aphilosophy

[lancek4]

Indeed, "in the beginning.." (..god created..) As english transcribed from the original hebrew or greek or whatever is supposed to mean something different than a set point called 'the beginning'.

I can't speak for Biblical hermeneutics, but the world "nonsense" may not be so clear cut.
We might take it literally as in beyond the senses. Or we might say gibberish, like Scrunge futtocks!
impossible like; dark light, or square circle.
Or it might mean illogical.

Well, really though, doesn't the suggestion that there is a god involved suggest that there was a beginning before "the beginning?" It has always seemed an impossible thing to me to suggest an eternal, changeless deity that suddenly decides (i.e. "changes" it's mind) and brings about (as Typist might put it) "the most massive change in the history of the world!"

The very fact that we have to assume that (a) nothing exists without cause, and (b) God needs no cause, tells us that we still don't understand something important. That's no shame -- it's a big universe, we're doing our best, but haven't learned everything yet. But in the face of not having an answer to throw up a notion that involves more unlikely complexity than mere existence seems gratuitous at best.

Because "square circle" is exactly the same sort of thing as "causeless cause."

No one can tell me that we do not have an idea that the universe is 'progressing'. EH here exemplifies perfectly this apparently inherent concpetion of history and the universe.

[chaz wyman]

Indeed, "in the beginning.." (..god created..) As english transcribed from the original hebrew or greek or whatever is supposed to mean something different than a set point called 'the beginning'.

I can't speak for Biblical hermeneutics, but the world "nonsense" may not be so clear cut.
We might take it literally as in beyond the senses. Or we might say gibberish, like Scrunge futtocks!
impossible like; dark light, or square circle.
Or it might mean illogical.

Well, really though, doesn't the suggestion that there is a god involved suggest that there was a beginning before "the beginning?" It has always seemed an impossible thing to me to suggest an eternal, changeless deity that suddenly decides (i.e. "changes" it's mind) and brings about (as Typist might put it) "the most massive change in the history of the world!"

The very fact that we have to assume that (a) nothing exists without cause, and (b) God needs no cause, tells us that we still don't understand something important. That's no shame -- it's a big universe, we're doing our best, but haven't learned everything yet. But in the face of not having an answer to throw up a notion that involves more unlikely complexity than mere existence seems gratuitous at best.

Because "square circle" is exactly the same sort of thing as "causeless cause."

I agree entirely.
I doubt the goat-herding early Bronze-age bumpkin who wrote it down really thought it through.
But Wittgenstein was more careful with his language.

[chaz wyman]

It is my understanding that the Hebrew or Greek term that was translated into English as "in the beginning" meant more something like "there was this universe that has been existing and here is where we will start our story".

Beginning Shmaginning, It's the start of the story, already! Yoy!

[chaz wyman]

.
Wittgenstein is wrong for the same reason aphilosophy is unthinkable and undoable.
It is true that there is more the thinking than language, and there is more to Being that having a language. Ask any higher mammal whose life and being far exceed the extreme limits of their language. It is the example of the priveledge of human intelligence to proclaim what Being or lanaguage is for another animal. This statement can only be applied in reference to the presumtiveness that is human perception: that humans are a 'higher' species, and this means that our consciousness has, likwise as our 'higherness that other animals' or any hierachry of animals, progressed with reference to what we may come upon in the evidence of our history and history in general.

But this means that to do aphilosphy one has to act and think like an animal, and that can never the the goal or achievement of any human. I am not totally following your reasoning in this paragraph here.

Indeed there may be more to Being than having a lanaguage. But we do have lanaguage, as you have said before I think, we would not be human without it. So it seems nonsequiter to suggest that Being is somehow 'larger' or 'greater' of 'more than' language. To be human is exactly to have this particular human-ability we call lanaguage -- it is difficult even to express the inherent relation.

This is what I mean when I have said that people tend to move into an arguement as it suits thier purpose and then to pull back as it suit what they want to argue, all under a guise of consistency of argument. One cannot say that the object is the the sublination of the Notion of the subject, argue that there is not progress of consciousness, and then rely upon some higher and lower creatures as if to draw a picture of some larger reality that language does not encompass. This last you are saying as much as Typist, but you argue against what he says.

There is a hint of inconsistency in such proposals taken together, and against this kind of inconsistency, one that hides behind a viel of consistency, that causes me to appreciate the consistency of Bill and Typist's inconsistency, because these two at least are coming to us 'whole' in thier assertions.

This former consistency, that is inconsistent in its nature, paints for me a picture; it evidences an individual who knows particularized arguments to make on cues, who knows, say, which moves to make given the situation of the game board, an individual who is merely playing with argument, who really has no consistent understanding but knows how to divert attention from his subject, and in this method lay his consistency. But he is inconsistent within himself.

