Qualia Blindness

[AlexW]

And yet they are different shades of red. I know because I programmed them that way.

color=#FF0000
color=#FF1111

So? What’s the point?
You asked me for a conventional yes/no answer, thats what I gave you.
But the interpretation is not direct experience - its a description of a labelled extract/pattern, not of the whole.

[Skepdick]

So? What’s the point?
You asked me for a conventional yes/no answer, thats what I gave you.
But the interpretation is not direct experience - its a description of a labelled extract/pattern, not of the whole.

The point is that you should have "drawn a line" in your experiences but you didn't.

You should have been able to determine that you were experiencing different things, but you couldn't.

[AlexW]

The point is that you didn't see the "line" where there was one.

Maybe I should book in for an eye test

[Skepdick]

Maybe I should book in for an eye test

The ability to distinguish difference between things is a property called "sensitivity": https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sensitivi ... pecificity

Your eye is not an exact instrument and never will be, the closer the shades of red - the less likely you are to notice a difference.

But where I am going with this is probably very Deleuzian. The notions of "similarity" and "difference" are pretty vaguely conceptualised.
It's not just about drawing lines - it's also about erasing them.

[Brent.Allsop]

Hi everyone,

Wow, all this eastern religious stuff is remarkably interesting. I’ve been studying all this in more detail online and on YouTube, trying to catch up with you all on this. However, most of this is a bit off topic with what we’re trying to accomplish with the “Theories of Consciousness” topic on Canonizer and more specifically with the “Representational Qualia Theory” emerging consensus camp we are trying to build and track as much scientific consensus as possible with (including tracking how much consensus there is against the ideas).

The general idea is that we are very sloppy with our epistemology of color (i.e. everyone, including most of the discussions here are qualia blind, as defined in RQT: only use one word for all things ‘red’)

There are currently about 40 of the 50 or so participating experts in the “Approachable Via Science” camp supporting RQT. A very significant amount of consensus that nobody has been able to achieve, anywhere. These 40 people have basically joined this camp, in support of the idea of the importance of improving our epistemology of color. Today, pretty much all of the peer reviewed articles in the world on the neuroscience of perception are completely ‘qualia blind’. In our opinion, this is a terrible problem that needs to be fixed, if we are to ever understand anything about the qualitative nature of consciousness, perception of color, and so on.

According to the supporters of RQT there are a set of ‘correct’ answers to all of the questions in this “Are you Qualia Blind” questioner. How many of you agree that these are the ‘correct’ answers, and that it is important for experimentalists studying perception to understand this (not be qualia blind)

If you agree that these are the ‘correct’ answers, could you help us amplify the wisdom of everyone by supporting at east RQT , if not one of (or create a new one) the supporting sub camps. And if the terminology in RQT can be improved, to better accommodate eastern philosophy, please help us with this, so we can build a better and more accurate scientific consensus about a good epistemology of color. I will do anything in my power to help ‘canonize’ all of you great ideas and integrate it all into this consensus building and tracking topic. The more people that participate, the more it amplifies the wisdom of everyone.

Please help push this field forward, so everyone can know and track, concisely and quantitatively, what all the experts think on this problematic topic. Instead of just nit picking and swearing at each other about what we disagree on, forever, let's find and focus on what we agree on, and change the world.
Hopefully,
Brent Allsop

[AlexW]

It's not just about drawing lines - it's also about erasing them.

Yes, very true.
As I see it, your red-experiment is also interesting when extrapolating it to how we generally recognise things (not just color).

For example: You look at a dripping kitchen tap - the drop forms, it falls, makes a plop - this process happens again and again ... every few seconds.
Now, besides going mad from the noise, most people would agree that it is not the same drop that is falling now to the one that has been falling a few seconds ago. The experience is definitely different, not the same - yet, when isolating the drop (e.g. making a photo of two different drops) you wont be able to tell the difference - you can do the same with the plop-sound etc etc...

With color, interestingly, we would conventionally say (as I did): these are the same colours (they "look the same")
With the drop on the other hand: we would conventionally say: this drop is not the same as the one before (even they actually "look the same")

It's the way how we interpret an experience (and not so much the experience in and of itself) that creates differences and similarities, that draws borders or erases them.

[AlexW]

Please help push this field forward, so everyone can know and track, concisely and quantitatively, what all the experts think on this problematic topic.

Happy to "help", but after reading through the text available on Canonizer I am not sure if what I would have to say would actually support your cause - e.g. build a better theory which can be applied to "do things like build conscious machines"...

As I see it, the problem is already inherent in the foundation - you state:
The supporters of this camp define Intentionality, free will, higher order knowledge, intersubjective knowledge, self-awareness, desire, love, spirits, and all other similar concepts, including consciousness itself, as computationally bound composite qualitative knowledge.

It mixes conceptual knowledge and ideas with the primary "essence" in which they arise - with consciousness itself.
There seems to be a generally accepted belief/agreement that one has consciousness and that one can be conscious of ones self - while in reality, being conscious OF something always involves a process of conceptual thought that "separates" (not literally) consciousness into self and other/objects.

I am pretty sure it won't be long before we are able to build "self-conscious" machines, they will be thinking/computing (similar to what human brains can do), but they won't be conscious - consciousness itself doesn't belong to a thing or person, things/persons belong to consciousness.

[Skepdick]

Yes, very true.
As I see it, your red-experiment is also interesting when extrapolating it to how we generally recognise things (not just color).

