Re:
Posted: Tue Jul 18, 2017 10:21 pm
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Then why did you call them closet determinists -- as if they were hiding their determinism?
Oh, that's easy. They DO hide it. If they didn't, they'd just say, "We are Determinists."
Immanuel Can wrote: ↑Tue Jul 18, 2017 10:38 pm They cannot find any basis for their affirmation of free will, so they just say, "Well, somehow, mysteriously, these things turn out to be compatible."
I'm actually willing to concede something along those lines, as I have already posted. The point I saw being missed by other posters shows itself here:Immanuel Can wrote: ↑Tue Jul 18, 2017 2:56 pmActually, what davidm argues, even if conceded entirely, would only deliver the Materialist to a different mechanical process known as "randomness." The situation of the individual will would be no less Deterministic: it would just be determined by forces of another name.
My bold throughout. You seem to imply that a physical human with physical mechanism for making choices is not genuinely human. Why is that? Are you claiming this is what a physicalist must accept?Nothing about "randomness" makes it more genuinely human or free-will-producing than simple causality: it's just a process that is even less predictable.
If your quest for truth rests on what you'd rather be, the argument is rationalized, not rational.For that reason, some philosophers worry that things like quantum dynamics, far from being an improvement on mechanical causality, are actually even one step worse. After all, wouldn't you rather be a cog in a predictable machine than a toy of mere capricious chance? Either way, there is no power in the individual will.
Again the definition of being a person not coming from the monist. All you're demonstrating is that the physical view is not compatible with your view, which is not news.So your "choice" was nothing but the sum of previous events, and involved no independent volitional action emanating from personhood.
It deprives us only of your definition of those things, a fact which I like just fine thank you. What I like is still irrelevant, but you seem to gravitate to the story with the fairy tale ending that looks more enticing so long as you don't really think about it too hard.We may not like that Materialism deprives us of morals, of personhood, of volition
Of course you agree. The quote is yours (from 906), not mine. Just trying to get that straight.Immanuel Can wrote: ↑Tue Jul 18, 2017 4:38 pmI actually agree with that entirely.Londoner wrote: ↑Tue Jul 18, 2017 8:56 amI do not think the last sentence can be right. If I have a feeling about my volition, then I am not identical with that volition. And the same with everything else I see in the world; in one sense I am part of it, but in another I am an observer of it.Not-Noax wrote: But if that's a fair definition, then where does volition or will fit in? Is it a "material" too? If I want to stay a Materialist, I have to say it is. And if so, then the phenomenon I perceive as my own volition or will is really nothing other than an interaction of matter, energy and scientific laws. Even my feeling or impression that volition is my own is merely a phenomenon caused by an interaction of matter, energy and scientific laws.
If that is the case, then all that matter, energy and scientific laws have not determined just one thing, in humans they have determined two contrasting things, human consciousness is an indeterminate state.
What do you imagine them as saying? Every one I've ever talked to pulls the "profound mystery" card. But if you know a different line, then spin it.
No. I mean that the physicalist must accept that the human person is not the buck-stopping point of the causal chain. Materialism has to hold that "a human chose to do X" is not a good explanation, because "chose" must be nothing but a failed way to describe the previous causal chain. All "choices" are merely products of prior material forces, to which the human person and his or her "decision" actually adds nothing.
Right. The Materialist would have to be willing to accept that his or her very natural and understandable distaste for such explanations would not count as any reason against them being true.If your quest for truth rests on what you'd rather be, the argument is rationalized, not rational.For that reason, some philosophers worry that things like quantum dynamics, far from being an improvement on mechanical causality, are actually even one step worse. After all, wouldn't you rather be a cog in a predictable machine than a toy of mere capricious chance? Either way, there is no power in the individual will.
True. But what I'm also demonstrating, I would hope, is that the physicalist or Materialist view is not a happy one, and results in some very, very unsavoury consequences. That does not, in itself, make it a wrong explanation; but it does mean that anyone who is willing to buy it consistently is going to have to live with those unsavoury consequences. And that is a good incentive to be at least a little bit open to a better explanation, I would say. If nothing else, it gives us plenty of reason not just to settle on Materialism as if doing so will cost nothing.All you're demonstrating is that the physical view is not compatible with your view, which is not news.
Yes. But give yourself more credit: I think it's more than a matter of mere "dislike." Maybe you're actually on to something.What I like is still irrelevant...
Any position I hold that cannot be proven may be less than absolutely true. And so it is with materialism. While I therefore have no problem in labelling myself one I do not hold it to be infallible. Even if it actually is. Because I cannot demonstrate such truth to that degree of certaintyImmanuel Can wrote:
But what I am also demonstrating I would hope is that the physicalist or materialist view is not a happy one and results in some very very
unsavoury consequences. That does not in itself make it a wrong explanation but it does mean that anyone who is willing to buy it consistently is
this pantheist knows the difference between imminent and immanentOmnipresence means "present everywhere," not "imminent in everything."
And actually, the first definition of each pair suits the Western traditions of Theism. The second (the "not this" side) actually describes the ideas about the Supreme Being held by the Eastern traditions, by Pantheists, Panentheists and Determinists of various kinds.
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I, myself, have never met a compatibilist who pulled such a card. I have to wonder if you know the definition of compatibilism.Immanuel Can wrote: ↑Wed Jul 19, 2017 1:56 amWhat do you imagine them as saying? Every one I've ever talked to pulls the "profound mystery" card. But if you know a different line, then spin it.
Point to where I said either, and I'll happily tell you. You need to explain what you mean by "omnipotent," since it's your word, and I did not use it. And then, for "unnecessary," I certainly did not say that.
Well, I wasn't aiming at indicting you at all...I was just explaining my own angle, and why I believe a Materialist will want to think very carefully before continuing as a Materialist. It has some pretty terrible corollaries, which, if one is wanting to be rationally consistent, one will have to live with.surreptitious57 wrote: ↑Wed Jul 19, 2017 5:49 amAny position I hold that cannot be proven may be less than absolutely true. And so it is with materialism. While I therefore have no problem in labelling myself one I do not hold it to be infallible. Even if it actually is. Because I cannot demonstrate such truth to that degree of certaintyImmanuel Can wrote:
But what I am also demonstrating I would hope is that the physicalist or materialist view is not a happy one and results in some very very
unsavoury consequences. That does not in itself make it a wrong explanation but it does mean that anyone who is willing to buy it consistently is