iambiguous wrote: ↑Wed Feb 02, 2022 10:04 pm
Well, where this gets increasingly more problematic for me is when nihilism becomes Nihilism.
Oh, I see...a feeling or experience, rather than an ideology or conclusion.
And even here I always focus in on "I" in the is/ought world.
I'm not sure I get what you mean. Of course, I know the is-ought problem, but I'm not sure what you "focus" on.
But how could I possibly demonstrate that what "I" do believe is the optimal frame of mind.
Immanuel Can wrote: ↑Mon Jan 31, 2022 10:39 pmThere are people who have done it. Some would say that Nietzsche was one of them. But I think Nietzsche fudged his conclusions a bit, so instead, I'd point to a brilliant little book by an ex-Atheist, Fr. Seraphim Rose. He's an Orthodox scholar (I'm not, but his book is great: an Orthodox friend pointed it out to me.) Another good book on the consequences of that worldview is
The Atheist Who Didn't Exist, by Andy Bannister. His book has the additional charm of being not merely profound but funny, as well.
Here though I would suggest that we bring such demonstrations "down to Earth". An "optimal frame of mind" in regard to what set of circumstances? [/quote]
I just mean "most consistent with what one believes to be fundamentally true": most realistic, on the given terms, most in accord with the "how things are" of a non-God universe.
...what would allow us perhaps to grasp the meaning of this more clearly is a particular "situation" in which the deontologist and the sociopath, the moral objectivist and the moral nihilist, argued for their own moral philosophy. Abortion, conscription, immigration, animal rights and the like. Something that brings the theoretical and the practical into better focus when intertwined.
That's a debate I'd like to see.
Immanuel Can wrote: ↑Mon Jan 31, 2022 10:39 pm
In Dostoevsky's story, the murder of a nasty old woman is "permitted" in the sense that the hero, Raskolnikov, finds it "permissible" to his own set of suppostions about morality being dead. But he finds himself chased by police who think his actions are not "permissible." So the two are very often at variance.
Using this example, it is the existence of God that becomes crucial for me. If there is no demonstrable God to differentiate permissible from impermissible behavior, then mere mortals either fall back on more or less blind faith and a Scripture, become philosophers or political ideologues and argue for a Rational Resolution, or, as a sociopath, ask themselves, "what's in it for me if she's dead?"; and then if there's enough in it for them if she is, ask themselves, "how do I make sure I don't get caught if I kill her?"
Yes, that's essentially the shape of the problem Dostoevsky walks us through. Raskolnikov starts off Nietzschean, behaves sociopathically, and then tries to rationalize his actions. And (spoiler alert) he "gets away" with it, eventually only to discover that he's condemned himself to an unliveable world. His encounter with a prostitute turns out to be transformative, and at the end, he has to essentially become his own judge and jailer, because life in a universe with no Law-Giver is no life at all.
What's crucial for me here is that, however you may conclude this or that behavior is either moral or immoral, what ultimately counts in your interactions with others is who has the power to actually enforce his or her own conclusions.
But then, "morality" and "force" are exactly the same words and concepts. That we don't think they are, is an illusion. And as Nietzsche maintained, the final fact becomes "will to power," not morality at all. "Morality" persists as a sort of ghost-concept only...a nuclear shadow on the wall, when the objective cause of the shadow has long ago been turned to ashes and dust. For a time, people continue to behave as if morality exists; but it's only on borrowed time. Eventually, people capitulate to the logic of non-Godness, and forsake their traditional conceptions of right and wrong, transgressing one after another by degrees, until, as you say, "everything is permissible."
And that's pretty much where our society is today. Everything is now "permissible" -- except the assertion of conventional morality.
That's why Nietzsche's madman throws down his lamp and smashes it, and declares, "I have come too early..." What Nietzsche foresaw, he knew would take time to arrive. It would not be instantly that people would forego conventional morality, but the forces to extirpate it were already in motion, long before the average Joe realized they were.
Immanuel Can wrote: ↑Mon Jan 31, 2022 10:39 pm
The problem with the
dasein perspective is that it denies one any points of reference by which to orient oneself. What does one go with? Is it, "Well I
feel this is right/wrong, so it is?" But the "I" also knows that his/her feelings are often misleading or confused. So is it "If my friends or my society say this is right/wrong, it is?" But why should we think that several "I"s, each one fallible itself, somehow become inerrant when grouped? Besides, others are not really part of the
dasein world...they're "outside," impinging on the "I" but not the secure basis of the "I."