He is like a classically trained muscian; one can easily tell this person when one hears him or her. He can play written music beautifully, knows which vibrato to use according to the nationality of the composer, knows how to shape the contours of crecendo and decrecendo and phrasing due to the number of pieces he has played and the direction he has been placed under. He knows how to play the music the way it was meant by the composer and knows how he should sound if he is to be considered a virtuoso. He also has become so adept that he can take liberties within the music; he can use French vibrato with Hayden, an Austrian composer. He can chop phrasings or string them out; he can use staccato where legato was written. This he calls improvisation, and it can be beautiful to hear, but it is really a gestalt of learned methods, devied up and reassembled. His consistency is that he has no real ability to improvise, to draw out of himself the music of his soul, for his soul has been compromised my the lesson he was taught, and so eagerly learned such that he might one day find himself in the music. He is Salieri.

But this virtuoso has been decieved, and he feels it, he knows it too late. So he draws the veil of his learning about him so that no one may see his fraud; his deception that he was trained to procure.

This is contrasted to the true improvisationalist, and this musician was a natural. His learning coincided with his training, such that his art was merely blossoming as he attended his lessons. He is Mozart. He writes music that imitates his mentors but never repeats them. He plays when inspires him before he was taught what should be played, and then becomes the opus of a style, as his interpretation did not repeat nor derive. But his derivations were his own; everyone can hear this in his music.
He is consistent in that he is true to himself as he was not tought through the examples of other's triuphs and mistakes, such that he learned how to construct the argument, but the arguments were apparent to him. Thus he is honest, and his exposure is his wholeness.

If there is a Being that is something of language but is also something other than lanaguage, the only way we might know this is through the language itself. Even if I might think in myself that I have some aspect of myself that is not language then it is merely a feeling, and this feeling, though it may be human of itself, it does nothing within the human being (within myself) to situate it (me) as human except as much as such a feeling finds language. I cannot hold an idea that there is something other than lanaguage to situate myself, to allow me to BE, without relying upon language itself. I cannot determine that there may be lower ot higher animals in thier Being except through human language.

the significance of these postures, the consistent and inconsistent, is that one cannot be nailed down against the particular other, and that the arguement to what may be refered is always in question. Only Mozart knows he is Mozart, everyone else just knows what they hear. Salieri likewise reflects upon himself such that there is Mozart, and so he feels his Salieri, and asserts and asserts. Yet the veil is also hideen from view, such that only those who know, see.

So it is that I do not follow your reasoning: that Wittgestien is wrong in the same way Typist is wrong.

No Witt is wrong in that there is more to thinking than just processing language; animals without language think too. We think in that way too. But we cannot uninvent language and forget that we have it, so whilst we also think like and animal it is inseparable from language thinking.
Witt is wrong in failing to grasps that which Typist thinks he can accomplish. Typist is wrong because we cannot help but think about things whilst also thinking like a pre-linguastic animal

[lancek4]

So it is that I do not follow your reasoning: that Wittgestien is wrong in the same way Typist is wrong.

No Witt is wrong in that there is more to thinking than just processing language; come on. you have argued better than this. How might I know there is more to thinking than processing lanaguage? By definition. whatever may be informing my ability to know anything, I cannot speak of it; I cannot even refer to it, I can only indirectly indicate that it might be. If it is more or less is dependant upon an aprirori relation which is entirely enveloped in the arena of lanaguage. the fact that my body may do things automatically like digest food, merely places me in existence, it tells nothing of thinking.
You have argued as much (I think, maybe it was AUK - crap, maybe Im hallicinating): Tell me how you know that there is more to thinking than language; tell me without thinking of the things that are more than thinking.

animals without language think too. We think in that way too. But we cannot uninvent language and forget that we have it, so whilst we also think like and animal it is inseparable from language thinking.
Witt is wrong in failing to grasps that which Typist thinks he can accomplish. Typist is wrong because we cannot help but think about things whilst also thinking like a pre-linguastic animal

What? human being cannnot separate itself from lanaguage for the processing or understanding of reality yet somehow we can 'see though' this inability to some greater or lesser world of thought that exists without lanaguge? That sounds to me like Typists "just stop thinking" idea.

Animals without language think exactly with reference to the fact that we know of them because we have language - and it is a human lanaguage, this does not say anything about what an animal language might be except in reference to the human priveledge. Our reality is this way because we are human. We do not and cannot say what kind of understanding or take on reality that an alligator may have unto itself.
So to say that the object is the sublination of the Notion of the subject is is inconsistent with what may be alligatorness, in that it may 'think' on its own but without lanaguage and be a 'lower' animal.

