of reality are not linguistic expressions. So, if there are moral features of reality, their existence and nature have nothing to do with language and communication. Your claim that a feature of reality can only be proven to exist through the use of words is utterly ridiculous.
[/quote]

The distinction between internal and external ideas is whether they're backed by externally sensed measurement. Mind is a metaphor for the patterns in the brain.

All patterns in the brain are a feature of reality, even if they have no external correlate. A feature of reality can only be proven by the use of words To Others - that means externally. Your own internal morality can be anything you want, whether or not it has anything to do with external circumstances.
[/quote]
Sorry - more nonsense. What's the difference between internally and externally sensed measurement? What's the inside, and why is it different from the outside? Are 'brain patterns' internal or external? This is conceptually incoherent.

And repeating your ridiculous claim does nothing to support it. Showing a feature of reality exists - to yourself or to someone else - has absolutely nothing to do with language. What are you talking about? The claim that there are real moral things incurs a burden of practical proof - the kind natural scientists incur, for example. Talking about it is peripheral.
[/quote]

I'm sorry you don't understand my words. That just proves how necessary they are to advanced thinking.
Perhaps you learn better in interpretive dance?

The difference is that senses are bodily sensations and there are internal and external versions of those. The external ones are what the word reality means, to the extent they're not illusions etc., which can be known by correlating them with internal senses in the case of physical space, and what others agree matches their own senses in the case of anything your own senses aren't sufficient for. Internal "measurement" is a self-ping, not a measurement. Measurement is a matter of distinguishing boundary conditions in a replicable way. Internal boundary conditions are not the same sort of thing. Only some of your internal representations share an external component that is capable of being measured directly.

Brain patterns are internal to the brain, n'est-ce pas? The brain is biological, the patterns are psychological. Could it be more simple? I don't understand what you don't understand. I'm not relying on esoteric descriptions here, the words make sense all on their own and match Everyone's experience unless they're literally insane.

Features of reality exist as undifferentiated stuff until we distinguish them according to use. They are ineffable and useless until we formalize them sufficiently to communicate, with or without words. When it comes to external communication of those ideas, whether to share as an offering or to vet for concurrence, words are usually necessary from the beginning but even ideas that can be expressed by other symbolism such as an architectural drawing, still require words to express with actionable specificity.

Real moral things are relationships between parts, just like physics. The relationships hold true, so the ideas are true. It's like logic - the soundness of the result does not depend on the accuracy of the input. IF we want a world where nobody suffers THEN morality is X. If we want a world where everyone suffers then morality is Y. There is no contradiction there. Moral facts aren't of the kind "you should do X", they are of the kind "X produces Y results, therefore if you want Y, do X".
[/quote]

[Peter Holmes]

Sorry - more nonsense. What's the difference between internally and externally sensed measurement? What's the inside, and why is it different from the outside? Are 'brain patterns' internal or external? This is conceptually incoherent.

And repeating your ridiculous claim does nothing to support it. Showing a feature of reality exists - to yourself or to someone else - has absolutely nothing to do with language. What are you talking about? The claim that there are real moral things incurs a burden of practical proof - the kind natural scientists incur, for example. Talking about it is peripheral.

I'm sorry you don't understand my words. That just proves how necessary they are to advanced thinking.
Perhaps you learn better in interpretive dance?

The difference is that senses are bodily sensations and there are internal and external versions of those. The external ones are what the word reality means, to the extent they're not illusions etc., which can be known by correlating them with internal senses in the case of physical space, and what others agree matches their own senses in the case of anything your own senses aren't sufficient for. Internal "measurement" is a self-ping, not a measurement. Measurement is a matter of distinguishing boundary conditions in a replicable way. Internal boundary conditions are not the same sort of thing. Only some of your internal representations share an external component that is capable of being measured directly.

Brain patterns are internal to the brain, n'est-ce pas? The brain is biological, the patterns are psychological. Could it be more simple? I don't understand what you don't understand. I'm not relying on esoteric descriptions here, the words make sense all on their own and match Everyone's experience unless they're literally insane.

Features of reality exist as undifferentiated stuff until we distinguish them according to use. They are ineffable and useless until we formalize them sufficiently to communicate, with or without words. When it comes to external communication of those ideas, whether to share as an offering or to vet for concurrence, words are usually necessary from the beginning but even ideas that can be expressed by other symbolism such as an architectural drawing, still require words to express with actionable specificity.

Real moral things are relationships between parts, just like physics. The relationships hold true, so the ideas are true. It's like logic - the soundness of the result does not depend on the accuracy of the input. IF we want a world where nobody suffers THEN morality is X. If we want a world where everyone suffers then morality is Y. There is no contradiction there. Moral facts aren't of the kind "you should do X", they are of the kind "X produces Y results, therefore if you want Y, do X".

