The problem of self under materialism

[bahman]

bahman, the self wouldn't be an illusion based on your insisting on defining it in a way that describes something that doesn't exist. That would just amount to you having a misconceived idea about what the (non-illusory) self is.

Hold on, there is a difference between a sense of having a self and having a self. The sense of having a self is something generated by brain. We don't have any self generated by brain.

[Terrapin Station]

Hold on, there is a difference between a sense of having a self and having a self. The sense of having a self is something generated by brain.

Yes, and as a conscious phenomenon, that's what a self is. There's nothing illusory about that.

[bahman]

Hold on, there is a difference between a sense of having a self and having a self. The sense of having a self is something generated by brain.

Yes, and as a conscious phenomenon, that's what a self is. There's nothing illusory about that.

I don't understand you. Do you agree that the sense of self is the only thing which is generated by brain? If yes then the self is not real.

[Terrapin Station]

I don't understand you. Do you agree that the sense of self is the only thing which is generated by brain? If yes then the self is not real.

I'm assuming that you meant to write "Do you agree that the sense of self is only a thing which is generated by the brain?"

My answer to that revised question is "Yes." But that doesn't mean that there's anything illusory about it.

[Immanuel Can]

Materialist can argue that capability to experience something is the result of processing specific mental state via brain.

Yes, but I think you and I can see just how inadequate that response is. After all, if "brain" is just another kind of "materials," then we haven't gone a step in the direction of explaining what it means to say it "processes" anything. Rocks don't "process," so what makes it possible for the lump of materials we call brains to do it?

[Ginkgo]

Materialist can argue that capability to experience something is the result of processing specific mental state via brain.

Yes, but I think you and I can see just how inadequate that response is. After all, if "brain" is just another kind of "materials," then we haven't gone a step in the direction of explaining what it means to say it "processes" anything. Rocks don't "process," so what makes it possible for the lump of materials we call brains to do it?

I think you are alluding to emergentism. This is the claim that consciousness emerges from the physical and chemical actions of the brain. In other words, from these processes an entirely new phenomenon emerges (consciousness). Consciousness is not identical, or reducible from the physical and chemical processes of the brain.

[bahman]

I don't understand you. Do you agree that the sense of self is the only thing which is generated by brain? If yes then the self is not real.

I'm assuming that you meant to write "Do you agree that the sense of self is only a thing which is generated by the brain?"

My answer to that revised question is "Yes." But that doesn't mean that there's anything illusory about it.

Self is an illusion if we can agree on the fact that we only have a sense of self.

[bahman]

Materialist can argue that capability to experience something is the result of processing specific mental state via brain.

Yes, but I think you and I can see just how inadequate that response is. After all, if "brain" is just another kind of "materials," then we haven't gone a step in the direction of explaining what it means to say it "processes" anything. Rocks don't "process," so what makes it possible for the lump of materials we call brains to do it?

I don't think that anybody have a clear answer to what consciousness is.

[henry quirk]

"Do you equate brain with self or self with a mental state?"

I'm an animal who is aware of existing, not merely conscious (aware) of what's around, but conscious of being a discrete event, separate from what's around.

This inward directed consciousness (awareness) is 'self' (or, I-ness [or just plain 'I' as I prefer]).

In the absence of any evidence to suggest differently, I assume outward directed awareness and the higher order inward directed awareness happens because of the particular and peculiar arrangement of organic matter that comprises me, and because of the chemical and electrical active-ness of that organic matter.

The locus of the inward directed awareness seems to be a brain (similar to, but not identical with, a whole whack of other brains).

This brain is utterly dependent on a body which offers the brain mobility and a means to apprehend what's around (physically and informationally).

The two -- brain and body -- are so intertwined in function and structure it's damn-near senseless (when considering 'I') to talk about anything but the animal as a whole.

So: I equate (my) self with the entirety of my flesh, all of it, inside and out, from toe tips clear up to the top of my bald head.

I am flesh, nuthin' but flesh, wholly flesh, a hierarchy of flesh culminating in that flesh lookin' in a mirror, recognizing itself, assessing itself, and sayin' 'Damn, but I look spiffy today!'.

[bahman]

"Do you equate brain with self or self with a mental state?"

The self to me is an illusion under materialism. You have a sense of Iness which is animated and produced by your brain.

I'm an animal who is aware of existing, not merely conscious (aware) of what's around, but conscious of being a discrete event, separate from what's around.

Iness as it was discussed in previous comment is nothing than a sense of self generated by brain.

This inward directed consciousness (awareness) is 'self' (or, I-ness [or just plain 'I' as I prefer]).

That is incorrect. There is no self under materialism. You only have a sense of Iness in materialism.

[Immanuel Can]

I think you are alluding to emergentism. This is the claim that consciousness emerges from the physical and chemical actions of the brain. In other words, from these processes an entirely new phenomenon emerges (consciousness). Consciousness is not identical, or reducible from the physical and chemical processes of the brain.

I quite agree. Emergentism is not really an explanation of the phenomenon at all. It's about as good as claiming that it "Just happened." There isn't even a smattering of the rational or scientific about it: it's a brush-off attempt, not an explanation.

[Immanuel Can]

I don't think that anybody have a clear answer to what consciousness is.

That is fair. And yet, we all know it exists. So that fact is very interesting in its implications for the limits of science, isn't it? But it's devastating to Materialism as an explanation.

[Terrapin Station]

Self is an illusion if we can agree on the fact that we only have a sense of self.

Let's try it this way: How would that make it an illusion in your view?

[Terrapin Station]

Yes, but I think you and I can see just how inadequate that response is. After all, if "brain" is just another kind of "materials," then we haven't gone a step in the direction of explaining what it means to say it "processes" anything. Rocks don't "process," so what makes it possible for the lump of materials we call brains to do it?

I'm not saying something about consciousness in the following, but rather just that sense of "process": computers process information don't they? You don't believe that computers aren't material, do you, just because rocks can't process information as computers can?

[bahman]

Self is an illusion if we can agree on the fact that we only have a sense of self.

Let's try it this way: How would that make it an illusion in your view?

Self is an illusion under materialism because we have a sense of self yet it doesn't exist.