For example: You look at a dripping kitchen tap - the drop forms, it falls, makes a plop - this process happens again and again ... every few seconds.
Now, besides going mad from the noise, most people would agree that it is not the same drop that is falling now to the one that has been falling a few seconds ago. The experience is definitely different, not the same - yet, when isolating the drop (e.g. making a photo of two different drops) you wont be able to tell the difference - you can do the same with the plop-sound etc etc...

With color, interestingly, we would conventionally say (as I did): these are the same colours (they "look the same")
With the drop on the other hand: we would conventionally say: this drop is not the same as the one before (even they actually "look the same")

It's the way how we interpret an experience (and not so much the experience in and of itself) that creates differences and similarities, that draws borders or erases them.

Exactly They just "look the same" to you. You don't draw a distinction, but somebody else might.

Classification is the process of sorting things into categories.

If two things are "the same" - they go into one category.
if they are "different" - they go into different categories.

It's the foundation of abstract thought. We've been taught to put things in their "right box" since we were toddlers.

But you must always be aware of the error/oxymoron in the very question: How can two individual things ever be "the same"? Well, they aren't really - we just ignored all of their differences.

[Brent.Allsop]

Please help push this field forward, so everyone can know and track, concisely and quantitatively, what all the experts think on this problematic topic.

Happy to "help",

Thanks for the willingness to help. Unlike Peer reviewed journals, which assume things are perfected, before it goes to publication, wiki systems are eternally progressing. I don’t yet fully understand these types of beliefs. Others that have also contributed, also, either don’t understand, or haven’t yet taken the time to help fix things.

And unlike Wikipedia, where once you find a disagreement, resulting in a win/lose edit war which polarizes people, with Canonizer you play a win/win game and push the disagreement (almost always less important than what people agree on) out of the way of consensus, down into multiple supporting sub camps. The ultimate goal is to find out and track, concisely and quantitatively, what everyone believes and how they define everything.

So, if you think it is possible, could you propose ways to improve “Representational Qualia Theory”?

But it sounds like supporters of “Representational Qualia Theory” use the word ‘consciousness’ as a label for something different than what you think of it as a label for?

Let me ask you this question regarding the way you define consciousness. As it illustrates in this video for each pixel of conscious knowledge we have, there must be something in the brain that is that conscious knowledge. Each pixel must be able to switch from redness to greenness, and so on. For example, sets of conscious beings that suffer from Achromatopsia or “total color blindness” aren’t as conscious as people that do not. As they do not have as much color depth to represent their visual knowledge with. When “RQT” people talk about engineering, fixing, and improving consciousness, this is what they are talking about. We define the minimum set to be considered conscious, as two pixels, each of which can assume two different intrinsic states, and they must be computationally bound to result in a "compost qualitative experience" which is what consciousness is. From there it goes to infinity, where we want to go.

It sounds like you think of the word ‘consciousness’ as a label for something different than this?

Either way, we need help to capture all this, to progress beyond what we have now.

[Skepdick]

Let me ask you this question regarding the way you define consciousness.

Either way, we need help to capture all this, to progress beyond what we have now.

Shouldn't we define "definition" before we can progress?

What is that word a label for?

At some point, philosophers will figure out to ask the question "What is evaluation?" Lets see how many centuries that takes.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eval

[Brent.Allsop]

Hi Skepdick,
Not sure what you are saying here, beyond the common understanding of what “define” and “eval” mean. But new common unified definitions people can agree on is a critical part of the ”Consciousness Consensus Project”. For example, there is not yet a commonly agreed on term for “effing” of the ineffable. So, we are working towards building consensus around what everyone agrees is the best term for that.

So, could you help us capture what it is you are getting at, so we can all get there sooner?
If you are already there, doesn't that count? It certainly would if you would canonize it.

[Skepdick]

Not sure what you are saying here, beyond the common understanding of what “define” and “eval” mean.

The common understanding of "red" and "redness" isn't good enough for you, right?
Which is why you are running this project. So that you can say things like "your redness is like my greenness"

Why is the common understanding of a "definition" good enough for you?

Why isn't your definition like my algorithm?

You can't explain consciousness in a language that's not homoiconic, because you can't qualitatively explain neither the notions of "explanation" nor the notion of "representation".

English is not homoiconic.

[Sculptor]

?
If you are already there, doesn't that count? It certainly would if you would canonize it.

Since you seemed to have dodged my other questions, I am still unclear if you really get "qualia".

Let me ask you this.

Is red one quale and green another quale?
Or are they both different qualia of colour?

[Brent.Allsop]

You can't explain consciousness in a language that's not homoiconic, because you can't qualitatively explain neither the notions of "explanation" nor the notion of "representation".

English is not homoiconic.

If English is not homoiconic, then how is it that I can ask you to help us redefine "define", or ask AlexW to give as an alternative definition for 'consciousness' that works better in his model, while a different definition may work better in my model? I thought that is what I was doing, in a homoiconic way, and we are using English, are we not?

[Skepdick]

If English is not homoiconic, then how is it that I can ask you to help us redefine "define"

You can ask me. It doesn't help me understand whether you mean the same thing by "define" and "redefinition", any more than you can know that my green is your red.

or ask AlexW to give as an alternative definition for 'consciousness' that works better in his model, while a different definition may work better in my model? I thought that is what I was doing, in a homoiconic way, and we are using English, are we not?

You missed the point is that when you say "redefine X", you expect a new English sentence and I expect an algorithm.

Algorithms work better in my model.