Realism is Not Tenable

[Iwannaplato]

Be interesting to see if Atla weighs in on the reality of objects. He may have done this elsewhere, but I'll see if I can bring him here to comment in this context, related to their schema.

An "object" is an illusory feature of dualistic thinking. The natural world seems to be continuous, non-separate, and as to my knowledge, there isn't a single verified counter-example to this known to humanity.

(That's why I don't wanna Plato)

In dualistic thinking, we divide the indivisible natural world into parts, treat them as separate things. And then we start to come up with all kinds of made-up stuff like "relationship between objects", objects "possessing attributes" and so on.

As a nondualist I have really lost the frame of mind where I percieve the world as an interplay of objects and subjects. I simply don't experience the world like that anymore. I had to learn to sort of force myself to return to objects and subjects anyway as that's how we conduct everyday life, but fundamentally I just don't see it anymore. I see one continuous world.

No objects = no-thingness. A thing is an object, it's a way of thinking.

But this doesn't change the fact of indirect perception, nor does it change the fact imo that being a realist on a mind-independent external world is a completely sensible position. OF COURSE the world 'out there' is undifferentiated. That's 100% consistent with indirect perception.

And this was my guess. IOW that the text quoted in the OP actually does not challenge your position. Not that it doesn't argue the case well, but that it doesn't contradict your position. In broad strokes it is compatible with it.

[Atla]

And this was my guess. IOW that the text quoted in the OP actually does not challenge your position. Not that it doesn't argue the case well, but that it doesn't contradict your position. In broad strokes it is compatible with it.

I didn't really comment on the text in the OP because I can't make heads or tails on it. I can't even get past the abstract.

Abstract
Realism about objects proposes an isomorphism between the objects of the external world and the corresponding mental representations.

?

Are we using this meaning of isomorphism?

isomorphism is a structure-preserving mapping between two structures of the same type that can be reversed by an inverse mapping.

The objects are "out there" in the noumenon. But our mental representation are definitely not isomorphic with them, obviously. Our mental representations only contain sort of a "small residue" about the external objects even in the best case, and it can only get worse from there.

And the sentence started with "realism about objects" and I don't know what's that doing there, and why it is proposing something.

[Veritas Aequitas]

From the article:
"In this sense, hallucinations may be seen as uncontrolled mental imagery."
"Perception is sometimes called controlled hallucination (Koenderink & van Doorn, 2008; Seth, 2021) or delusional (Lotto, 2017)."

Well, there goes empricism.

V.S. Ramachandran, The Tell-Tale Brain: A Neuroscientist's Quest for What Makes Us Human
“Indeed, the line between perceiving and hallucinating is not as crisp as we like to think. In a sense, when we look at the world, we are hallucinating all the time. One could almost regard perception as the act of choosing the one hallucination that best fits the incoming data.”

And there goes empricism.

It makes no sense of an antirealist to start calling perceptions hallucinations, because for the antirealist those perceptions ARE THE ONLY REAL THINGS, they don't come from something else or point to something else.

Only a realist can call them Hallucinations. Because then you are saying they may not match what is out there.

If there is no mind independent world and you call all perceptions hallucinations, there's nothing real. Nothing.

The article stated.

• "First, the percepts in hallucinations “are what they are”, i.e., they are just as proper percepts as non-illusory cases. [controlled hallucinations].
  One may feel deceived because there is no external world cause and decide to make a distinction between objects which occur only in drawings, fantasy, etc. and which occur in nature.
  However, this is a cognitive and not a perceptual issue.
  In this sense, hallucinations tell us that not only external states but also internal states can activate mental Representations.
  In fact, mental Representations can directly be activated by stimulating the corresponding neurons (Kammer et al., 2005).
  Hence, non-surjectivity is only surprising when one assumes that Perception is triggered exclusively by external world objects and that there is a 1-1 mapping- which is obviously not the case as we know from dreams and mental imagery.
  Bistable stimuli, such as Wittgenstein’s famous duck-rabbit, are another example in which not only the external world, but also “internal” brain processes influence Perception."

It is not a lost cause for empiricism.
As I had stated elsewhere there are two main sense of realism, i.e.
1. Empirical Realism - relative independence
2. Philosophical Realism - Absolute independence

Thus an anti-philosophical_realist can still refer to hallucinations from the empirical realist perspective.
This term "hallucinations" as qualified is useful for medical purpose and other cognitive issues.

What is critical is to qualify the contexts where necessary.

[Veritas Aequitas]

Moral facts deniers rely on realism* [philosophical, indirect, or direct] to insist there are no moral facts thus morality cannot be objective.

You got off to a bad start.
Most who claim moral relativism and cultural relativism recognise idealism as the reason why objectivity is problematic.
Realist think that objectivity is no problem at all.

You seem to be on the decsent into madness again.

You are ignorant that,
The Two Faces of Objectivity
viewtopic.php?p=679854#p679854

R. W. Newell wrote:
The idea of objectivity is handed down to us bearing two generically different faces.

• 1. One of them [faces] is a source of self-imposed puzzlement and guides directly to foundationalism.
  