I leave you your mumbo-jumbo. But - as I've been pointing out, no doubt tediously, all along - the assertion 'X produces Y' does not make a moral claim. It says nothing about the moral rightness of either X or Y. So it's not even a moral assertion, and therefore can't be a moral fact. And the claim that Y is morally right obviously expresses a matter of opinion.

Sorry, but you make no case for moral objectivity. It's the same rehashed fallacy.

[Advocate]

[quote="Peter Holmes" post_id=491956 time=1611416425 user_id=15099]
[quote=Advocate post_id=491944 time=1611413177 user_id=15238]
[quote=Advocate post_id=491939 time=1611411879 user_id=15238]


I'm sorry you don't understand my words. That just proves how necessary they are to advanced thinking.
Perhaps you learn better in interpretive dance?

The difference is that senses are bodily sensations and there are internal and external versions of those. The external ones are what the word reality means, to the extent they're not illusions etc., which can be known by correlating them with internal senses in the case of physical space, and what others agree matches their own senses in the case of anything your own senses aren't sufficient for. Internal "measurement" is a self-ping, not a measurement. Measurement is a matter of distinguishing boundary conditions in a replicable way. Internal boundary conditions are not the same sort of thing. Only some of your internal representations share an external component that is capable of being measured directly.

Brain patterns are internal to the brain, n'est-ce pas? The brain is biological, the patterns are psychological. Could it be more simple? I don't understand what you don't understand. I'm not relying on esoteric descriptions here, the words make sense all on their own and match Everyone's experience unless they're literally insane.

Features of reality exist as undifferentiated stuff until we distinguish them according to use. They are ineffable and useless until we formalize them sufficiently to communicate, with or without words. When it comes to external communication of those ideas, whether to share as an offering or to vet for concurrence, words are usually necessary from the beginning but even ideas that can be expressed by other symbolism such as an architectural drawing, still require words to express with actionable specificity.

Real moral things are relationships between parts, just like physics. The relationships hold true, so the ideas are true. It's like logic - the soundness of the result does not depend on the accuracy of the input. IF we want a world where nobody suffers THEN morality is X. If we want a world where everyone suffers then morality is Y. There is no contradiction there. Moral facts aren't of the kind "you should do X", they are of the kind "X produces Y results, therefore if you want Y, do X".
[/quote]
[/quote]
I leave you your mumbo-jumbo. But - as I've been pointing out, no doubt tediously, all along - the assertion 'X produces Y' does not make a moral claim. It says nothing about the moral rightness of either X or Y. So it's not even a moral assertion, and therefore can't be a moral fact. And the claim that Y is morally right obviously expresses a matter of opinion.

Sorry, but you make no case for moral objectivity. It's the same rehashed fallacy.
[/quote]

You've completely ignored my main point - the contingency.

[Terrapin Station]

I keep wondering why the "quote" formatting function doesn't work for your posts.

[Skepdick]

I leave you your mumbo-jumbo. But - as I've been pointing out, no doubt tediously, all along - the assertion 'X produces Y' does not make a moral claim. It says nothing about the moral rightness of either X or Y. So it's not even a moral assertion, and therefore can't be a moral fact. And the claim that Y is morally right obviously expresses a matter of opinion.

Sorry, but you make no case for moral objectivity. It's the same rehashed fallacy.

I leave you with your mumbo-jumbo. But - as I've been pointing out, no doubt tediously, all along - the assertion "X produces Y" does not make a factual claim. It says nothing about the factuality of either X or Y. So it's not even a factual assertion, and therefore cannot be a fact. And the claim that Y is factual is obviously expresses a matter of opinion.

Because ALL expressions are contingent upon the expressor for being expressed.

WHY are you expressing expressions?

[Terrapin Station]

The difference is that senses are bodily sensations and there are internal and external versions of those. The external ones are what the word reality means,

"External bodily sensation" -- are you saying that the sensation has the property of being external, or that the sensation is OF something external?

[DougPeters]

I hope nobody is offended by dredging up an old thread to respond to the O/P (as opposed to attempt to address the direction that the thread went)...

Alasdair MacIntyre (in After Virtue, p.58-ish) claims that we can get an 'ought' from an 'is' by leveraging 'functional language': any entity that is properly functioning is then a 'good' such entity. But surely this is weak reasoning? The word 'good' in the context of a 'good' watch (to use his example) has no moral content. Any 'ought' implied by the word 'good' is a hypothetical variety leading toward a 'functioning watch'. Similarly, there is no moral content to breathing, or walking, or seeing, or speaking, and yet one could legitimately claim that these are all aspects of the 'proper function' of a human being. Anyone care to defend MacIntyre? Did I misrepresent or misunderstand him? Or even better, can someone give me an actual example of a collection of 'is' leading to 'ought'? (as recommended by:

If one doesn't like or disagrees with "No 'ought' follows from any 'is'" maxim ... the thing to do is simply to show how some "is" would imply some "ought."

)