Again, we need to zero in on the factors in one's life that
do act existentially as reference points to orient "I". These include the historical and cultural context into which one is "thrown" at birth. [/quote]
Ah, but as the poststructuralists insist,
we don't know what these are.
Both our grasp of history and our grasp of our cultural context are, they say, erroneous. They take the Existentialists one step further, and say that you're not only "thrown into" history and positionality, but also that you don't even know what history or positionality it really is. All you have to go on is a metanarrative you shape out of the detritus of your existential experience, and one that is guaranteed to be no more than your own fabrication.
And before we simply dismiss them, we need to realize
they do have a kind of point. You know this, if you ever returned to a place you knew some decades ago, and found that the memories you had in your head were strangely different from the actuality of the place you revisited. Even the memories we're making at the moment are fraught with inaccuracies and interpretations that may not be objectively true.
So it's actually not trite an simplistic -- not at all the way the SJW set would like us to think it is -- that you are born into a particular context, and that context simply dictates your preferences to you, as if all boys born to white, working-class Pennsylvania families were automatically Steeler fans. It's much more complicated than that.
Consider this "personal experience" I noted in a thread over at ILP:
I still recall the very first experience I had as a child with my "identity" as more than just me thinking this or doing that. I was at my Aunt Betty and Uncle Mike's house in Miners Mills, Pennsylvania. My family moved to Baltimore when I was 7, but every summer I would go back and spend a couple of months at my Grandmother's house. That day I had I had done something I was being reprimanded for but I refused to go into details as to why I had done it. That's when my Aunt Mary said something to the effect, "it's no use, he is just like his father".
And then for the first time, and for reasons I did not understand, I began to really think about that. "Philosophically", as it were. I began to wonder how the boy I had become was connected to my parents and my family and how they had raised me and how in some ways I had come to be like them.
What if I had been raised by different parents in very different circumstances? Would I have done what I did that day? Would I have reacted to others as I did?
But then of course I slipped back into just being a kid again.
Yes, I see.
But you were, as you say, a child. And that dawning suspicion was actually the first evidence of you having obtained sufficient maturity of insight to "step out of" yourself and your Pennsylvania programming for a few short seconds, and to look at it for the first time "from the outside," and with a critical eye. That faculty was to increase and develop, wasn't it?
Are you now still in thrall to your upbringing? Surely not, even if there are vestiges of it still to be made conscious and examined. You've chosen a lot of what you've become. If you had not, then all children from your kind of background would always end up the same.
You now know not all Pennsylvanians don't end up as Steeler fans. Some go for the Eagles, and the unfortunate ones, for the Bears or Browns.
...it is the behaviors that we choice that result in actual consequences.
That's the most unDeterministic thing you could possibly say.
Thus...
"Why did you choose that behavior?"
"Because I believe it is the right behavior."
"Why do you believe it is the right behavior?"
"Because it produces consequences I believe in".
But
why do you want those particular consequences? And who is this agent, this
"you" that wants them? And how can this "you," being a product of nothing but predetermined forces, speak of having "chosen" anything?
Yes, but from my frame of mind, this is but one particular political prejudice that you have been predisposed existentially to accept given the manner in which I root value judgments of this sort in dasein. Had your life been very different you might be here arguing more favorably for Marxism.
I think not. And I'll say why, if I may.
I know Marxism. I could have chosen it, if I thought it rational. I have had it advocated to me, and even lived in circumstances in which it was a favoured dogma. And the only conditions under which I can even imagine being drawn to Marxism at all is if I had no historical, practical or theoretical knowledge of it, and were a totally different kind of person as well. By the time speculations get that wild, and require that many things to be "other than they are," I think we're well into the realm of speculative fiction.
Then the assumption that both sides have reasonable arguments to make...
I think the vast preponderance of the evidence counts against Marxism. Killing 140 million in the last century is a pretty hard tally to counterbalance, for starters. But I think it's both historically disproven and ideologically incoherent, as well. So I don't think we ought to weigh it up equally with the alternatives.
Almost anything is better than Marxism. And that's an empirical fact, I would say.