  2. Objectivity's other face is altogether different; it is central to our concerns and indispensable to our actions as rational beings.
  Objectivity's second face is a largely untechnical conception, on the whole thought to be of less philosophical interest than the first one.

[see below]

Your sort of objectivity is ontological and grounded on an illusion you are clinging onto an illusion.
Worst is you are relying on an illusion to deny there are your interpretation of moral facts which are illusory.

Are you an idealist, or a realist?

I am an Empirical Realist which is at the same time an ANTI-philosophical_realism.

You think you are a realist, but in fact, you are a Transcendental Realist, because what is real is beyond, i.e. transcend beyond yourself.

Your reality is independent of yourself thus transcendental, so you're a Transcendental Realist and at the same time an Empirical Idealist which end up with solipsism.

[Iwannaplato]

The article stated.
In this sense, hallucinations tell us that not only external states but also internal states can activate mental Representations.

What are external states and internal states to an antirealist?

In fact, mental Representations can directly be activated by stimulating the corresponding neurons (Kammer et al., 2005).
Hence, non-surjectivity is only surprising when one assumes that Perception is triggered exclusively by external world objects and that there is a 1-1 mapping- which is obviously not the case as we know from dreams and mental imagery.
Bistable stimuli, such as Wittgenstein’s famous duck-rabbit, are another example in which not only the external world, but also “internal” brain processes influence Perception."[/list]

Everyone, including realists, most of them anyway, know all this.

Again, if you are saying all perceptions are hallucinations, then you are saying they are all false. And the question then arises, compared to what and how could anyone possibly know this?

Thus an anti-philosophical_realist can still refer to hallucinations from the empirical realist perspective.

So give us an example, in the context that all perceptions are hallucinations.

This term "hallucinations" as qualified is useful for medical purpose and other cognitive issues.

They are precisely NOT limiting that word to those situations.

[Sculptor]

I am an Empirical Realist which is at the same time an ANTI-philosophical_realism.

What you are is a confused little puppy

[Atla]

"Perception is sometimes called controlled hallucination (Koenderink & van Doorn, 2008; Seth, 2021) or delusional (Lotto, 2017)."

Anil Seth (saw one of his talks on Youtube) is a neuroscientist who stepped outside his field and tried philosophy, and turns out he's an annoying sensationalist nitwit of a philosopher. (I'm being polite.) NO, by definition we shouldn't call perceptions "controlled hallucinations".

A perception is a perception of an external object. A hallucination is either NOT a perception of an external object at all, or the perception of the external object goes seriously wrong and too much made-up stuff gets added to it and/or too many of its parts are missing.

It's not really about being controlled or uncontrolled. A perception can be fairly accurate even without adequate control, and a lot of control can also create hallucinations.

"Everything is a hallucination" is just a sensationalist nonsense, it's just for PR. Typical that VA would latch onto it. (And yes, ironically, since VA denies the external world, he's only left with unreliable hallucinations and nothing else.)

[Skepdick]

A perception is a perception of an external object.

External to what? I perceive I'm tired.

What's the "external object" to tiredness?
Where does "internal" end and the "external" begin?

[Atla]

External to what?

to yo momma

[Veritas Aequitas]

The article stated.
In this sense, hallucinations tell us that not only external states but also internal states can activate mental Representations.

What are external states and internal states to an antirealist?

An antirealists when adopting the empirical realist stance will differentiate between internal states and external states.
However, an antirealist [Kantian] will not insist they are absolute but merely relative to the human conditions.
P-realists on the other hand insist external states are mind-independent regardless whether there are humans or not.

In fact, mental Representations can directly be activated by stimulating the corresponding neurons (Kammer et al., 2005).
Hence, non-surjectivity is only surprising when one assumes that Perception is triggered exclusively by external world objects and that there is a 1-1 mapping- which is obviously not the case as we know from dreams and mental imagery.
Bistable stimuli, such as Wittgenstein’s famous duck-rabbit, are another example in which not only the external world, but also “internal” brain processes influence Perception."[/list]

Everyone, including realists, most of them anyway, know all this.

Again, if you are saying all perceptions are hallucinations, then you are saying they are all false. And the question then arises, compared to what and how could anyone possibly know this?

Thus an anti-philosophical_realist can still refer to hallucinations from the empirical realist perspective.

So give us an example, in the context that all perceptions are hallucinations.

For example a psychiatrist [who is antirealist philosophically] in his job will professionally tell his schizophrenic patient that he is suffering from hallucinations which is abnormal negative and thus need medical treatments.

However, if the psychiatrist change to a empirical realist's hat for relevant reason [say in debating with a p-realist], he will assert all our perceptions are merely hallucinations on a continuum.

This term "hallucinations" as qualified is useful for medical purpose and other cognitive issues.

They are precisely NOT limiting that word to those situations.