Thus we have Wittgestein's meaning: when we understand the extents of the Langauge Game, how it functions to allow for a human reality, we thus can come to what truth we can really speak about without asserting metaphysics: we have the Facts of the matter.

The problem is then how we might have come to this knowing of the facts.

[chaz wyman]

So it is that I do not follow your reasoning: that Wittgestien is wrong in the same way Typist is wrong.

No Witt is wrong in that there is more to thinking than just processing language; come on. you have argued better than this. How might I know there is more to thinking than processing lanaguage? By definition. whatever may be informing my ability to know anything, I cannot speak of it; I cannot even refer to it, I can only indirectly indicate that it might be. If it is more or less is dependant upon an aprirori relation which is entirely enveloped in the arena of lanaguage. the fact that my body may do things automatically like digest food, merely places me in existence, it tells nothing of thinking.
You have argued as much (I think, maybe it was AUK - crap, maybe Im hallicinating): Tell me how you know that there is more to thinking than language; tell me without thinking of the things that are more than thinking.

animals without language think too. We think in that way too. But we cannot uninvent language and forget that we have it, so whilst we also think like and animal it is inseparable from language thinking.
Witt is wrong in failing to grasps that which Typist thinks he can accomplish. Typist is wrong because we cannot help but think about things whilst also thinking like a pre-linguastic animal

What? human being cannnot separate itself from lanaguage for the processing or understanding of reality yet somehow we can 'see though' this inability to some greater or lesser world of thought that exists without lanaguge? That sounds to me like Typists "just stop thinking" idea.

No - duh typist is wrong we cannot separate ourselves from non-linguistinc thinking. But we do do it. We can type on a keyboard without being consciously aware of the keys,- there is thinking going on. But there are unconscious/subconscious levels of thinking. We are not separable from ourselves - that does not mean we do not have thinking process like animals too! I'm not sure how many other ways I can say it.


Animals without language think exactly with reference to the fact that we know of them because we have language - and it is a human lanaguage, this does not say anything about what an animal language might be except in reference to the human priveledge.

Do you think this makes sense?
My point is that animals demonstrate thinking behaviour, but do not demonstrate language as such

Our reality is this way because we are human. We do not and cannot say what kind of understanding or take on reality that an alligator may have unto itself.
So to say that the object is the sublination of the Notion of the subject is is inconsistent with what may be alligatorness, in that it may 'think' on its own but without lanaguage and be a 'lower' animal.

Your point?


Thus we have Wittgestein's meaning: when we understand the extents of the Langauge Game, how it functions to allow for a human reality, we thus can come to what truth we can really speak about without asserting metaphysics: we have the Facts of the matter.

That is saying nothing at all. Its completely circular. The point earlier conflated this tautology with the inclusion of thinking. I am saying that thinking is more than language. There is a part of human experience that does not include it.
Language does not limit reality - it only limits our description of it.


The problem is then how we might have come to this knowing of the facts.

I person without language still knows.

[Typist]

No - duh typist is wrong we cannot separate ourselves from non-linguistinc thinking.

Based on your zero minutes of experience with this matter, you've concluded you know more than the millions of people who have been experiencing this for themselves for thousands of years.

If you read this, you have only yourself to blame.

If you reply to this, you have only yourself to blame.

[chaz wyman]

No - duh typist is wrong we cannot separate ourselves from non-linguistinc thinking.

Based on your zero minutes of experience with this matter, you've concluded you know more than the millions of people who have been experiencing this for themselves for thousands of years.

If you read this, you have only yourself to blame.

If you reply to this, you have only yourself to blame.

But you sister told me I was right, when I was banging her.

[Typist]

But you sister told me I was right, when I was banging her.

Good spellinks is esennshul to an effactive quip!

[chaz wyman]

But you sister told me I was right, when I was banging her.

Good spellinks is esennshul to an effactive quip!

...

[lancek4]

No - duh typist is wrong we cannot separate ourselves from non-linguistinc thinking.

Based on your zero minutes of experience with this matter, you've concluded you know more than the millions of people who have been experiencing this for themselves for thousands of years.

If you read this, you have only yourself to blame.

If you reply to this, you have only yourself to blame.

But you sister told me I was right, when I was banging her.

Aaahh hahaha. I love it!

[lancek4]

My point is: you cannot have a sublimated object of the subject and also have an essential object in itself with out denial of the first premise

[lancek4]

But you sister told me I was right, when I was banging her.

Good spellinks is esennshul to an effactive quip!

Yeah her cint was reedy 4 meee

You guys are priceless!

[Typist]

We are priceless morons! We have no value!

[lancek4]

We are priceless morons! We have no value!

or infinite value: as in your money is not good here.

It is so vaulable that no price can be attached to it.

A person walking into a wall that he did not see; or one that he did see but walked into it anyways on accident, and then cussing -
such comedy.