I did not state, they have limited that word to those situations.
We can use our intelligence to make good use of the point on hallucination for pragmatic purposes., e.g. in the psychiatric situation.

If we were to put all perceptions within a continuum of hallucinations,
then we can use it to counter the theists' claim that God exists.
In this case, we can rank [based on justified criteria by rational people] the perception [idea] that God exists as perceived and real as a 90/100 hallucination while ordinary perceptions that can be empirically justified such as those in science be rated at 5/100.
We can rate all other types of perceptions and hallucinations along the continuum.

[Veritas Aequitas]

I am an Empirical Realist which is at the same time an ANTI-philosophical_realism.

What you are is a confused little puppy

You are absolutely ignorant on this.
You want references that this point is discussed with the elites of the philosophical community, to expose your ignorance?

[Sculptor]

I am an Empirical Realist which is at the same time an ANTI-philosophical_realism.

What you are is a confused little puppy

You are absolutely ignorant on this.
You want references that this point is discussed with the elites of the philosophical community, to expose your ignorance?

[Iwannaplato]

For example a psychiatrist [who is antirealist philosophically] in his job will professionally tell his schizophrenic patient that he is suffering from hallucinations which is abnormal negative and thus need medical treatments.

However, if the psychiatrist change to a empirical realist's hat for relevant reason [say in debating with a p-realist], he will assert all our perceptions are merely hallucinations on a continuum

. On a continuum from what to what? They would all also be whatever is on the other end of the continuum. Hallucination on this end<-------------------------------->accurate perception on the other end. If they are all hallucinations, then they are all accurate perceptions - to varying degrees

I did not state, they have limited that word to those situations.
We can use our intelligence to make good use of the point on hallucination for pragmatic purposes., e.g. in the psychiatric situation.

If we were to put all perceptions within a continuum of hallucinations,
then we can use it to counter the theists' claim that God exists.
In this case, we can rank [based on justified criteria by rational people] the perception [idea] that God exists as perceived and real as a 90/100 hallucination while ordinary perceptions that can be empirically justified such as those in science be rated at 5/100.
We can rate all other types of perceptions and hallucinations along the continuum.

So, a perception of God is 10% real.

[Atla]

For example a psychiatrist [who is antirealist philosophically] in his job will professionally tell his schizophrenic patient that he is suffering from hallucinations which is abnormal negative and thus need medical treatments.

However, if the psychiatrist change to a empirical realist's hat for relevant reason [say in debating with a p-realist], he will assert all our perceptions are merely hallucinations on a continuum

. On a continuum from what to what? They would all also be whatever is on the other end of the continuum. Hallucination on this end<-------------------------------->accurate perception on the other end. If they are all hallucinations, then they are all accurate perceptions - to varying degrees

I did not state, they have limited that word to those situations.
We can use our intelligence to make good use of the point on hallucination for pragmatic purposes., e.g. in the psychiatric situation.

If we were to put all perceptions within a continuum of hallucinations,
then we can use it to counter the theists' claim that God exists.
In this case, we can rank [based on justified criteria by rational people] the perception [idea] that God exists as perceived and real as a 90/100 hallucination while ordinary perceptions that can be empirically justified such as those in science be rated at 5/100.
We can rate all other types of perceptions and hallucinations along the continuum.

So, a perception of God is 10% real.

I was hallucinating again yesterday that VA owes me 10 million. 10% of that is 1 million, well okay I'll settle for that, so be it.

Now pay, VA

[Iwannaplato]

I was hallucinating again yesterday that VA owes me 10 million. 10% of that is 1 million, well okay I'll settle for that, so be it.

Now pay, VA

I understand the rhetorical use of the term Hallucination. But once you get passed that moment, a better term should be used. Filters/Selection/Interpretation.

But then you get a real problem if you starting giving numbers. One is what you're pointing out. Another is it is as if one facet of the perceiving is hallucination. What's the other part, then?

It ends up sounding like a mix of naive realism (the good part of the perception is somehow direct) and indirect realism, and down to percentages.

Another problem or perhaps another way of saying the same problem is that hallucinations indicate that the perception is of something not there. Where is that there for an antirealist?

I think that an metaphysical antirealist needs to treat all perceptions as real, however some are individual reality, others are group or collective - and can be found again via empirical research by others.

If you say it isn't real, the perceptions of someone realists would say was hallucinating, this entails that one can check with the object. Or check that there was no object 'there'. Which is realist.

You could say that the person experiencing things that others cannot in the same situation is having mono-empirical moments rather than inter-empirical ones. That black boxes the whole 'real' determination. And there is absolutely no reason to label one person's experience unreal or hallucinatory. They may well have problems if they expect others to have the same empirical moments, and in what gets called the mentally ill, we can predict some of those problems, but once there is no mind independent reality, hallucination as a term is meaningless.

Empirically isolated people may turn out to be actually having perceptions that later many or all will have. This has happened.

These points are meant within a metaphysical antirealist stance.